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Summary 
This dissertation investigates the decision usefulness of goodwill-accounting 
numbers. The new impairment-only method under current IFRS is in particular 
focus. Purchased goodwill shall no longer be amortised over expected economic 
lifetime, but tested for impairment losses at least annually. This accounting-
method change has several implications. The modified historical-cost model is 
replaced by a model based on fair-value accounting, and the asymmetric 
accounting treatment of purchased and internally-generated goodwill is to some 
extent removed. Book goodwill is kept unchanged as long as the book value can 
be justified by reference to a recoverable amount of the cash-generating unit at 
which goodwill is allocated. This allows indirect capitalisation of internally-
generated goodwill, which might lead to more relevant information. At the same 
time, accounting for goodwill-impairment losses provides the accounting 
preparers with a lot of discretionary freedom, which probably leads to more 
opportunistic reporting. This might impair the reliability of these impairment 
losses.  
 
An investigation of the decision usefulness of goodwill-accounting numbers 
should, therefore, emphasise the relevance and the reliability of these numbers. 
Clear references are made to the conceptual framework of IASB when choosing 
theoretical foundation and methodological design for this dissertation. Based on 
the concept of decision usefulness and the primary qualitative characteristics, 
relevance and reliability, theory and methodology from three lines of literature are 
employed: value relevance, earnings management and corporate-governance 
literature. An accounting number is considered value relevant if it has a predicted 
association with stock prices and/or stock returns. Demonstrated value relevance 
suggests that the accounting numbers provide relevant, and to some extent, 
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reliable information. The risk of opportunistic earnings management in accounting 
numbers might be investigated by testing associations between accounting choices 
concerning these numbers and variables for economic substance, earnings-
management incentives and corporate-governance mechanisms. This will provide 
some evidence on the reliability of these numbers.  
 
Three alternative accounting methods are investigated: impairment-only method, 
amortisation-only method and a combined amortisation-and-impairment method. 
The results suggest that all these three methods provide accounting numbers that 
are associated with stock prices and stock returns. Book goodwill is positively 
associated with stock prices, whereas goodwill-impairment losses are negatively 
associated with stock prices and stock returns, respectively. These results are 
consistent with predictions. Inconsistent with prediction, however, goodwill-
amortisation charges are positively associated with stock prices and stock returns, 
respectively. The positive association is mainly driven by firms having high 
performance and/or growth. These results suggest that goodwill-amortisation 
charges proxy for economic benefits not recognised on the balance sheet. Likely 
candidates are non-recognised intangible assets embedded in internally-generated 
goodwill. An investigation of the relative value relevance of goodwill-accounting 
numbers reported under each accounting method is also conducted. For reasons of 
completeness, accounting numbers reported under a permanent-retention method 
are included in this investigation. Differences in adjusted R-squares are tested by 
performing z-tests with bootstrapped-standard errors and Vuong tests. All methods 
with amortisation and/or impairment testing provide more value-relevant 
accounting numbers than the permanent-retention method. The order of preference, 
however, is less clear when it comes to the other three methods. Indications are 
found that the method with amortisation and impairment testing is the one that 
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best explains variation in stock prices and stock returns. Still, this method is not 
necessarily the one to be preferred. Goodwill-amortisation charges do not reflect 
economic charges. Rather, they seem to proxy for economic value not recognised 
on the balance sheet. Reporting these as charges in the profit and loss account is 
inconsistent with faithful reporting.  
 
Value-relevance results provide limited evidence on the reliability of accounting 
numbers. Lack of reliability and, in particular, verifiability might threaten the 
decision usefulness of goodwill-impairment losses. Such losses are reported under 
extensive discretion and might be affected by managers’ earnings-management 
incentives to either understate or overstate net earnings and net-asset values. Two 
sets of analyses are conducted: An investigation of associations between 
impairment decisions, size of reported impairment losses and variables for 
economic impairment and earnings-management incentives, and an investigation 
of associations between estimates of understated and overstated impairment losses, 
variables for earnings-management incentives and corporate-governance 
mechanisms. The first test design is supposed to provide evidence on the extent to 
which impairment losses are explained by economic impairment and/or earnings-
management incentives. If strong predicted associations are demonstrated between 
reported impairment losses and variables for economic impairment, this is 
consistent with faithful reporting. In contrast, if strong predicted associations are 
demonstrated between reported impairment losses and variables for earnings-
management incentives after controlling for economic impairment, it suggests that 
impairment losses reflect earnings-management incentives. Variables for 
economic impairment are included at three levels of aggregation: macro-economic 
level, industry-sector level and firm-level. Besides, these variables are formed on 
market-based, accounting-based and cash-based data. The evidence suggests that 
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impairment decisions and size of reported impairment losses are explained by 
these variables of economic impairment. Variables reflecting earnings-
management incentives, however, are generally insignificantly associated with 
impairment decisions and size of reported impairment losses. There are, however, 
some indications that impairment losses might be associated with CFO cash-bonus 
payments, CFO conditional stocks, smoothing incentives and CEO changes, but 
these results are relatively weaker than those for variables of economic 
impairment.  
 
The above test design does not directly address misrepresentation of impairment 
losses. Earnings-management incentives are believed to be associated with more 
misrepresentation, whereas corporate-governance mechanisms are believed to be 
associated with less misrepresentation. Estimates of misrepresentation are 
obtained from a regression of reported impairment losses on variables for 
economic impairment. Fitted values from this regression serve as estimates of 
normal (expected) impairment losses, whereas differences between reported 
impairment losses and these normal-impairment losses might be interpreted as 
misrepresentation or abnormal-impairment losses. Some weak evidence is found 
that firms with CFO cash-bonus payments and firms with CEOs holding more 
stock options generally understate impairment losses. There is also some weak 
evidence suggesting that overstated impairment losses are associated with CEO 
changes. Limited evidence is found that corporate-governance mechanisms are 
able to constrain misrepresentation in these losses. Some evidence, however, 
suggests that corporate-governance mechanisms, represented by board 
characteristics and cross-listing, are associated with overstated impairment losses. 
This is consistent with stronger corporate governance leading to more 
conservative accounting and potentially overstated impairment losses.  
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Impairment testing of goodwill requires high expertise in financial accounting and 
valuation. Besides, the impairment-testing procedure offers discretionary freedom 
in most of its facets. No associations between some corporate-governance 
mechanisms and abnormal-impairment losses could simply be the result of these 
mechanisms not being efficient to constrain the misrepresentation. An alternative 
explanation is that these results are influenced by econometrical problems such as 
measurement errors. Taking all these results together, they support IASB’s 
decision to introduce the impairment-only method. Goodwill-impairment losses 
provide value-relevant information. No strong results are found that these losses 
are heavily influenced by earnings management. At the same time, the results 
indicate that conventional corporate-governance mechanisms are rather inefficient 
to reduce misrepresentation of these losses. These interpretations are made on the 
premise that the results are not substantially affected by econometrical problems 
such as measurement errors. 
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Sammendrag  
Denne avhandlingen undersøker beslutningsnytten til regnskapsmessig goodwill. 
Avhandlingen fokuserer spesielt på den nye regnskapsmessige løsningen for 
goodwill under nåværende IFRS. Kjøpt goodwill skal ikke lenger avskrives over 
forventet økonomisk levetid, men testes minst årlig for nedskrivninger. Denne 
endringen i regnskapsmessig løsning har flere implikasjoner. Den modifiserte 
historisk-kost modellen er erstattet med en modell basert på virkelig verdi, og den 
asymmetriske behandlingen av kjøpt og egenutviklet goodwill er delvis fjernet. 
Bokført goodwill opprettholdes så lenge den bokførte verdien kan rettferdiggjøres 
med referanse til et gjenvinnbart beløp beregnet for den kontantgenererende 
enheten som goodwill tilhører, noe som åpner for indirekte balanseføring av 
egenutviklet goodwill. Den nye løsningen kan derfor bidra til rapportering av mer 
relevant informasjon om goodwill. Samtidig har regnskapsprodusentene stor 
skjønnsmessig frihet når det gjelder rapportering av goodwillnedskrivninger. Dette 
kan føre til mer opportunistisk regnskapsrapportering og redusert pålitelighet. 
 
En studie av beslutningsnytten til regnskapsmessig goodwill bør derfor fokusere 
på relevans og pålitelighet. Av den grunn er valg av teoretisk fundament og 
metodisk tilnærming gjort med klare referanser til IASBs konseptuelle rammeverk. 
Tre forskningsretninger er valgt: Forskning på verdirelevans, 
regnskapsmanipulering og corporate governance. En regnskapsstørrelse har 
verdirelevans hvis den har en forventet assosiasjon med aksjekursen eller 
aksjeavkastningen. Dokumentert verdirelevans gir derfor en indikasjon på at 
regnskapsstørrelsene bidrar med relevant og i noe grad pålitelig informasjon. 
Risikoen for at regnskapsstørrelser er manipulert kan undersøkes ved å teste 
sammenhengen mellom regnskapsmessige valg for de aktuelle 
regnskapsstørrelsene og variabler som er ment å reflektere økonomisk substans, 
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incentiver for manipulering og corporate governance. Et slikt testdesign kan gi 
indikasjoner på påliteligheten til disse regnskapsstørrelsene.  
 
Tre ulike regnskapsmessige løsninger er undersøkt: en løsning hvor goodwill kun 
testes for nedskrivninger, en løsning hvor goodwill skal avskrives og en løsning 
hvor goodwill skal avskrives og testes for verdifall. Resultatene indikerer at alle 
tre løsningene gir regnskapstall som er assosiert med aksjekursen og 
aksjeavkastningen. Bokført goodwill er positivt assosiert med aksjekursen, mens 
goodwillnedskrivninger er negativt assosiert med henholdsvis aksjekursen og 
aksjeavkastningen. Disse resultatene er i samsvar med prediksjonene. En uventet 
positiv sammenheng er funnet mellom goodwillavskrivninger og henholdsvis 
aksjekursen og aksjeavkastningen. Den positive sammenhengen drives i hovedsak 
av selskaper med høy lønnsomhet og/eller vekst. Disse resultatene indikerer at 
goodwillavskrivninger reflekterer en ikke-rapportert økonomisk fordel, for 
eksempel ikke-rapporterte immaterielle eiendeler, som inngår i egenutviklet 
goodwill.  
 
Det er også foretatt tester av den relative verdirelevansen til goodwill når goodwill 
er rapportert under ulike regnskapsmessige løsninger. For å gjøre analysen 
komplett, er også regnskapstall fra en løsning hvor goodwill verken avskrives eller 
testes for verdifall inkludert. Forskjeller i justert forklaringskraft er testet ved hjelp 
av z-test hvor standardfeilen er estimert ved hjelp av bootstrapping og Vuong test. 
Resultatene viser at regnskapsmessige løsninger som krever avskrivninger og/eller 
testing for verdifall bidrar med mer verdirelevant informasjon enn en løsning som 
verken tillater avskrivninger eller nedskrivninger. Det er vanskeligere å avgjøre 
hvilken av de tre andre regnskapsmessige løsningene som bidrar med mest 
verdirelevant informasjon. Noen svake resultater indikerer at en regnskapsmessig 
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løsning hvor goodwill avskrives og testes for nedskrivninger er den løsningen som 
best forklarer variasjonen i aksjekursen og aksjeavkastningen. Likevel er ikke 
dette den regnskapsmessige løsningen som bør foretrekkes. 
Goodwillavskrivninger ser ikke ut til å reflektere økonomiske kostnader. I stedet 
er det funnet indikasjoner på at goodwillavskrivninger reflekterer økonomisk verdi 
som ikke er innregnet på balansen. Resultatføring av disse er ikke i tråd med en 
troverdig og valid representasjon av økonomisk substans.  
 
Verdirelevansresultater gir begrenset informasjon om påliteligheten til 
regnskapstall. Mangel på pålitelighet, og i særdeleshet verifiserbarhet, kan true 
beslutningsnytten til rapporterte goodwillnedskrivninger. Disse nedskrivningene 
rapporteres under betydelig skjønn og kan være påvirket av ledelsens 
rapporteringsincentiver for enten å underrapportere eller overrapportere 
regnskapsmessig resultat og egenkapital. To ulike analyser er utført: En test av 
sammenhengen mellom nedskrivningsbeslutning, størrelsen på rapportert 
nedskrivning og variabler for økonomisk verdifall og rapporteringsincentiver, og 
en test av sammenhengen mellom estimater for under- eller overrapporterte 
nedskrivninger, variabler for rapporteringsincentiver og corporate governance. Det 
første testdesignet er ment å undersøke i hvilken grad rapporterte nedskrivninger 
er forklart av økonomisk verdifall og/eller rapporteringsincentiver. Hvis man 
finner sterke, predikerte sammenhenger mellom rapporterte nedskrivninger og 
variabler for økonomisk verdifall, vil dette støtte opp under den antagelsen at disse 
nedskrivningene gir en troverdig representasjon av økonomisk verdifall. I motsatt 
fall, hvis sterke, predikerte sammenhenger er funnet mellom rapporterte 
nedskrivninger og variabler for rapporteringsincentiver etter at det er foretatt 
kontroll for økonomisk verdifall, indikerer dette at nedskrivningene reflekterer 
rapporteringsincentiver. Variabler som er ment å reflektere økonomisk verdifall er 
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inkludert fra tre ulike nivåer: makroøkonomisk nivå, bransjesektornivå og 
selskapsnivå. Variablene er enten markedsbaserte, regnskapsbaserte eller 
kontantstrømbaserte. Resultatene tilsier at nedskrivningsbeslutningen og størrelsen 
på nedskrivningen kan forklares ved hjelp av variabler som reflekterer økonomisk 
verdifall. Variabler som reflekterer rapporteringsincentiver er som regel verken 
assosiert med nedskrivningsbeslutningen eller størrelsen på den rapporterte 
nedskrivningen. Det er riktignok noen indikasjoner på at nedskrivninger kan være 
assosiert med bonusutbetalinger til CFO, betingede aksjer som eies av CFO, 
incentiver for resultatutjevning eller skifte av CEO, men disse resultatene er 
relativt svake sammenlignet med resultatene for økonomisk verdifall. 
 
Dette testdesignet har ikke direkte fokus på regnskapsmessig støy i nedskrivninger. 
Rapporteringsincentiver er forventet å føre til mer regnskapsmessig støy, mens 
corporate governance er forventet å redusere regnskapsmessig støy. Estimater på 
regnskapsmessig støy er fremskaffet ved å kjøre en regresjon med rapporterte 
nedskrivninger som avhengig variabel og variabler for økonomisk verdifall som 
uavhengige variabler. Estimerte verdier fra denne regresjonen representerer 
normale (forventede) nedskrivninger, mens forskjellen mellom rapporterte 
nedskrivninger og disse normale nedskrivningene kan tolkes som regnskapsmessig 
støy eller abnormale nedskrivninger. Resultatene indikerer at selskaper med høye 
bonusutbetalinger til CFO eller selskaper som har en CEO som eier mye 
ansattopsjoner, underrapporterer goodwillnedskrivninger. Det er også funnet 
resultater som indikerer at overrapporterte nedskrivninger er assosiert med skifte 
av CEO. Det er funnet begrenset støtte for at corporate governance reduserer 
regnskapsmessig støy i disse nedskrivningene. Noe støtte er derimot funnet for at 
corporate governance, representert ved kjennetegn ved styret eller ved 
kryssnotering, er assosiert med overrapporterte nedskrivninger. Dette kan tyde på 
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at sterkere corporate governance fører til mer forsiktig regnskapsrapportering og 
dermed overrapportering av goodwillnedskrivninger. Testing av verdifall i 
goodwill krever solid regnskapsfaglig kompetanse og solid 
verdsettingskompetanse. Dessuten er det stort innslag av skjønn i de fleste 
trinnene i en slik nedskrivningstest. Grunnen til at man ikke finner noen 
sammenheng mellom flere av corporate governance-variablene og 
regnskapsmessig støy kan derfor ganske enkelt være at disse kontrollmekanismene 
ikke er effektive nok til å redusere regnskapsmessig støy ved rapportering av 
goodwillnedskrivninger. En annen forklaring kan være at resultatene er påvirket 
av økonometriske problemer slik som målefeil.  
 
Samlet sett gir resultatene i denne avhandlingen støtte for IASBs valg av 
regnskapsmessig løsning for goodwill. Goodwillnedskrivningene bidrar med 
verdirelevant informasjon. Resultatene tyder også på at nedskrivningene i liten 
grad kan forklares med incentiver for regnskapsmanipulering. Samtidig indikerer 
resultatene at tradisjonelle corporate-governance- mekanismer i liten grad evner å 
redusere regnskapsmessig støy i nedskrivningene. Disse tolkningene bygger på 
den forutsetningen at resultatene i liten grad er drevet av økonometriske problemer 
slik som målefeil.  
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1. Motivation and research questions  
 
This dissertation investigates the decision usefulness of goodwill-accounting 
numbers under current IFRS. Theory and methodology from value relevance, 
earnings management and corporate-governance literature are employed. The 
dissertation compares the value relevance of goodwill numbers reported under the 
impairment-only method of current IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards) to the value relevance of goodwill numbers reported under alternative 
accounting methods. The dissertation also investigates the extent to which 
goodwill-impairment losses under IFRS are associated with variables for 
economic impairment, earnings-management incentives and corporate-governance 
mechanisms. The findings of this dissertation are supposed to inform standard 
setters, accounting prepares and accounting users on the decision usefulness of 
goodwill under current IFRS. 
 
1.1. Introduction and background 
Accounting for goodwill is one of the most controversial issues in financial-
accounting theory and standard setting. Generations of accounting academics and 
standard setters have struggled with the challenge of developing a theoretically 
consistent accounting treatment of goodwill (Hudges 1982). In the quest to 
promulgate high-quality accounting standards that generate relevant and reliable 
information for decision-making, the US-standard setter, FASB (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board), and the international standard setter, IASB 
(International Accounting Standards Board), have implemented a substantial 
change in the reporting policy of goodwill. First, the new regulation requires firms 
to perform an annual impairment test for goodwill, and second, amortisation of 
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goodwill is no longer permitted. Three factors are believed to affect the decision 
usefulness of accounting information for a given accounting method: the extent to 
which the information reflects economic fundamentals, the measurement 
uncertainty and the risk of opportunistic earnings management (Wilson 1996, 
Healy and Wahlen 2001). All these factors will influence the relevance and 
reliability of the accounting information and thereby its decision usefulness. 
Accounting information that fails to reflect economic fundamentals will lack 
relevance and reliability. Information reported under significant measurement 
uncertainty will lack reliability and to some extent relevance, and finally, 
accounting information reported under risk of opportunistic earnings management 
will probably lack both relevance and reliability. The discussion about goodwill-
accounting methods will strongly involve all three factors.  
 
Both purchased and internally-generated goodwill represent economic resources 
and will most likely have limited economic life. This suggests that both should be 
capitalised on the balance sheet and amortised over expected economic lifetime. 
Instead, purchased goodwill is capitalised and tested at least annually for 
impairment losses, and internally-generated goodwill is charged against the profit 
and loss account. Surprisingly, the chosen accounting methods for goodwill do not 
seem to reflect economic fundamentals in goodwill. The reason for these chosen 
methods is measurement problems. Internally-generated goodwill cannot be 
reliably measured at cost. Purchased goodwill, however, has a reliable cost price, 
but subsequent amortisation involves significant measurement uncertainty. FASB 
and IASB argue that the pattern and the length over which purchased goodwill is 
consumed are impossible to determine with sufficient reliability. They claim that 
the amount amortised for goodwill in any given period is at best an arbitrary 
estimate of the consumption of goodwill for that period, which suggests that the 
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amortisation lacks relevance and reliability (e.g. IASB 2004b:IAS 36 BC 134-5). 
This argument is not fully valid. Some guidance on the estimation of amortisation 
charges might be found. Purchased goodwill, as all other assets, represents 
expected future benefits. On acquiring these benefits, the managers will have 
expectations as to the period and the pattern over which these benefits are to be 
received, which is useful information when determining the amortisation plan. 
 
The impairment-only method does not distinguish remaining purchased goodwill 
from internally-generated goodwill. As long as purchased and internally-generated 
goodwill can justify book goodwill, no impairment loss is recognised. This may 
lead to indirect capitalisation of internally-generated goodwill and a removal of 
some of the accounting asymmetry between purchased and internally-generated 
goodwill. This suggests a more faithful representation of total goodwill and 
improved decision usefulness. On the other hand, significant measurement 
uncertainty and the risk of opportunistic earnings management may impair 
decision usefulness.  
 
The impairment test is conducted on cash-generating units at which goodwill is 
allocated. If recoverable amounts are below carrying amounts of these units, 
impairment losses must be reported. Allocation of goodwill to cash-generating 
units and estimation of recoverable amounts of these units, however, involve 
significant uncertainty and discretionary freedom, which in turn gives room for 
opportunistic earnings management. It is an empirical question whether the 
impairment-only method provides more decision-useful information than other 
methods such as capitalisation and amortisation. The amortisation method may 
provide less relevant information at least for valuation purposes. At the same time 
this method provides more reliable information due to its higher degree of 
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verifiability. The impairment-only method, however, may provide more relevant 
information, but information that is less verifiable and at a higher risk of being 
opportunistically managed.  
 
1.2. Research questions 
Three lines of literature are believed to provide evidence on the decision 
usefulness of accounting information: the value relevance and information-content 
literature, the earnings-management literature and the literature investigating the 
link between corporate-governance and earnings management. The first line of 
literature is supposed to provide evidence on the usefulness of accounting for 
equity valuation. Value-relevance studies test the extent to which accounting 
numbers are associated with stock prices. A demonstrated association is 
interpreted as accounting numbers capturing information in stock prices. Short-
term information content studies (short-term event studies), however, are supposed 
to test the extent to which accounting numbers affect stock prices. Earnings-
management studies represent the second line of literature. These studies are 
investigating how earnings management can be detected in earnings and accrual 
patterns, which conditions and factors that increase the risk of earnings 
management and what impact earnings management have on accounting 
information and the decisions made upon accounting information. In contrast to 
the first line of literature, earnings-management studies are not basically motivated 
by questions regarding decision usefulness. It is expected, however, that 
opportunistic earnings management will impair decision usefulness as the results 
of such opportunism typically are misleading and/or fraudulent accounting. This 
suggests that evidence of opportunistic earnings management may serve as 
evidence of impaired decision usefulness. The third line of literature demonstrates 
that corporate-governance mechanisms can constrain managers’ opportunism and 
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restrict their ability to engage in opportunistic earnings management. Opportunism 
and agency costs will diminish under efficient monitoring and contracting. An 
efficient corporate-governance structure can, therefore, be indicative of less 
opportunistic earnings management and more decision-useful accounting 
information.  
 
Several studies examine the value relevance of book goodwill and goodwill-
amortisation charges, and some studies investigate the value relevance and 
information content of goodwill-impairment losses. In general, book goodwill is 
found to be value relevant. This evidence is consistent across numerous studies 
which employ different samples and methodological designs (e.g. Wang 1993, 
Amir, Harris and Venuti 1993, Chauvin and Hirschey 1994, Jennings, Robinson, 
Thompson  and Duvall 1996, Huijgen 1996, Barth and Clinch 1996, Vincent 
1997, Wilkins, Swanson and Loudder 1998, Henning, Lewis and Shaw 2000, 
Petersen 2001, 2002, Bugeja and Gallery 2006, Jifri and Citron 2010). The value-
relevance findings of goodwill-amortisation charges are less consistent (e.g. 
Jennings et al. 1996a, Huijgen 1996, Petersen 2001, 2002). Jennings et al. (1996a) 
report weak evidence, suggesting that goodwill-amortisation charges are value 
relevant. In contrast, Jennings, LeClere and Thompson  (2001) find that earnings 
before goodwill amortisation are more value relevant than earnings after goodwill 
amortisation. They interpret these results as evidence of goodwill amortisation 
introducing noise rather than adding useful information to earnings. Henning et al. 
(2000) employ a somewhat different methodological design. They examine the 
value relevance of components of goodwill and goodwill-amortisation charges and 
report evidence suggesting that at least some components of goodwill amortisation 
have value relevance.  
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Impairment losses and goodwill-impairment losses, in particular, are supposed to 
suffer from significant measurement uncertainty, lack of verifiability and the risk 
of being managed (e.g. Elliot and Shaw 1988, Francis, Hanna and Vincent 1996, 
Alcatore, Dee, Easton and Spear 1998, Riedl 2004, Kvaal 2005, Beatty and Weber 
2006, Lapointe-Antunes, Cormier and Magnan 2008, Ramanna 2008, Zang 2008, 
Ramanna and Watts 2009, Kothari, Ramanna and Skinner 2010). Although 
significant effort is made to tighten the test procedure for goodwill, the 
discretionary freedom is still significant. Francis et al. (1996) provide evidence, 
using pre-SFAS 121 data (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 121), 
which supports the notion that impairment losses are associated with economic 
impairment and to some extent earnings-management incentives. They 
demonstrate evidence suggesting that earnings-management incentives play a 
minor role when reporting impairment losses in inventory and property, plant and 
equipment, but play a substantial role when reporting other, more discretionary 
impairment losses, such as losses in goodwill. Recent evidence reported by Beatty 
and Weber (2006), Zang (2008) and Ramanna and Watts (2009) suggests that even 
SFAS 142-impairment losses in goodwill are associated with managers’ reporting 
incentives. These results question the claim made by the standard setters that the 
impairment-only method improves the decision usefulness of goodwill compared 
to the previous amortisation method. Rather, these results are in line with several 
commentators arguing that goodwill-impairment losses require significantly 
greater judgement, which cannot be verified by auditors (Lewis, Lippitt and 
Mastracchio 2001, Massoud and Raiborn 2003, Watts 2003, Ramanna 2008, 
Ramanna and Watts 2009).  Watts (2003), Ramanna (2008) and Ramanna and 
Watts (2009) argue that reporting unverifiable estimates such as fair-value 
estimates will seriously compromise the usefulness of those numbers and increase 
the likelihood of opportunistic earnings management. Kothari et al. (2010) even 
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argue that this method will be short-lived and will probably be replaced by the 
former amortisation method. Others, like Barth (2006), claim that fair-value 
accounting will lead to reporting of asset values, which reflects current economic 
conditions and up-to-date expectations suggesting increased decision usefulness.  
 
Opportunistic earnings management is expected to be constrained by efficient 
corporate-governance mechanisms. Prior literature demonstrates evidence that 
firms with stronger corporate-governance structures are less likely to engage in 
earnings management (e.g. Warfield, Wild and Wild 1995, Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney 1996, Beasley 1996, Chtourou, Bedard and Courteau 2001, Klein 2002, 
Koh 2003, Xie, Davidson and DaDalt 2003, Peasnell, Pope and Young 2005, 
Mulgrew and Forker 2006, Ebrahim 2007). A similar line of literature 
demonstrates that efficient corporate governance improves the information content 
of earnings (e.g. Warfield et al. 1995, Anderson, Deli and Gillan 2004) and 
improves earnings and accrual quality (Doyle, Ge and McVay 2007, Kent, 
Routledge and Stewart 2010). Managers disciplined by efficient corporate-
governance structures are likely to avoid opportunism and instead use their 
accounting discretion to convey faithful information. This suggests reporting 
impairment losses that better reflect economic fundamentals. Alternatively, given 
strong earnings-management incentives and weak corporate-governance 
structures, managers may exploit the accounting discretion to report impairment 
losses. Most of the research conducted on earnings management and corporate 
governance has employed abnormal-accrual models to indicate earnings 
management (e.g. Warfield et al. 1995, Chtourou et al. 2001, Klein 2002, Koh 
2003, Xie et al. 2003, Peasnell et al. 2005, Mulgrew and Forker 2006, Ebrahim 
2007). These abnormal-accrual models have been strongly criticised for being too 
crude and aggregate to reveal earnings management (e.g. Dechow et al. 1995, 
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Guay, Kothari and Watts 1996, McNichols 2000, Field, Lys and Vincent 2001). 
However, the idea of estimating the portion of accruals that might be managed or 
misrepresented still has some appeal among accounting researchers (e.g. Peasnell 
et al. 2005, Davidson, Godwin-Stewart and Kent 2005, Mulgrew and Forker 2006, 
Ebrahim 2007, Koh, LaPlante and Tong 2007, Jones, Krishnan and Melendrez 
2008). The problem lies in the estimation of the portion being managed or the 
portion being misrepresented. A related problem is the aggregate level at which 
the abnormal accruals are estimated. As these accruals represent net aggregate 
accruals, they may not depict managed accruals at a disaggregated level such as 
impairment losses. Inspired by previous earnings-management studies and by 
contributions in the asset-impairment literature (Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2008, 
Zang 2008), a measure of abnormal-impairment losses is employed to indicate the 
degree of misrepresentation in goodwill-impairment losses. In contrast to earlier 
measures used in the literature, this measure is derived for a specific accrual: 
impairment losses. This is consistent with Healy and Wahlen (1999), McNichols 
(2000) and Field et al. (2001) who argue that future earnings-management studies 
should rely on disaggregated accrual measures. Moreover, economic impairment 
in goodwill will probably be highly associated with economic variables reflecting 
deteriorated firm performance, industry performance and macro-economic 
performance. This suggests that these variables can be used to determine whether 
reported impairment losses are understated, overstated or unbiased depictions of 
economic impairment. Differences between reported impairment losses and 
estimated economic impairment are considered as unexpected or abnormal-
impairment losses.    
  
An investigation of the decision usefulness of goodwill numbers under current 
IFRS should involve questions regarding the value relevance of goodwill numbers 
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and the risk of goodwill-impairment losses being opportunistically managed. The 
risk is a function of information asymmetry, discretionary freedom and managers’ 
expected benefits over costs of managing earnings. Efficient corporate-governance 
structures are supposed to reduce the expected net benefits of earnings 
management by aligning conflicting interests and by monitoring managers’ 
actions. An investigation of the decision usefulness should, therefore, include 
corporate-governance mechanisms as potential limiting factors of earnings 
management.  
 
Taken together, prior literature provides limited or no answers to questions 
regarding the decision usefulness of goodwill under IFRS. No prior study, at least 
to my knowledge, has investigated the value relevance of alternative accounting 
methods for goodwill using IFRS data. Some evidence is reported on US-GAAP 
data, but this evidence cannot be fully converted to IFRS due to a different 
impairment-test procedure. Moreover, scarce evidence is reported on the 
associations between goodwill-impairment losses and variables for economic 
impairment and earnings-management incentives using IFRS data. And finally, no 
prior study, at least to my knowledge, has investigated how corporate-governance 
mechanisms influence the accounting for goodwill-impairment losses. This leads 
to the following research questions: 
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Table 1.1 Research questions 
 
These research questions are supposed to provide evidence relevant for financial-
accounting standard setters, preparers and users on the decision usefulness of 
goodwill numbers. The answers to these research questions might be useful to 
standard setters when they evaluate prior policy decisions and make new policy 
decisions regarding goodwill. Accounting preparers and accounting users might 
 
Research question 1 
 
What is the value relevance of goodwill numbers reported under current IFRS? 
 
 
Research question 2 
 
What is the value relevance of goodwill numbers reported under current IFRS 
compared to the value relevance of goodwill numbers under alternative 
accounting methods? 
 
 
Research question 3 
 
What are the associations between goodwill-impairment losses reported under 
current IFRS and variables for economic impairment and earnings-management 
incentives?   
 
 
Research question 4 
 
What are the associations between abnormal-impairment losses in goodwill 
reported under current IFRS, variables for earnings-management incentives and 
corporate-governance mechanisms? 
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find the answers useful to easier understand what mechanisms that affect the 
decision usefulness of goodwill numbers. And finally, the answers might also help 
accounting users detecting goodwill numbers (e.g. goodwill-impairment losses) of 
high and low quality. The research questions are investigated for a sample of 1293 
firm-year observations of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange in the period 
2004 to 2009. The core investigation period is the post-IFRS period 2005 to 2009. 
This period includes 1122 firm-year observations.   
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1.3. Structure 
The dissertation proceeds as delineated in Figure 1.1 below.  
 
Figure 1.1 Structure of the dissertation  
 
 
 
 
Part 1 
 
Accounting 
fundamentals  
Part 2 
 
Literature 
review and 
hypotheses  


Chapter 2   Accounting for goodwill  







Chapter 6   Methodological choices 
   
Part 3 
 
Empirical 
investigation 
Chapter 3 Value relevance – some fundamentals and prior evidence for 
goodwill 
Chapter 4 Earnings management – some fundamentals and prior 
evidence for goodwill 
Chapter 5 Hypotheses 

Chapter 8 Discussion, conclusion and future research 
  
Chapter 7 Empirical analysis  
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2. Accounting for goodwill  
Goodwill is the focal concept of this dissertation. The nature of goodwill and the 
discussion of alternative accounting methods for goodwill represent a background 
for discussing the current impairment-only method. The first part of the chapter 
concerns the nature and conceptual meaning of goodwill, while the second part 
concerns initial and subsequent accounting for goodwill. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the impairment-only method. 
 
2.1. Nature of goodwill 
Goodwill has certain characteristics that distinguish it from other economic 
resources (Guthire 1898, Hugdes 1982). Goodwill has no physical substance. It is 
not possible to address economic benefits of goodwill to a physical object. For 
instance, the economic benefits of a piece of land can be addressed to the right to 
occupy and utilise a defined portion of terrain. Lack of physical representation, 
however, is a characteristic that goodwill has in common with other intangible 
assets like brand names and patents and assets not considered as intangibles in 
accounting such as stocks, receivables and deferred tax assets. Still, goodwill is 
supposed to be the most intangible of the intangibles (Davis 1992). It is difficult to 
determine what constitutes goodwill or which economic benefits are embedded in 
goodwill. The recognition criteria for intangible assets ensure that goodwill, either 
purchased or internally generated, consists of intangible resources that are most 
difficult to identify and measure separately (Høegh-Krohn and Knivsflå 2000). 
Purchased goodwill is measured as the portion of the cost price (or the purchase 
price) that cannot be allocated to identifiable net assets in the acquired firm. 
Internally-generated goodwill, on the other hand, will consist of intangible 
resources that do not meet recognition criteria of capitalisation. Consequently, 
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both purchased and internally-generated goodwill consist of the portion of 
intangibles that do not meet the criteria for separate recognition on the balance 
sheet which makes goodwill the most intangible asset.  
 
An intangible nature, however, does not imply that goodwill should be an 
accounting challenge. Other characteristics are more important. Goodwill lacks 
transferability. It is attributed to the cash-generating capacity of all the assets in 
the firm, or more specifically, assets within cash-generating units to which 
goodwill is attributed. A separate transfer of goodwill is, therefore, not possible 
(Catlett and Olson 1968:121, Kothari, Ramanna and Skinner 2010). As stated by 
Hugdes (1982:187): “The problems associated with its [goodwill’s] transferability 
and realization might be compared with an attempt to sell the speed of a 
racehorse apart from the animal itself.” Other characteristics also distinguish 
goodwill from tangible and most intangible assets. Goodwill is believed to have no 
alternative use and thus, no opportunity cost (Hendriksen and van Breda 
1992:635-636, Lev 2001:22-26, Elling 2001:190, Kothari et al. 2010). Tangible 
and most intangible assets have different values in alternative uses. They are rival 
assets in the sense that different uses compete for the services of these assets. A 
specific use precludes the assets from simultaneously being used elsewhere. In 
contrast, goodwill and some other intangible assets are believed to be nonrival. 
They can be used at the same time for multiple purposes where a given use does 
not compete with the use elsewhere. For instance, good reputation of the firm’s 
products is often seen as part of goodwill unless it can be attributed to a brand 
name that meets the recognition criteria. Good reputation does not have any 
competing alternative use. This means that using good reputation as a catalyser 
when promoting new products will not diminish the benefits of the reputation. It is 
                                           
1 References to books, booklets, dissertations and theses are given with page number.  
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only enclosed by the potential size of the market and the actions of potential 
competitors, not by its own use (Lev 2001:22).  
 
The measurement problems of goodwill have several sources. As stated 
previously, goodwill cannot be transferred separately. It is not possible to find an 
observable market price for goodwill and separate cash flows cannot be attributed 
to goodwill alone. Besides, intangible assets embedded in goodwill are difficult to 
identify and even more difficult to value (Grinyer, Russel and Walker 1990:108, 
Wyatt 2008, Kothari et al. 2010). Taken together, goodwill has some distinctive 
characteristics. Goodwill has no alternative use, it lacks separability, it is difficult 
to determine whether initially recognised goodwill is maintained, and finally, 
future benefits from goodwill are highly uncertain (Høegh-Krohn and Knivsflå 
2000). This makes goodwill the ultimate challenge in accounting (Hendriksen and 
van Breda 1992: 637). 
 
2.2. Definition of goodwill  
An important part of the goodwill discussion deals with its definition. A number 
of definitions are suggested, but each definition suffers from several flaws. First, 
most of the definitions truly do not deserve to be referred to as definitions. They 
are measurement procedures only. They do not describe in rigorous terms what 
constitutes goodwill. Rather, they are attempts to assign monetary value to 
goodwill. Second, some definitions try to constitute what goodwill is, but they fail 
because they do not provide clear demarcation between goodwill and other 
economic resources.  
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2.2.1. Residual approach and abnormal-return approach 
Goodwill is a wellknown item in trade and industry, but very few can give a 
proper description of what goodwill really is. Its meaning is obscure, and the 
nature of the term is often misunderstood (Petersen 2001:14). The accounting 
literature generally defines goodwill as residual goodwill or as abnormal-return 
goodwill. Residual goodwill is frequently termed the master valuation amount 
(e.g. Canning 1929:41-2, Falk and Gordon 1977, Hendriksen and van Breda 
1992:641-2), and abnormal-return goodwill is frequently termed excess profits or 
super profits (e.g. Bloom 2008:74). 
 
The residual approach identifies goodwill as a positive difference between the 
firm’s cost price or purchase price and the fair values of the firm’s identifiable net 
assets. A variant of this definition is found in most financial-accounting regimes. 
Only goodwill recognised as part of a business combination is captured by the 
residual approach. Internally-generated goodwill is ignored. Still, internally-
generated goodwill might be recognised as part of purchased goodwill in a 
business combination, but when the business combination is settled, this goodwill 
is literally purchased rather than internally generated. The abnormal-return 
approach, however, derives a cash-generating capacity concept that does not 
distinguish internally-generated goodwill from purchased goodwill. This approach 
measures goodwill as the present value of expected abnormal returns in excess of 
required rate of returns (e.g. More 1891, Dicksee 1897, Leake 1914, Catlett and 
Olson 1968, Falk and Gordon 1977, Colley and Volkan 1988, Blanchet and 
Tweedie 1989, Davis 1992). Abnormal returns are generated by internally 
developed as well as purchased assets. The fact that this approach does not 
distinguish internally-generated goodwill from purchased goodwill might be seen 
a strength.  
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However, this is not correct. The abnormal-return approach does not separate any 
economic assets from goodwill neither (other) intangible nor tangible assets. All 
assets may jointly contribute to abnormal returns (Ma and Hopkins 1988, Arnold, 
Egginton, Kirkham, Macve and Peasnell 1992:36, Petersen 2001:14). It is, 
therefore, difficult if not impossible to separate abnormal returns generated by 
residual goodwill from abnormal returns generated by other assets. Hendriksen 
and van Breda (1992:641) argue that the notion that “(...) tangible assets can earn 
only a “normal” rate while other factors are responsible for the excess rate is 
pure fiction. (…) All factors interact in the production of the final service or 
product and in permitting cash distributions to shareholders. Any attempt to 
allocate a portion of the total value of a firm on the basis of the capitalisation of 
superior earnings is, therefore, completely artificial.” Watts (2003) supports this 
argument and states that the allocation of cash flows is arbitrary, meaningless and 
unverifiable. Still, it seems reasonable to believe that abnormal returns, at least to 
some extent, are generated by intangible assets. Such assets might represent 
benefits from a dynamic organisation and/or superior knowledge and skills held by 
managers and employees. There are also examples from the literature that residual 
goodwill is considered equal to abnormal-return goodwill. For instance, Jennings, 
LeClere and Thompson  (2001:20) state that goodwill measured as “(...) the 
difference between the value of a company’s ownership interest and the fair value 
of its identifiable net assets represents comparative advantages that are expected 
to enable the company to generate earnings in excess to a ‘normal’ return on 
investment.” According to this interpretation, residual goodwill is the purchase 
price of expected abnormal returns.  
 
Other definitions of goodwill are also suggested. Most of these can be considered 
as definitions of residual goodwill and/or abnormal-return goodwill. For instance, 
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goodwill is sometimes referred to as the custom of a trade. According to this view, 
goodwill is a collection of favourable attributes enjoyed by an enterprise which 
have arisen from the productive use of its resources (Wines and Ferguson 1993). 
These favourable attributes will probably be captured by residual goodwill as well 
as abnormal-return goodwill. Hugdes (1972:7-8) describes goodwill in terms of 
“(...) the different ability of one business, in comparison with an assumed 
averaged firm, to make profit.” The abnormal-return approach is easily found in 
this definition. The profit made by the average firm is an estimate of the required 
rate of return. Any profit in excess of this rate of return is interpreted as evidence 
of goodwill. Moreover, Catlett and Olson (1968:10) and Davis (1992) consider 
goodwill to be everything that might contribute to the advantages an established 
firm possesses over a firm just started. These advantages could, for instance, be a 
result of well-established market position and superior knowledge about market 
forces. Both well-established market position and superior knowledge will 
probably be part of residual goodwill, and it is likely that these advantages will be 
sources of abnormal return and thereby part of abnormal-return goodwill.  
 
Colley and Volkan (1988), however, employ a different approach to define 
goodwill. The focus here is on competitive advantages in general, not necessarily 
the comparative advantages an established firm holds relative to a newly started 
firm: “(…) a firm may decide to acquire the net assets of another in order to add 
certain production capabilities to its existing product lines. An alternative would 
have been to develop these products internally. If the firm can estimate the dollar 
amounts of the expenditures over the time period necessary to develop these 
production and sale capabilities, and the income lost due to waiting for the sales 
to start, then the amount of goodwill paid will, ideally, be equal to the difference 
between the present value of these amounts computed using the project time 
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horizon, (...), and the anticipated return on the market value of the identifiable net 
assets of the acquired firm” (Colley and Volkan (1988:35). This demonstrates a 
residual approach to define goodwill. The present value of the expenditures 
necessary to develop the same production and sale capabilities will equal the 
purchase price of a firm holding these capabilities, and the present value of the 
anticipated return on the market value of the identifiable net assets will equal the 
fair value of the identifiable net assets. Goodwill is measured as the difference 
between these two amounts which corresponds to residual goodwill. 
  
2.2.2. List-based approach 
Davis (1992) argues that the conventional ways to define and measure goodwill 
cannot serve as definitions. The residual and the abnormal-return approach only 
assign monetary value to goodwill. They do not explain what goodwill is. This has 
motivated researchers to find alternative ways to define and describe goodwill. 
Johnson and Petrone (1988) distinguish between two alternative approaches for 
defining goodwill: a bottom-up approach and a top-down approach. The first 
approach sees goodwill as part of a larger asset, i.e. the cash-generating unit or the 
firm itself. The definition of goodwill found in financial accounting is consistent 
with a top-down approach. According to the bottom-up approach, goodwill is 
constituted by the intangible resources that sum goodwill up. Several attempts 
have been made to define goodwill in a bottom-up approach or a list-based 
approach (e.g. Nelson 1953, Colley and Volkan 1988, Davis 1992). The purpose 
has been to end up with a definition or at least a description of what constitutes 
goodwill rather than just a measurement procedure for goodwill. However, none 
of these attempts have succeeded. The set of intangible assets that constitutes 
goodwill is not given. Even if, a list of intangibles might give some description of 
what constitutes goodwill, this approach suffers from several flaws. First, the list-
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based approach lacks accuracy and demarcation. An obvious problem lies in the 
language itself. By decomposing goodwill into intangibles, the list of terms 
reflecting potential intangibles embedded in goodwill could be almost infinite 
without giving any accurate description of what goodwill is. Besides, it does not 
provide any clear demarcation between intangibles to be embedded in goodwill 
and intangibles to be separated from goodwill. By referring to the review article of 
Davis (1992), the objections above are easily demonstrated. Davis (1992) 
discusses list-based definitions suggested in prior studies. First, the list-based 
definitions mix sources of goodwill with the effects of goodwill being present. For 
instance, licences and franchises included in some of the list-based definitions 
may explain the presence of goodwill. Superior earnings power also included 
represents the effect of goodwill being present. Second, several of the items 
included in the list-based definitions are interrelated to one another or over-
lapping, suggesting that they are included because of lack of linguistic accuracy 
and not the fact that they are individual factors creating goodwill. For instance, 
there is obviously a relation between managerial talent and the managers’ ability 
to discover talents and favourable resources. Both are included in the same list-
based definition. Moreover, it is impossible to distinguish favourable 
governmental relations from good governmental relations.  
 
Third, some of the items are truly identifiable assets that will meet the accounting 
criteria of separate recognition on the balance sheet. For instance, purchased 
patents, purchased copyrights and purchased brand names are all identifiable 
intangible assets. This stresses the need for clear demarcation. And finally, as 
emphasised by Colley and Volkan (1988:37) “(…) the characteristics must not 
only be identified, but also assigned meaningful dollar values.” But as stated 
previously, it is difficult or even impossible to individually measure each 
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intangible asset embedded in goodwill. In business combination where goodwill 
only consists of one or two intangible assets, this may be feasible. However, in 
most cases, goodwill consists of a multitude of intangibles. Not being able to 
assign values to these intangibles, undermine the usefulness of this list-based 
approach even more. As stated by Hugdes (1982:175): “More than a century has 
passed since the first accounting article on goodwill appeared, and in that time 
goodwill has been defined in literally hundreds of ways. In fact the most striking 
feature of this literature is not that most of the definitions are similar, but that 
many of them are different and most cases (…) even conflicting.” Thus, a proper 
goodwill definition remains still to be found (Bloom 2008:73). Goodwill is at best 
considered as a monetary quantum measured as the residual in a business 
combination or as the present value of abnormal returns. Other approaches only 
lead to endless lists of intangibles that are supposed to sum goodwill up. In this 
dissertation, goodwill is considered a residual consisting of comparative 
advantages that may give rise to abnormal returns. This interpretation is consistent 
with the residual approach found in financial accounting. At the same time, it 
emphasises that goodwill may give rise to abnormal-return opportunities. 
 
2.3. Accounting recognition of goodwill 
Recognition and measurement are crucial elements of financial accounting. By 
recognition is meant the determination of when and how particular items enter the 
accounting records of an entity (Liang 2001). The significance of recognition is 
clearly demonstrated for goodwill as purchased goodwill is recognised on the 
balance sheet and internally-generated goodwill is not. The reason for this 
asymmetric treatment is mainly found in the measurement problems of internally-
generated goodwill and thereby the lack of meeting the recognition criteria for 
  
46 
capitalisation. This subchapter will discuss both “types” of goodwill: purchased 
goodwill and internally-generated goodwill.  
 
Two different orientations exist for recognition of earnings and balance sheet 
items: the balance orientation and the income orientation. Balance orientation has 
been termed the asset-liability view or the balance-sheet approach and income 
orientation has been termed the revenue-expense view and income statement 
approach (FASB 1976:103-9, Kvifte 2003:94). Under balance orientation, 
goodwill must meet the definition of an asset to be reported on the balance sheet. 
This makes definitions of assets, liabilities and equity fundamental for accounting 
recognition (Elling 2001:115-6, Kvifte 2003:94). Meeting the asset definition, 
however, is not sufficient for recognition on the balance sheet. The asset or 
liability must also be reliably measured (IASB 1989: paragraph 83). According to 
the income-orientation approach, revenue recognition and matching are of most 
importance (Kvifte 2003:94, Dichev 2008). This means that any capitalisation of 
goodwill under this orientation must be justified by the need of future matching.  
 
Balance orientation and income orientation have typically been addressed to 
certain objectives of financial accounting. Emphasis on the balance sheet is 
thought to provide information more useful for investment valuation, whereas 
emphasis on the profit and loss account is thought to provide information more 
useful for stewardship purposes (Davis, Paterson and Wilson 1997). This is partly 
explained by the fact that both orientations are linked to certain measurement 
attributes. Fair value is attributed to balance orientation and historical cost to 
income orientation. Kvifte (2003:123) argues that there is no direct link between 
these two orientations of financial accounting and a certain favouritism of 
measurement attributes: “(…) the conflict between the A-L [Asset-Liability] and 
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the R-E [Revenue-Expenses] view is not necessarily a disagreement primarily 
concerning measurement attributes. It is not true that particular measurement 
attributes goes hand in hand with one of the two views.” This reduces the potential 
conflict between the balance orientation and the income orientation to the role the 
definitions play for accounting recognition: “In the A-L view assets and liabilities 
are economic resources and obligations. Economic resources and obligations will 
typically be included in the balance sheet in an R-E view as assets and liabilities 
as well. However, in addition the balance sheet will include certain accruals 
(accrued costs and revenues) and deferrals (deferred costs and revenues) that are 
not economic resources and obligations” (Kvifte 2003:126). Thus, it is not 
obvious that the fundamental approach of accounting makes any difference when 
it comes to the initial recognition of goodwill. Arnold and Kirkham (1992) support 
this view. They argue that the matching principle, fundamental to the income 
orientation, will make it necessary to capitalise goodwill to ascertain a proper 
match between future revenues and charges. Moreover, the expectation of future 
benefits suggests the presence of an asset, and thus, capitalisation under the 
balance orientation.  
 
The following sections will focus on the recognition criteria under the balance 
orientation. There are several reasons for this choice. There is little doubt that 
balance orientation is the one preferred in financial accounting. The fact that the 
leading standard setters throughout the world are manifesting this approach in 
their conceptual frameworks strongly supports this choice. Some, however, argue 
that the balance orientation should be challenged and reconsidered. For instance, 
Dichev (2008) argues that this orientation is flawed. It does not reflect the 
essential features of the business model which is to generate earnings. He also 
claims that more focus on assets and liabilities and fair value as the preferred 
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measurement attribute will destroy the forward-looking ability of earnings. 
Moreover, Kvifte (2003, 2008) refers to several examples from standard setting, 
where the balance-oriented conceptual framework has been ineffective in solving 
standard-setting problems. Nevertheless, the new accounting regulation for 
goodwill, the impairment-only method, is developed with references to the 
balance-oriented conceptual framework (e.g. IASB 2004d), which makes an 
examination of the recognition criteria within this framework most relevant for 
this dissertation. The first criterion is whether goodwill meets the definition of an 
asset which is in focus in the following sections. 
 
2.3.1. Goodwill – an asset 
The goodwill-asset discussion culminated in the US at the end of the 1960s. Two 
decades later the asset question was high on the standard setters’ agenda in the 
UK. In both cases the discussion was motivated by accounting-policy choices for 
goodwill.  
 
2.3.1.1. Asset definition – some general criticism 
The asset definitions of the leading standard setters, FASB, IASB and ASB 
(Accounting Standards Board), are almost identical (FASB 1985:6.25, IASB 
1989:53-9, ASB 1999:4.6). For instance, FASB defines assets as “(...) probable 
economic benefits obtained and controlled by a particular entity as a result of past 
transactions or events.” According to this definition, an asset has three 
fundamental characteristics. Assets must represent a potential for future economic 
benefits, be controlled by the entity and be confirmed by past transactions or 
events. 
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The fundamentals of an asset is the present right or access to some economic 
benefits. There might be uncertainty regarding these benefits, but the fact that 
uncertainty exists does not preclude the benefits from constituting an asset. The 
term probable or expected, used by FASB and IASB, reflects this uncertainty. The 
degree of uncertainty will affect the valuation of the asset, not the classification as 
an asset. In extreme cases, however, the uncertainty may affect the answer to the 
asset question, but only if the uncertainty drives the expected benefits down to 
zero (Hendriksen and van Breda 1992:455). Before an economic resource can be 
classified an asset in accounting terms, the resource also needs to meet the criteria 
of being controlled by the firm and confirmed by past transactions or events.  
 
The asset definitions of FASB, IASB and ASB have been debated, and other 
definitions are suggested. Schuetze (1993, 2001) is one of the major contributors 
in this debate. He is concerned about the high level of abstraction in the definition: 
“Defining an asset as a probable future economic benefit is to use a high-order 
abstraction. Under such an approach, the truck per se is not the asset. The asset is 
the present value of the cash flows that will come from using the truck to haul 
lumber, or coal, or bread”  (Schuetze (1993:67). According to him, “[t]he 
definition is so complex, so abstract, so open-ended, so all-inclusive and so vague 
that we cannot use it to solve problems” (Schuetze (1993:67). Instead, he 
proposes, according to him, a more simple definition. He suggests that assets 
should be defined as “(...) cash, contractual claims to cash or services, and items 
that can be sold separately for cash” (Schuetze 1993:69). Thus, he considers 
transferability to be an important characteristic of assets. One important 
characteristic of goodwill, however, is the lack of transferability. This implies that 
goodwill will not meet the asset criteria suggested by Schuetze (1993, 2001). 
Samuelson (1996) supports Schuetze (1993, 2001) in that the present asset 
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definition is too complex, ambiguous and allows too much to the category of 
assets. But, he employs a different approach to derive an asset definition. He 
argues that the definition should not be based on future economic benefits, but on 
property rights: “Future events (or flows) can be anticipated, but they cannot be 
observed presently. A definition of assets based on future events lacks empirical 
content because future events are inherently unobservable” (Samuelson 
1996:151). Instead, he argues that the asset definition should be changed from a 
focus on future economic benefits to rights to use economic benefits, that is, 
property rights. He finds the transferability criterion suggested by Schuetze (1993) 
useful, but not sufficient to serve as demarcation between assets and non-assets: 
“In general, property rights are exchangeable and the reserve proposition should 
always be true: anything that is exchangeable is a property right” (Samuelson 
1996:154). Obviously, goodwill is not an asset according to his definition. It does 
not represent any claim on future economic benefits and thus, fails to meet the 
proposed asset definition. Recently, Kothari et al. (2010) have suggested a similar 
asset definition to the one by Schuetze (1993, 2001). They argue that the asset 
definition should be based on the criterion of separability which excludes 
goodwill. Such a definition will lead to more conservative and verifiable 
accounting which they claim is in the interest of both shareholders and 
debtholders.  
 
2.3.1.2. Early discussion on goodwill being an asset 
In the mid-1960s there was a growing dissatisfaction with the abuse of the 
pooling-of-interest method in the US, which at the same time triggered the debate 
on goodwill. Prior to the introduction of APB 16 (Accounting Principles Board 
16) and APB 17 under US-GAAP the debate was focused on capitalisation or non-
capitalisation of goodwill and the goodwill-asset question (APB 1970a, 1970b). 
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Thus, the discussion was triggered by the objective to find a proper accounting 
method for goodwill which in turn made the question of goodwill being an asset 
important. At that point in time, there existed no conceptual framework and thus, 
no agreed-upon asset definition for standard setting. This makes the discussion 
richer when it comes to ideas and arguments, but at the same time more mixed as 
the goodwill-asset question and the asset criteria are discussed simultaneously. 
 
A lot of US researchers argued that the nature of goodwill prevents a classification 
of goodwill as an asset. One significant contributor to this debate is Chambers 
(1966). He argues that assets along with all other items in the financial statement 
should be measured according to their current cash equivalent. As goodwill lacks 
the ability of being transferable, Chambers (1966) concludes that goodwill should 
not be capitalised on the balance sheet. Catlett and Olson (1968:107) state that: 
“[g]oodwill is not a resource or property right that is consumed or utilized in the 
production of earnings. Rather it is the result of earnings or of the expectations of 
them, as appraised by the investors.” They argue that the objective of financial 
accounting is to provide information making it possible for the shareholders to 
assess the firm’s future prospects and thereby its value. They argue that producing 
assets of the acquired firm should be reported at fair value and that goodwill 
should be immediately written-off against equity. Otherwise, they claim, the 
financial statement will determine the value of the firm rather than provide the 
shareholders with information useful for that purpose. 
 
The direct write-off suggestion was attacked. Some argued that goodwill should 
be classified as an asset and capitalised on the balance sheet. Paton (1968), for 
instance, makes a point of the demarcation between tangible and intangible assets. 
As he writes in his critical comments to Catlett and Olson’s monograph: “Assets 
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are not inherently tangible or physical. An asset is an economic quantum. It may 
be attached to or represented by some physical object, or it may not. One of the 
common mistakes we all tend to make is that of attributing too much significance 
to molecular conception of property. A brick wall is nothing but mud on edge if its 
capacity to render economic service has disappeared; the molecules are still there 
and the wall may be as solid as ever but the value is gone” (Paton in Catlett and 
Olson 1968:143).  If the term asset is understood as future benefits, goodwill 
becomes no more intangible than a building. The substance of an asset, that is, a 
potential for future benefits, does not depend on physical representation. Gynther 
(1969:247-8) supports this view: “Economic assets have economic value because 
they contain future, beneficial service. (…) Beneficial service potentials can exist 
in various forms, and if the form does have physical substance, it merely provides 
greater evidence that service potentials may exist.”  
 
After the implementation of APB 17, which made capitalisation and amortisation 
mandatory for goodwill, the goodwill-asset discussion subsided in the US. This 
happened without any thorough discussion of the asset question. In the UK a 
couple of decades later the discussion is heated once more, triggered by the 
problem of selecting an appropriate accounting method for goodwill. As in the 
US, the views were split on which method to choose: Should goodwill be 
capitalised and amortised or written-off against equity? In contrast to the earlier 
US discussion, the UK discussion addresses the goodwill-asset question to an 
asset definition found in the conceptual framework. According to the ASB 
framework, assets are “(…) rights or other access to future economic benefits 
controlled by an entity as a result of past transactions or events” (ASB 1999:4.6). 
This definition is not significantly different from the asset definitions found in the 
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conceptual frameworks of IASB and FASB, making the discussion below relevant 
outside the UK-GAAP area. 
 
Some argued that goodwill fails to meet the criteria of an asset and in particular 
the criterion of being controlled. Arnold and Kirkman (1992) argue that for an 
item to be controlled, the item must be transferable, which means that it must be 
capable of being sold or realised independently of the other assets in the firm. This 
is further supported by Upton (2001:61): “With control comes the ability to buy, 
sell, or withhold from the market – characteristics of the everyday notion of an 
asset.” Thus, Arnold and Kirkman (1992) and Upton (2001) emphasise that 
transferability is necessary for control. This conclusion is not obvious. For 
instance, some contractual-legal rights may establish property rights without being 
transferable (IASB 2008d: IAS 38 BC10). This suggests that an intangible asset 
might be controllable, even though it lacks transferability. If this reasoning holds, 
it will undermine the rationale of refusing goodwill as an asset due to its lack of 
transferability. Moreover, transferability is not a criterion of an asset. Thus, 
transferability is not part of the discussion of goodwill meeting the asset 
definition, but part of the discussion of which criteria are to be included in the 
asset definition. 
 
2.3.1.3. Recent conclusion – goodwill is classified as an asset  
Three leading standard setters, FASB, IASB and ASB, have recently discussed the 
goodwill-asset question. Surprisingly, FASB and IASB reached the opposite 
conclusion to the one reached by ASB. After more than 10 years of discussion and 
several different drafts, ASB implements the new standard for goodwill, FRS 10 
(Financial Reporting Standard 10), in 1997, which makes capitalisation and 
amortisation of goodwill mandatory (ASB 1997). However, goodwill is not found 
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to meet the criteria of an asset. ASB does not reveal in detail the arguments for 
their conclusion. Still, it is reasonable that the lack of goodwill meeting the control 
criterion has played an important role when reaching this conclusion (Johnson and 
Petrone 1998). This is supported by the interpretation ASB makes of control in its 
1995 draft of the Statement of Principles: “Items that cannot be separately 
identified from the business as a whole cannot be individually controlled by the 
entity and hence are not assets” (ASB 1995:3.18). Tollington (1997:1) states that 
“(…) purchased goodwill is not in itself an asset (…) and yet it is to be (…) 
capitalised and classified as an asset on the balance sheet. (...) These apparent 
contradictions lead one to ask; when is an asset not an asset? And the answer is 
when it is goodwill.” Some years later, in 2001, the US standard setter, FASB, 
concludes the opposite, namely that goodwill should be classified as an asset. 
Until then, goodwill was considered not to meet the asset definition. Still, it was 
capitalised on the balance sheet. In 1953 capitalisation and amortisation became 
the preferred method for goodwill under US-GAAP, and in 1970 it became the 
only legal method (APB 17). Being treated as an asset for 50 years, goodwill 
finally got approval as an asset. In line with international convergence, IASB 
makes the same conclusion in 2004 (IASB 2004d).  
 
In the following paragraphs, IASB’s arguments for classifying goodwill as an 
asset are discussed (IASB 2004d: IFRS 3 BC 129-35). As a starting point, it is 
useful to repeat the asset characteristics. Assets must represent a potential for 
future economic benefits, be controlled by the entity and be confirmed by past 
transactions or events. When assessing whether goodwill meets these criteria, 
IASB splits goodwill into the components suggested by Johnson and Petrone 
(1998). According to this decomposition, core goodwill consists of a going-
concern component and a synergy component. Given that the business 
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combination has been settled between independent, informed and willing parties, 
core goodwill represents expectations of future economic benefits, and thus meets 
the first criterion of an asset. The next, the control criterion, is not as trivial to 
justify. Typically, goodwill consists of intangible resources or benefits that cannot 
be controlled. For instance, goodwill may reflect the value of knowledge and skills 
held by the employees or the value of loyal customers. The employees can quit 
and (of course) take with them their knowledge and skills. Moreover, customers 
can probably meet their needs by acquiring products or services from competitors. 
IASB admits that some of the intangibles embedded in goodwill cannot be 
regarded as controlled by the firm. However, some sort of indirect control is 
thought to exist since the acquirer, by definition, controls the entity to which 
goodwill belongs. As stated by IASB (2004: IFRS 3 BC 132): “(...) control is 
provided by means of the acquirer’s power to direct policies and management of 
the acquire.”  This interpretation of control is close to the interpretion found in 
group accounting. In real-life, control over employees’ knowledge and skills or 
customers’ loyalty is far more indirect than control over merchandise, equipment 
or property. Some may argue that employees’ knowledge and skills or customers’ 
loyalty in no way are controlled by the firm. The employees and customers have 
their free will. This leads one to ask: Will the control criterion ever play a role? If 
the criterion has no significance for goodwill, will it ever have significance? 
(Kvifte 2003:101) The position taken by IASB may suggest that any expense can 
be classified as an asset. IASB is aware of this criticism and has included the asset 
definition as part of the joint conceptual framework project. Up until the present 
date, IASB has replaced the traditional control criterion with “(...) rights and 
privileged access to economic resources.”2 This makes it easier to justify that 
goodwill indeed meets the asset definition. Apparently, the asset definition has 
                                           
2 See IASB’s and FASB’s project update: http://www.fasb.org/project/cf_phase-b.shtml  
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accommodated the characteristics of goodwill in such a way that goodwill meets 
the criteria of the definition. However, in a balance-oriented deductive conceptual 
framework the asset definition should be derived independently of the expected 
outcome for goodwill meeting that definition. 
 
The other components that might be part of goodwill are also considered. Assets 
and liabilities that meet the criteria of separate recognition should be separated 
from goodwill and measured at their fair value. More problematic is the inclusion 
of potential under or overpayments which conceptually represent gains or losses. 
To the extent that goodwill includes these components, goodwill includes items 
that are not assets. However, as stated by IASB, these gains or losses are not 
possible to identify and measure at the date of the business combination, making it 
necessary to leave such gains or losses as part of goodwill (IASB 2004d: IFRS 3 
BC 133-5). The conclusion of FASB and IASB ends the goodwill-asset 
discussion.  
 
2.3.2. Capitalisation or non-capitalisation of goodwill  
Capitalisation or non-capitalisation of goodwill is closely related to the 
information demands of shareholders and debtholders. Shareholders will generally 
demand information about the cash-generating capacity of the firm’s net assets. 
All assets should, therefore, be capitalised on the balance sheet. Shareholders also 
want to hold the managers responsible for past investment decisions, which 
suggests that goodwill should be capitalised and amortised over expected 
economic lifetime. Debtholders, however, will often take a liquidation approach. 
This favours the direct write-off method for goodwill (Kothari et al. 2010).  
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Non-capitalisation of goodwill could be the result of not meeting the criteria for 
capitalisation, which is the case for internally-generated goodwill. It could also be 
due to the choice of the pooling-of-interest method when accounting for business 
combinations or it could be due to the initial accounting treatment of purchased 
goodwill, for instance the use of the direct write-off method. In the following 
section, internally-generated goodwill and purchased goodwill are in focus.  
 
2.3.2.1. Internally-generated goodwill and purchased goodwill  
In contrast to purchased goodwill, internally-generated goodwill is not reported on 
the balance sheet. Under IFRS, the prohibition against capitalisation of internally-
generated goodwill is given explicitly (IASB 2008d: IAS 38.48). The asymmetric 
treatment of internally-generated goodwill and purchased goodwill is one of the 
greatest anomalies in financial accounting, causing firms growing internally to be 
incomparable to firms growing by business combinations (Grinyer et al. 1990). 
This accounting-method choice is not motivated by differences in the very nature 
of internally-generated and purchased goodwill. Rather, the accounting choice is 
motivated by problems of identifiability and measurability of internally-generated 
goodwill (Huijgen 1996:65).  
 
Purchased goodwill can be reliably measured, whereas internally-generated 
goodwill cannot. Goodwill, both purchased and internally generated, is an 
inseparable part of the firm holding it. An estimate of the goodwill value is 
feasible when goodwill is recognised as part of a business combination. Internally-
generated goodwill, however, will probably be associated with benefits rising 
from non-specific expenses, such as expenses for advertising, product 
development, staff recruitment and staff training, but not limited to these, nor do 
all such expenses create goodwill. Thus, it is not possible to reliably measure the 
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cost price. Given rational and non-opportunistic managers, it is reasonable to 
expect that expenses, for instance advertising expenses, are spent to obtain some 
future economic benefits. But the initial cost price and the relation between this 
cost price, if possible to determine, and future economic benefits are too weak or 
diffuse to justify recognition (Høegh-Krohn and Knivsflå 2000). Bloom (2008:37) 
summarises the challenges of internally-generated goodwill as such: First, it is 
difficult or impossible to identify the events or transactions which contribute to the 
overall goodwill of the firm. Second, it is difficult or impossible to assess the 
extent to which past events or transactions generate future benefits, and finally, the 
value of such benefits are not usually capable of being reliably measured. 
Consequently, expenses which may reflect internally-generated goodwill are 
charged against the profit and loss account. 
  
Some argue that the historical-cost approach is the main reason for non-
capitalisation of internally-generated goodwill. They argue that a fair-value 
approach, termed market-capitalisation approach, will solve the controversy of 
goodwill: the artificial distinction between purchased and internally-generated 
goodwill and the question about goodwill amortisation (e.g. Bloom 2008). It is 
easy to argue, however, that a market-capitalisation approach will lead to highly 
subjective estimates for goodwill and a high risk of earnings management. The 
reported goodwill numbers will suffer from low reliability and verifiability, which 
in turn will harm the usefulness of these numbers for decision making. 
 
2.4. Subsequent accounting for goodwill  
Purchased goodwill has been accounted for in a number of ways. Almost every 
possible treatment for a debit within a double-entry system is being discussed and 
implemented as good accounting practise (For reviews, see Hugdes 1982, Nobes 
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1992, McLeay, Neal and Tollington 1999). Goodwill has been capitalised and 
amortised over expected economic lifetime, capitalised and tested for impairment 
losses, capitalised and treated as a permanent asset, charged against earnings or 
written-off against equity. Two categories of accounting methods can be 
identified. In the first category goodwill is capitalised on the balance sheet. 
Goodwill is either considered an asset and/or capitalised to meet the need for 
future matching. In the second category goodwill is charged against earnings or 
written-off against equity. This latter category concerns initial accounting for 
goodwill and is not discussed here.  
 
2.4.1. Systematic amortisation  
The historical-cost model has traditionally been related to the income orientation 
where revenue recognition and matching are the basic principles. According to 
this approach, capitalisation and amortisation is motivated by the need of future 
matching. A feature of the amortisation debate is the lack of addressing decision 
usefulness when arguing in favour or disfavour of amortisation. The latest 
discussion by IASB and FASB is an exception. Instead, the debate addresses the 
economic fundamentals of goodwill and especially whether goodwill is believed 
to have limited economic lifetime. The question of economic lifetime will be in 
focus in this section. 
 
The controversy of goodwill amortisation is closely linked to the very nature of 
goodwill. As argued previously, goodwill is not transferable and identifiable 
unless as a residual in a business combination. This makes it difficult at a given 
point in time subsequent the business combination to identify and measure the 
portion of total goodwill that is purchased and internally generated. This is one of 
the main arguments for leaving amortisation of purchased goodwill. Hendriksen 
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and van Breda (1992:646) support this view: “(…) the time at which the original 
asset value is completely replaced by additional expenditures cannot be 
determined, even in retrospect. (...) This suggests that the original cost should 
remain on the books and the costs of maintenance or replacement should be 
charged against current income. No amortization should be made because the 
value of the original asset continues if proper maintenance expenditures are 
made.” Not being able to separate purchased from internally-generated goodwill, 
makes it difficult to determine the amortisation pattern for goodwill. Based on 
this, IASB (2004: IFRS 3 BC 140) concludes that purchased goodwill has an 
indefinite economic lifetime: “The Board [IASB] observed that the useful lifetime 
of acquired goodwill and the patterns in which it diminishes generally are not 
possible to predict, yet its amortisation depends on such predictions. As a result, 
the amount amortised in any given period can at best be described as an arbitrary 
estimate of the consumption of acquired goodwill during that period.”  
 
Some guidance, however, may be found for its estimation. In accounting theory, 
amortisation is seen as a process of allocation. The purpose of the amortisation 
charge is to measure the consumption of the benefits, ensuring that over the 
economic lifetime of the asset, each period is allocated its fair share of the cost of 
the asset (Wilkins et al. 1998, Alfredson, Leo, Picker, Pacter and Radford 
2005:297). Assets by definition are expected future benefits. On acquiring these 
benefits, the acquirer will have expectations as to which period these benefits are 
to be received. This suggests that one possible approach to estimate the economic 
lifetime of the asset and the pattern of its consumption is to make use of the 
investment analysis made by the acquirer prior to the business combination. Such 
an analysis generally constitutes an estimate of how many years the investment is 
expected to contribute with net cash inflows and the pattern of these net cash 
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inflows. Since goodwill is closely related to the acquired firm, the investment, it is 
reasonable to expect that the economic lifetime of goodwill is strongly positively 
associated with the economic lifetime of the investment. Colley and Volkan 
(1988:39) support this view and state that “(…) a logical choice would be the time 
period selected by management to compute the present value of the excess 
earnings or cash flows.”  
 
Despite the estimation challenge, few scholars doubt that purchased goodwill 
indeed has a limited economic lifetime. Some even argue that the lifetime is short 
(Hugdes 1982:146-7, Arnold and Kirkham 1992, Wang 1993). Their arguments 
are often supported with reference to economic theory and abnormal-return 
goodwill. In economic theory goodwill is measured as the present value of 
abnormal returns. Given perfect market conditions, there will not be any 
abnormal-return opportunities, and thus, no goodwill. On the contrary, in a market 
with imperfections, such abnormal-return opportunities may exist and even persist 
for some time, but probably not very long. The reason is found in the market 
mechanism. At any time and in any given market some firms may enjoy above-
normal returns due to factors causing market disequilibrium in the short run. The 
existence of above-normal return in the short run will induce entry in the long run. 
Consequently, above-normal returns are an economic anomaly not consistent with 
the long equilibrium conditions (Gomes 1988).  
 
Still, a crucial question is left unanswered: How fast will these market forces push 
the abnormal return towards normal risk-adjusted return? This depends on the 
factors creating goodwill in the first place. Given that purchased goodwill 
represents factors causing abnormal returns, goodwill can be seen as the 
competitive advantages held by the firm. Resource-based theory may be helpful to 
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enlighten the way goodwill diminishes. Within this theory, a framework called the 
VRIO framework is essential to help identifying and assessing potential 
competitive advantages. In order to meet the characteristics of a sustained 
competitive advantage, it must represent economic benefits, be rare, hard to copy 
and the entity that possesses or has access to the advantage must know how to 
exploit it (Barney 2002:155-85).3 The stronger these factors are present, the more 
likely it is that this advantage really gives rise to abnormal returns. For the 
abnormal returns to last for some time, all the factors referred to above must be 
strongly present. For instance, if a resource gives rise to a competitive advantage, 
but the advantage is easy to copy, it is reasonable to believe that this advantage 
will last for a short time only. If the resource is rare and at the same time hard to 
copy, the economic benefits will probably last for a longer period of time. Given 
that these benefits are part of purchased goodwill, the above framework might be 
useful.  
 
Another argument for amortisation is that purchased goodwill holds the same main 
characteristics as other long-lived assets. Just as other assets are subject to 
exhaustion, so is goodwill. For instance, Hugdes (1982) argues that goodwill is no 
different from other assets. The difference between goodwill and other assets are 
differences of degree rather than nature. In particular, he states: “Attempts to 
require amortisation of goodwill represent the logical extension of accounting 
conventions to goodwill that are applied to other assets. Based on the premise that 
goodwill is an asset, the treatment represents uncompromising adherence to 
                                           
3 Two lines of strategy literature are useful in order to understand the main sources of competitive advantage: the 
industrial-organisation model developed by Porter (1980, 1985) focusing on factors at industry level, and the 
resource-based model of competitive advantages focusing on firm-specific factors (e.g. Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 
1991, 2002).  
  
63 
determination of profitability through matching of expired costs with revenues” 
(Hugdes 1982:147). 
 
A few scholars, however, have questioned whether goodwill is subject to 
consumption. Catlett and Olson (1968) may represent this group of scholars. They 
use the odd nature of goodwill as basis for their non-amortisation position: 
“Goodwill is a value which attaches only to a business as a whole; it has no 
specific term of existence as do certain property rights. The value of goodwill may, 
and does fluctuate suddenly and widely because of the innumerable factors – 
factors affecting earnings power or investors opinion about earnings power, 
which influence that value” (Catlett and Olson 1968:85). Referring to these 
characteristics, they conclude that “[g]oodwill value is not consumed or used in 
the production of earnings as the separable resources and property rights of a 
business. Rather goodwill is the result of earnings or the expectations of them, and 
its value fluctuates as earnings and expectations of earnings vary” (Catlett and 
Olson 1968:85). Graham (1987:22) takes a similar position: “When profits are 
earned we do not regard part of the investment as having been used up and any 
dividend being received as being a realisation of the original investment. On the 
contrary, we assume that the achievement of the expected level of earnings has the 
effect, not of reducing the value of the investment, but of confirming its value.”  
 
Among practitioners the arguments by Catlett and Olson (1968) and Graham 
(1987) have been extremely popular. Some have also argued that goodwill 
amortisation leads to non-cash charges with no significance. In particular, 
managers “(...) emphasize earnings before goodwill amortisation in (…) earnings 
releases and reports to shareholders” (Jennings et al. 2001:21). The same notion 
is expressed by Lindenberg, Ross and Barney (1999). They state that “(...) the 
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SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission] and FASB should consider requiring 
firms to report EPS on a pre-amortization basis even if net income is reported on 
a post-amortization basis” (Lindenberg et al. 1999:41). The desire to avoid 
goodwill-amortisation charges is part of a larger picture. The popularity of the 
direct write-off method under UK-GAAP and the pooling-of-interest method 
under US-GAAP can be explained by the managers’ aversion to report goodwill-
amortisation charges. Ultimately, the amortisation charges have a serious negative 
effect on earnings. Moehrle, Reynolds-Moehrle and Wallace (2001:244) show one 
extreme example where the amortisation of goodwill turned positive earnings into 
a significant negative earnings figure: “(…) MindSpring Enterprises reported a 93 
cent loss per share as its traditional accounting earnings disclosure, but positive 
earnings before goodwill amortisation totalling 94 cents per share for the same 
period.” Referring to Nielson (1999) they explain managers’ eager to report 
earnings before amortisation charges as such: “All firms would like their earnings 
reported on a cash basis (cash earnings), because earnings are higher, price-
earnings multiples are higher, and this will justify a higher stock price” (Moehrle 
et al. 2001:244). A non-amortisation position leads to higher reported earnings. 
Managers believe that higher reported earnings have a favourable effect on stock 
prices, their own compensation and reputation. This may explain their dislike of 
goodwill-amortisation charges (Nobes 1992). Goodwill amortisation has, 
therefore, been high on the standard setters’ and the financial-accounting 
preparers’ and users’ agenda for years. The latest change in accounting for 
goodwill has left goodwill amortisation in favour of an impairment-only method. 
This last method is in focus in the next section.  
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2.4.2. Impairment testing and no systematic amortisation 
The recent change in accounting for goodwill under IFRS and US-GAAP 
represents a shift in accounting models and measurement attributes. The historical-
cost model is replaced by a fair-value accounting model (Ramanna 2008, 
Ramanna and Watts 2009, Kothari et al. 2010). Goodwill is now measured as the 
fair value of the consideration paid reduced by the fair value of identifiable assets 
and liabilities (IASB 2008: IFRS 3). This measurement procedure will provide a 
value close to a fair-value estimate of goodwill. Subsequent impairment testing is 
done by comparing the recoverable amount with the carrying amount of the cash-
generating unit to which goodwill is allocated. This section focuses on the 
arguments in favour and disfavour of the impairment-only method put forward by 
IASB.  
 
The idea of an impairment-only method is not new in financial accounting. 
Treating goodwill as a permanent asset, i.e. with no amortisation, was common 
accounting practise in the US early in the 20th century (Hugdes 1982). Even as 
late as the beginning of the 1980s some firms carried permanent goodwill on their 
balance sheets in the UK (Nobes 1992). Several scholars have argued that 
goodwill should not be amortised as long as its recoverable amount is maintained. 
As stated by Gynther (1969:228): “(...) the purchase price of goodwill (...) must be 
treated for what it really is, and goodwill must at least be left intact as long as the 
earnings power of the entity is unimpaired.”   Some even find it surprising that it 
has taken so long before such arguments have become mainstream (Bloom 
2008:78).  However, the change in accounting method for goodwill seems hard to 
justify based on economic fundamentals. It is common belief that goodwill has 
limited economic lifetime which implies amortisation. Rather, the reason for the 
change seems to be pragmatic. It is difficult to determine whether an expense for 
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marketing, organisation development or product development has maintained or 
even increased the value of existing goodwill. In other words, it is difficult at a 
point in time subsequent to the business combination to distinguish remaining 
purchased goodwill from internally-generated goodwill.  
 
Testing goodwill for potential impairment losses is challenging. As stated 
previously, goodwill is not transferable, and thus, there will not be any separate 
market price that can justify the reported goodwill amount. Besides, it is not 
possible to separately determine the net cash inflows generated by goodwill. The 
net cash inflows are generated in synergy with other assets in the firm, which in 
turn makes it difficult to estimate a current value for goodwill. Still, the 
impairment regulation requires goodwill to be allocated to cash-generating units at 
levels below or equal to the segment-level. The purpose of this allocation is to 
assign goodwill to those cash-generating units where goodwill is believed to 
contribute with earnings power and by that, provide a basis for impairment testing.  
 
Several factors, however, may shield an impairment loss from being recognised. 
First, the impairment test employs the carrying amount of the units’ recognised 
assets. If the fair values of these assets are higher than their carrying amounts, the 
extra benefits related to these assets increase the recoverable amount of the units 
and may shield impairment losses in purchased goodwill. Second, internally-
generated goodwill may replace impaired purchased goodwill. If the recoverable 
amount is lower than the carrying amount, an impairment loss must to be reported 
for goodwill. The regulation does not require any distinction to be made between 
internally-generated goodwill and purchased goodwill when estimating the 
recoverable amount of the cash-generating units. This means that internally-
generated goodwill can be indirectly capitalised. The standard setter, IASB (2004: 
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IFRS 3 BC 134-5), is aware of this problem, but explains why such a distinction is 
impossible: “(…), goodwill acquired in a business combination and goodwill 
generated after that business combination cannot be separately identified, because 
they contribute jointly to the same cash flow. Therefore, (…) the objective of the 
goodwill impairment test could at best be to ensure that the carrying amount of 
goodwill is recoverable from future cash flows expected to be generated by both 
acquired goodwill and internally generated goodwill after the business 
combination.” The idea is that as long as the total value of goodwill, that is the 
earnings power, is maintained, it is of less interest for financial-accounting users 
whether this earnings power is generated by purchased and/or internally-generated 
goodwill. This makes it possible, given that purchased goodwill has limited 
economic life or has impaired, to indirectly capitalise internally-generated 
goodwill. In other words, by implementing this impairment method for goodwill, a 
business combination will not only constitute a purchase of the entity’s net assets 
inclusive goodwill, but also a right to capitalise internally-generated goodwill up 
to the goodwill amount initially recognised in the acquisition analysis.  
 
A related issue is the indirect test procedure for goodwill under IFRS. The test is 
performed on cash-generating units to which goodwill is allocated and not on 
goodwill. This means that a recognised impairment loss in the cash-generating 
unit may have its origin in goodwill and/or other assets in the cash-generating unit. 
The impairment loss is arbitrarily allocated to goodwill first without any 
subsequent test to determine whether it really is impaired. The US-standard SFAS 
142, however, requires a two-step test for goodwill. The first step recognises 
whether there is an impairment loss in the cash-generating unit.4 This step is 
identical to the IFRS-regulation. If there is an impairment loss, the next step will 
                                           
4 The standard uses the term reporting unit instead of cash-generating unit.  
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be to estimate the implied fair value of goodwill. To finish the second step, 
goodwill is estimated as if the cash-generating unit was purchased in a business 
combination which requires fair values for the assets and liabilities in the cash-
generating unit. This makes the two-step test relatively more comprehensive and 
costly than the one-step test under IFRS.  
 
FASB received significant criticism on the two-step test. An extract from the 
comment letters may serve as an illustration: “The mechanism of the impairment 
test will be cost prohibitive to undertake. The Board cannot seriously expect to 
regularly estimate the fair value of its assets and liabilities in attempting to 
calculate the implied fair value of goodwill. Our experience with obtaining such 
appraisals in the context of business acquisitions has led us to believe that any 
benefit from such impairment measurements is far outweighed by the prohibitive 
costs of retaining and regularly engaging outside experts whose opinions can vary 
widely in their professional assessment” (FASB 2005 Summary of Comment 
Letters). IASB (2004b: IAS 36 BC 170) supports this argument and states that 
“(...) the complexity and costs of applying the two-step test (…) would outweigh 
the benefits of that approach”, leaving the two-step test in favour of a one-step 
test.  
 
The shift to the impairment-only method is based on the premise that goodwill-
amortisation charges are arbitrary and are void of decision usefulness. Two factors 
seem particularly important when predicting the decision usefulness of goodwill 
numbers under the impairment-only approach relative to the amortisation 
approach: the degree of faithful representation of economic fundamentals and the 
degree of discretionary freedom offered by these two methods. The first factor will 
affect the relevance and the reliability of the goodwill numbers. A goodwill-
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amortisation approach will be more consistent with economic fundamentals of 
goodwill if goodwill has limited economic lifetime. At the same time, it is difficult 
to reliably measure the way goodwill is consumed, which may harm both the 
reliability and relevance of the accounting numbers. The impairment-only 
approach, however, makes it possible to indirectly capitalise internally-generated 
goodwill, which may suggest increased relevance. On the other hand, the 
regulation of goodwill-impairment losses is believed to provide the managers with 
more discretionary freedom than under the previous amortisation method (Watts 
2003, Ramanna 2008, Ramanna and Watts 2009, Kothari et al. 2010). This will 
probably increase the incidence of earnings management. The next section will 
discuss, in particular, the discretionary freedom offered by the impairment-only 
method. 
 
2.4.2.1. Discretionary freedom in impairment testing 
The degree of discretionary freedom in impairment losses is only interesting if the 
reporting flexibility is relatively higher or lower than under the previous 
amortisation method. If the discretionary freedom is supposed to be equal, it is 
reasonable to expect that both methods will be subject to the same intensity of 
opportunistic earnings management. However, there are reasons to believe that the 
impairment-only method offers more discretionary freedom than the amortisation 
method (Watts 2003, Ramanna 2008, Ramanna and Watts 2009, Kothari et al. 
2010). Goodwill-amortisation charges are indeed discretionary in nature, but at a 
discount relative to goodwill-impairment losses. As stated earlier, it is not possible 
to observe the consumption of goodwill. Still, goodwill-amortisation charges are 
believed to be more verifiable and thereby easier to audit. The amortisation plan is 
generally linear and most accounting regimes require a maximum amortisation 
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period of 20 or 40 years.5 Besides, every change in the amortisation plan and the 
effects of such changes on accounting numbers must be revealed in additional 
disclosures. This makes it difficult to employ changes in goodwill amortisation as 
a reporting strategy. Reported impairment losses, however, are easy to manipulate 
and very difficult to audit. As managers generally have superior information about 
the firm’s future prospects, it is difficult for auditors to question estimates and 
assumptions made by the managers regarding impairment testing, if they are not 
clearly unreasonable (Benston et al. 2007).  
 
The flexibility of the impairment regulation is easy to demonstrate. Flexibility is 
given when it comes to the allocation of goodwill to cash-generating units, the 
frequency of impairment testing and the measurement of impairment losses. First, 
impairment test of goodwill can be performed at any date during a year, but has to 
be executed at the same date each year for the same cash-generating unit (IASB 
2008a: IAS 36.90). The choice of test-dates can, therefore, be made according to 
the managers’ reporting strategy. If the managers want to shift earnings from 
future periods to the present by avoiding goodwill-impairment losses, cash-
generating units that operate in seasonal industries should be tested during periods 
of the year where the cash-generating units’ recoverable amounts are at the 
highest.6 In contrast, if managers intend to shift earnings from the present into the 
future by overstating goodwill-impairment losses, impairment-test dates should be 
chosen to minimise the recoverable amounts of the cash-generating units. 
                                           
5 For instance, US-GAAP required that goodwill should be amortised over a period not to exceed 40 years (APB 
1970b), and UK-GAAP has a presumption that goodwill shall not be amortised over more than 20 years (ASB 
1997).  
6 It could be argued that the testing dates make no difference. However, in practice forecasting periods are short and 
terminal values are not necessarily defined as perpetuity. Also, when recoverable amounts are measured using other 
estimates than present values, the testing dates are likely to be relevant.  
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However, the requirement to test each cash-generating unit at the same date each 
year, limits managers’ discretionary freedom.  
 
The regulation offers an exception from estimating the recoverable amounts each 
year. For the exception to take effect, three cumulative requirements must be met 
(IASB 2008a: IAS 36.99). First, assets and liabilities allocated to the units have 
not changed significantly since last time the recoverable amounts were estimated. 
Second, when the recoverable amounts of the cash-generating units were 
estimated the last time, they exceeded the cash-generating units’ carrying amounts 
by substantial margins. Third, an analysis of events and changes in circumstances 
suggests that the probability that the recoverable amounts have fallen below the 
carrying amounts of the units is remote. The managers are, therefore, left with 
discretion to sidestep impairment tests of goodwill. The list of indicators 
suggesting that assets are impaired also provides some discretionary freedom. 
Since a fixed test date for each cash-generating unit might preclude timely 
recognition of impairment losses, IAS 36 provides a non-exhaustive list of 
impairment indicators (IASB 2008a: IAS 36.12). An unscheduled impairment test 
is required when one or more of these indicators suggest that the asset has 
impaired. Since the list is non-exhaustive, managers are free to find additional 
impairment indicators. To the extent that overstated impairment losses are 
consistent with managers’ reporting strategies, the managers have incentives to 
employ events and circumstances other than those listed as impairment indicators.  
 
The allocation of goodwill to cash-generating units may influence the likelihood 
of reporting impairment losses in the future. According to IAS 36, goodwill shall 
be tested for impairment losses at a level of reporting referred to as cash-
generating unit or groups of cash-generating units (IASB 2008a: IAS 36.80). The 
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higher the level of aggregation at which cash-generating units are formed, the 
larger is the probability that a decrease in goodwill will be compensated by 
internally-generated goodwill in another cash-generating unit. Therefore, the level 
at which an entity defines its allocation units for goodwill determines to a large 
extent the likelihood of reporting goodwill-impairment losses in subsequent 
periods (Henning, Shaw and Stock 2004, Zang 2008, Ramanna 2008,  Ramanna 
and Watts 2009).  
 
The most significant discretionary element in the testing procedure relates to the 
estimation of recoverable amounts. The recoverable amount is the higher of the 
value-in-use and the fair value (IASB 2008a: IAS 36.18). The fair value will be an 
observed market value of the cash-generating unit or a market value of a similar 
cash-generating unit. If market values are unavailable, calculating the present 
value of future net cash flows is the best available method to get an estimate of the 
recoverable amount. The present-value technique requires estimates of future cash 
flows, or in more complex cases, expectations about possible variations in the 
amount and timing of the cash flows. In order to achieve more reliability, external 
information should be given more weight than internal information (IASB 2008a: 
IAS 36.33). The present-value technique provides plenty of room for discretionary 
freedom. Even when managers try to estimate unbiased recoverable amounts, the 
problems associated with uncertain future cash flows and risk-adjusted rates are 
serious. This makes it reasonable to question the relevance and reliability of the 
recoverable amounts and by that, the impairment losses calculated upon them 
(Watts 2003).  
 
This section has demonstrated that in most of its facets goodwill-impairment 
testing is a highly discretionary procedure that allows managers to coordinate 
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impairment accounting to their reporting strategy. The discretionary freedom can 
be exploited to understate impairment losses and overstate current earnings and 
net assets or to overstate impairment losses, understate current earnings and net 
assets. Assumptions and estimates and other subjective elements are required at all 
stages (Ramanna 2008, Zang 2008, Ramanna and Watts 2009). This suggests that 
the impairment-only approach provides managers with opportunities to engage in 
earnings management, which may impair the decision usefulness of goodwill 
numbers.  
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3. Value relevance – some fundamentals and 
prior evidence for goodwill 
The value-relevance methodology is supposed to provide some evidence on the 
decision usefulness of accounting for equity valuation. This makes the 
methodology particularly suited for examining the usefulness of accounting 
information under alternative accounting methods. The first part of the chapter 
discusses the fundamentals of value relevance: definitions and interpretations of 
value relevance, the relationship between value relevance and decision usefulness 
and fundamentals of the value-relevance methodology. The second part of the 
chapter discusses prior value-relevance findings for book goodwill, goodwill-
amortisation charges and goodwill-impairment losses. Some evidence on the 
information content of impairment losses and write-downs are also discussed. 
 
3.1. Value relevance defined 
The value-relevance literature is an important part of the research area 
investigating the relationship between financial-accounting information and 
capital markets7, generally referred to as market-based accounting research (Lev 
and Ohlson 1982, Kothari 2001, Beaver 2002). Value-relevance research is 
defined rather broadly. Beaver (2002:459), for instance, states that “[v]alue-
relevance research examines the association between a security-based dependent 
variable and a set of accounting variables. An accounting number is termed 
‘value-relevant’ if it is significantly related to the dependent variable.” Despite 
this, value-relevance research does have some specific characteristics that 
distinguish it from other lines of market-based accounting research such as 
                                           
7 If not stated explicitly, capital markets are equity-capital markets in this dissertation.  
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research on fundamental analysis and market efficiency. First, value-relevance 
research is generally motivated by giving standard-setting implications (Barth, 
Beaver and Landsman 2001). None of the other market-based accounting research 
areas are basically motivated by standard-setting issues. Value-relevance 
researchers will, therefore, need in-depth knowledge about accounting institutions, 
accounting standards and how to construct accounting numbers. Such knowledge 
is generally not required in other areas of market-based accounting research 
(Beaver 2002). Second, the value-relevance methodology is generally based on the 
assumption of market efficiency (Holthausen and Watts 2001). In research on 
fundamental analysis, however, markets are assumed to suffer from imperfections 
which lead to market inefficiency. Moreover, in research investigating market 
efficiency, the degree of efficiency is the object of investigation, rather than being 
a premise of the research methodology. And finally, research on fundamental 
analysis may include all variables that potentially explain current firm values and 
predict future firm values. This research is generally not concerned with whether 
or not price-relevant information is reported in financial statements or reported 
elsewhere. In contrast, value-relevance research has particular focus on whether 
financial statements reflect price-relevant information.  
 
Francis and Schipper (1999) present four interpretations of value relevance. The 
first interpretation contradicts the above characteristics of value relevance. This 
interpretation is based on the premise that accounting information leads stock 
prices by capturing intrinsic values toward which stock prices drift. Value 
relevance is measured as the profit that can be earned by implementing 
accounting-based trading rules, which is close to fundamental analysis. 
Accounting numbers rather than stock prices are assumed to reflect intrinsic 
values, which contradicts the assumption of market efficiency. The difference 
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between accounting numbers and expected future cash flows is considered as 
measurement errors, not as the object of primary interest. This suggests that no 
standard-setting motivations are involved which are inconsistent with the basic 
characteristics of value-relevance research.  
 
The second interpretation by Francis and Schipper (1999) suggests that accounting 
information is value relevant if it contains information that can be used in a 
valuation model or information that can be used to assist in predicting these 
variables. Again, this interpretation is close to fundamental analysis. The fact that 
both value relevance and fundamental-analysis research employ the same 
theoretical valuation models as justification for their regressions may explain why 
some researchers consider value relevance as part of fundamental analysis 
(Kothari 2001). The role of the error term in regressions of stock prices on 
accounting numbers may stress some of the differences between fundamental 
analysis and value relevance. In fundamental analysis the error term is seen as 
other price-relevant variables that should be uncovered in order to enhance the 
valuation model. In value-relevance research the error term might be interpreted as 
insufficient recognition of earnings, assets and liabilities or as measurement errors 
in reported earnings, assets and liabilities. As fundamental analysis has a valuation 
perspective, value relevance has an accounting perspective. Holthausen and Watts 
(2001) claim that value-relevant accounting numbers should either measure equity 
values directly (direct valuation) or provide information useful for that purpose 
(inputs-to-equity valuation). Others, however, argue that value-relevance research 
has no intention to estimate firm value (Barth et al. 2001). This is the objective of 
fundamental analysis. Rather, value-relevance research has the intention to give 
some insight about how well accounting numbers measure firm value or provide 
information about firm value (Barth 2000).  
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The interpretation of Francis and Schipper (1999) also suggests that not only 
studies examining the association between accounting numbers and stock prices 
should be considered as value-relevance studies, but also studies that examine the 
association between accounting numbers and variables used for valuation e.g. 
future earnings, accruals or cash flows. For instance, Finger (1994:210) employs 
an interpretation similar to the one above: “This article examines the value 
relevance of earnings by testing their ability to predict two future benefits of 
equity investment: earnings and cash flows from operations.” Thus, the value 
relevance of earnings “(...) might be measured by the ability of earnings to predict 
future dividends, future cash flows, future earnings, or future book values” 
(Francis and Schipper 1999:325). Jarva (2009) argues that demonstrated 
associations between accounting numbers and future cash flows are direct 
evidence of value relevance. According to him, stock prices are only noisy proxies 
for expected cash flows. They are not themselves cash flows. Others take the 
opposite position. A test of the association between accounting numbers and 
variables used for valuation will not bring direct, but indirect support for value 
relevance. A direct test will be to examine the association between accounting 
numbers and a measure of firm value such as stock prices. As argued by Beisland 
(2009), a demonstrated association between current earnings and say, next year’s 
earnings or next year’s cash flows is not a perfect substitute for a similar 
association between current earnings and stock prices. The reason is that next 
year’s earnings or cash flows are believed to be a noisier estimator of the 
fundamental value of the firm than stock prices. In this dissertation studies 
examining associations between current accounting numbers and future earnings, 
accruals in earnings, cash flows or book-equity values are not considered as part 
of the value-relevance literature.  
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According to interpretation three and four, value relevance is indicated by a 
statistically significant association between accounting numbers and stock prices. 
Interpretation three concerns information-content studies and suggests that value 
relevance is demonstrated if accounting numbers reveal new and relevant 
information to the capital market. Interpretation four concerns long-term 
association studies and suggests that value relevance is demonstrated if accounting 
numbers are capable of capturing and summarising information useful to explain 
or predict firm value (Alciatore et al. 1998, Hitz 2007, Song, Wayne and Yi 2010). 
The information-content studies are often referred to as short-term event studies as 
opposed to long-term event studies 8  (Kothari 2001). These short-term event 
studies provide strong evidence of accounting information playing a role in 
changing investors’ beliefs (Lev 1989). These studies investigate whether 
accounting numbers provide new and relevant information to the capital market 
measured as the market response in short windows surrounding the announcement 
day of that information (Lev 1989, Barth 2000, Kothari 2001, Hitz 2007). Short-
term event studies address other research questions than long-term value relevance 
studies. They provide evidence on the relevance and timeliness of accounting 
numbers. They do not address whether certain items in the financial statements 
such as book goodwill and goodwill-impairment losses capture and summarise 
information reflected in stock prices or whether book goodwill and goodwill-
impairment losses reflect economic assets and economic losses (e.g. Barth 2000, 
Beaver 2002). Long-term value relevance studies, however, typically address 
these issues.  
 
                                           
8 These are not the same as long-term value relevance studies referred to below. Long-term event studies are 
generally investigating post-earnings announcement drift.  
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Short-term event studies will probably not provide evidence useful for standard-
setting deliberations. For instance, it seems unreasonable to exclude items of the 
profit and loss account and the balance sheet simply because the information could 
easily be predicted, and therefore, is not new to the capital market (Barth et al. 
2001, Beaver 2002). Relying on new information as the criterion for accounting 
recognition will probably lead to the exclusion of a lot of assets, liabilities and 
other items from the financial statement. Such exclusions will not be consistent 
with the recognition criteria for assets, liabilities, revenues and charges in the 
conceptual frameworks. Rather, the financial statement is intended to be complete 
within the constraints, the definitions and the recognition criteria of accounting 
(Beaver 2002). One main purpose of this dissertation is to give standard setters 
some indications on the decision usefulness of goodwill-accounting numbers. 
Since the very purpose of conceptual frameworks is to guide standard setters on 
accounting-policy choices, it is reasonable to use these frameworks as reference 
point when choosing the methodological design. A short-term association study 
will provide evidence on the relevance and in particular the timeliness of 
accounting numbers. But such evidence is not particularly relevant to the standard 
setters. A long-term association study, however, is capable of providing evidence 
on the extent to which accounting numbers represent economic fundamentals 
reflected in stock prices. This is more consistent with the recognition criteria 
found in the conceptual frameworks. Still, short-term association studies are not 
totally excluded from this dissertation (See section 3.4.3 and 4.2.1 below). 
Evidence from these studies will be discussed when relevant. 
 
Interpretation four by Francis and Schipper (1999) will serve as basis for a 
definition of value relevance in this dissertation. The chosen definition is as 
follows: An accounting number is considered value relevant if it has a predicted 
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long-term association with stock prices or stock returns. This definition differs 
from some previous definitions of long-term value relevance. For instance, value 
relevance might be defined as the ability of accounting numbers to capture and 
summarise information useful to explain or predict firm value (Alciatore et al. 
1998, Hitz 2007, Song et al. 2010). This definition excludes any concerns about 
timeliness in accounting numbers and will generally lead to a price-level 
regression where stock prices are regressed on accounting numbers. Timeliness is 
particularly important when investigating goodwill-impairment losses (Heflin and 
Warfield 1997, Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks 1998, Li, Shroff and Ventakaraman 
2005). Thus, the chosen value-relevance definition should involve timeliness. 
Long-term association studies might indicate timeliness. For instance, 
significantly negative associations between goodwill-impairment losses and 
contemporaneous stock returns suggest that these losses are relatively timely 
reported (Barth et al. 2001). This suggests that long-term return-earnings 
regressions should be employed along with price-level regressions in this 
dissertation (Barth et al. 2001). A more careful discussion of the price-level and 
return-earnings regressions is given in section 3.3.2.5 below. 
 
According to the chosen definition, two criteria are important in order to 
demonstrate value relevance. The association between the accounting number and 
stock prices or stock returns must be significantly different from zero and with the 
predicted sign (Barth et al. 2001). The latter requirement is generally left out in 
previous definitions of value relevance (e.g. Barth and Landsman 1995, Barth 
2000), but is considered to be important. A simple example may clarify the 
significance of this criterion. The association between book goodwill and stock 
prices is expected to be positive (Amir et al. 1993, Wang 1993, Chauvin and 
Hirschey 1994, Jennings et al. 1996a, Huijgen 1996, Barth and Clinch 1996, 
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Wilkins et al. 1998, Henning et al. 2000, Petersen 2001, 2002, Bugeja and Gallery 
2006, Jifri and Citron 2010). If the association turns out to be significantly 
negative, the first, but not the second criterion is met. Book goodwill has a 
significant coefficient, but the sign of the coefficient is inconsistent with 
expectations and impossible to interpret without additional analyses. According to 
the above definition of value relevance, such a result will reject the hypothesis that 
book goodwill is value relevant.  
 
3.2.  Value relevance – a measure of decision usefulness 
Value-relevance research is supposed to provide some evidence on the decision 
usefulness of accounting numbers (Lev 1989, Barth 2000, Barth et al. 2001, 
Holthausen and Watts 2001, Landsman 2007). The strong faith in the relevance of 
this research for standard setting is demonstrated in the literature review by 
Holthausen and Watts (2001). As much as 54 out of 62 value-relevance articles 
explicitly state that the research is motivated by standard-setting issues. The 
relevance of this research for standard setting might also be indicated by standard 
setters’ own references to the research area. For instance, in the joint conceptual-
framework project of IASB and FASB, the standard setters discuss the extent to 
which faithful representation can be empirically measured. Specifically, they state 
that value-relevance research has “(...) accumulated considerable evidence 
supporting the combination of relevance and faithful representation of accounting 
information for measurement purposes by correlation to market prices and 
changes in them” (IASB 2008f: Exposure Draft of an Improved Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting 2.23). The standard setters also employ results 
from the value-relevance literature when justifying the impairment-only method 
for goodwill: “(…) straight-line amortisation of goodwill over an arbitrary period 
fails to provide useful information. The Board noted that both anecdotal and 
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research evidence supports this view” (IASB 2004d: IFRS 3 BC 140). A parallel 
reference to the value-relevance literature is made by FASB. Still, it is not evident 
that the value-relevance research is useful for standard setting (Holthausen and 
Watts 2001).  
 
In order to discuss the usefulness of this research for standard setting, it is 
necessary to make references to the conceptual frameworks whose purpose is to 
guide standard setters in their accounting-policy decisions. The most important of 
these references are those to the overall objective of financial accounting, the 
financial-statement users and the qualitative characteristics of financial 
accounting. The main objective of financial accounting is to provide decision-
useful information (Ijiri 1983, Lennart 2008). This means that the financial 
statement shall assist the users in making decisions upon the firm (Lennart 2008). 
Information is decision useful if it assists investment-valuation decisions and 
stewardship decisions (Kothari et al. 2010). The financial statement shall provide 
information that meets both purposes (FASB 1978, IASB 1989).  Some argue, 
however, that the information needs for investment valuation are rather different 
from the information needs for stewardship. Investment valuation will obviously 
require forward-looking information, whereas stewardship will require more 
backward-looking information (Beaver and Demski 1979, Kirk 1998). This 
suggests a conflict between these two demands of information. Gjesdal (1981) 
supports this view. He argues that these two demands require different sets of 
information. A similar view is given by Ijiri (1983). He points out important 
differences between investment valuation and stewardship: More information is 
better in investment valuation as long as the benefits of additional information 
exceed the costs. This is not necessarily the case under stewardship: “(...) the 
accountee has certain right to know; at the same time, the accountor has a right to 
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protect privacy. More information about the accountor is not necessarily better. It 
is perhaps better from the standpoint of the accountee but not necessarily from the 
overall accountability relation” (Ijiri 1983:75). He also argues that subjective 
non-verifiable information is insufficient in meeting the stewardship demand, but 
not necessarily in meeting the investment-valuation demand. Kothari et al. (2010) 
argue that there might be a conflict between these two demands, but that 
information relevant for stewardship may also have relevance for valuation 
purposes.  
 
Others, however, argue that no conflict exists. Gore (1992), for instance, claims 
that the stewardship demand is met if the investment-valuation demand is met. 
Lennart (2008) takes a similar position. He does admit, however, that the 
exclusion of stewardship incurs the risk that those who argue for the inclusion of 
information required for an assessment of stewardship will be placed at a 
disadvantage. According to him, stewardship and investment valuation are 
complementary demands rather than contradictory demands. A similar position is 
taken by IASB and FASB in their discussion paper on a new conceptual 
framework (IASB 2006). They argue that the information needed for investment 
valuation will also be needed for stewardship. However, this argument led to 
massive criticism from commentators, which eventually led to the inclusion of 
stewardship as a separate objective in the exposure draft of the conceptual 
framework (IASB 2008e). Thus, there is no general agreement that the 
investment-valuation demand and the stewardship demand are met by the same set 
of accounting information. Rather, it is likely that any attempt to meet both the 
investment valuation and the stewardship demand will be too ambitious (Aitken 
1990, Kvifte 2003). A preference for one of these two is probably necessary. In 
recent years, the leading standard setters have expanded fair-value accounting to 
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assets and liabilities where no observable market prices are available, which has 
led to a more excessive use of non-verifiable fair-value estimates. This suggests 
that the standard setters have de-emphasised stewardship relative to investment 
valuation (Lambert 2010). This de-emphasis is not uncontroversial (Kothari et al. 
2010).  
 
The financial statement has a wide range of potential users such as investors, 
creditors, suppliers, employees, management, regulatory authorities, financial 
press and the public (e.g. FASB 1978). Both FASB and IASB consider investors 
as primary users of financial statements (FASB 1978, IASB 1989). Investors are 
current and potential shareholders. FASB also includes creditors who consist of all 
sorts of debtholders such as lending institutions, individual lenders, trade creditors 
and customers and employees with claims (FASB 1978). This broader view of 
primary users is also found in the exposure draft of the conceptual framework. In 
this draft capital providers are defined as the primary users of financial statements 
(IASB 2008e). There are at least three arguments for this narrow focus. First, the 
objective and users of financial statements need to be focused to avoid being too 
vague and abstract (FASB 1978). Second, the different users will obviously 
demand different information and in some cases these demands will be conflicting 
(Holthausen and Watts 2001, Kothari et al. 2010). Based on this premise, it can be 
argued that it is impossible to meet all demands (Aitken 1990, Kothari et al. 2010). 
And finally, the narrow focus is justified by the notion that the information needs 
of investors (and creditors) are so comprehensive that meeting their needs will 
meet most of the needs of other users of financial statements (IASB 1989). Even 
narrowing down the primary users to investors and creditors will not remove the 
problems of balancing different users’ needs of information. Creditors are 
generally more interested in debt valuation and default risk than equity valuation. 
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Hence, it is not apparent that decision usefulness of a piece of accounting 
information is the same for investors and creditors (Holthausen and Watts 2001, 
Watts 2003, Kothari et al. 2010). Creditors will probably demand more 
conservative and verifiable accounting information (Watts 2003, Kothari et al. 
2010). The recent trend to allow excessive use of unverifiable fair-value 
accounting suggests that the information needs of investors are emphasised more 
than the information needs of creditors (Lambert 2010). This justifies the 
emphasis on investors’ needs of information in this dissertation.  
 
Relevance and reliability are the two fundamental criteria of decision usefulness 
(Solomons 1986, Barth et al. 2001, Liang 2001, Barley and Haddad 2003). These 
criteria can be used to distinguish more from less decision-useful information. If 
the information lacks relevance and/or reliability, it will not be useful for decision 
making. Recently, the leading standard setters, IASB and FASB, have replaced 
reliability by faithful representation (IASB 2008e). The new framework is not yet 
effective. This justifies the use of the previous conceptual frameworks of IASB 
and FASB as references when discussing the qualitative characteristics.  
 
A piece of information is considered relevant if it makes an impact on the decision 
maker in a particular situation. Relevant information must be “(…) capable of 
making a difference in a decision by helping users to form predictions about the 
outcomes of past, present, and future events or to confirm or correct expectations” 
(FASB 1980:2.47). This makes relevance the most important criterion for decision 
usefulness. If information lacks relevance, it makes little difference what other 
qualities it has. The information will still lack decision usefulness (FASB 1976). 
Relevant information must have predictive value and/or feedback value and 
timeliness. The predictive value is necessary for the information to be useful for 
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valuation purposes. The feedback value, however, will involve both the valuation 
and the stewardship role of accounting. The other main qualitative characteristic, 
reliability, is interpreted as the degree of confidence that can be placed on the 
accounting information (FASB 1976:155). Verifiability, faithful representation 
and neutrality are all parts of reliability. Verifiability is “(...) a quality that may be 
demonstrated by a high degree of consensus among independent measurers using 
the same measurement methods” (Sterling 1975:30). Verifiability is, therefore, an 
assurance for the users that the accounting information represents what it purports 
to represent. Faithful representation, the second element of reliability, has a 
conceptual meaning close to validity (Benston et al. 2007). And finally, neutrality 
can be interpreted as representational accuracy (Solomons 1978).  
 
The value-relevance methodology is supposed to aid standard setters when making 
accounting-policy deliberations. In order to do so, value-relevance studies must 
provide evidence on the decision usefulness of accounting information, which 
necessitates tests of relevance and reliability (Barth 2000, Barth et al. 2001, Barth 
2007). However, value-relevance studies are not intended to provide sufficient 
evidence for making policy decisions. Standard setting involves complex social-
welfare concerns which are not considered in value-relevance studies (Lev 1989, 
Barth 2000, Barth et al. 2001, Barth 2007, Scott 2012:153). The value-relevance 
research can, however, be helpful when identifying policy issues. The research can 
also help standard setters in structuring their thinking about particular policy 
issues and provide evidence that speaks to particular policy issues (Barth 2000, 
Barth 2007). Value relevance might be seen as empirical operationalisation of key 
dimensions in the conceptual framework (Barth et al. 2001). The research 
emphasises equity investors and equity valuation (Holthausen and Watts 2001). 
This does not suggest, however, that the value-relevance researchers consider 
  
88 
other uses of financial-accounting information such as stewardship uses as less 
important. Rather, the emphasis on equity valuation is a result of wellknown 
limitations in value-relevance methodology and findings. Significant associations 
between accounting numbers and stock prices will provide evidence on the 
valuation usefulness of these numbers, not the stewardship usefulness. This 
implies that there are limits to what can be learned from value-relevance research 
(Holthausen and Watts 2001). For instance, the usefulness of particular accounting 
numbers in contracting such as management-compensation contracts and debt 
contracts cannot be learned from value-relevance findings. But this does not imply 
that value relevance is of no use when making policy deliberations (Barth et al. 
2001). The recent trends towards fair-value accounting suggest that the standard 
setters consider investment valuation as the primary use of accounting and 
investors as the primary users (Barth 2006, Lambert 2010). Conservatism is not a 
primary accounting principle and verifiability is no longer a primary qualitative 
characteristic in financial accounting (Kothari et al. 2010). Given this, value-
relevance studies are probably more suited to provide useful evidence for standard 
setting today and in the future, than some years ago. Thus, the argument presented 
by Lee (2001:13) does not seem to be fully valid: “Until accounting regulators 
decide that reported earnings should include anticipated profits from future 
exchanges (that is, until we abandon the “revenue recognition principle), it is 
difficult to see how higher correlation with contemporaneous returns should have 
any standard-setting implications.” The proposed conceptual framework and the 
excessive use of fair value suggest otherwise.  
 
The value-relevance methodology is supposed to provide tests of relevance and 
reliability. Barth et al. (2001:81) state that “(…) value relevance indicates that the 
accounting amount is relevant and reliable.”  But, they emphasise that it can be 
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difficult to attribute the cause of lack of value relevance to either of these two 
qualitative characteristics. The same notion is found in Barth (2000:17): “It is 
often difficult to distinguish relevance and reliability. For an accounting amount 
to be value-relevant, it must be relevant to investors and sufficiently reliable to be 
reflected in the value measure, i.e. share price. Failure to detect a significant 
relation between the amount and the equity value could be attributable to lack of 
relevance, lack of reliability, or both. However, in some cases relevance is a 
maintained assumption and failure to find that the item is significantly associated 
with value is attributed to lack of reliability.” Following Barth (2000), Wyatt 
(2008:217-8) argues that value relevance provides evidence of relevance and to 
some extent reliability: “(...) if the information items of interest are significantly 
associated with the information set that was used by investors to value the 
company, we can infer that information as relevant (…). This statistical 
association with stock price also suggests that information is reliable enough to be 
value-relevant.”  
 
The close relation between value relevance and the quality characteristic, 
relevance, is also prominent in the discussion of Francis and Schipper (1999). In 
their article they are concerned with the decline in value relevance over the past 
decades. They emphasise that there is a close relation between value relevance and 
relevance as a qualitative characteristic of accounting information: “If the 
relevance of financial statement information has declined over time, we expect to 
observe a decline in its ability to explain the cross-sectional variation in security 
returns. Relatedly, following research which models the market price of equity as 
a function of asset and liability book values, we expect that if the relevance of 
balance sheet information has declined over time, the ability of these variables to 
explain market equity will also decline” (Francis and Schipper 1999:321). 
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An accounting number is considered to be relevant if it has predictive value and/or 
feedback value and timeliness. Given semi-strong market efficiency, stock prices 
will reflect all information available in the public domain concerning the firms’ 
future prospects. This suggests that a value-relevant accounting number will have 
predictive value. It is, however, less clear whether value relevance demonstrates 
feedback value. To have feedback value the accounting number must reflect 
backward-looking rather than forward-looking information.  
 
The last element of relevance is timeliness. Some researchers question the extent 
to which value relevance demonstrates timeliness (Beaver 2002, Hitz 2007). 
Timeliness is claimed not to be of particular concern in value-relevance studies 
(Beaver 2002). This is true when price-levels regressions are employed to 
investigate the long-term associations between accounting numbers and stock 
prices. Such a research design will provide evidence on the accounting numbers’ 
ability to summarise information that is reflected in stock prices. When return 
regressions rather than price-level regressions are employed, significant 
associations between accounting numbers and stock returns will indicate both 
value relevance and timeliness (Barth et al. 2001). For instance, a significant 
negative association between goodwill-impairment losses and contemporaneous 
stock returns suggests that these losses are value relevant and timely reported. 
Timeliness can also be investigated by testing the long-term association between 
accounting numbers and led/lagged stock return (e.g. Chen, Kohlbeck and 
Warfield 2004). Short-term event studies, however, have timeliness as primary 
focus. These studies investigate whether accounting numbers reflect new, relevant 
and thereby timely information to the capital market (Barth 2000, Beaver 2002).  
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This suggests that value-relevance studies are appropriate to investigate the 
relevance of accounting information. But it is more debatable whether they 
provide evidence on reliability. Some researchers claim that they do. For instance, 
Barth et al. (2001:81) state that “[r]ejecting the null of no significance (…) is 
interpreted as evidence that the accounting amount is relevant and not totally 
unreliable.” In earlier value-relevance research somewhat stronger confidence 
was placed on the test of reliability. The study by Barth and Clinch (1996) may 
serve as an example. They conduct an international comparison study where they 
investigate the value relevance of alternative accounting methods for a set of 
controversial issues in financial accounting, among these accounting for goodwill 
and asset revaluations. When discussing the test of reliability, they state that “(…) 
even if the economic construct purportedly represented by an accounting measure 
is relevant to investors in valuing firms’ equity, it will not be reflected in share 
prices or returns if it is not sufficiently reliable. Consequently, observing 
estimated coefficients that differ from our expectations can be interpreted as 
evidence for the measures’ reliability” (Barth and Clinch 1996:137). Similar 
arguments are found in the concluding section of the article: “UK revaluations are 
not positively correlated with information investors’ use in setting share prices. 
Because we expect revalued amounts to be value relevant, these findings suggest 
that revalued amounts are unreliable, perhaps attributed to management 
discretion over timing, estimated amounts, and which assets to revalue” (Barth 
and Clinch 1996:141). This shows strong beliefs that this research provides 
evidence on relevance and reliability. Others, however, argue that little can be 
learned from value-relevance studies when it comes to reliability in accounting 
numbers (Holthausen and Watts 2001, Dahmash, Durand and Watson 2009). 
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Reliability consists of three elements: verifiability, faithful representation and 
neutrality. Holthausen and Watts (2001) claim that value-relevance studies pay no 
attention to verifiability and thereby reliability. Verifiability is an assurance for the 
users that the accounting information represents what it purports to represent. In 
value-relevance studies, however, reliability is tested and interpreted as faithful 
representation. The way value relevance is tested supports this argument. Given 
sufficient market efficiency, stock prices are supposed to reflect information about 
expected future net cash flows. A significant association between accounting 
numbers and these stock prices suggests that accounting numbers faithfully depict 
these expected cash flows. Verifiability is not a necessary condition for faithful 
representation and, therefore, not part of the value-relevance test.  
 
A direct test of verifiability is difficult to establish. Wyatt (2008:223) suggests that 
a comparison of “(...) the regression coefficient for the (...) item with the size of 
the coefficient for more reliable assets” might be a proper way to examine 
reliability. The higher the coefficient, the more reliable is the accounting number. 
This does not seem to solve the problem, namely to distinguish relevance and 
reliability and to address verifiability. A higher coefficient could be interpreted as 
understated net earnings or net-asset values, which is inconsistent with reliability 
(e.g. Jennings, Simko, Thompson  1996, Dahmash et al. 2009). Other studies 
address the issue of reliability by examining the extent to which the regression 
coefficient of the accounting number differs from its theoretical coefficient of -1 
or +1 (e.g. Landsman 1986, Barth, Beaver and Landsman 1992, Barth and Clinch 
1996, Easton 1998, Dahmash et al. 2009). In these studies, rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the empirical and theoretical coefficients are the same is 
interpreted as evidence that the accounting number of interest fails to reflect the 
characteristics of the economic fundamentals. For instance, Dahmash et al. 
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(2009:121) state that when “(...) a coefficient is significantly less than or greater 
than “1”, we assume the asset is reported with bias and, therefore not reliably 
reported.” These studies, however, test faithful representation rather than 
verifiability.  
 
This suggests that the value-relevance methodology offers insufficient tests of 
verifiability and thereby reliability. Holthausen and Watts (2001:28) stress this in 
particular and argue that the “(...) failure to consider the potential of verifiability 
of the numbers in value-relevance studies could lead to misleading results.” 
Higher degree of verifiability is supposed to prevent misrepresentation due to 
earnings management. As stated by Holhausen and Watts (2001:30): 
“Misrepresentation in financial statements occurs because the management 
responsible for preparing the statements has better information than both the 
auditor and the investors and has an incentive to misrepresent.” This highlights 
the importance to look for other factors that may influence the degree of 
misrepresentation and to include additional test designs that investigate the 
importance of these factors. This is particularly important for highly discretionary 
items such as goodwill-impairment losses. Obvious candidates are earnings-
management incentives and corporate-governance mechanisms. These are 
supposed to have opposite effects on the degree of misrepresentation. As earnings-
management incentives are supposed to increase the likelihood of 
misrepresentation, efficient corporate-governance mechanisms are supposed to 
reduce misrepresentation. Both are carefully discussed in chapter four.  
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3.3. Value relevance – assumptions and test design 
As stated previously, value-relevance research investigates the relationship 
between accounting numbers and stock prices (Barth 2000, Barth et al. 2001, 
Fung, Su and Zhu 2010). This relationship is expressed in table 3.1 below: 
 
Table 3.1 Value relevance – formal expressions 
 
1)(   AIMV  
2)(   AIR  
 
 
 
A demonstrated association between accounting numbers and stock prices is 
interpreted as evidence of accounting numbers capturing and summarising 
economic fundamentals reflected in stock prices. A typical long-term association 
study investigates the association between goodwill-impairment losses and stock 
prices. A demonstrated negative association suggests that reported losses capture 
economic impairment reflected in stock prices. No assumption, however, is made 
about causality (Lev 1989, Kothari 2001, Scott 2012:160-1). Thus, a significant 
association should not be interpreted as these losses have affected the market 
perception of the firm. Rather, it suggests that these losses are associated with 
economic impairment already reflected in these stock prices. This distinguishes 
long-term value relevance studies from event studies. In event studies the 
assumption of causality is essential. In short-term event studies, often referred to 
as short-term information content studies, the causality is ensured by investigating 
where 
 
MV  = Market price of equity. 
R = Market return on equity. 
AI = Accounting number. 
m  = Residual term of equation m where   . 
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abnormal stock returns and/or changes in trading volume in narrow windows 
centred on the announcement day. Significant abnormal returns and/or changes in 
trading volume are interpreted as new and relevant information affecting stock 
prices. In long-term event studies, however, causality is far more difficult to 
establish. Demonstrated abnormal returns over one up to five years subsequent to 
an event will potentially be affected by other price-relevant information (Kothari 
2001). Clearly, two elements are needed in a value-relevance study: A benchmark 
believed to reflect economic fundamentals to assess the usefulness of accounting 
numbers for equity valuation, and a model which maps the accounting numbers to 
this benchmark (Barth 2000, Barth et al. 2001, Holthausen and Watts 2001). The 
benchmark is generally the firm’s stock prices or stock returns (Barth 2000). The 
following sections discuss the assumption of market efficiency and the theoretical 
models used as reference when constructing value-relevance regressions. 
 
3.3.1. The assumption of market efficiency 
There are two perspectives on the role of financial accounting as an information 
provider in value-relevance research: the information perspective and the 
measurement perspective. The information perspective considers financial 
statements as one of numerous sources of price-relevant information that are 
quickly and fully reflected in stock prices. This perspective is based on the 
assumption of semi-strongly efficient stock markets. The more information is 
reported in financial statements, the better. Whether the information is reported in 
the profit and loss account, in the balance sheet or as additional disclosure is 
irrelevant as long as sufficient information is reported to uncover its economic 
implications (Barth 2000, Liang 2001, Hitz 2007).  
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The measurement perspective is motivated by research findings suggesting that 
the capital market is less than semi-strongly efficient. In this perspective, 
accounting becomes even more important than in the information perspective. 
Accounting information is now considered as numerical inputs in valuation 
models (Hitz 2007). The fundamental notion underlying this perspective is that 
accounting should directly measure and report the basic information required by 
investors for equity valuation, which is fair-value estimates of assets and liabilities 
(Barth 2000, Liang 2001, Hitz 2007). As studies under the information perspective 
investigate how well accounting numbers summarise and capture information that 
might be available from other sources, the measurement perspective will 
investigate how accurately reported assets and liabilities reflect their economic 
counterparts. This may lead to different predictions. Taking the information 
perspective, a typical hypothesis will be that the associations between accounting 
numbers and stock prices are significantly different from zero. Assets are 
predicted to have significantly positive coefficients, whereas liabilities are 
predicted to have significantly negative coefficients (Barth 2000, Holthausen and 
Watts 2001). Under the measurement perspective, the coefficients on assets and 
liabilities are generally predicted to equal +1 and -1, respectively (Barth 2000, 
Holthausen and Watts 2001).  
 
In both perspectives, the value-relevance methodology needs to be based on a 
certain degree of market efficiency (Lev 1989, Barth et al. 2001, Holthausen and 
Watts 2001, Wyatt 2008, Fung et al. 2010). Holthausen and Watts (2001:18) argue 
that “(...) it is necessary for all the [value relevance] studies to assume at least 
that capital markets are reasonably efficient. Otherwise the variables reflected in 
stock prices would not be good estimates of variables of interests or good 
benchmarks of standard setting.” There is at least one concern that must be paid 
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attention to in relation to market efficiency and value-relevance research. 
Mounting evidence suggests that the capital markets are inefficient. This leads to 
several important questions: Which implications does market inefficiency have for 
value-relevance research? Is it possible to relax the assumption of semi-strong 
market efficiency? Are there any adjustments to stock prices that could potentially 
correct for inefficiency, and are there other candidates than stock prices that can 
serve as proxy for economic fundamentals? The evidence on market efficiency 
and the consequences of lack of market efficiency for value-relevance research are 
discussed below. 
 
3.3.1.1. Empirical findings on market efficiency 
Capital-market efficiency implies that price-relevant information is quickly and 
fully reflected in stock prices. The market-efficiency theory is based on the 
mechanisms and forces of arbitrage. If a piece of price-relevant information is not 
yet incorporated in the current stock price, there will be powerful economic 
incentives to uncover it and to trade on it. Consequently, the stock price will adjust 
until it fully reflects all available price-relevant information. This implies that 
capital markets might be efficient to some information systems, but not to others 
(Fama 1970, Ball 1972, Beaver 1998). Market efficiency should, therefore, be 
assessed for a given set of available information. For instance, the capital market 
may well be efficient when it comes to immediate reflection of price-relevant 
accounting information. But the market may be inefficient when it comes to 
private information (i.e. insider information). Fama (1970) classifies market 
efficiency in three different forms: weak, semi-strong and strong. If the capital 
market is strongly efficient, which is an unrealistic assumption, all information, 
even private information held by the managers, is reflected in stock prices. All 
information is already in the public domain. Thus, there is no information 
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asymmetry, and thereby, no need for accounting (Ronen 1974, Bromvich 1977, 
Barth and Landsman 1995, Field et al. 2001). If the capital market is semi-strongly 
efficient, however, financial statements become an important low-cost provider of 
information. Under semi-strong efficiency, all publicly available information, 
including financial-accounting information, is reflected in stock prices. The more 
private information that is made publicly available, e.g. through financial 
statements, the more information is reflected in stock prices (Beaver 2002). 
 
Market-efficiency tests found in the accounting literature fall into two categories: 
event studies and cross-sectional tests of return predictability (Kothari 2001). 
These studies provide tests of semi-strong market efficiency. Event studies 
comprise short-term and long-term event studies. These studies investigate 
abnormal returns over narrow windows surrounding the event (short-term event 
studies) or over longer periods following the event (long-term event studies). The 
investigated events could be earnings announcements, dividend announcements, 
announcements of restructuring or merger plans or announced changes in 
accounting methods. Cross-sectional tests of return predictability investigate 
whether accounting-based trading rules can be used to form portfolios of stocks 
that perform abnormal returns. Such tests generally use accrual measures or 
market-to-book ratios to form these portfolios (Kothari 2001, Beaver 2002). Both 
lines of literature are discussed briefly below. Other literature investigating 
capital-market efficiency may also be relevant. Still, the primary concern is 
whether the capital market is efficient when it comes to reflecting accounting 
information; not information from other sources than the financial statement.  
 
Short-term event studies provide joint tests of information content and market 
efficiency. Given price-relevant information, event studies bring evidence on the 
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impact, speed and unbiasedness of the market reaction to that information. Strong 
evidence is found for quick and unbiased market responses to earnings 
announcements, merger and restructuring announcements and dividend 
announcements (Kothari 2001). Still, these studies do have some methodological 
challenges. An important issue is to ensure that the event, for instance the earnings 
announcement, is not published simultaneously with other announcements (Lev 
1989). This may confound the association between the short-window abnormal 
return and the event. The second issue is to identify the day on which the 
information is actually revealed to the capital market. To avoid missing the actual 
day, the return window is usually set equal to a few days centred on the 
announcement day.  
 
The evidence from short-term event studies supports semi-strong market 
efficiency (Kothari 2001). The studies by Lee (1992) and Landsman and Maydew 
(2002) may serve as illustrative examples. Lee (1992) uses intra-day returns and 
trading-volume data to investigate the market reactions to earnings 
announcements. He reports a statistically significant price reaction of the same 
sign as the earnings surprise within 30 minutes of the earnings announcement. No 
statistically discernible price effect is discovered afterwards. The shift in trading 
volume is also short-lived: less than two hours for large trades and a few hours for 
small trades. Landsman and Maydew (2002) investigate the market reactions to 
earnings announcements over three decades. They find that stock-return volatility 
and trading volume are significantly larger on earnings-announcement days and 
that the activity reverts to normal immediately afterwards. 
 
Long-term event studies generally investigate post-announcement drifts in stock 
returns following an event. There are several potential reasons for the post-
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announcement drift. Likely candidates are economic irrationality among the 
investors and market frictions. A post-announcement drift can be defined as the 
predictability of abnormal returns following certain events (Kothari 2001). 
Numbers of studies have demonstrated large abnormal returns following well-
published events such as earnings announcements, initial public offerings (IOPs), 
seasoned public offerings (SPOs) and analysts’ long-term forecasts (Kothari 
2001). These findings seriously challenge the market-efficiency hypothesis. Post-
announcement drift is found to have the same sign as unexpected earnings in 
earnings announcements. This has led to the general conclusion that capital 
markets underreact to earnings announcements.  
 
Important seminal articles discussing post-announcement drift are Rendleman, 
Jones and Latane (1987), Freeman and Tse (1989) and Bernard and Thomas 
(1989, 1990). Bernard and Thomas (1989) investigate the post-announcement drift 
in changes in quarterly earnings. Earnings surprises are calculated as the 
difference between earnings for a given quarter one year and earnings of the same 
quarter the previous year. They demonstrate that buying stocks in firms reporting 
surprisingly high quarterly earnings, selling short stocks in firms reporting 
surprisingly low quarterly earnings and holding this position for 60 days following 
the announcement, will give a significantly high abnormal return. As Bernard and 
Thomas (1989) point out, it is a wellknown fact that quarterly-seasonal earnings 
changes are positively correlated. Thus, if a firm reports surprisingly high earnings 
this quarter compared to the same quarter last year, it is likely that its future 
quarter earnings will be surprisingly high as well. Rational investors should 
anticipate this and be willing to bid up the price of the firms’ stocks in response to 
surprisingly high quarterly earnings, but Bernard and Thomas (1989) find that this 
is not the case. These findings suggest that the capital market underestimates the 
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positive correlation between quarterly earnings changes (Bernard and Thomas 
1989, 1990, Ball and Bartov 1996). Surprisingly, the post-announcement drift has 
not disappeared even several decades after its first discovery (e.g. 
Narayanamoorhy 2006). Later studies, however, have found that the significance 
of the announcement drift varies according to certain characteristics of the firms 
and the capital market. Bhushan (1994) for instance, demonstrates that the post-
announcement drift is mainly driven by relatively smaller firms, firms with stocks 
having relatively larger bid-ask spreads, stocks that are less frequently traded and 
less closely followed by analysts. Other studies report evidence suggesting that the 
post-announcement drift is less strong in firms having more institutional 
ownership (Bartov, Radhakrisknan and Krinsky 2000) and more timely analysts’ 
forecast revisions (Zhang 2008). This last finding is consistent with Bhushan 
(1994). The results for short-term and long-term event studies are puzzling. The 
short-term event studies demonstrate evidence consistent with market efficiency. 
In constrast, the long-term event studies suggest the opposite that price-relevant 
information is reflected in stock prices with substantial time lag following the 
events. This last evidence is inconsistent with market efficiency (Beaver 2002).  
 
One potential reason for these contradicting results is different methodology. 
Long-term event studies are believed to suffer from more serious methodological 
problems than short-term event studies. Likely problems in long-term event 
studies are omitted variables and survivorship bias (Lev 1989, Kothari 2001). 
Post-announcement drifts could be due to an omitted priced risk factor. The 
omission of this risk factor will affect the estimate of expected return and thereby 
the estimate of abnormal return. Thus, the post-announcement drift could be the 
result of an under or misspecified return model rather than evidence of market 
inefficiency (Kothari 2001). In contrast, short-term event studies are believed to 
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suffer from fewer problems of misestimated expected returns (e.g. Brown and 
Warner 1985). Common expected return in short-term event studies is about 
0.05% per day. The misestimation of expected return due to risk mismeasurement 
is likely to be less than 0.01-0.02% per day. This is small compared to a common 
abnormal return of 0.5% in these studies (Kothari 2001). Due to fewer 
methodological problems, more confidence can be placed on the evidence from 
short-term event studies than the evidence from long-term event studies. Despite 
this, there is no doubt that the mounting evidence on the post-announcement drift 
still represents a serious challenge to the market-efficiency hypothesis.  
 
A different line of literature investigates market responses to accounting-method 
changes. These studies are similar to the event studies in that they investigate the 
market response to a certain event, in this case, change in accounting methods. 
The accounting-method changes have no (apparent) cash-flow effects. An efficient 
capital market is, therefore, predicted not to be misled by its effects on net 
earnings and net-asset values. Thus, no market response to accounting-method 
changes is consistent with an efficient capital market (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986:72, 1990, Beaver 1998: 135, Kothari et al. 2010). These tests, however, are 
problematic. Changes in accounting methods are not exogenous, but endogenous. 
A voluntary change in accounting methods could reflect opportunistic reporting 
incentives or signalling incentives. Likewise, a mandatory change in accounting 
methods could be the result of lobbying effort of different interest groups (Watts 
and Zimmerman 1986). For instance, the decision to capitalise research and 
development costs could be driven by the desire to affect the outcomes of 
earnings-based compensation contracts. Alternatively, capitalisation might signal 
that the research and development activity is expected to provide economic 
benefits. This suggests that accounting-method changes might have cash-flow 
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effects. Early studies, however, report findings consistent with market efficiency. 
Ball (1972), for instance, investigates accounting changes in net earnings and 
reports no significant market response to these changes, which is consistent with 
market efficiency. Likewise, Beaver and Duke (1973) find no significant market 
response to changes in depreciation methods. Some later evidence is inconsistent 
with the market-efficiency hypothesis. For instance, capital markets are not found 
to be able to undo the effects on net earnings when firms choose between pooling 
and purchase accounting. Vincent (1997) compares price-earnings ratios of firms 
using the pooling-of-interests method with those using the purchase method for 
business combinations. The earnings numbers of the pooling-method firms are 
restated as if these firms used the purchase method. She finds that the price-
earnings ratios of the pooling-method firms are higher than those for purchase-
method firms, suggesting that firms using the purchase method are placed at a 
disadvantage. Taken together, the results on accounting-method changes and 
market efficiency are somewhat mixed and inconclusive (Kothari 2001).  
 
The evidence on market responses to accounting accruals is mainly found to be 
inconsistent with market efficiency. These studies are not considered as event 
studies. Rather, they are investigating cross-sectional predictability of abnormal 
returns without addressing particular events (Kothari 2001). Sloan (1996) is an 
important seminal study in this line of literature. Net earnings consist of cash 
flows and net accruals. The cash-flow component is found to be more persistent 
and less likely to be incurred by measurement errors than the accrual component 
in net earnings. Since accruals are less persistent and more subject to measurement 
errors than cash flows, the capital market is predicted to respond more strongly to 
changes in earnings caused by the cash-flow component in earnings than the 
accrual component. Sloan (1996) reports evidence inconsistent with these 
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predictions. Rather, the evidence suggests that the capital market overestimates the 
persistence of accruals and underestimates the persistence of cash flows. This 
questions whether the capital market effectively distinguishes high from low 
quality earnings. Lev and Nissim (2006) report evidence consistent with Sloan 
(1996), but they conclude that the accrual anomaly is less severe for firms having 
institutional investors. In contrast, Kraft, Leone and Wasley (2007) report 
evidence inconsistent with Sloan (1996) and Lev and Nissim (2006). They add 
variables such as capital expenditures to the analysis and find that the mispricing 
of accruals disappears. A recent survey by Kothari et al. (2010) questions whether 
prior research findings can reject the market-efficiency hypothesis. They conclude 
that an overwhelming body of evidence suggests that stock prices largely 
anticipate the economic substance of the information in financial statements. They 
argue that “(...) the evidence of market inefficiency is much like waves over deep 
sea waters – the tranquillity of deep waters underneath swamps any indication of 
turbulence from waves on the top” (Kothari et al 2010:278). Still, it is reasonable 
to question whether the capital markets are efficient.  
 
3.3.1.2. Market efficiency and value-relevance methodology 
The evidence against capital-market efficiency may have serious implications for 
value-relevance research. Lee (2001) argues that a naïve assumption of strong 
market efficiency, in which stock price is assumed to equal fundamental value, is 
an inadequate conceptual starting point for future market-related research. 
According to Lee (2001), it is an over-simplification that fails to capture the 
richness of market-pricing dynamics and the process of price discovery. Instead, 
he suggests that the market-efficiency puzzle should be seen as a fruitful way for 
further research. For instance, he suggests that researchers within the value-
  
105 
relevance area should derive independent measures of fundamental value, rather 
than assume market efficiency.  
 
The study by Aboody, Hughes and Liu (2002) is motivated by Lee (2001). They 
examine the extent to which measures of value relevance are affected by market 
inefficiency. First, they examine analytically the impact of market inefficiency on 
the estimation of the coefficients in value-relevance regressions and derive an 
adjustment procedure that potentially corrects bias caused by this inefficiency. The 
procedure adjusts current stock prices for future risk-adjusted stock-price changes 
and provides value-relevance estimates that capture both current and delayed 
market reactions. Delayed market reactions may occur if the market is inefficient. 
Second, they apply this procedure on three types of studies that have attracted 
much attention. Studies which investigate value relevance of earnings and book 
values, value relevance of residual-income estimates and value relevance of 
accruals and cash flows. The procedure adjusts current stock price with the ratio of 
one plus the actual stock return to one plus the required rate of stock return, both 
measured in the future period   where   is set equal to 12, 24 or 36 months. 
Significant differences are found when comparing results from conventional 
value-relevance regressions with those regressions with adjusted stock price. 
Specifically, they report that regression coefficients on both earnings and book 
equity value increase significantly when employing the adjustment procedure.  
 
Other recent studies try to develop a measure of fundamental value (Subramanyam 
and Venkatachalam 2007, Fung et al. 2010). For instance, Subramanyam and 
Venkatachalam (2007) develop a model for estimating fundamental values based 
on the dividend-discount model. Their model measures fundamental value as the 
sum of the present value of dividends for the next three years and the present value 
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of stock price in three years. Fung et al. (2010) employ this measure and 
investigate the difference between stock prices and these estimates of fundamental 
value. The difference is found to increase over time and in proxies for noise 
trading and information uncertainty. The difference, however, is less serious for 
larger firms. They investigate the demonstrated decline in value relevance reported 
in prior studies (e.g. Lev and Zarowin 1999, Francis and Schipper 1999).  When 
they replace the stock price with the measure of fundamental value, they do not 
find that the associations between this measure and accounting numbers have 
declined. Instead, they argue that the decline in value relevance found in prior 
studies is evidence of stock pricing becoming a worsening measure of firms’ 
fundamental value over time.  
 
These studies demonstrate some compelling evidence. Still, there are reasons why 
stock prices might be preferable to these alternative measures of fundamental 
value. First, these alternative measures have not become standard in recent value-
relevance research. A number of recent value-relevance studies has not employed 
this adjustment procedure (e.g. Barth, Landsman and Lang 2008, Kumar and 
Krishnan 2008, Jifri and Citron 2009, Kang and Zhao 2010, Song et al. 2010), 
even though there are exceptions (e.g. Gjerde, Knivsflå and Sættem 2008, 2011, 
Fung et al. 2010). Second, these measures might suffer from measurement errors. 
There are two alternative explanations of the improved associations between these 
measures of fundamental value (e.g. Aboody et al. 2002, Subramanyam and 
Venkatachalam 2007) and accounting numbers. It could be that these measures are 
better at reflecting fundamental value as advocated by Aboody et al. (2002), 
Subramanyam and Venkatachalam (2007) and Fung et al. (2010). Alternatively, it 
could be that these measures are better at reflecting accounting numbers. The 
“true” fundamental value is unobservable, which suggests that these measures 
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reflect the fundamental value with some unknown error. Thus, the validity of these 
measures might be open to question.  
 
However, the assumption of market efficiency in value-relevance studies might be 
met in other ways. One possibility is to let the assumption of market efficiency 
influence the sample-selection process. The following procedure might be 
appropriate: First, choose a stock market which is supposed to be liquid and 
informational efficient, e.g. the London Stock Exchange, and second, select those 
firms on this stock market which are supposed to have the most liquid and 
informational efficient stock prices. These firms are generally those with the 
highest market capitalization (for instance, firms included in the FTSE-100 index 
or the FTSE-350 index) (e.g. Fung et al. 2010). There is also possible to use other 
benchmarks than adjusted or non-adjusted stock prices and estimates of 
fundamental values in value-relevance studies. Two examples are analysts’ 
forecasts and managements’ forecasts. It is debatable, however, whether these 
proxies are better at reflecting fundamental value than stock prices. 
  
There are some researchers, however, that question whether market efficiency is a 
necessary assumption. For instance, Barth (2000), Barth et al. (2001) and 
Dahmash et al. (2009) argue that value-relevance studies do not need to assume 
market efficiency. They do admit, however, that market efficiency will provide a 
more powerful test as it makes it possible to examine the extent to which 
accounting numbers reflect economic fundamentals. Still, it is not necessary to 
assume that stock prices are “true” and unbiased measures of fundamental values. 
Such “true” measures are unobservable and therefore unattainable. Holthausen and 
Watts (2001), however, argue that associations with inefficient market prices 
provide no standard-setting implications: “(…) if the stock market was inefficient 
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and the estimates of the market value of investment securities implicit in stock 
price were poor, why would the FASB want to use those implicit values?” 
(Holthausen and Watts 2001:18) 
 
The importance of market efficiency is also a question of the chosen perspective 
and methodology. There is a distinction between studies under the information 
perspective and the measurement perspective. Under the measurement 
perspective, the coefficients are generally predicted to equal some valuation 
weight, typically +1 for assets and -1 for liabilities. In these studies the accounting 
numbers of assets and liabilities are supposed to measure economic assets and 
liabilities. This makes the assumption of market efficiency particularly important. 
In fact, these studies need to assume that the capital market is close to being 
perfect and complete, which subsumes strong market efficiency (Holthausen and 
Watts 2001). If this is the case, there is literally no need for accounting. Under the 
information perspective, it is claimed to be sufficient to assume that stock prices 
reflect investors’ consensus beliefs (Barth 2000, Barth et al. 2001, Dahmash et al. 
2009). This seems only to be the case for long-term association studies, not short-
term event studies. Long-term association studies typically investigate the 
association between accounting information and stock prices over longer periods 
of time. Short-term event studies, however, investigate changes in stock prices or 
trading volume in narrow windows centred on the announcement day. Thus, the 
maintained hypothesis in short-term event studies has to be that the capital market 
is informationally efficient in the sense that stock prices quickly and fully reflect 
the revealed information (Lev 1989, Kothari 2001). As stated in the previous 
section, these studies are in fact joint tests of information content and market 
efficiency.  
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3.3.2. Valuation models 
The value relevance-methodology requires a model that specifies a link between 
the benchmark variable, stock prices or stock returns, and the accounting numbers. 
Three different valuation models are discussed in this section: the earnings model, 
the balance-sheet model and the combined earnings-and-balance sheet model 
referred to as the Ohlson model (Holthausen and Watts 2001). The above 
valuation models are chosen because they are frequently used as justification for 
regression models employed in value-relevance studies. Other accounting-based 
valuation models could be relevant, but these models are generally restricted 
versions of the above three models (Dechow, Hutton and Sloan 1999). All the 
models are derived (or can be derived) from the basic dividend-discount model 
under the assumption of perfect and complete markets (Kothari and Zimmerman 
1995, Lo and Lys 2000, Barth 2000). Such market settings imply no information 
asymmetry and no need for accounting (Barth et al. 2001, Holthausen and Watts 
2001, Field et al. 2001). According to Barth et al. (2001), this does not preclude, 
however, the use of these models to assess the value relevance of accounting 
information. 
 
3.3.2.1. Earnings model 
The earnings model (or earnings-capitalisation model) is derived on assumptions 
of perfect and complete markets. The discount rates are assumed to be constant 
across firms and across time (Kothari and Zimmerman 1995, Barth 2000). Given 
no uncertainty, fair-value accounting and no dividends, current year’s net earnings 
will equal the beginning of the year’s equity times the discount rate which is 
perfectly the same as the current year’s changes in equity values. Given 
uncertainty, current year’s net earnings will equal expected net earnings adjusted 
for current year’s unexpected earnings (Barth and Landsman 1995). Perfect and 
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complete markets imply that the dividend policy has no wealth effects for 
shareholders (Miller and Modigliani 1961). They can simply invest the dividends 
and obtain the same rate of return as the firm. But, the dividend policy will 
obviously have implications for the firm’s growth in earnings and equity. The 
earnings model is generally specified as a non-growth model (Ohlson 1995, 
Lundholm 1995, Kothari and Zimmerman 1995, Kothari 2001). This implies that 
current year’s earnings equal current year’s dividends. Given random walk in net 
earnings and no reinvestment, expected net earnings will be equal for all years. 
With an unlimited time-horizon, this yields a very simple model where current 
year’s net earnings divided by the discount rate equal the market value of equity 
(notation from Barth 2000:12): 
 
Table 3.2 Earnings model 
 
r
XMV tt
*

 
 
 
 
The assumptions of this model are obviously violated in a real market setting. No 
markets are perfect and complete. This will, for instance, have implications for the 
discount rate. Under imperfect and incomplete market settings, the discount rate 
will generally vary across firms and across time (Kothari and Zimmerman 1995, 
Lo and Lys 2000, Barth 2000). This makes it important to consider the 
                                           
9 If future net earnings are uncertain (assume random walk) and investors are risk-averse, the discount rate should 
be risk-adjusted.  
where 
tMV   = Market value of equity, time t. 
*
tX  
= Net earnings, period t. 
r  = Discount rate.9 
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determinants of the discount rate such as risk and growth in empirical applications 
of this model (Barth 2000).  
 
The earnings model is also based on unrealistic assumptions regarding the time-
series properties of net earnings (Lev 1989, Kothari and Zimmerman 1995, Barth 
2000, Kothari 2001, Holthausen and Watts 2001). The common assumption is that 
reported net earnings proxy for permanent earnings (e.g. Miller and Modigliani 
1966, Lev 1989, Barth 2000, Holthausen and Watts 2001). This assumption 
implies that net earnings are equal in all future reporting periods, which is highly 
unrealistic. Both transitory and permanent earnings components will be part of net 
earnings for a given year, which makes it crucial to determine which earnings 
components in net earnings may or may not reflect permanent earnings (Barth 
2000). For instance, prior literature has found that the market response varies with 
the persistence of the earnings components (e.g Ramakrishnan and Thomas 1998). 
However, the exercise of adjusting net earnings to reflect permanent earnings will 
be rather arbitrary and will most likely fail (Holthausen and Watts 2001). Net 
earnings are not intended to reflect permanent earnings and there are only a few 
cases in which a clear distinction is made between one-time gains and losses and 
more permanent earnings components (Holthausen and Watts 2001).  
 
An alternative assumption is that net earnings follow a random walk (Lev 1989, 
Kothari and Zimmerman 1995, Kothari 2001). This assumption allows net 
earnings to be a stochastic zero-mean variable. Any deviation in actual net 
earnings from expected net earnings will be non-persistent. Moreover, since actual 
net earnings are paid out in dividends, net earnings the current year will not affect 
next year’s expected net earnings. The assumption of no growth (no reinvestment) 
will ensure that expected net earnings will be equal across reporting periods. 
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Empirical evidence, however, has demonstrated that net earnings are 
intertemporally correlated, which is inconsistent with the random-walk assumption 
(Kothari 2001). The empirical counterpart of the above earnings model is given in 
table 3.3 below: 
  
Table 3.3 Price-earnings regression 
 
tititi XP ,,10,    
 
 
The coefficient 1 is the monetary unit change in stock price in response to one 
monetary unit change in earnings-per-share, which equals the basic price-earnings 
ratio (Kothari and Zimmerman 1995). Under the measurement perspective, the 
coefficient of net earnings is expected to be equal to 1/r where r is the discount 
rate (Kothari and Zimmerman 1995, Holthausen and Watts 2001, Kothari 2001). 
Predicting the size of the coefficient, however, is generally impossible for several 
reasons. A violation of the assumptions of perfect and complete markets and a 
violation of the assumed time-series properties of net earnings will obviously lead 
to an estimated coefficient which differs from 1/r (Kothari and Zimmerman 1995, 
Kothari 2001). There are also other reasons why the coefficient on net earnings 
will deviate from 1/r. The earnings model is based on the assumption that reported 
net earnings equal economic earnings. Current year’s economic earnings are 
calculated as current year’s changes in net present values. In a realistic accounting 
setting, however, net earnings will equal current year’s net cash flows adjusted for 
current year’s net accruals (Dechow and Dichev 2002). These accruals will 
 
where 
tiP ,   
= Stock price of firm i, time t. 
tiX ,  
= Earnings-per-share of firm i, period t. 
ti ,  = 
Residual of firm i, time t. 
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generally not be based on changes in present values. They will be a mixed product 
of modified historical-cost accounting on the one hand, and thereby, principles for 
revenue recognition, matching and prudence, and fair-value accounting on the 
other. The prices-lead-earnings phenomenon could be explained by the accrual 
process. Given sufficient market efficiency, it is expected that stock prices will 
quickly and fully incorporate changes in net present values. Due to principles for 
revenue recognition and prudence, however, net earnings generally reflect stock-
price changes with time lags (e.g. Beaver 1980, Lev 1989, Kothari 2001). Under 
the information perspective, however, no predictions are made regarding the size 
of the earnings coefficient, only that the coefficient is significant positive.  
 
The price-earnings model is typically employed in relative-association studies and 
incremental-association studies (Holthausen and Watts 2001). In relative-
association studies, stock prices are regressed on alternative measures of earnings. 
The measure whose regression has the highest explanatory power is considered the 
best earnings measure or most value-relevant earnings measure. For instance, the 
study by Jennings et al. (2001) is a typical relative association study using the 
earnings model as basis for the regression specification. They test whether 
earnings before goodwill-amortisation charges have higher value relevance 
measured by R-square than earnings after goodwill-amortisation charges. In 
incremental-association studies, however, the stock price is regressed on 
components of earnings. Jennings et al. (1996a) for instance, employ an 
incremental-association design to examine the associations between stock prices 
and different components of earnings such as earnings before goodwill 
amortisation, goodwill-amortisation charges and other depreciation charges. 
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The earnings model is often specified in changes rather than levels form. Given 
clean surplus accounting, current year’s earnings will equal changes in book 
equity values and net dividends. This suggests that the price-earnings regression 
can be specified as a return-earnings regression. The simplest version of the 
return-earnings model is specified in table 3.4 below:  
 
Table 3.4 Return-earnings regression 
 
tititi XR ,,10, 		   
 
 
This regression has been extensively investigated in prior literature. The 
coefficient of earnings, 1	 , is often referred to as the earnings-response coefficient 
(Kothari 2001). This coefficient reflects the change in stock returns for a given 
change in earnings. Value-relevance researchers frequently focus on the 
association between abnormal stock returns and some measure of abnormal 
earnings. The coefficient on abnormal earnings is also referred to as the earnings-
response coefficient (Lev 1989, Scott 2012:163). Abnormal stock returns are 
estimated by deducting expected stock returns from raw stock returns. An estimate 
of expected stock returns can be obtained in a number of ways, for instance by 
using the market model with theoretical reference to the capital-asset pricing 
model (CAPM) or the Fama and French three-factor model (Fama and French 
1993, 1995, 1996). Abnormal stock returns are regressed on abnormal earnings 
where the latter are the differences between net earnings and an estimate of 
expected net earnings. Abnormal earnings could simply be differences between 
 
where 
tiR ,   
= Stock return of firm i, period t. 
tiX ,  
= Earnings of firm i, period t (scaled by stock price, time t-1) 
ti ,  = 
Residual of firm i, time t. 
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current net earnings and previous year’s net earnings assuming a random walk 
(Lev 1989). In other cases, analysts’ forecasts are used as an estimate of expected 
net earnings (e.g. Kormendi and Lipe 1987, Easton and Zmijewski 1989, Lev 
1989, Freeman and Tse 1992). This abnormal return model is employed in short-
term as well as long-term event studies (e.g. Kothari 2001). In the long-term event 
studies the above model is generally employed to investigate post-announcement 
drifts.   
 
3.3.2.2. Balance-sheet model 
Along with the earnings model, the balance-sheet model is one of the simplest 
when it comes to its specification, but the simplicity is off-set by the strict 
assumptions of the model. Similar to the above earnings model, the balance-sheet 
model is based on the assumptions of perfect and complete markets (Barth 2000, 
Holthausen and Watts 2001). Given these assumptions and fair-value accounting, 
all relevant information is found on the balance sheet. All assets and liabilities are 
recognised at their present values which equal their market values. Given no 
dividends, current year’s net earnings equal current year’s changes in equity 
values, which implies that net earnings provide no additional information beyond 
the information offered by the balance sheet (Barth and Landsman 1995, Scott 
2012: 35-45). Thus, the balance-sheet model expresses the market value or the 
present value of equity as a function of the market values or the present values of 
the firm’s assets and liabilities (Landsman 1986, Barth 1991, Barth 2000, 
Holthausen and Watts 2001). In contrast to the earnings model, the balance-sheet 
model is not based on any particular assumption regarding the dividend policy. 
The model is specified in table 3.5 below (notation from Holthausen and Watts 
2001:53): 
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Table 3.5 Balance-sheet model 
 
**
ttt LIASMV   
 
 
 
The regression counterpart of this model is based on the same assumptions as the 
theoretical balance-sheet model. All assets and liabilities should be recognised at 
their market values or present values. This is certainly not the case in a real 
setting. Far from all assets and liabilities are recognised on the balance sheet. 
Obvious examples are internally-generated intangible assets, contingent assets and 
liabilities and some uncertain provisions. Moreover, the assets and liabilities that 
are recognised on the balance sheet are generally not reported at their market 
values or their present values. Rather, they are reported at modified historical cost. 
Table 3.6 below specifies the empirical version of the balance-sheet model: 
 
Table 3.6 Balance-sheet regression 
 
titititi LIASP ,,2,10,    
 
 
where 
tMV   = Market value or  present value of equity, time t. 
*
tAS = Market value or present value of assets, time t. 
*
tLI = Market value or present value of liabilities, time t. 
 
where 
 
tiP ,   
= Stock price of firm i, time t. 
tiAS , = Book value of assets per share of firm i, time t. 
tiLI , = Book value of liabilities per share of firm i, time t. 
ti ,  = 
Residual of firm i, time t. 
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This regression is typically employed in incremental-association studies. In these 
studies asset and liability values are separated from total assets and total liabilities 
and included as independent variables (Holthausen and Watts 2001). Under the 
measurement perspective, the coefficients of assets and liabilities are predicted to 
equal +1 and -1, respectively. Under the information perspective, however, the 
predictions are relaxed. Reported assets are now predicted to have significantly 
positive coefficients and reported liabilities significantly negative coefficients 
(Barth 2000, Holthausen and Watts 2001). No assumptions are made regarding the 
size of the coefficients. Still, it is necessary to assume that reported asset and 
liability values are highly positively associated with the economic asset and 
liability values. To avoid confounding inferences, it is crucial to assess which 
assets and liabilities are not reported on the balance sheet (Barth 2000). Potential 
candidates are internally-generated intangible assets. These assets can give rise to 
abnormal-return opportunities and economic growth. Control variables for growth 
and industry sectors should, therefore, be included to avoid inference problems 
due to correlated-omitted variables (Barth et al. 2001, Holthausen and Watts 
2001). 
 
3.3.2.3. Feltham-Ohlson and Ohlson model 
Ohlson (1995) derives an accounting-based valuation model that includes earnings 
and equity book value as independent variables. The model provides a link 
between accounting variables and firm value. The theoretical fundamentals of the 
Ohlson model are found in the residual-income model known as the Feltham-
Ohlson model (Ohlson 1995, Feltham and Ohlson 1995). The Feltham-Ohlson 
model is specified in table 3.7:   
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Table 3.7 Feltham-Ohlson model 
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where 
 
tMV  = Market value of equity, time t. 
tY  
= Book value of equity, time t. 
1tY  = Book value of equity, time t-1. 
a
tX  
= Abnormal earnings, period t. 
tX  = Net earnings, period t. 
kR  
= Discount factor, one plus the discount rate r .10
 
 
The model is based on the dividend-discount model with the assumption of clean-
surplus accounting and perfect and complete markets (Ohlson 1995). No particular 
assumption is made regarding the dividend policy. One monetary unit paid out in 
dividends will reduce next year’s expected earnings by the interest that could be 
earned on that monetary unit (Lundholm 1995). The model does not offer any 
theory of information or theory on measurement. But it permits a representation of 
the value of equity in terms of accounting numbers, book-equity value and 
expected abnormal earnings (Beaver 2002). If additional assumptions regarding 
the information dynamics of abnormal earnings and non-accounting information 
are added, the Feltham-Ohlson model can be restated as a model where the market 
value is explained by current earnings and current book value of equity. Abnormal 
earnings and non-accounting information are assumed to follow an autoregressive 
process. Non-accounting information represents additive shocks that are expected 
to flow through future abnormal earnings. This means that non-accounting 
information is turned to earnings in the future. The formal derivation of this model 
                                           
10 If future abnormal earnings are uncertain and investors are risk-averse, the discount rate should be risk-adjusted.  
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is shown in appendix C. By adding a parameter for non-accounting information, , 
a parameter,  , which is a function of the discount rate, and a parameter, k , which 
is a function of the discount rate and the persistence of abnormal earnings, to the 
Feltham-Ohlson framework, it is possible to express the relative importance of 
earnings )( X  and book value )(Y  as determinants of the market value of equity 
(Ohlson 1995, Lundholm 1995). This model is specified in table 3.8 below:   
 
Table 3.8 Ohlson model 
 
ttttt YkDXkMV  2)1()( 
 
The above model, generally referred to as the Ohlson model, is solely based on 
earnings and book equity value and other non-accounting price-relevant 
information as explanatory variables of market value. The parameter   acts like 
an earnings multiplier. The parameter, k , is partly determined by the persistence 
parameter  . The lower limit of  , 0 , implies 0k . Similarly, the upper 
limit of  , 1 , implies 1k . The Ohlson model can be seen as a weighted 
 
where 
 
tMV  = Market value of equity, time t. 
 
k  
 
= )(
)1()1( 1 




k
k
k R
RR where   is the persistence parameter of earnings; 10   . 
 
  = )1( r
r

where r is the discount rate . 
tX  = Net earnings, period t. 
tY  = Book value of equity, time t. 
tD  = Net dividends, period t. 
 
2  = ))((   kk
k
RR
R
where  is the regression coefficient from the following autoregressive 
model: 11
~~
  ttt   where the error term, 
~ , is a stochastic zero-mean variable. 
2  = Non-accounting price-relevant information, time t. 
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average of an earnings model and a balance-sheet model (e.g. Penman 1998). If 
the persistent parameter equals 1,  = 1, the Ohlson model turns into an earnings 
model. In contrast, if the persistent parameter equals 0,  = 0, the Ohlson model 
turns into a balance-sheet model. These information dynamics have been further 
developed to involve conservatism (Feltham and Ohlson 1996), to distinguish 
between permanent and transitory components in earnings (Ohlson 1999) and to 
include additional conditioning variables, for instance, different compositions of 
earnings such as cash flows and accruals (Barth, Beaver, Hand and Landsman 
1999). The above Ohlson model is used as a theoretical justification for the 
combined earnings and book equity regression models. The empirical version of 
the Ohlson model is given in table 3.9 below: 
 
Table 3.9 Ohlson regression  
 
titititi YXP ,1,2,10,     
 
 
 
The Ohlson model and its regression counterpart are appealing for value-relevance 
research because they specify a link between accounting numbers and stock 
prices. Using the Ohlson model as basis for the regression model adds the 
assumptions of the Ohlson model to the ordinary-least-square regression 
assumptions.  
 
where 
tiP ,  
= Stock price of equity of firm i, time t. 
tiX ,  
= Net earnings-per-share of firm i, period t. 
1, tiY = Book value of equity per share of firm i, time t-1. 
ti ,  = 
Residual of firm i, time t. 
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3.3.2.4. Criticisms of the Feltham-Ohlson and the Ohlson model  
The Feltham-Ohlson model and the Ohlson model are based on the assumption of 
clean surplus. Earnings must equal the comprehensive income concept which 
means that all gains and losses for a given period are reported on the profit and 
loss account. This assumption alone is very weak concerning the properties of the 
accounting system. The Feltham-Ohlson model specifies two accounting 
variables, earnings and book equity, but only one time-series assumption: clean 
surplus. This makes the model nothing but a restatement of the dividend-discount 
model. Assuming a steam of future dividends, the value of book equity, tY , and net 
earnings, tX , could be picked at random. As long as all future book-equity 
values, tY , are calculated according to the clean-surplus assumption, the 
Feltham-Ohlson model will yield the present value of the future dividends. Seen 
from an empirical perspective, the Feltham-Ohlson model leaves the researcher in 
much the same position as the dividend-discount model. The valuation model 
cannot be applied without estimates of future abnormal earnings, which means 
that future book values are required. To estimate future book values, the 
researcher needs to estimate future dividends. But, once future dividends are 
estimated, book-equity values and earnings numbers become redundant, and the 
researcher may well use the dividend-discount model instead. Albeit, the Feltham-
Ohlson model has intuitive appeal due to its use of earnings and book-equity 
values instead of dividends, it provides no new empirical implications in and of 
itself (Dechow et al. 1999, Holthausen and Watts 2001, Kothari 2001).  
 
Lo and Lys (2000) and Bernard (1995) argue that the clean-surplus assumption is 
a strength of the model. This is true when the model is used for equity-value 
estimation. Any accounting system meeting the clean-surplus assumption can be 
used to estimate equity value. But this is not necessarily true when it comes to its 
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applicability in value-relevance research. Value-relevance studies do not use the 
Feltham-Ohlson model for equity valuation, but as basis for regression models 
whose purpose is to test the valuation usefulness of accounting numbers (e.g. 
Barth et al. 2001). Value-relevance research is not motivated by equity valuation 
per se, but motivated to give standard-setting implications on the valuation 
usefulness of accounting numbers. The Feltham-Ohlson model does not give any 
implications for accounting standard-setting as any set of accounting methods 
meeting the clean-surplus assumption will encompass the model. This suggests 
that the strength of the model seen from a fundamental-analysis perspective is a 
limitation when seen from a value-relevance perspective.  
 
This has led researchers to question the use of the Feltham-Ohlson model as 
justification for value-relevance regressions (Ohlson 1995, Bernard 1995, 
Holthausen and Watts 2001, Kothari 2001). Barth et al. (2001) acknowledge that 
the model itself does not give any implications for accounting-method choices. 
Still, they do not think this undermines the usefulness of the model for standard-
setting: “(…) none of the valuation models explicitly derive an optimal accounting 
system or even a demand for accounting information, this does not preclude use of 
such models to assess the value relevance of accounting amounts and to provide 
insights relevant to standard setters, as HW [Holthausen and Watts] claims” 
(Barth et al. (2001:92). In a footnote, Holthausen and Watts (2001:61, footnote 20) 
give a response to this argument: “We agree that the model can be used to assess 
associations between equity value and accounting numbers, but that is not the 
point we are making. Our point is that the model itself has no implications for 
accounting methods and provides no direct inferences for accounting standards.” 
Beaver (2002) claims that the criticism stated by Holthausen and Watts (2001) is 
misplaced and misdirected. He argues that “(...) the modelling could be 
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informative without including an endogenous demand for accounting. By analogy, 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) has no demand for financial institutions, 
yet we observe financial institutions empirically. What do we conclude? Do we 
conclude that the risk-return trade-off derived from the CAPM is of no interest or 
relevance to investors or to managers of financial institutions? I think not” 
(Beaver 2002:458). The model provides a framework for valuation based on 
accounting numbers. As Beaver (2002:458) states: “This framework relates 
published accounting data to equity valuation (…).With contextual accounting 
arguments added to the general framework, researchers can predict how 
accounting numbers would relate to value (…).”  
 
In order to derive the Ohlson model, additional assumptions regarding the 
information dynamics are needed to specify the time-series pattern of abnormal 
earning and non-accounting information. These information dynamics are also 
essential to the empirical applicability of the model beyond the Feltham-Ohlson 
model and the dividend-discount model. These additional assumptions make it 
possible to derive a link between current earnings and book-equity values and 
future abnormal earnings (Ohlson 1995, Lo and Lys 2000). Dechow et al. (1999) 
conduct an empirical analysis of the linear dynamics of abnormal earnings. Using 
a pooled regression of all the firm observations with one period lag, the 
persistence parameter equals 0.62. The persistence is far from its limits of 0 and 1, 
suggesting that stock prices are jointly explained by current net earnings and book 
equity. Thus, neither a balance-sheet model nor an earnings model seems 
appropriate to explain variation in stock prices. In the second part of the article 
they examine variables that may affect the persistence of abnormal earnings across 
firms and over time such as high levels of earnings, extreme accounting rates of 
return, high operating accruals, high payout ratios of dividends, high levels of non-
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recurring items and industry-specific factors. The analysis reveals that all the 
determinants are statistically significant, suggesting that the persistence parameter 
varies cross-sectionally and time-serially as a result of firm-specific and industry-
specific characteristics. Thus, the information dynamics are not completely 
captured by the simple autoregressive model presented by Ohlson (1995). Lo and 
Lys (2001), however, argue in the spirit of Roll’s critique (Roll 1977) that the test 
of the Feltham-Ohlson model and the Ohlson model is a joint test of the models’ 
assumptions on the one hand and whether the model is descriptive of the market 
pricing of stocks on the other. Kothari (2001) takes the same position and 
concludes that the evidence rejecting the information dynamics is weak.  
 
Other aspects of the Ohlson model also question its applicability. First, the model 
and its regression counterparts are built on the assumption of linearity. This 
assumption is generally violated if there are omitted variables which are correlated 
with the independent variables. Potential candidates are variables affecting the 
persistence of abnormal earnings. Holthausen and Watts (2001) argue that 
nonlinearity could be due to growth options, abandonment options and 
conservatism. For instance, Hayn (1995) investigates the information content of 
positive and negative earnings. She reports that negative earnings are less 
informative than positive earnings and maintains that this is due to the 
abandonment option held by the shareholders. The shareholders can always 
liquidate the firm rather than suffer from indefinite losses. A similar point is made 
by Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2006).  
 
Barth et al. (2001) claim that potential nonlinearity problems due to growth 
options and abandonment options can be handled within the existing Ohlson 
model. The growth options, termed economic rents in their article, are captured by 
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the persistence parameter of earnings,  , and the non-accounting information 
parameter, . In the regression counterpart of the Ohlson model the present value 
of future cash flows not attributed to book equity can be used as a proxy for future 
growth options. They also claim that intangible assets such as customer lists, 
brand names and research and development costs are attributable to growth 
options. These suggestions, however, do not seem to solve the problem addressed 
by Holthausen and Watts (2001). Expected future cash flows are generally 
uncertain and unobservable, and any allocation of cash flows between book equity 
and other net assets not recognised on the balance sheet will most likely be 
arbitrary. Another way to counter the problem of nonlinearity is to allow the 
regression coefficients to vary cross-sectionally and time-serially, using a fixed 
effects regression model. This approach will control for correlated omitted 
variables that are associated with particular firms or reporting periods and 
potentially maintain linearity within each partitioning.  
 
A different approach might be used to control for growth options and 
abandonment options (Barth et al. 2001). Growth options will probably be 
associated with industry membership and the intensity of intangible assets such as 
goodwill. This suggests that the inclusion of industry dummies and proxies for 
growth might control for growth options. Similarly, abandonment options will be 
strongly associated with weak economic performance. Including proxies of 
financial health will potentially control for these options (Barth et al. 2001). Like 
growth and abandonment options, conservatism is another reason for a nonlinear 
relationship between accounting numbers and stock prices. Conservatism refers to 
the fact that losses are generally recognised before profits in the profit and loss 
account. For instance, Basu (1997) defines conservatism as an accounting 
principle making earnings reflect “bad news” more quickly than “good news”, 
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which has consequences both for the timeliness and persistence of net earnings. 
Consistent with this, he reports that the earnings-response coefficients for positive 
earnings changes are higher than the earnings-response coefficients for negative 
earnings changes. This suggests that the association between earnings and stock 
prices is nonlinear, rather than linear. Barth et al. (2001) argue that the Ohlson 
model can handle conservatism. Subsequent refinements of the initial Ohlson 
model explicitly model the effects of conservatism (Feltham and Ohlson 1995, 
1996). Moreover, the size of the coefficient on asset, liability and equity numbers 
might be interpreted as the degree of conservatism in those numbers. A lot of 
value-relevance studies try to explain why equity-market values exceed equity 
book values. These studies can be seen as attempts to examining conservatism in 
accounting (Barth et al. 2001).  
 
A final concern is that value-relevance studies assume assets to be additively 
separable (Holthausen and Watts 2001). Lack of separability is one of the 
important characteristics of goodwill. As discussed in section 2.1, goodwill 
consists of economic assets that are inseparable from the firm. There is no active 
market where goodwill is traded, and hence, goodwill is not additively separable 
from other assets in the firm. Barth et al. (2001) argue that lack of separability 
does not lead to any problems. The regression coefficient on inseparable assets, 
such as goodwill, captures the incremental association with stock prices beyond 
that of other assets and liabilities (Barth et al. 2001).  
 
In sum, it is debatable whether the value-relevance regressions can be justified by 
reference to the Feltham-Ohlson and Ohlson model. The reason is the weak link 
between the theoretical valuation models on the one hand and the regression 
specifications used to test value relevance on the other. If the Ohlson model is 
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used as theoretical justification, at least some caution should be exercised when it 
comes to potential correlated-omitted variables and nonlinearity problems. Such 
problems will potentially bias the ordinary-least-square regression coefficients,  
t-statistics and R-square estimates which may lead to misinterpretations of the 
regression results.   
 
3.3.2.5. Price level or return regressions 
The choice of the correctly specified regression model is crucial in order to make 
correct inferences on empirical analyses (Barth et al. 2001). The choice between 
the price-level regression and the return regression has drawn a lot of attention in 
value-relevance research and more generally in market-based accounting research. 
Landsman and Magliolo (1988) argue that there is no single answer as to which 
regression model to choose when investigating associations between accounting 
numbers and stock prices. They state that the decision to choose a price-level 
regression or a return regression is a joint function of the assumed economic 
relationship between accounting numbers and stock prices (the economic model) 
and potential econometrical problems caused by the violation of ordinary-least-
square regression assumptions. Landsman and Magliolo (1988) argue that the 
empirical ex-post counterpart of the capital-asset pricing model (CAPM), namely 
the market model, provides a basis for the return regression. Three arguments 
speak for a market-model design. First, the market model has a clear reference to 
the capital-asset pricing model which implies that risk is incorporated in a rigorous 
fashion. Second, a solution is offered to the scaling problem as the relevant scale 
proxy becomes the opening stock price of the return period. And third, the return 
model provides some control for potential correlated-omitted variables. The above 
arguments, however, are not fully valid. First, a number of other risk proxies than 
market beta are found to explain stock returns (e.g. Fama and French 1993, 1995, 
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1996). The empirical applicability of the market model is, therefore, debatable. 
Second, scaling by opening stock price does not totally eliminate scale effects 
(Barth and Clinch 2009) and third, the return model is only efficient to mitigate 
problems of correlated-omitted variables if the variables are constant over time. If, 
instead, these variables vary intertemporally, the return model may exacerbate 
specification problems (Barth 2000).   
 
Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) argue that price-level and return regressions have 
both strengths and weaknesses. Net earnings consist of a surprise component and a 
stale component. The stale component is irrelevant when explaining current 
return, and thus, constitutes an error in the independent variable. As a result, the 
regression coefficient will be biased towards zero in the return regression. The 
price-level regression, however, does not suffer from this problem because stock 
prices reflect the cumulative information of both the surprise and the stale 
component (Kothari and Zimmerman 1995). Price-level regressions, however, are 
expected to suffer from more serious heteroscedastic disturbance caused by scale 
effects. This issue will be further discussed in chapter six.  
 
Both Landsman and Magliolo (1988) and Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) 
emphasise that the choice of model should be based on the hypotheses supposed to 
be tested by the regression model. Price-level regressions are appropriate to 
investigate what is reflected in firm value, whereas return regressions are 
appropriate to investgate what is reflected in changes in firm value (Barth et al. 
2001, Beaver 2002). Taken together, neither of these two specifications is superior 
to the other. Rather, there are arguments for including both specifications when 
investigating value relevance of accounting numbers and, in particular, value 
relevance of earnings components such as goodwill-impairment losses. Both 
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regressions models are, therefore, employed in this dissertation. This does not 
suggest, however, that econometrical problems, for instance in price-book 
earnings regressions, are of no concern. Potential econometrical problems such as 
heteroscedasticity caused by scale effects are carefully investigated in the 
empirical analysis of this dissertation.  
 
3.4. Accounting for goodwill – evidence of value relevance 
The second part of this chapter discusses the value relevance of book goodwill, 
goodwill-amortisation charges and goodwill-impairment losses. Some studies are 
also included that report evidence on the information content of impairment losses 
and write-downs in other assets than goodwill.  
 
3.4.1. Value relevance of book goodwill 
The value relevance of capitalised and non-capitalised assets and liabilities has 
been investigated for decades. Landsman (1986) is among the first to study 
whether capitalised assets and liabilities represent economic assets and liabilities 
reflected in stock prices. He investigates whether pension-fund assets and 
liabilities are associated with stock prices by employing a balance-sheet regression 
where pension and non-pension assets and liabilities are included as independent 
variables. This study inspired researchers to investigate the value relevance of 
other assets such as goodwill. Amir et al. (1993) and Chauvin and Hirschey (1994) 
are among the first to report value-relevance findings for book goodwill. Both 
studies report evidence consistent with book goodwill being value relevant. None 
of these studies, however, have the value relevance of book goodwill as primary 
focus. This is the focus, however, in McCarthy and Schneider (1995). They test 
whether book goodwill has value relevance beyond other assets and liabilities. At 
the date of the business combination, it is reasonable to believe that recognised 
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goodwill represents expectations of future cash flows. This suggests a positive 
association between book goodwill and stock prices. The regression coefficient on 
book goodwill is found to be positive and significant in all years and larger than 
the the coefficients on other assets. However, the null hypothesis of equal 
coefficients can only be rejected in two out of five years. They address several 
econometrical problems. Cross-sectional regressions will generally suffer from 
heteroscedastic disturbance. Hetereoscedasticity might arise from measurement 
errors and misspecified regressions. They find evidence of heteroscedasticity in 14 
out of 15 regressions. To mitigate problems of heteroscedasticity, all the standard 
errors are adjusted by White’s robustness procedure (White 1980). They also scale 
all the variables with total sales. The results are unchanged. Another potential 
econometrical problem is multicollinearity. If the regressions suffer from 
multicollinearity, it is not possible to isolate the effect of one of the independent 
variables controlling for the others. McCarthy and Schneider (1995) argue that 
instability of the regression coefficients might be a result of multicollinearity. 
Rather than including book value of liabilities and book value of assets less 
goodwill as independent variables, they combine these two variables in one 
independent variable: net assets less goodwill. The results remain the same.  
 
Similar to McCarthy and Schneider (1995), Jennings et al. (1996a) investigate the 
association between book goodwill and stock prices. Their sample consists of 259 
US-listed firms with observations over the period 1982-1988. The value relevance 
of book goodwill is investigated by year-by-year regressions. A positive 
coefficient is reported for book goodwill. Consistent with the findings of 
McCarthy and Schneider (1995), the coefficient on book goodwill is generally 
higher than the coefficient on property, plant and equipment and the coefficient on 
other assets. A high regression coefficient may indicate that goodwill is 
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understated relative to goodwill reflected in stock prices. There are several reasons 
for a high regression coefficient. One potential reason is that book goodwill 
proxies for total goodwill reflected in stock prices. Another reason is that book 
goodwill proxies for the economic success of the firm. In both cases there is a 
correlated-omitted variable which biases the coefficient on book goodwill. 
Jennings et al. (1996a) argue that relatively more successful firms are better able 
to and more inclined to engage in business combinations than relatively less 
successful firms. To address this concern, they pool all the firms across years and 
run a fixed-effects regression. Fixed effects across firms and years not captured by 
the independent variables are controlled for by separate intercepts for each firm 
and separate intercepts and regression coefficients for each year. The average 
regression coefficients on book goodwill in the fixed-effects regressions are 
smaller than the average regression coefficients across the seven year-by-year 
regressions. The year-by-year-regression results are to some extent driven by 
correlated-omitted variables controlled for in the fixed-effects regressions. Similar 
evidence to those reported by McCarthy and Schneider (1995) and Jennings et al. 
(1996a) is demonstrated by Huijgen (1996), Wilkins et al. (1998) and Petersen 
(2002).  
 
The study by Henning et al. (2000) represents a significant extension to the prior 
literature. Rather than investigating the value relevance of book goodwill, they 
investigate the value relevance of components of goodwill by separating the 
purchase premium into four different components similar to those suggested by 
Johnson and Petrone (1998). Two components are supposed to reflect core 
goodwill: One component present in the target prior to the business combination, 
going-concern goodwill, and another component created as the result of the 
business combination, synergy goodwill. Goodwill is the residual from the 
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acquisition analysis. Any flaws when identifying assets and liabilities or 
estimating fair values of these assets and liabilities will directly affect the goodwill 
amount. This means that recognised goodwill might include components that are 
not part of goodwill such as write-ups to fair value of identifiable assets.  
 
Henning et al. (2000) estimate values on these components and investigate 
whether they are value relevant. They use a sample of 1576 business combinations 
over the period 1990-1994. The asset write-up to fair value is estimated as the 
difference between the fair value of identifiable assets and the pre-acquisition 
book value. The going-concern component is estimated as the difference between 
the pre-acquisition market value six days prior to the business combination and the 
fair value of identifiable assets. The synergy component is estimated as the sum of 
the cumulative abnormal returns of the target and the acquirer for the eleven days 
centred on the date of the acquisition announcement. And finally, a potential 
overprice is estimated as the purchase price less the pre-acquisition equity book 
value of the target and the sum of the other components. All components except 
overprice are predicted to be positively associated with stock prices. The overprice 
component represents a loss and is, therefore, predicted to have a negative 
association with stock prices. Evidence consistent with these predictions is found. 
The asset write-ups and the going-concern components have positive coefficients. 
The synergy components are also found to have a positive coefficient, but a 
coefficient that is significantly higher than the going-concern coefficient. And 
finally, the overprice coefficient is found to be negative.  
 
In sum, research findings from prior literature suggest that book goodwill reflects 
value-relevant information. This is consistent with the notion that purchased 
goodwill should be classified as an asset and capitalised on the balance sheet. The 
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next section discusses literature investigating the value relevance of goodwill 
amortisation.  
 
3.4.2. Value relevance of goodwill-amortisation charges  
Several studies have investigated the extent to which goodwill-amortisation 
charges reflect value-relevant information. Jennings et al. (1996a) argue that 
goodwill amortisation should be negatively associated with stock prices. They 
find, however, that the association between goodwill amortisation and stock prices 
is insignificant in all seven years investigated and that only five out of seven years 
have a predicted negative association. For the remaining years, the coefficient on 
amortisation charges is insignificantly negative. This questions whether these 
charges provide any value-relevant information. The above results, however, 
could be driven by correlated-omitted variables. Jennings et al. (1996a) argue that 
the insignificant coefficient on amortisation charges could be the result of growth 
options. To examine this possibility, they pool all the firm-year observations over 
seven years and estimate a fixed-effect regression with separate intercepts for each 
firm and separate intercepts and regression coefficients for each year. The fixed-
effect regression will potentially control for variation across years and firms not 
captured by the independent variables. When including these fixed-effect 
dummies, the average coefficient on goodwill amortisation turns negative and 
significant. They also rerun all the year-by-year regressions including book 
goodwill as an additional independent variable. The inclusion of book goodwill 
turns five out of seven coefficients significantly negative.  
 
There are several studies investigating the value relevance of goodwill 
amortisation that are close to Jennings et al. (1996a) when it comes to research 
design and research findings. One of these is the study by Petersen (2001, 2002). 
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He employs 307 firm-year observations for Danish-listed firms over the period 
1984-1997. Goodwill-amortisation charges are calculated for different 
amortisation periods. This makes it possible to explore whether certain 
amortisation periods of goodwill increase or decrease the value relevance of these 
charges. The coefficient on amortisation charges is in some cases found to be 
significantly negative as predicted, but in other cases insignificant. Several 
additional tests are employed. For instance, a price-earnings regression is run 
instead of a return-earnings regression, but with unchanged results. Huigjen 
(1996) reports somewhat similar results. He finds that goodwill amortisation has 
positive, but insignificant coefficients in most regressions. 
 
Two of the most cited value-relevance studies on goodwill amortisation are 
Jennings et al. (2001) and Moehlre et al. (2001). Jennings et al. (2001) use a 
sample of 2 918 observations of US-listed firms for the period 1993-1998. They 
run both cross-sectional year-by-year regressions and a pooled fixed-effect version 
of the regressions. The purpose of the study is to investigate whether net earnings 
without goodwill amortisation or net earnings with goodwill amortisation are best 
to explain variation in stock prices. If goodwill amortisation enhances the 
usefulness of net earnings, then net earnings with goodwill amortisation shall 
explain more of the observed cross-sectional variation in stock prices than 
earnings without goodwill amortisation. Explanatory power is used as a metric of 
value relevance. The results suggest that net earnings with goodwill amortisation 
explain the variation in stock prices to a larger extent than net earnings without 
goodwill amortisation. All the differences in explanatory power in the year-by-
year regressions and the pooled fixed-effect regressions are statistically 
significant. They also include goodwill-amortisation charges as an independent 
variable. As concluded by Jennings et al. (2001:26): “(…) excluding goodwill 
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amortization from corporate income statements under the new rule will not reduce 
the usefulness of earnings but, rather, may eliminate a source of noise in earnings 
as measured under previous standards.” Similar results are reported by Moehlre 
et al. (2001).  
 
For the sake of completeness, this section ends with two studies investigating 
components of goodwill and goodwill-amortisation charges. As stated in the 
previous section, Henning et al. (2000) separate the purchase premium into four 
different components following Johnson and Petrone (1998). The study 
investigates whether the capital market places different valuation weights on 
components of goodwill and goodwill-amortisation charges. To calculate goodwill 
amortisation for each component, they use the fraction each component represents 
of book goodwill. This makes it possible to investigate whether certain 
components of goodwill-amortisation charges are value relevant. The results 
suggest that several of these components of goodwill-amortisation charges lack 
value relevance which is consistent with the findings in Huigjen (1996), Jennings 
et al. (2001), Moehlre et al. (2001) and Petersen (2002).   
 
Bugeja and Gallery (2006) investigate the value relevance of components of 
goodwill from a different perspective. They do not separate purchased goodwill in 
different components at the date of the business combination. Rather, they 
separate book goodwill by age. They argue that a limitation of previous studies, 
except the study by Henning et al. (2000), is that they are “(...) generally 
restricted to testing the association between market value and aggregated 
amounts of goodwill” (Bugeja and Gallery 2006:523). Book goodwill accumulates 
goodwill from multiple business combinations, and therefore, is likely to reflect 
goodwill of different ages. The fundamental idea is as follows: “If goodwill is 
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regarded as an asset over its nominated useful life, it is expected to be priced by 
the market for the period it is recognised. However, if the economic benefits of 
purchased goodwill are considered to dissipate over a shorter period than 
nominated useful life, then the value relevance of goodwill should decline with 
age” (Bugeja and Gallery 2006:523). Their sample consists of 475 firm-year 
observations for Australian-listed firms over the period 1995-1999. The results 
indicate that the value relevance of purchased goodwill increases from the year of 
the business combination to the first year subsequent to the business combination, 
as the regression coefficient increases, and then, decreases in the second year, and 
finally, is no longer value relevant three years after the business combination. 
They state that “(...) over time the benefits of the acquisition are increasingly 
reflected in the normal operations of the firm so that these benefits are reflected in 
net income and not the balance of goodwill included in the regression model” 
(Bugeja and Gallery 2006:531). These results suggest that goodwill has a limited, 
and probably short, economic lifetime.  
 
Summing up, the results for goodwill-amortisation charges are rather inconsistent. 
The regression coefficient on these charges is in some cases insignificant, in other 
cases significantly positive and in yet other cases significantly negative. Evidence 
also indicates that the economic lifetime of goodwill is rather short (Bugeja and 
Gallery 2006). One reason for some of the inconsistent results could be 
econometrical problems, for instance, insufficient correction for scale effects, 
multicollinearity problems and correlated-omitted variables.  
 
3.4.3. Value relevance and information content of impairment losses  
The literature has carefully investigated the value relevance and information 
content of impairment losses. Only scarce evidence, however, is reported for 
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goodwill-impairment losses under the impairment-only method. The first section 
discusses evidence on the information content and timeliness of impairment losses 
and write-downs, while the last section discusses evidence on the value relevance 
of goodwill-impairment losses.  
 
3.4.3.1. Information content and timeliness of impairment losses 
The information-content methodology makes it possible to investigate the extent 
to which a piece of accounting information, e.g. an impairment loss, conveys new 
and relevant information to the capital market. The market response upon the 
revealed information is measured as abnormal returns or trading volume over a 
narrow window surrounding the announcement day (Collins and Kothari 1989, 
Kothari 2001). If changes in stock prices or trading volume are significant, the 
conclusion is that the announcement conveys price-relevant information. As stated 
by Kothari (2001:116): “The degree of confidence in this conclusion critically 
hinges on whether the events are dispersed in calendar time and whether there are 
any confounding events (e.g. a simultaneous dividend and earnings 
announcement) co-occurring with the event of interest to the researchers.” The 
last issue is particularly important when it comes to impairment losses. They are 
frequently announced as part of a larger restructuring, which often involves 
restructuring plans and changes in dividend policy.  
 
Strong and Meyer (1987) are among the first to investigate the information content 
of write-down announcements. They do not separate impairment losses from 
restructuring charges although these charges are fundamentally different. If 
faithfully reported, impairment losses will reflect current-value reductions. 
Restructuring charges, however, may reflect the opposite, that is, increased current 
values (e.g. Elliot and Shaw 1988, Francis et al. 1996, Bartov et al. 1998). Strong 
  
138 
and Meyer (1987) investigate the market response to 78 write-downs over the 
period 1981-1985. The information content of these write-downs is examined by 
the effect of the write-down on stock returns. They report a positive abnormal 
return prior and subsequent to the announcement period. In the announcement 
period, however, the write-down firms have negative abnormal returns. These 
results should be interpreted with caution since impairment losses and 
restructuring charges are pooled together. 
 
Elliot and Shaw (1988) investigate 240 firms reporting write-downs for the period 
1982-1985. In contrast to Strong and Meyer (1987), they investigate the 
information content of impairment losses and restructuring charges separately. 
Consistent with Strong and Meyer (1987), they find a negative abnormal return in 
the announcement period. They do not find, however, evidence of a positive 
abnormal return subsequent to the announcement. The impairment firms have a 
negative industry-adjusted return over a period of six months subsequent to the 
announcement. Elliot and Shaw (1988) conclude that these findings contrast with 
the hypothesis that impairment losses are positive signals to the capital market. 
Rather, the findings are consistent with the notion that impairment losses are 
reported “(...) during a period of sustained economic difficulty” (Elliot and Shaw 
1988:114). Zucca and Campbell (1992:36), however, report no market response 
surrounding the write-down announcement: “On the average, there were no 
significant unusual or excess returns earned by the write-down firms over this 
period of time.” Other reasons than the lack of information content might be 
plausible. Zucca and Campbell (1992) do not control for other announcements that 
might explain the market response. For instance, positive earnings signals reported 
simultaneously with the impairment losses will potentially confound the 
association between these losses and abnormal returns.  
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Later studies investigate different research questions and employ different 
research designs. Some of these later studies make attempts to respond to the 
suggestions made by Waymire (1988). He argues that research on impairment 
losses should take into consideration the degree of discretion across different 
“types” of impairment losses and the influence of the history of prior impairment 
losses. Elliot and Hanna (1996) investigate whether the capital market responds 
differently to net earnings in firms with repeated impairment losses versus firms 
with no or one impairment loss. Francis et al. (1996) investigate the market 
response to impairment losses in different assets along with the market response to 
restructuring charges, whereas Rees, Gill and Gore (1996) investigate the 
relationship between impairment losses, abnormal accruals and market responses. 
And finally, Heflin and Warfield (1997) and Bartov et al. (1998) provide evidence 
on the timeliness of impairment losses.  
 
Elliot and Hanna (1996) investigate a sample of 2761 firms reporting at least one 
impairment loss, defined as large special items,11 in the period 1970-1994. To 
examine the impact of repeated impairment losses on the information content, the 
researchers examine the change in the earnings-response coefficient when a firm 
reports several impairment losses in sequence. They regress two-day market-
adjusted returns on unexpected earnings before special items. This model is run 
separately for six partitions based on the number of impairment losses in 
sequence: no impairment loss, one impairment loss, two, three, four and more than 
four impairment losses. The results demonstrate that impairment losses are 
negatively associated with stock returns. Moreover, the earnings-response 
coefficient on impairment losses declines as the sequence of impairment losses 
increases and becomes insignificant for long sequences of impairment losses. 
                                           
11 Large special items are defined as special items in excess of 1% of total assets (Elliot and Hanna 1996:135). 
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They conclude that “(...) when a write-off evolves into a series of write-offs, 
valuation implications of each of the components of reported earnings is altered. 
This is consistent with a lessening of investors’ confidence in their ability to 
understand and value the permanent and transitory composition of the reported 
earnings realizations” (Elliot and Hanna 1996:154). In contrast to Elliot and 
Hanna (1996), Francis et al. (1996) investigate impairment losses for different 
assets along with restructuring charges. The study employs a sample of 507 
impairment losses reported in the period 1989-1992. To examine the market 
response to the impairment-loss announcement, the researchers regress the 
market-adjusted two-day returns on the impairment losses. The market response is 
found to be negative. However, when the impairment losses are investigated for 
different classes of assets, the market response is insignificantly positive for 
impairment losses in property, plant and equipment and goodwill and significantly 
negative for impairment losses in inventory. This evidence is consistent with the 
notion that impairment losses in less discretionary assets such as inventory reflect 
current-value reductions, whereas impairment losses in more discretionary assets 
such as goodwill are too unreliable to represent price-relevant information.  
 
Rees et al. (1996) investigate the association between impairment losses and 
abnormal accruals for a sample of 277 firms reporting 365 impairment losses over 
the years 1987-1992. Consistent with other studies, the sample firms have 
significantly lower return-on-assets and market-adjusted returns prior to the 
impairment loss than the median firm in their industry. A modified version of the 
Jones model is used to estimate abnormal accruals. Firms with impairment losses 
are found to have significantly negative abnormal accruals in the year of the 
impairment-loss announcement. These accruals do not reserve in subsequent 
years. The researchers interpret these findings as evidence “(...) that the write-
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down and concurrent discretionary operating accruals are an appropriate 
response by management to changes in the firm’s economic environment” (Rees et 
al. 1996:168). This is consistent with the notion that impairment losses faithfully 
reflect economic impairment. Bunis (1997) argues that impairment losses may 
reflect positive, no or negative cash flows. Rather than investigating abnormal 
accruals, Bunis (1997) studies cash-flow implications associated with impairment 
losses. He investigates 207 US-firms reporting impairment losses in the period 
1983-1989. The impairment firms are classified into three groups: Firms where 
impairment losses are supposed to have negative cash-flow implications, firms 
where impairment losses are supposed to have no cash-flow implications, and 
finally, firms with positive cash-flow implications. As stock prices are supposed to 
reflect future cash flows, any negative or positive change in expected cash flows 
associated with an impairment loss is believed to be followed by a negative or 
positive market response. The results support these predictions. Impairment losses 
that are supposed to have negative cash-flow effects are followed by negative 
market responses, just as impairment losses with positive cash-flow effects are 
followed by positive market responses. As predicted, impairment losses with no 
cash-flow effects are not followed by any significant market response.  
 
Heflin and Warfield (1997) investigate the timeliness of impairment losses. Their 
sample includes 845 impairment losses reported by 588 US-firms in the period 
1985-1991. They find that pre-impairment earnings of impairment firms are 
generally higher or equal to industry-matched earnings in three years preceding 
the impairment losses, but their earnings fall below industry levels in the 
impairment year. They find that pre-impairment earnings are negatively associated 
with stock returns over the three years preceding the impairment losses which is 
inconsistent with timely recognition of impairment losses. Bartov et al. (1998) 
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investigate both the information content and the timeliness of impairment losses 
and restructuring charges. They claim that the market response to impairment 
losses is much smaller in size than the impairment loss per share. Referring to 
prior studies by Strong and Meyer (1987) and Elliot and Shaw (1988), they argue 
that impairment losses average around 20% of the firms’ market values as the 
market responses are less than one percent. They believe the capital market 
underreacts to impairment announcements and gradually adjust in the post-
announcement period. An alternative explanation could be that the market largely 
anticipates the impairment losses prior to the announcement. They study 373 
impairment announcements of 298 US-firms in 1984 and 1985. A negative 
association is found between abnormal returns and impairment losses over a four-
day announcement period. The results also demonstrate a negative abnormal 
return over a period of two years preceding the announcement. This suggests that 
the impairment losses are anticipated by the capital market prior to the impairment 
announcement, which is inconsistent with timely recognition of these losses.  
 
The above studies, however, report scarce evidence on market responses on 
goodwill-impairment losses. Except from Francis et al. (1996), none of these early 
studies investigate the information content of these losses. Hirschey and 
Richardson (2002, 2003) are among the first. They investigate the information 
content of 80 goodwill-impairment announcements for US-firms over the years 
1992-1996. A significantly negative market response is found on the pre-
announcement day and the impairment-announcement day. They also test whether 
the market response is different when other announcements are made 
simultaneously with impairment losses. The market response is insignificantly 
positive when positive earnings announcements are reported simultanously with 
impairment losses. If these earnings announcements are negative, the market 
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response is also negative. Abnormal returns in both the pre and post-
announcement periods are investigated. The results are somewhat mixed. A 
significant negative abnormal stock return is found prior to impairment 
announcements. Similar results are found when impairment announcements are 
reported simultaneously with negative earnings announcements. Abnormal returns 
are found to be significantly negative in some cases and insignificantly negative in 
other cases subsequent to the announcement. These results suggest that the capital 
market partly, but not fully, anticipates goodwill-impairment losses prior to their 
announcement.  
 
Some recent studies have investigated the information content and timeliness of 
goodwill-impairment losses under SFAS 142. Li et al. (2004) test the information 
content of 385 impairment-loss announcements reported for US-firms in the years 
2002 and 2003. They investigate the market response over a three-day window 
centred on the announcement day. If the announcement provides new and relevant 
information to the capital market, the market response is predicted to be negative. 
They find evidence consistent with these predictions. A negative stock return is 
also found as far back in time as eight quarters prior to the announcement day. 
Goodwill-impairment losses are, therefore, to some extent anticipated by the 
capital market prior to the announcement. Chen et al. (2004, 2008) investigate the 
timeliness of 726 goodwill-impairment losses reported under SFAS 142. Their 
focus is on the losses reported in the adoption year of SFAS 142 (year 2002). The 
first-time-adoption impairment is an adjustment that brings book goodwill in line 
with SFAS 142. Chen et al. (2004, 2008) claim that SFAS 142 requires a more 
rigorous and timelier test procedure on goodwill compared to prior regulation. 
Based on this notion, they argue that the adoption impairment should be associated 
with prior years’ stock returns only. They find results consistent with these 
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predictions. Similar results are reported by Bens and Heltzer (2005) and Bens, 
Heltzer and Segal (2007). 
 
The above evidence suggests that impairment losses convey new and relevant 
information to the capital market. Still, these losses are to some extent anticipated 
by the capital market prior to their announcement or recognition in the financial 
statement. Some concerns, however, limit the significance of these findings. 
Strong and Meyer (1987) and Elliot and Hanna (1996) investigate large special 
items which include impairment losses, restructuring charges and prior years’ 
adjustments. These items are basically different and pooling them together may 
confound the results. There is also another methodological problem. None of these 
studies investigate the market response to the unexpected portion of impairment 
losses. Rather, they investigate the market response to the entire impairment-loss 
amount, which may bias the regression coefficients (Alciatore et al. 1998).  
 
3.4.3.2. Value relevance of goodwill-impairment losses 
Information-content studies investigate market responses to accounting numbers 
such as impairment losses, whereas value-relevance studies investigate the extent 
to which accounting numbers reflect information in stock prices. Some of the 
previously discussed studies have investigated the value relevance of goodwill-
impairment losses. The findings from these studies will briefly be referred to in 
this section. Chen et al. (2004, 2008) investigate the value relevance and 
timeliness of goodwill-impairment losses. They compare the explanatory power of 
two regressions where the first regression includes adoption-impairment losses 
and the second subsequent impairment losses. The results support the notion that 
impairment losses provide value-relevant information. Similar results are reported 
by Li and Meeks (2006). They employ a price-earnings regression and find a 
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significantly negative association between impairment losses and stock prices in 
the adoption-year 2002. For previous years, 1997-2001, the association is 
insignificant.  
 
None of these studies compare the value relevance of goodwill under alternative 
accounting methods. Chambers (2007) offers such a comparison. He examines 
alternative methods for goodwill and compares the relative value relevance of 
goodwill numbers reported under each method. The sample includes 5262 firm-
year observations over the years 2003-2005. Eight different combinations of 
accounting methods are investigated: Impairment testing, impairment testing and 
amortisation over three amortisation periods, amortisation over three amortisation 
periods and permanent retention. The amortisation periods are 10, 20 and 40 years. 
The coefficient on book goodwill is smallest under the impairment-only method 
and the permanent retention method, suggesting that book goodwill is being 
discounted in the absence of amortisation. The coefficient on goodwill-impairment 
losses is statistically significant under the impairment-only method, but not under 
impairment testing combined with amortisation. This suggests that goodwill-
impairment losses are irrelevant in the presence of amortisation. Goodwill 
amortisation combined with impairment testing gives higher explanatory power 
than any other accounting method for goodwill. Thus, goodwill numbers from an 
accounting system that includes amortisation in combination with impairment 
testing provides more value-relevant information than an accounting system where 
goodwill is treated as a permanent asset or where goodwill is either amortised or 
tested for impairment losses. The evidence is interesting because it suggests that 
the previous accounting method is the one providing most value-relevant 
information. This contradicts the conclusion made by IASB and FASB. To 
challenge these results, Chambers (2007) performs additional tests. The results 
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from these tests reveal that the value relevance of goodwill numbers is sensitive to 
the size of the firm, the size of book goodwill and whether the firms are 
financially distressed.  
 
The results for goodwill-impairment losses are rather inconsistent. Some studies 
like Chen et al. (2004) and Li and Meeks (2006) suggest that goodwill reported 
under the impairment-only method provides more value-relevant information than 
goodwill reported under the previous amortisation method. Chambers (2007) finds 
evidence inconsistent with these results. He concludes that the combined 
amortisation-and-impairment method provides the most value-relevant 
information. Thus, it is not apparent which method to prefer based on value-
relevance findings.  
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4. Earnings management – some fundamentals 
and prior evidence for goodwill 
The value-relevance methodology is believed to provide evidence on relevance, 
but only to a limited extent reliability of accounting numbers. As decision 
usefulness is defined on the premise of relevance and reliability, additional tests 
for reliability are needed. This seems particularly important when it comes to 
discretionary items such as goodwill-impairment losses. The earnings 
management and corporate-governance literature are believed to provide a 
theoretical and methodological foundation for investigating the reliability and the 
degree of misrepresentation in accounting numbers. The first part of the chapter 
discusses what earnings management is, how earnings management may affect 
decision usefulness and the incentives that may trigger earnings management. The 
next part discusses earnings management in relation to corporate governance. The 
last part of the chapter reviews prior evidence on earnings management in 
impairment losses.  
 
4.1. Earnings management defined 
Earnings management can be considered as deliberate actions taken by managers 
to affect outcomes on explicit or implicit contracts where these outcomes are 
directly or indirectly affected by accounting information (Field et al. 2001, Ronen 
and Yaari 2008: xiv). Earnings management is generally interpreted as an 
earnings-reporting phenomenon. This means that the reporting behaviour is 
basically motivated by its effects on earnings rather than its effects on other 
elements of the financial statement. Others, however, interpret the concept more 
broadly. Schipper (1989) for instance, interprets earnings management as 
disclosure management, which suggests that all managerial activities that have the 
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intent to affect accounting information are part of the concept. Nevertheless, 
earnings are generally considered to be the single most important reporting 
number as shareholders are believed to “buy future earnings” (Lev 1989, Penman 
2003, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005, Dichev 2008). Besides, recent research 
demonstrates that smooth earnings streams and earnings that meet or beat last 
year’s earnings are particularly desirable to managers (e.g. Graham et al. 2005). 
This suggests that earnings management should be considered as “managing 
earnings” rather than managing other elements of the financial statement.  
 
Reported earnings are affected by real economic decisions and reporting decisions. 
In some cases real economic decisions are made to affect earnings. The question is 
whether these decisions should be considered as earnings management. Some 
researchers claim that economic decisions are earnings management if the 
motivation for the decisions is to alter reported earnings. If the economic decisions 
are made to increase the value of the firm, they are not earnings management. In 
contrast, if economic decisions are made for the purpose of affecting reported 
earnings, the decisions might be considered as earnings management (Schipper 
1989, Field et al. 2001, Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005). Graham et al. (2005) argue 
that managers make reporting decisions as well as real economic decisions to meet 
or beat earnings targets. For instance, the managers are willing to spend or 
withdraw research and development expenses, advertising expenses and 
maintenance expenses for the sake of meeting or beating such earnings targets. 
They report that more than half of the managers in their survey state that they will 
delay starting a new project to meet an earnings target. This evidence is dramatic 
as it suggests that managers are willing to impose economic losses upon the firm 
for the sake of reporting desired earnings numbers.  
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Beneish (2001) argues that the time horizon over which the accounting is affected 
may serve as a demarcation between economic decisions and their effects on 
reported earnings on the one hand and reporting decisions on the other. If real 
economic decisions delay or accelerate a discretionary expenditure for a short 
period of time surrounding the fiscal-year end, the economic decision might be 
considered as earnings management. He does admit, however, that the inclusion of 
investment and financing decisions will make it difficult to disentangle earnings 
management from economic decisions not intended to be part of a reporting 
strategy. This point is also made by Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005:1106): “Real 
earnings management is often indistinguishable from other economic transactions 
undertaken by the firm.” It is reasonable to believe that most economic decisions 
are made to exploit profitable opportunities. An interpretation where economic 
decisions in general are seen as part of the managers’ reporting strategy, will lead 
to false conclusions regarding the significance of earnings management. Besides, 
managing earnings by making economic decisions are probably the expensive way 
to report desired earnings numbers. As far as other alternatives are available, 
earnings will probably be manipulated directly by exploiting the discretionary 
freedom in accruals rather than indirectly through economic decisions. As stated 
by Ronen and Yaari (2008:318): “Intuitively, accruals management seems more 
appealing.” On the other hand, managing earnings by real economic decisions has 
the added benefit that it is less transparent, and thus, much harder to detect 
(Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan 1995). This argument, however, is weighted at a 
discount. Earnings management is, therefore, perceived as a reporting 
phenomenon in this dissertation.  
 
The conceptual meaning of earnings management is sometimes contradictory. 
This makes the concept particularly demanding to understand. Managers may 
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engage in earnings management to inform or to mislead stakeholders (e.g. Dechow 
1994, Scott 2012:423). This suggests that earnings management is motivated by 
signalling or by opportunism (Beaver 2002). Ronan and Yaari (2008:25-6) provide 
a careful discussion of this positive and negative side of earnings management. 
Three different interpretations of the concept are discussed, symbolised by 
“white”, “grey” and “black”. “White” earnings management is reporting decisions 
made by the managers to reveal private, faithful information about the firm. Such 
earnings management is non-opportunistic. “Grey” earnings management is 
reporting decisions made for opportunistic or non-opportunistic reasons. 
Opportunistic earnings management is expected to increase the wealth of some 
stakeholders, for instance the managers, at the expense of some others, for instance 
the shareholders, by reporting misleading information. In contrast, non-
opportunistic earnings management is expected to increase the wealth of 
stakeholders (all contracting parties) by reporting faithful information (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1990). This highlights the point that accounting might be misleading 
while at the same time non-opportunistic towards certain stakeholders. For 
instance, shareholders will benefit when earnings management is used to reveal 
private, faithful information about the firm. However, shareholders may also 
benefit from earnings management that is conducted to mislead debtholders to 
avoid costly debt re-contracting (Peasnell et al. 2005, Zhong, Gribbin and Zheng 
2007). “Black” earnings management is a purely opportunistic reporting activity. 
In the famous speech called The Numbers Game the former SEC (Securities and 
Exchange Commission) chairman Levitt (1998) expresses concern about what he 
calls an “(…) erosion in the quality of earnings, and therefore, the quality of 
financial reporting.” He describes the flexibility within and outside existing US-
GAAP as a continuum “(…) between legitimacy and outright fraud. A gray area 
where the accounting is being perverted; where managers are cutting corners; 
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and where earnings report the desires of management rather than the underlying 
financial performance of the company.” An interpretation of earnings 
management as an opportunistic and even fraudulent reporting activity is common. 
For instance, Schipper (1989:92) describes earnings management as “(...) 
purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent 
of obtaining some private gain.” Healy and Wahlen (1999:368) state that “(…) 
earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” 
This suggests that the demarcation between “white”, “grey” and “black” earnings 
management is found in the managerial intent. In this dissertation, if not stated 
otherwise, earnings management is interpreted as an opportunistic reporting 
activity.  
 
Reporting decisions are either in coherence with existing GAAP or not. Earnings 
management that leads to GAAP violations is probably intended to mislead some 
stakeholders. Conversely, earnings management intended to inform stakeholders 
will probably be in coherence with GAAP. Davidson, Stickney and Weil (1987: 
cited in Schipper 1989:92) define earnings management as “(...) the process of 
taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting 
principles.” Others argue that earnings management is misrepresentation and 
fraud, which suggests accounting outside GAAP (e.g. Schipper 1989). Dechow 
and Skinner (2000) try to distinguish reporting decisions made within GAAP from 
reporting decisions outside GAAP. Accounting within GAAP is termed 
conservative accounting, neutral accounting or aggressive accounting, while 
accounting outside GAAP is termed fraudulent accounting. Reporting sales before 
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they are realised, reporting fictitious sales, backdating sales invoices and 
overstating inventory by recording fictitious inventory are examples of fraudulent 
accounting. Fraudulent accounting clearly demonstrates the intent to deceive 
stakeholders. Accounting within GAAP is more difficult to interpret “(…) without 
any objective evidence of intent to distinguish earnings management from the 
legitimate exercise of accounting discretion” (Dechow and Skinner 2000). All 
accounting decisions, within as well as outside GAAP, are more or less influenced 
by managers’ reporting strategies (e.g. Dechow et al. 1996). Fraudulent 
accounting is not in focus in this dissertation. No attempts are, therefore, made to 
distinguish earnings management within GAAP from earnings management 
outside GAAP. 
 
4.2. Earnings management and decision usefulness 
Earnings-management research is not basically motivated by standard-setting 
considerations although there are exceptions (e.g. Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005). 
This does not mean, however, that the decision usefulness of accounting 
information is unaffected by earnings management. The likelihood and 
significance of earnings management is believed to increase in discretionary 
freedom. This freedom will partly be determined by the standard setters’ beliefs in 
managers reporting relevant and reliable information. If standard setters believe 
that managers will make reporting decisions that represent the best in terms of 
decision usefulness, they will probably allow managers to make these decisions. In 
contrast, if standard setters believe that managers will engage in opportunistic 
earnings management, they will probably restrict their reporting flexibility (e.g. 
Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005). The trade-off between more and less discretionary 
freedom can be seen as a counterpart of the trade-off between relevance and 
reliability. More discretionary freedom gives managers the opportunity to report 
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more relevant information, but such information may suffer from low reliability. If 
managers engage in opportunistic earnings management, this generally means that 
the reported information drifts away from reflecting economic fundamentals, 
which in turn will harm faithful representation, neutrality and reliability (Fischer 
and Verrecchia 2000).  
 
On the other hand, less discretionary freedom may lead to less relevant, but more 
reliable and verifiable information. Thus, some optimal level of discretionary 
freedom may exist (Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005). Opportunistic earnings 
management is, therefore, expected to impair decision usefulness, whereas non-
opportunistic earnings management is expected to improve decision usefulness by 
revealing private information. It is important to emphasise, however, that reporting 
economic fundamentals is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for decision 
usefulness. First, as discussed in section 3.2 above, information about economic 
fundamentals may lack timeliness and thereby decision usefulness. Second, even 
information not reflecting economic fundamentals will in certain cases be decision 
useful. For instance, information about the risk of earnings management in 
accounting numbers might be useful for decision makers (Fischer and Verrecchia 
2000, Fischer and Stocken 2004). The general notion, however, is that 
opportunistic earnings management will impair decision usefulness because 
accounting numbers deviate from their economic fundamentals.  
 
4.2.1. Value relevance, information content and earnings management 
The effect of earnings management on decision usefulness might be discussed 
with reference to the literature investigating the association between earnings 
management and value relevance (or information content). This is based on the 
notion that value relevance (or information content) provides some evidence on 
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the decision usefulness or at least the valuation usefulness of accounting numbers. 
There are several analytical and empirical studies investigating the effect of 
opportunistic and non-opportunistic earnings management on value relevance (or 
information content) of accounting numbers.  
 
Before discussing these studies, however, the somewhat contradicting assumptions 
of value-relevance methodology and earnings-management rationality need to be 
discussed (e.g. Scott 2012:303). Earnings management is only a rational reporting 
strategy if there is information asymmetry between managers and some, not 
necessary all, stakeholders. This implies that at least some markets (e.g. capital 
markets, markets for top managers), in which the firms’ stakeholders allocate their 
resources, are less than strongly efficient (Field et al. 2001). Without any 
information asymmetry, there is no need for financial-accounting information and 
no room for earnings management. If expected benefits from earnings 
management exceed the costs, earnings management becomes a rational reporting 
strategy (Watts 1992, Fischer and Verrecchia 2000) (See section 4.3.1 below).  
 
The value-relevance methodology is based on an assumption of semi-strong 
capital markets, which implies that the markets reflect all publicly available 
information such as financial-accounting information (e.g. Fama 1970). Earnings 
management might be a rational reporting strategy even in the presence of semi-
strong capital markets. Non-opportunistic earnings management will reduce the 
information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders by reporting private 
information. The disclosure of private information might favourably affect the 
outcomes of contracts directly or indirectly written on accounting numbers and/or 
the pricing in markets that are less than strongly efficient (e.g. semi-strongly 
efficient). Opportunistic earnings management, however, might be hidden as 
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private information. Semi-strong markets will only be efficient with respect to 
published information, not private information (Fama 1970, Beaver 1998:145). 
This implies that these markets will not detect opportunistic earnings management 
that is unknown. But, when the extent of earnings management can be detected by 
published information, semi-strong markets will immediately and fully reveal and 
penalise the manipulation. There is, therefore, a potential that semi-strong capital 
markets might be misled when there is insufficient published information to detect 
the earnings management. Still, this might not hold on average (Fischer and 
Verrecchia 2000). Moreover, it is reasonable to believe that opportunistic earnings 
management is a highly risky strategy in semi-strongly efficient markets. 
Financial-accounting information is only one out of numerous sources of 
information. The expected costs of opportunistic earnings management might, 
therefore, exceed the expected benefits in markets that are semi-strongly efficient. 
This might suggest that opportunistic earnings management will only be a rational 
reporting strategy if the markets (e.g the capital markets) are less than semi-
strongly efficient (Field et al. 2001).  
 
Some analytical studies have examined the association between earnings 
management and information content of earnings, measured by the earnings-
response coefficient. The evidence from these studies shows that earnings 
management might increase or decrease earnings-response coefficients. Sankar 
(1999) investigates analytically how earnings maximisation and smoothing affect 
the return-earnings relationship. If investors expect managers to maximise 
earnings, but are unsure of the magnitude of the discretion available, reported 
earnings are on average less informative than when faithfully reported. This is not 
the case for income smoothing. Rather, he demonstrates the opposite. If investors 
expect managers to smooth earnings over a longer period of time, but are unsure 
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of the degree of discretion available, then the reported earnings are on average 
more informative than when faithfully reported. The reason why is not that 
smoothing conveys private information about future earnings and future cash 
flows, but that smoothing decreases the variability in earnings and thereby 
increases the valuation usefulness of these earnings. Sankar and Subramanyam 
(2001) demonstrate similar results, but their analytical analysis is different. 
Managers might use their private information about future earnings to smooth 
earnings towards a more permanent earnings number. By doing so, the earnings 
number will gain higher valuation usefulness measured as higher earnings-
response coefficients. Similar to Sankar (1999) and Sankar and Subramanyam 
(2001), Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) develop an analytical model based on 
the assumption that investors use earnings surprises as a metric of assessing 
earnings presision. In contrast to the above studies, they show that both smoothing 
and big-bath accounting could be non-opportunistic reporting strategies. Reporting 
a large earnings surprise reduces the inferred presision of earnings and provides a 
natural demand for smoother earnings. In contrast, a sufficiently large negative 
earnings surprise gives an incentive to report a maximum loss. The inferred 
precision of that loss will nevertheless be low.  
 
Several studies have empirically investigated the impact of opportunistic earnings 
management on the earnings-response coefficient. These studies are based on 
assumptions of semi-strong market efficiency. If earnings management leads to 
unfaithful reporting of earnings, and the capital market is able to see through the 
manipulation, the earnings-response coefficient is supposed to be lower compared 
to the earnings-response coefficient when earnings are faithfully reported (Lev 
1989, Kothari 2001). Empirical evidence supports this notion (Christensen, Hoyt 
and Paterson 1999, DeFond and Park 2001, Baber and Kang 2001, 2002, 
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Burgstahler and Eames 2003, Cohen, Dey and Lys 2005, Lin and Shih 2009). For 
instance, Lin and Shih (2009) examine the earnings-response coefficient for firms 
that meet analysts’ forecasts. They present evidence suggesting that the earnings-
response coefficient is discounted for firms reporting zero or small positive 
earnings surprises. 
 
 Similar evidence is found in long-term value relevance studies (Warfield et al. 
1995, Aboody, Barth and Kasznik 1999, Kallapur and Kwan 2004, Marquardt and 
Wiedman 2004). For instance, Kallapur and Kwan (2004) investigate value 
relevance and earnings management related to recognition of brand assets in 33 
UK-listed firms. They separate the sample firms in two groups: one with high and 
one with low incentives for brand-asset capitalisation. The regression coefficients 
on the interactions between earnings-management proxies and brand capitalisation 
suggest that firms with lower incentives have larger coefficients relative to firms 
with higher incentives. This is interpreted as evidence of earnings management 
impairing the value relevance: “The difference in market capitalisation rates 
indicates differences in the amount of bias or error in brand valuations of different 
groups of firms, suggesting that brand asset measures lack reliability for firms 
with high contracting incentives” (Kallapur and Kwan 2004:170). The analytical 
and empirical evidence discussed in this section suggests that opportunistic 
earnings management is negatively associated with value relevance. To the extent 
value relevance measures decision usefulness, it supports the general notion that 
opportunistic earnings management impairs the decision usefulness of accounting 
numbers.  
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4.3. Earnings-management incentives  
The incentives are the driving forces of earnings management. The effect of 
earnings management on decision usefulness is among the consequences. The 
following sections will discuss preconditions for earnings management and 
earnings-management incentives. 
 
4.3.1. Earnings management – some preconditions 
Three preconditions make earnings management a rational reporting strategy. The 
first condition concerns the characteristics of the markets in which the firms’ 
stakeholders allocate their resources. As stated in the previous section, these 
markets must be less than strongly efficient (Field et al. 2001). Information cannot 
be free and perfectly available to all stakeholders simultaneously. Managers will 
generally have more and better information about the firm than other stakeholders. 
This information asymmetry will give rise to information and contracting costs. 
Under these conditions, accounting serves an important role to reduce the 
information asymmetry between managers and other stakeholders. This is 
consistent with managers using their reporting flexibility to reveal private 
information about the firms (i.e. non-opportunistic earnings management). In 
contrast, managers may use accounting as an instrument to mislead other 
stakeholders to obtain private benefits (i.e. opportunistic earnings management) 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1990, Warfield et al. 1995, Ramanna and Watts 2009). If 
opportunistic earnings management is observable at low cost, it is reasonable to 
believe that the earnings management is harmless to the stakeholders. As long as 
market participants have access to all relevant information and are sufficiently 
sophisticated in using that information, they will reveal the earnings management 
and undo its effects on accounting (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Watts and 
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Zimmerman 1978, 1986, Baber, Chen and Kang 2006). Under inefficient market 
settings, however, earnings management might be a rational reporting strategy.  
 
The second condition concerns the discretionary reporting freedom available to 
managers. Without any reporting freedom, there will not be any room to engage in 
either non-opportunistic or opportunistic earnings management. All the reporting 
choices are pre-made by the standard setter. This will be the case in cash 
accounting. In a real accounting setting, however, there is more or less 
discretionary freedom, depending on the nature of the economic transaction and 
the event or the phenomenon to be reported (Schipper 2003, Ewert and 
Wagenhofer 2005). As discussed above, the discretionary freedom in reporting 
impairment losses is supposed to be rather excessive, providing the managers with 
opportunities to align the reporting strategy with their own reporting incentives 
(Ramanna 2008, Ramanna and Watts 2009). Even with excessive discretionary 
freedom, there are some constraining factors. The most important of these are 
monitoring mechanisms such as corporate-governance structures.  
 
The third condition concerns the net benefits of earnings management. Rational 
managers will neither engage in non-opportunistic nor opportunistic earnings 
management unless the reporting strategy is expected to provide benefits that 
exceed the costs of the strategy (Watts and Zimmerman 1990, Gaver, Gaver and 
Austin 1995, Christensen et al. 1999). Some early analytical and empirical studies 
fail to recognise this important assumption (Fischer and Verrecchia 2000). These 
studies generally assume that all earnings management can be perfectly foreseen 
by the market participants. But under such market conditions, no rational manager 
will engage in earnings management simply because doing so will give the 
managers zero or even negative net benefits. Taken together, it is reasonable to 
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expect earnings management (either non-opportunistic or opportunistic) if there is 
information asymmetry, discretionary reporting freedom and net benefits.  
 
4.3.2. Earnings-management incentives – introduction 
Three different, but not mutually exclusive sets of incentives are identified. The 
first set represents the desire to affect the outcomes of accounting-based contracts. 
The second set represents political-cost considerations and the third and last set 
represents the desire to influence the market perception of the firm or the market 
perception of top managers (e.g. Healy and Wahlen 1999, Dechow and Skinner 
2000, Field et al. 2001). The literature also identifies other incentives such as 
those related to litigation and tax liabilities (e.g. Beaver 2002), but these incentives 
will not be considered in this dissertation.  
 
Basically, all incentives can be addressed to contracting. The firms can be seen as 
a nexus of contracts between various stakeholders (e.g Coase 1937). There are a 
number of formal and explicit contracts and an even larger number of informal 
and implicit contracts. Formal and explicit contracts are those generally referred 
to. These are, for instance, remuneration contracts whose purpose is to align the 
interests of the managers with those of the shareholders, and debt contracts whose 
purpose is to align the interests of the managers and shareholders with those of the 
debtholders. Informal and implicit contracts are probably more frequent and take a 
variety of forms. For instance, the relation between the firm and society might be 
seen as an implicit contract. Other informal contracts can be found between the 
manager, i.e. the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the board of directors. Their 
relationship is extremely complex which makes it impractical to construct state-
contingent contracts that specify appropriate actions under every single scenario. 
As a solution, the CEO and the board will generally develop a set of informal rules 
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and understandings that guide the behaviour of both parties over time. Such 
informal and implicit contracts are complementary to employment and 
compensation arrangements (Watts and Zimmerman 1986:180, Armstrong, Guay 
and Weber 2010).  
 
The theoretical underpinning of the contracting role in accounting is found in 
positive accounting theory. This theory provides explanations for reporting 
choices and earnings management. The objective of positive accounting theory is 
to “(…) predict and explain accounting [decisions]” (Watts and Zimmerman 
1990: 132). To find explanatory variables for reporting decisions, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978, 1979, 1986, 1990), the founders of positive accounting theory, 
made use of the principal-agent literature and the property-right literature (e.g. 
Coase 1937, Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama and Jensen 1983, Sappington 1983, 
1991, Grossman and Hart 1983). A principal-agent relationship exists if “(...) one 
or more persons (principals) engage another person (agent) to perform some 
services on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority 
to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling 1976:308).  The literature on principal-agent 
relationships is particularly concerned with the conflicts of interest between 
managers on the one hand and shareholders on the other. A conflict between 
managers and shareholders is likely because these two parties have different risk 
attitudes, different access to company perks and/or different time-horizons (Ronan 
and Yaari 2008:61, Dey 2008). The following section will focus on managers and 
shareholders, but principal-agent conflicts are not limited to these relationships. In 
a later section, the potential conflict between managers, shareholders and 
debtholders is discussed.  
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An obvious problem for shareholders is to ensure that the managers make 
decisions in their interest. Positive contracting and information costs make it 
challenging to monitor the managers’ decisions and/or align the interests of the 
managers with those of the shareholders. Given conflicts of interest and 
information asymmetry, the managers may act opportunistically, which will 
impose agency costs upon the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
Armstrong et al. 2010). Two remedies are supposed to reduce opportunism and 
agency costs: To monitor the decisions made by the managers, which increases the 
risk that opportunistic behavior will be detected and penalised, and to establish a 
contract which seeks to align the managers’ interests with those of the 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983). An effective board of directors is believed 
to monitor and constrain the risk of opportunism. Moreover, the conflicts of 
interest might be aligned by managerial ownership and compensation contracts 
(Core, Wayne and Larcker 2003). Compensation contracts could, therefore, be 
considered as corporate-governance mechanisms (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Dey 
2008). However, monitoring and contracting will generally incur costs. This 
suggests that monitoring and/or contracting will only be rational from the 
shareholders’ point of view if the expected decrease in agency costs due to 
reduced opportunism outweighs the increase in costs due to monitoring and/or 
contracting.  
 
In the property-right literature it is argued that efficient markets can solve the 
principal-agent problem. Given that managers hold a significant portion of the 
stocks, the agency costs are borne, at least to some extent, by the managers (Fama 
1980, Watts and Zimmerman 1986, Field et al. 2001). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
demonstrate this result. The wealth-reducing behaviour of the managers, the 
opportunism, is expected by the shareholders ex ante. The shareholders will then 
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price-protect themselves by discounting the market price. This result will only 
hold if the markets are efficient (Fischer and Verrecchia 2000). If the contracting 
and/or information costs rise too high, the market will suffer from imperfections. 
The shareholders will no longer be price-protected and the shareholders, not the 
managers, will be the ones to bear the agency costs. Under such conditions, 
shareholders will have incentives to contract with the managers (Warfield et al. 
1995, Dechow and Skinner 2000). Still, after contracting, some agency costs may 
remain due to high contracting and/or information costs.  
 
This leads to an important recognition. Efficient contracts reduce (minimise) 
opportunism and agency costs. In contrast, inefficient contracts do not prevent 
opportunism; they rather create incentives for opportunism (e.g. Watts and 
Zimmerman 1990, Warfield, et al. 1995, Xie et al. 2003). In cases where contracts 
are written on accounting numbers, such as earnings, inefficient contracting 
implies that earnings management has the potential to increase the wealth of 
managers at the expense of the wealth of some other stakeholders of the firm, for 
instance the wealth of the shareholders. Core et al. (1999) investigate the 
determinants of CEO compensation. They find that CEOs of firms with greater 
agency problems receive greater compensation, and that these firms perform 
worse. It seems unreasonable to conclude, however, that contracts are inefficient 
on average for all firms and for longer periods of time. Inefficient contractual 
arrangements will probably be replaced by more efficient substitutes, for instance 
more efficient corporate-governance structures. Still, contracts may be inefficient 
for certain firms, in certain situations and in certain periods of time, especially 
when contracting and information costs are high (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, 
Core et al. 2003).  
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4.3.3. Accounting-based contracting incentives 
This section discusses the accounting-based contracting incentives found in 
conventional positive accounting theory: Incentives for earnings management 
triggered by earnings-based compensation plans and accounting-based debt 
contracts. These incentives can be addressed to the bonus-plan hypothesis and 
debt-equity hypothesis, which initially were formulated by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986, 1990).  
 
4.3.3.1. Earnings-based compensation  
Earnings-based compensation is intended to motivate managers to make decisions 
that maximise the firm value and the wealth of the shareholders. The 
compensation is generally given as a cash-bonus payment determined by an 
accounting number such as growth in earnings, growth in earnings before tax or 
growth in earnings-per-share. An earnings-based compensation plan is generally 
one out of several components of the managers’ overall compensation package. 
Usually these packages also consist of salary, specific benefits (insurances, free 
house and car and pension benefits), and equity-based compensation such as 
stocks, conditional stocks and stock options. Salary is a fixed cash payment and to 
limited extent determined by managers’ performance. Equity-based compensation, 
on the other hand, is non-cash-based and at least partly determined by stock return 
as an indicator of managers’ performance. Thus, earnings-based compensation is 
understood as cash-bonus compensation in this dissertation.  
 
The use of accounting earnings rather than firm value to determine the 
compensation is not straightforward. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that the 
growth and survival of earnings-based compensation suggest that they are efficient 
contracts which motivate managers to make decisions that are expected to 
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maximise firm value. There are several reasons for the existence of earnings-based 
compensation (Watts and Zimmerman 1986: 201-3). The majority of firms are not 
traded regularly, which implies that the firm-market value is not directly 
observable. This makes it costly to estimate changes in the market value of the 
firm. In such cases, the firm’s earnings could be the most cost-efficient proxy. 
Second, even if the market value is observable, only top managers are responsible 
for the entire firm. The market values of subunits of the firm are generally not 
available, which means that the other managers’ effect on the firm value cannot be 
observed directly. In recent years, however, this picture has changed and equity-
based compensation has become increasingly important, not only for top 
managers, but also for managers at lower levels in the organisation (Core et al. 
2003, Bushman and Smith 2003, Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew 2006).  
 
The earnings number has to be reported under limited discretionary freedom. If 
managers can report any earnings number they want, they will probably 
manipulate the numbers to their own advantage, reporting arbitrarily high earnings 
rather than taking actions to increase earnings through firm-value increasing 
decisions. The demand for some conservatism and verifiability in earnings 
numbers are examples of regulatory restrictions that limit the discretionary 
freedom. Still, compensation plans allow some discretion. Dye and Verrecchia 
(1995) argue that discretion is necessary to allow the management to reveal 
private information. This is based on the assumption that efficient contracting is 
possible. But, if such contracting is unattainable because of high contracting and 
information costs, the allowed discretion is surprising. Evans and Shribar (1996) 
offer a pragmatic justification. In their model it is costly for the shareholders to 
eliminate all reporting flexibility as it removes the managers’ opportunity to 
choose an efficient set of accounting methods. This makes some flexibility a 
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relatively low-cost compromise. Moreover, if managers can influence their 
compensation by managing either accruals or real economic decisions, then 
manipulating accruals may result in lower wealth loss to shareholders than 
manipulating real activity (Field et al. 2001).  
 
Most empirical research investigating the earnings-based compensation plans 
assumes that the manager’s compensation is a positive linear function of reported 
earnings. Stated otherwise, according to this assumption, an increase in the firm’s 
reported earnings will increase the present value of the manager’s compensation. 
This leads to the bonus-plan hypothesis formulated by Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986:208): “Ceteris paribus, managers of firms with bonus plans are more likely 
to choose accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from future periods 
to current period.” This hypothesis does not include the more complex forms of 
compensation plans. The bonus one year is often a function of reported earnings 
over a target earnings number the previous year. If earnings are less than the 
target, no bonus is awarded. Some compensation plans also have an upper 
threshold. The incentive to increase or decrease current period earnings depends 
on whether earnings are below the lower threshold, between the lower and the 
upper threshold or above the upper threshold. If earnings are above the upper 
threshold, the manager has incentives to reduce earnings by deferring earnings to 
later reporting periods. The bonus will be lost forever on earnings in excess of the 
upper threshold. If earnings are between the lower and the upper threshold, the 
managers have incentives to increase earnings to maximise the bonus. And finally, 
if earnings fall short of the lower threshold, the manager has incentives to take a 
bath (Healy 1985, Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser 1999, Gaver et al. 1995). As 
stated by Watts and Zimmerman (1986:210): “It would not be very likely that 
managers would switch back and forth between accounting methods such as 
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straight-line and accelerated depreciation since those charges are readily 
apparent to the compensation committee (…) Instead, accruals such as the 
recognition of losses (…) are more likely candidates.” Such discretionary losses 
could be impairment losses in goodwill. Not only big-bath accounting, but also 
income smoothing is suggested by the bonus-plan theory. If a lower threshold for 
earnings does not exist, but an upper threshold does, managers may smooth 
earnings towards the upper threshold.  
 
The research findings from this literature are generally interpreted as evidence of 
opportunistic earnings management. For instance, Healy (1985) shows that when 
earnings fall between the upper and the lower threshold, managers make earnings-
increasing reporting decisions. When earnings are expected to be either above the 
upper threshold or below the lower threshold, managers shift earnings to future 
periods to maximise compensation. Some studies report findings inconsistent with 
Healy (1985). For instance, Gaver et al. (1995) find evidence consistent with 
managers manipulating towards a lower threshold. They examine the relation 
between discretionary abnormal accruals and the bonus plan. Contrary to Healy 
(1985), they find that when earnings before discretionary accruals fall below the 
lower threshold, managers make income-increasing reporting decisions. This 
result is consistent with income smoothing. Holthausen et al. (1995) find evidence 
consistent with an upper threshold. Unlike Healy (1985), they find no evidence 
that managers manipulate earnings downwards when earnings fall below the 
minimum necessary earnings to receive a bonus (Holthausen et al. 1995). Finally, 
Barton (2001) reports evidence of a positive association between bonus payments 
and earnings management measured as abnormal accruals.  
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These research findings, however, may suffer from methodological problems. A 
common, but strongly criticised method is to use total accruals (Healy 1985) or 
abnormal accruals (Gaver et al. 1995, Holthausen et al. 1995, Barton 2001) as 
measures of earnings management. Total accruals are a very crude measure likely 
to reflect accruals from real economic activities just as accruals from earnings 
management (Dechow et al. 1995, Guay et al. 1996, Beneish 1999, 2001, Field et 
al. 2001). When separating out the discretionary component of total accruals, the 
results turn inconsistent with the findings of Healy (1985). Still, the estimation of 
abnormal accruals is not unproblematic. McNichols (2000) and Field et al. (2001) 
argue that the level and changes in abnormal accruals could just as much be 
evidence of actual performance as opportunistic reported performance. For 
instance, the very purpose of compensation contracts is to align the interest of the 
managers with the interests of shareholders. If the compensation contract is 
efficient, the observation of a given bonus payment along with a certain earnings 
pattern cannot serve as evidence of opportunistic earnings management: “(…) 
researchers implicitly assume that managers manipulating earnings in an 
apparent attempt to maximize their compensation are not acting in the best 
interests of shareholders. If, however, the incentive compensation contract is 
structured to align managers interests with those of shareholders, such actions 
might well be beneficial to shareholders” (Field et al. 2001). Guay et al. (1996) 
report evidence suggesting that the separation of total accruals into a discretionary 
and a non-discretionary component is most arbitrary. They compare all the 
conventional accrual-estimation models with one that arbitrarily separates out 
discretionary accruals. They find high positive correlation between the 
discretionary accruals in all these models. Despite the methodological challenges, 
abnormal accruals are still used in recent studies to indicate earnings management 
(e.g. Chtourou et al. 2001, Xie et al. 2003, Bradbury, Mak and Tan 2004, Vafeas 
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2005, Peasnell et al. 2005). Research findings from these studies will be referred 
to when relevant, but the findings have to be interpreted with some caution. In 
recent years, earnings management has been examined by alternative methods. To 
increase the power of the research design, specific reporting decisions rather than 
aggregate accruals are investigated. Some studies are also conducted on firms that 
are known to have managed earnings ex post.  
 
Recent evidence has demonstrated that earnings-based compensation explains 
earnings management at a discount relative to equity-based incentives (Schipper 
and Vincent 2003, Graham et al. 2005, Yaari and Ronen 2008:80). Moreover, 
conditional stocks and stock options have become a major component of top 
management-compensation packages (Hall and Liebman 1998, Murphy 1999, Hall 
and Murphy 2002, Denis, Hanouna and Sarin 2006).  This may suggest that 
earnings-based compensation is of less importance. The asset-impairment 
literature has to a limited extent investigated earnings-based compensation 
incentives. Some exceptions are found in Beatty and Weber (2006), Lapointe-
Antunes, Cormier and Magnan (2008) and Ramanna and Watts (2009). Ramanna 
and Watts (2009) include an indicator variable for CEO cash-bonus payments. 
They find an insignificant association between this indicator variable and 
goodwill-impairment losses. Similar evidence is found by Lapointe-Antunes et al. 
(2008). Beatty and Weber (2006), however, report a significantly positive 
association between the indicator variable for bonus payment and goodwill-
impairment losses.   
 
4.3.3.2. Accounting-based debt covenants 
The interest conflict is tripled in firms holding debt compared to firms holding no 
debt. There are potential conflicts between shareholders and debtholders, 
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managers and shareholders and managers and debtholders (Black and Scholes 
1973, Merton 1974, Jensen and Meckling 1976, Smith and Warner 1979, Leftwich 
1983). As shareholders are concerned that managers are too risk-averse, the 
debtholders on the other hand are concerned that the shareholders are too much of 
a risk-taker. Debtholders prefer low-risk projects that increase the probability of 
debt and interests being paid. The shareholders’ claim is analogous to a call option 
on the firm’s assets with an exercise price equal to the face value of debt. The 
debtholders’ claim, however, is analogous to a put option in that their upside is 
equal to the face value of debt. If the firm value falls below the face value of debt, 
the debtholders lose the difference between the face value of debt and the firm 
value (Black and Scholes 1973, Merton 1974). Shareholders can potentially 
transfer wealth from debtholders to themselves by investing in riskier assets than 
expected when the debt was issued (asset substitution). The potential of wealth 
transfer increases as firm value falls and the shareholders call option moves from 
being well in the money to being at or close to the money, and it becomes 
particularly actute as this option falls out of the money (Merton 1974, Kothari et 
al. 2010). 
 
Debt covenants are intended and designed to restrict managers from engaging in 
investment and financing decisions that reduce the value of the debtholders’ claim 
(Smith and Warner 1979, Leftwich 1983, Guay 2008). Because debt covenants 
frequently are written on accounting numbers and violation of these covenants are 
believed to be costly for the firm, managers of firms that are close to violating 
debt covenants are supposed to make reporting decisions that reduce the likelihood 
of default (Watts and Zimmerman 1986:186-91). This leads to the debt-equity 
hypothesis formulated by Watts and Zimmerman (1986:216): “Ceteris paribus, 
the larger a firm’s debt/equity ratio, the more likely the firm’s manager is to select 
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accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from future periods to the 
current period.” In more general terms, this hypothesis can be rephrased as a debt-
covenant hypothesis, where managers have incentives to make reporting decisions 
that reduce the likelihood of debt-covenant violation (Field et al. 2001). The 
strength of these incentives depends on the expected costs of violation.  
 
Debtholders will not engage in contracting unless they expect to be better off 
writing these contracts. If the agency costs due to opportunism are expected ex 
ante, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986:189) 
demonstrate that these agency costs to a large extent will be borne by managers 
and shareholders. The debtholders will on average be price-protected, which 
makes contracting unnecessary. This conclusion, however, is based on the 
assumption that debt is traded in an efficient debt-capital market, which is 
generally not the case. Without efficient markets for debt, the debtholders will not 
be price-protected. Under such conditions, contracts serve an important role to 
align the interests of managers and shareholders with those of the debtholders. An 
efficient contract will, therefore, minimise the agency costs. If, however, the 
contracting and information costs are too high, the contract may turn out to be 
inefficient and itself provide incentives for earnings management.  
 
The debt contracts may include different covenants. For instance, there might be 
covenants that constrain managers’ decisions regarding dividend payouts, future 
debt issuances, participation in mergers and disposition of assets (Leftwich 1983, 
Dichev and Skinner 2002). Debt covenants can be accounting-based or non-
accounting-based and will appear more often and be tighter in private rather than 
public debt contracts. A variety of accounting-based ratios are used to set debt 
covenants. Ratios such as debt-to-cash flows, debt-to-equity and interest coverage 
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are intended to measure the firm’s ability to make debt-related payments (Dichev 
and Skinner 2002). These covenants are calculated on current GAAP or modified 
GAAP (Leftwich 1983). When current GAAP is the relevant basis for calculation, 
accounting can either be frozen at the time of the debt issuance or be allowed to 
follow changes in GAAP over time.  
 
Departures from current GAAP are quite common. Generally, these departures 
lead to more conservative accounting as certain increases in net earnings and net-
asset values are excluded when calculating the covenants. For instance, in some 
contracts accounting for intangibles such as goodwill are excluded (Leftwich 
1983, Holthausen and Watts 2001, Watts 2003, Beatty, Weber and Yu 2008). 
Debtholders are often believed to use a liquidation approach. Some assets such as 
goodwill are expected to have liquidation values equal to zero. This justifies 
exclusion of book goodwill (Holthausen and Watts 2001, Beatty et al. 2008, 
Kothari et al. 2010). The exclusion might also be justified on the basis of 
unverifiability and asset-value uncertainty (Leftwich 1983, Kothari et al. 2010). 
Guay (2008) find evidence consistent with book goodwill being excluded from the 
calculation of net-worth covenants. He argues, however, that the exclusion of 
intangible assets in net worth is likely to vary across firms, depending on the 
intensity of recognised intangible assets and the importance of intangible assets in 
the business model. For firms with few intangible assets, debtholders may exclude 
intangible assets when calculating net-worth covenants. For firms with lots of 
intangible assets, however, debtholders will likely include book values of these 
assets, if available, when calculating the covenants. There are at least two reasons 
why intangible assets are included. First, tangible net worth may not be a relevant 
metric of financial health in these firms. When a large fraction of the assets are 
intangible, debtholders will probably want to obtain decision rights when 
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intangible assets are substantially impaired. Second, debtholders may have an 
interest in monitoring the covenant, intangible assets to tangible assets. As 
intangible assets are amortised or impaired over time, the firm must recoup those 
earnings effects in cash flows or tangible assets to avoid losing covenant slack 
(Guay 2008, Zang 2008). Lambert (2010) argues that all assets, also intangible 
assets such as goodwill, are relevant for debtholders. The reason is that all assets 
generate cash flows which can be used to pay off debt. He also argues that the 
liquidiation approach is only relevant for debtholders when firms are in financial 
distress. In all other situations, profitability and cash-generating capacity of the 
firms are of most interest.  
 
Unfortunately, details of debt covenants are generally unavailable to researchers. 
Empirical tests of the debt-covenant hypothesis frequently rely on variables that 
are supposed to be positively correlated with debt covenants. The most frequently 
used indicator is the debt-to-equity ratio (Duke and Hunt 1990, Smith 1993, 
Dechow et al. 1996). Later research generally relies on actual covenant data 
(Healy and Palepu 1990, Beneish and Press 1993, Smith 1993, Sweeney 1994, 
Dichev and Skinner 2002). Watts and Zimmerman (1986:216) argue that the debt-
to-equity ratio is a reasonable approximation of most debt covenants, as the 
likelihood of these other covenants being violated will increase in debt-to-equity 
ratio. Nonetheless, they encourage researchers to increasingly rely on details of 
debt covenants. Duke and Hunt (1990) examine empirically the accounting-based 
debt-covenant details. They find that the debt-to-equity ratio captures the most 
common accounting-based restrictions used in actual debt covenants. They 
conclude that researchers are comparatively safe to use the debt-to-equity ratio as 
a proxy for actual covenants. Others, however, oppose this conclusion. Dichev and 
Skinner (2002), for instance, argue that debt-to-equity only to a limited extent 
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correlate with firms’ actual closeness to covenant restrictions. They conclude that 
the debt-to-equity-ratio is a fairly noisy proxy for managers’ reporting incentives 
triggered by debt covenants. Despite the mixed evidence on the validity of the 
debt-to-equity ratio, this proxy is widely employed in the asset-impairment 
literature (Lo and Tan 2002, Segal 2003, Sellhorn 2004, Kvaal 2005, Lapointe-
Antunes et al. 2008, Zang 2008).  
 
The incentives to avoid covenant violations will be a function of the probability of 
violation and the expected default costs imposed on the firm given violation. The 
probability of violation will be determined by the debt-covenant slack and the 
choices made regarding the calculation of the debt covenant (Dichev and Skinner 
2002). The expected default cost is in focus here. If a firm is technically default, 
this may result in significant default costs (Sweeney 1994). Beneish and Press 
(1993) demonstrate that the cost associated with technical defaults is quite 
significant. They estimate that refinancing costs resulting from interest-cost 
increases vary from 0.84% to 1.63% of the market value of the borrower’s equity. 
Gopalakrishnan and Parkash (1995) identify six potential debtholder responses to 
covenant violations: termination of the debt contract, demand for immediate 
repayment, increased collateral, increased interest rate, imposition of additional 
covenant constraints and a waiver. Immediate repayment is rare. The common 
response is a waiver. Dichev and Skinner (2002) for instance, demonstrate that 
violations occur rather frequently. They find that approximately one-third of the 
loans violated covenants. In addition, most loans with debt covenants had multiple 
violations. The same results are also demonstrated by Gopalakrishnan and Parkash 
(1995). Both lenders and borrowers indicated a waiver as the most likely response 
to the violation of an accounting-based debt covenant. This suggests that other 
information sources than financial statements are used to decide whether to waive 
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or not (Lambert 2010). Still, a violation will likely impose some default costs on 
the firm.  
 
This provides the managers and shareholders with incentives to try to avoid 
violations by making earnings-increasing reporting decisions. Sweeney (1994) 
examines the time series of reporting decisions prior to firms violating accounting-
based debt covenants. She investigates whether managers change accounting 
methods, which type of accounting methods managers change, when they make 
these changes and to what extent these changes affect the restrictiveness of 
accounting-based covenants. Her findings demonstrate that firms approaching 
violations of accounting-based covenants are more likely to make earnings-
increasing accounting changes and early adopt earnings-increasing mandatory 
accounting changes relative to a sample of control firms matched on industry and 
size. Beneish and Press (1993) find evidence in line with Sweeney (1994). They 
find that debt-covenant violators make earnings-increasing reporting decisions in 
the year of violation and up to five years prior to the violation. Using accrual-
estimation models for investigating earnings management, DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) find that managers use discretionary accruals to avoid debt-covenant 
violations. They examine firms that report debt-covenant violations in their 
financial statement, and their findings suggest that there are positive discretionary 
accruals in the year prior to the violation and the year of the violation. Some 
evidence, however, contradicts these findings. DeAnglo, DeAnglo and Skinner 
(1994) argue and find evidence inconsistent with the debt-covenant hypothesis. 
They state that “(…) managers of troubled firms have incentives to take 
discretionary write-offs that signal to the lenders their willingness to acknowledge 
and deal with the firm’s problems” (DeAnglo et al. 1994:134). They find that in 
the year of the dividend reduction 40 out of 76 firms report impairment losses or 
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restructuring charges. The incentives to do so are found in the desire to affect the 
renegotiation outcomes. More than 87% of the firms were renegotiating contracts 
with lenders or labour unions, had changes in top management and/or lobbied for 
governmental support, all of which plausibly motivated managers to reduce 
reported earnings. In contrast, Dichev and Skinner (2002) find a significantly 
higher proportion of firms reporting accounting numbers slightly above current 
ratio and tangible-net-worth constraints. Taken together, it is reasonable to predict 
that managers make reporting decisions to avoid covenant violations. 
 
4.3.4. Political-cost incentives 
Accounting information is frequently used by politicians and bureaucrats to 
determine the direction and amount of wealth transfer. This gives rise to other 
earnings-management incentives than those related to formal and explicit 
accounting-based contracts. The incentives stem from the fact that accounting 
information, e.g. earnings, may influence the degree to which firms are subject to 
potentially adverse regulation and increased taxation. First, the amount of profit in 
certain industries might be restricted ex ante by regulation based on accounting 
numbers. Second, adverse economic consequences for politically visible firms are 
assumed to arise ex post from their accounting numbers such as earnings (Watts 
and Zimmerman 1986:115). Several regulated industries, for instance the oil and 
gas industry in the US, have been investigated in political-cost studies. In these 
industries firms’ profits are restricted to some fair rate of return-on-assets 
estimated as weighted-average cost of capital (Hall 1993, Han and Wang 1998). 
Accounting numbers are expected to determine a firm’s political visibility, i.e. the 
likelihood of adverse regulation and increased political costs. Obscenely high 
earnings generally indicate monopoly profits or windfall profits. Such earnings, 
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along with large fluctuations in earnings, increase the likelihood of adverse 
regulation (Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1986, 1990, Moses 1987).  
 
Researchers have tried to increase the power of their empirical tests by focusing 
on specific settings in which firms’ political-cost incentives are supposed to be 
particularly strong. Such settings, signalled by high earnings reported by certain 
firms, are perceived in the political process as potential crises that must be 
overcome with additional regulation (Cahan 1992, Han and Wang 1998). The 
likelihood of increased political costs has frequently, especially in earlier research, 
been assumed to increase in the size of the firm. This leads to the prediction that 
large firms relative to small firms are more inclined to use earnings management 
to reduce reported earnings. This is known as the size hypothesis in positive-
accounting theory: “Ceteris paribus, the larger the firm, the more likely the 
manager is to choose accounting procedures that defer reported earnings from 
current to future periods” (Watts and Zimmerman 1986:235). The size proxy, 
however, has been criticised for being crude, since it is not explicitly linked to 
political costs per se (Ball and Foster 1982, Watts and Zimmerman 1990). 
According to Ball and Foster (1982), size may proxy for a variety of other aspects 
of the firm, including industry membership. Despite the criticism, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990) conclude that no alternative theories explain the empirical 
regularity that large firms tend to make earnings-decreasing reporting decisions. 
Along with size, variables supposed to reflect monopoly rents such as the firm’s 
market power are used to proxy for political-cost incentives (Moses 1987, Gupta 
1995). The political-cost hypothesis is rarely tested in the asset-impairment 
literature. Francis et al. (1996) for instance, include firm size, measured as the log 
of total sales, as an independent variable. However, that variable is not intended to 
reflect political-cost incentives. It is simply a control variable.   
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4.3.5. Equity-based incentives 
Earnings management is often driven by other incentives than those from political 
costs and accounting-based contract (Fischer and Verrecchia 2000, Fischer and 
Stocken 2004). These other incentives are generally termed equity-based 
incentives or capital-marked based incentives. Equity-based incentives emerge as 
a result of capital-market imperfections, that is, less than semi-strong capital 
markets (Field et al. 2001). Without market imperfections, earnings management 
will not have any effect on the market perception of the firm (Watts and 
Zimmerman 186:198). The importance of equity-based incentives has increased 
relative to political cost and accounting-based contracting incentives (e.g. Graham 
et al. 2005). The main reason is that stocks, conditional stocks and stock options 
have become an increasingly important part of managers’ total compensation (e.g. 
Hall and Liebman 1998, Murphy 1999, Hall and Murphy 2002, Hall 2003, Denis, 
Hanouna and Sarin 2006).  
 
4.3.5.1. Equity-based compensation and managers’ reputation 
Equity-based compensation is, like earnings-based compensation, intended to 
motivate the managers to make decisions that maximise firm value and 
shareholders’ wealth. Stocks and stock-option holdings, in particular, are seen as 
important mechanisms to align managers’ interests with those of the shareholders 
and thereby reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Burns and Kedia 
2006, Johnson, Ryan and Tian 2009). They are considered to be important 
corporate-governance mechanisms. Stock options, for instance, will impose 
higher-level risk on the managers. Stock options are only valuable if the stock 
price has risen when exercised. A manager that is reluctant to bear personal risk 
will still make decisions that are expected to maximise the firm value (Ronen and 
Yaari 2008:54-83). For instance, Morgan and Poulsen (2001) find empirical 
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evidence supporting a positive effect of stock options on firm value. Conversely, 
equity-based compensation contracts such as conditional stocks and stock options 
might be inefficient in aligning the interest of the managers with those of the 
shareholders. In such cases these contracts could themselves lead to opportunism 
(e.g Gao and Shrieves 2002, Denis et al. 2006, Erickson et al. 2006, Burns and 
Kedia 2006, Johnson et al. 2009). 
 
The earnings number may affect equity-based compensation in two ways. Under 
less than semi-strong efficiency, capital markets may not be able to undo the 
effects of earnings management. This implies that earnings management might 
affect the value of stocks, conditional stocks and stock options. Earnings 
management may also affect metrics, such as stock returns, used to determined 
conditional stock and stock-option awards. In some cases, these awards are 
determined by a weighted stock-based and accounting-based metric, for instance, 
stock returns and earnings-per-share. In such cases, the awards might be affected 
directly through earnings-per-share and indirectly through altered stock prices.  
 
The literature demonstrates a positive association between managers’ stock-option 
holdings and earnings management. For instance, Gao and Shrieves (2002) find 
that the number of stock options is positively related to the intensity of earnings 
management as measured by abnormal accruals. Denis et al. (2006) and Erickson 
et al. (2006) find that the likelihood of being accused of fraud increases in the 
amount of stock compensation, in the percentage of total executive compensation 
being stock-based and in the sensitivity of managers’ stock-based wealth to 
changes in stock prices. Burns and Kedia (2006) further document that the 
sensitivity of the CEOs’ stock-option portfolios to stock price is significantly 
positively associated with the propensity to engage in opportunistic earnings 
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management. They do not find, however, that other components of CEO 
compensation, i.e. stocks, restricted stocks or bonus payments, have any 
significant impact on the propensity to misreport.  
 
The asset-impairment literature has to a limited extent investigated equity-based 
inventives. There are, however, some recent exceptions. Lapointe-Antunes et al. 
(2008) investigate the association between stock options and goodwill-impairment 
losses. They argue that the likelihood of stock-option awards and the value of 
stock-option holdings will increase when stock prices increase. Given that 
impairment losses have the potential to negatively affect stock prices, it is 
expected that managers will understate impairment losses. Consistent with their 
hypothesis, they find a negative association between stock options and goodwill-
impairment losses (impairment losses take positive values). Ramanna and Watts 
(2009) use the earnings-response coefficient to investigate equity-pricing 
concerns. They argue that non-impairment decisions are more likely for firms 
having higher earnings-response coefficients. They find, however, no significant 
association between earnings-response coefficients and impairment decisions.  
 
Equity-based incentives may also arise absent equity-based compensation. 
Managers of growing firms are likely to obtain a sense of status and prestige from 
the size and growth of the firm, which increase their own market value as a 
manager. A growing firm will also reduce the manager’s risk of dismissal (Fama 
and Jensen 1983). Managers’ reputation concerns have in recent years been 
considered an important explanation for the managers’ reluctance to report 
impairment losses. For instance, Beatty and Weber (2006) and Ramanna and 
Watts (2009) argue that managers’ tenures are important to explain the tendency 
to understate impairment losses in goodwill. The longer the tenure, the more likely 
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it is that the manager reporting the goodwill impairment was in charge at the time 
when goodwill was recognised. Beatty and Weber (2006) and Ramanna and Watts 
(2009) find that tenure significantly explains the impairment decisions and the size 
of the reported impairment losses.  
 
Overall, both equity-based compensation and enhanced reputation give rise to 
incentives to achieve a steady growth in stock prices. The following sections 
discuss three reporting patterns: income smoothing, target accounting and big-bath 
accounting. All these three reporting patterns might be explained by accounting-
based contracting incentives (e.g. Healy 1985). In recent years, however, these 
reporting patterns have been addressed to equity-based incentives (Sellhorn 2003).  
 
4.3.5.2. Income smoothing  
Income smoothing is a reporting activity which seeks to reduce the variability of 
earnings (Moses 1987, Hunt, Moyer and Shevlin 1997, Kirschenheiter and 
Melumad 2002). For instance, Zucca and Campbell (1992:35) state that “[i]ncome 
smoothing describes an earnings pattern in which management aspires to 
maintain a steady and predictable rate of earnings growth.” Rather than being an 
earnings-management incentive, income smoothing is an earnings pattern like 
target accounting and big-bath accounting, reflecting some reporting incentives. 
Two types of income smoothing can be found: artificial and real income 
smoothing. The latter type is considered outside the definition of earnings 
management in this dissertation. This type of income smoothing involves 
financing and investment decisions that reduce the variability of economic 
earnings. Artificial income smoothing can be separated into intertemporal 
smoothing and classificatory smoothing (Lambert 1984). Intertemporal smoothing 
involves shifting gains and losses between reporting periods to reduce reported 
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earnings in periods with above expected earnings and increase reported earnings in 
periods with below expected earnings. Classificatory smoothing deals with the 
presentation of reported earnings. Given the assumption that shareholders 
concentrate on earnings from continuing operations, components of earnings that 
are incompatible with the smoothing strategy are classified as non-recurring 
earnings. Under IFRS, such classification is difficult, since there is no room for 
extraordinary items on the profit and loss account.  
 
A smooth earnings stream is assumed to be desirable to managers, shareholders 
and debtholders. Shareholders and debtholders may interpret a steady earnings 
stream as low risk, which justifies a higher stock price and a lower interest rate on 
debt. The sideeffects could be higher earnings-based compensation and lower risk 
of dismissal (Trueman and Titman 1988, Barth, Elliot and Finn 1999, 
Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2002). Empirical evidence supports this notion by 
demonstrating positive associations between earnings variability and measures of 
total risk and systematic risk (e.g. Beaver, Kettler and Scholes 1970, Rosenberg 
and McKibben 1973, Lev and Kunitzky 1974, Bildersee 1975, Eskew 1979, 
Brimble 2003). Income smoothing might also be triggered by political-cost 
considerations. Large fluctuations in earnings may attract attention of politicians 
and bureaucrats. Large upward fluctuations in earnings might be interpreted as 
monopolistic profits as large downward fluctuations may signal crisis and cause 
regulators to act (Moses 1987). 
 
Income smoothing can be a non-opportunistic or an opportunistic reporting 
strategy. Beneficial smoothing means that managers use smoothing to signal the 
economic earnings stream and the risk of that earnings stream. Signalling means 
that the managers use its discretion to indicate future prospects of the firm; thereby 
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increasing the predictive ability of the earnings stream. Higher variability in 
earnings, that is, higher perceived risk implies lower market value of the firm. 
Both analytical and empirical evidence support this. Trueman and Titman (1988) 
demonstrate analytically that income smoothing can increase the market value and 
be non-opportunistic towards the interests of shareholders, but opportunistic 
towards the interests of debtholders. As summarised in their study: “A corporate 
manager may rationally want to smooth reported income - namely to lower claim 
holders’ perception of the variance of the firms’ underlying economic earnings. In 
turn, it was shown that such action could have a positive effect on the firm’s 
market value” (Trueman and Titman 1988:139-40). Similar analytical results are 
demonstrated by Sankar (1999), Sankar and Subramanyam (2001) and 
Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002). Sankar (1999) investigates the impact of 
earnings management on the earnings-response coefficients. He demonstrates that 
earnings-response coefficients are higher if the earnings surprises are small. This 
suggests that the positive effect of income smoothing on the usefulness of earnings 
is not caused by private information in this model. It is simply driven by a more 
precise earnings number. Sankar and Subramanyam (2001) find similar analytical 
evidence when managers use their private information to smooth the earnings 
stream. Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) demonstrate analytically that both 
income smoothing and big-bath accounting could be a non-opportunistic reporting 
strategy.  
 
Subramanyam (1996) reports empirical evidence consistent with income 
smoothing. He finds that the variance of net earnings is significantly smaller than 
the variance of non-discretionary accruals and cash flows. Hunt et al. (1997) 
investigate income smoothing by testing the value relevance of different sources 
of smoothing: variability of cash flows, variability of discretionary accruals and 
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variability of non-discretionary accruals. Their results reveal that the discretionary 
smoothing variable is significantly positive, which suggests that income 
smoothing increases the informativeness of earnings. The association between 
earnings variability and market value differ for non-discretionary and 
discretionary accrual-components of earnings variability. For a given earnings 
level, smoother earnings are associated with higher market value. Zarowin (2002) 
investigates whether income smoothing makes stock prices more informative. He 
uses two smoothing measures, namely the correlation between changes in accruals 
and cash flows and the dispersion in net earnings scaled by the dispersion in cash 
flows. He then regresses current stock returns on lagged, current and future 
earnings (cash flows) and finds that stock returns of firms with more smoothing 
capture more information about future earnings (cash flows).  
 
Income smoothing may also be seen as an opportunistically reporting strategy 
(Ball and Foster 1982). Cheng and Warfield (2005) examine the income-
smoothing hypothesis along with the target-accounting hypothesis. Managers may 
engage in income-decreasing activities in periods with good performance in order 
to increase earnings in future periods. Such income smoothing increases the 
likelihood of meeting analysts’ forecasts in the future. Consistent with this 
argument, they find evidence suggesting that high equity-incentive managers are 
less likely to report large positive earnings surprises compared to those with low 
equity incentives. This is consistent with opportunistic earnings management. In 
the asset-impairment literature, the income-smoothing hypothesis has been 
popular. Zucca and Campbell (1992), Francis et al. (1996), Segal (2003), Riedl 
(2004) and Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) examine income smoothing when 
reporting impairment losses. The empirical results from these studies are 
somewhat mixed and will be discussed at the end of this chapter.    
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4.3.5.3. Target accounting 
Target accounting is a reporting activity concerned with the level of earnings 
rather than the variability of earnings (Ronen and Yaari 2008:135). Target 
accounting, known as the numbers game, is heavily criticised by regulators (e.g. 
Levitt 1998) and is considered among managers to be important determinants of 
reported earnings. The results from a survey among managers suggest that 
meeting and beating earnings targets are extremely important (Graham et al. 
2005). Managers describe a trade-off between the short-term need to deliver 
earnings and the long-term objective of making value-maximising investment 
decisions. Managers are primarily interested in meeting or beating earnings 
targets. Bonus plan, debt covenant and political-cost concerns are less important. 
Graham et al. (2005) report that 85.1% of the managers consider meeting or 
beating the earnings number reported the same quarter last year as important. 
Similarly, meeting analysts’ consensus forecasts is considered important by 
73.5%, reporting positive earnings is important by 65.2% and meeting previous 
quarter’s earnings-per-share is considered important by 54.2% of the managers 
(Graham et al. 2005:29).  
 
The target-accounting literature examines whether earnings are indeed managed 
with respect to certain targets, why these targets appear to be important, whether 
target accounting varies across firms and whether making the numbers (failing to 
make the numbers) is rewarded (penalised) by the capital market. Anecdotal as 
well as systematic evidence suggests that managers do manage earnings to meet or 
beat different types of targets (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, Myers, Myers and 
Skinner 2006). While some of these targets such as analysts’ forecasts or 
management’s forecasts are direct proxies for shareholders’ expectations, others 
are not. For instance, targets such as last year’s annual earnings or last quarter’s 
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earnings are not directly linked to such expectations. Degeorge et al. (1999:1) 
argue that there is a hierarchy of targets: “[It] is important first to make positive 
profits, second to report quarterly profits at least equal profits of 4 quarters ago, 
and third to meet analysts’ expectations.” The first target, to report positive 
earnings, arises from the psychologically important distinction between positive 
earnings numbers and negative earnings numbers. Their findings clearly 
demonstrate that earnings management is driven by these targets: reporting small 
positive earnings, meeting and sustaining recent performance and meeting 
analysts’ forecasts. Other researchers have reported similar results. Hayn (1995) 
finds an unexpected concentration of small above-zero earnings, suggesting that 
earnings are managed to avoid losses. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) report a 
similar concentration, using annual earnings. They all conclude that earnings 
management is used to avoid losses.  
 
The importance of earnings targets is intuitive when targets proxy for the 
expectations of market participants. This is especially true if the information costs 
are assumed to be high. Under such conditions, shareholders are expected to rely 
on earnings-based heuristics such as analysts’ forecasts to assess firm 
performance. However, it is less clear why meeting and beating simple targets 
such as zero earnings, prior year’s earnings or round numbers is important. It is 
claimed that managers “(…) focus on thresholds for earnings because the parties 
concerned with the firm’s performance do” (Degeorge et al. 1999:5). For instance, 
shareholders tend to increase their monitoring activities when a loss or a decline in 
earnings is reported, which imposes costs on the managers in the form of reduced 
compensation and an increased probability of dismissal.  
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Another question is whether the capital market rewards this purely “cosmetic” 
reporting strategy. Barth, Elliot and Finn (1999) find that firms with a history of 
earnings increases have higher price-earnings multiples than other firms. 
Similarly, DeAnglo, DeAnglo and Skinner (1996) find that breaking a string of 
increasing annual earnings triggers a significantly negative abnormal stock return. 
Similar results are reported by Myers et al. (2006) for quarterly earnings. This 
provides managers with strong incentives to maintain and increase reported 
earnings. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) predict and find that the marginal 
benefits of earnings management are especially high around zero earnings. Similar 
findings are also reported for meeting and beating analysts’ forecasts. Bartov, 
Givoly and Hayn (2002) document that positive quarterly-forecast errors are 
associated with higher returns, even when the earnings surprise has apparently 
been achieved by either earnings or managers own forecasts. Significant negative 
responses to even small earnings disappointments are found by Skinner and Sloan 
(2002) and Kinney, Burgstahler and Martin (2002). The common belief is that a 
well-run and stable firm should be able to produce the numbers necessary to meet 
the earnings target even in a year that is otherwise down. If the firm does not 
manage to report such earnings, this is taken as a signal that the firm is heavily 
distressed (Graham et al. 2005).  
 
4.3.5.4. Big-bath accounting and management change 
Big-bath accounting has been widely investigated by researchers (Strong and 
Meyer 1987, Elliot and Shaw 1988, Francis et al. 1996, Cotter, Stokes and Wyatt 
1998, Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2002, Riedl 2004, Kvaal 2005, Beatty and 
Weber 2006, Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2008, Zang 2008). The big-bath hypothesis 
suggests that managers are inclined to report excessive losses in periods where 
earnings fall well below the earnings target. This is based on an assumption that 
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shareholders do not fix mechanically on the reported earnings number as under 
target accounting, but carefully evaluate the implications of current earnings for 
the firm’s future prospects, even if that implies ignoring large one-time losses such 
as impairment losses. Given this assumption, managers can sell a large and 
possibly overstated loss as good news. Healy (1985) argues and provides evidence 
that managers take a bath when earnings fall well below the lower threshold in 
their bonus plan. Big-bath accounting is not limited, however, to thresholds in 
bonus plans, but is expected to occur when earnings fall short of any threshold, 
e.g. analysts’ forecast or last year’s annual earnings (Degeorge et al. 1999, Gaver 
et al. 1995). By engaging in big-bath accounting, the managers build up reserves 
for future periods by accelerating and/or overstating losses making it more likely 
that the threshold will be met in the future. Moreover, it is believed that the 
marginal costs associated with falling short of earnings targets will decline in the 
amount of the deficit. This means that the costs of taking a big bath by reporting 
an overstated loss are only slightly higher than the costs of disappointing 
shareholders by a narrow margin, which makes it rational for managers to reserve 
earnings for future periods by overstating losses.  
 
Big-bath accounting has generally been related to CEO changes. The preceding 
CEO is supposed to have incentives to smooth or maximise earnings (Dechow and 
Sloan 1991). The evidence, however, is mixed and is potentially driven by an 
inappropriate separation of forced CEO departures driven by poor performance 
and peaceful CEO departures (Ronen and Yaari 2008:99). Dechow and Sloan 
(1991) find evidence that the departing CEO is managing earnings upwards to 
increase bonus payments. Conversely, Pourciau (1993) finds evidence suggesting 
that the departing CEO reports impairment losses that decrease earnings in his last 
year as a manager. The incoming CEO, however, is believed to have incentives to 
  
189 
take a bath (Strong and Meyer 1987, Elliot and Shaw 1988, Francis et al. 1996, 
Cotter et al. 1998, Riedl 2004, Kvaal 2005, Beatty and Weber 2006, Lapointe-
Antunes et al. 2008:41, Zang 2008). Low earnings the first year might be blamed 
on the preceding manager. The excessive losses could be seen as a signal that 
worst is over, the desks are cleaned and a strategic reorientation is implemented, 
which suggests that the problems left behind by the preceding manager are dealt 
with. The incoming CEO is pressured to show results and the sooner the better. 
Large impairment losses the first year will establish a low earnings and net-asset 
base, which increases the probability of reporting a growth in earnings and net-
asset values in the future. An alternative argument suggests that the positive 
association between losses and management change may reflect true economic 
changes as opposed to managerial opportunism as the incoming manager may 
exercise greater scrutiny over existing assets or change the firm’s strategic focus 
resulting in impairment losses (Wilson 1996, Francis et al. 1996, Riedl 2004). A 
final argument suggests that the management change is a consequence of poor 
firm performance, which necessitates impairment losses (Murphy and Zimmerman 
1993, Fields et al. 2001). The empirical evidence on the big-bath hypothesis is 
mixed (e.g. White, Sondi and Fried 2003: 60, 278-9). While some researchers 
report negative associations between impairment losses and unexpected negative 
earnings suggesting big bath (Riedl 2004), others do not find such associations 
(Segal 2003). Moreover, some evidence suggests that impairment losses rather are 
understated than overstated. For instance, Elliot and Hanna (1996) and Francis et 
al. (1996) document that a reported impairment is rarely a one-time event, but is 
often followed by several impairment losses reported in sequence.  
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4.4. Corporate governance and earnings management 
This part of the chapter discusses evidence on corporate governance, accounting 
quality and earnings management. The focus will be on board and audit-
committee characteristics and other monitoring mechanisms. Literature on 
external audit quality is relevant, but is excluded from the below literature review 
in order to maintain a narrow focus of this dissertation.  
 
4.4.1. Corporate governance and earnings management – introduction  
Corporate governance deals with the rights and responsibilities of managers, board 
of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders of the firm (e.g. Brickley and 
Zimmerman 2010). It is an instrument to reduce the risk of opportunism in 
principal-agent relations (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Armstrong et al. 2010). The 
firm can be seen as a hierarchy of principal-agent relationships between the 
shareholders and the board of directors and between the board of directors and the 
managers. The shareholders act as a principal to the board. The board is an agent 
of the shareholders and principal of the managers, and finally, the managers are an 
agent of the board and the shareholders. The principal-agent problem of managers 
and shareholders is generally explained by the separation of ownership and 
control. Managers have an information advantage compared to shareholders. 
Managers and shareholders are also believed to have different interests, different 
risk attitudes and different time horizons (Dey 2008, Armstrong et al. 2010). This 
makes the manager-shareholder relationship particularly challenging.  
 
Corporate governance is based on contracting and monitoring devices (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997). Efficient corporate governance is supposed to constrain 
managers’ opportunism and restrict their ability to engage in opportunistic 
earnings management (Dechow et al. 1996, Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright 
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2004). The optimal set of corporate-governance mechanisms will probably vary 
across firms due to the firms’ economic characteristics (Armstrong et al. 2010). 
This suggests that a corporate structure, which is optimal for one firm, is not 
necessarily optimal for other firms.  
 
Two lines of literature investigate corporate governance in relation to accounting. 
One line demonstrates that corporate-governance mechanisms improve the quality 
of accounting measured as the information content and accrual quality of earnings. 
For instance, Warfield et al. (1995) document that increased managerial ownership 
improves the informativeness of earnings. Others such as Anderson et al. (2004) 
argue that efficient corporate-governance mechanisms reduce the noise in earnings 
and thereby increase the earnings-response coefficients. They find that the 
informativeness of earnings improves with increased board activity and more 
board independence. Similar findings are reported for audit-committee activity 
and audit-committee independence. And finally, Doyle et al. (2007) and Kent, 
Routledge and Stewart (2010) report a positive association between corporate 
governance and accrual quality.  
 
A complementary line of literature provides evidence that firms with stronger 
corporate governance are less likely to engage in earnings management (e.g. 
Warfield et al. 1995, Dechow et al. 1996, Beasley 1996, Chtourou et al. 2001, 
Klein 2002, Koh 2003, Xie et al. 2003, Peasnell, et al. 2005, Davidson et al. 2005, 
Mulgrew and Forker 2006, Ebrahim 2007, Koh, LaPlante and Tong 2007). For 
instance, Dechow et al. (1996) investigate firms subject to accounting-
enforcement actions by SEC for reporting overstated earnings. They document 
that firms manipulating earnings are more likely to have boards dominated by 
management, more likely to have a CEO who simultaneously serves as a chairman 
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of the board (COB), less likely to have an audit committee and less likely to have 
outside blockholders. Chtourou et al. (2001) investigate the association between 
corporate-governance mechanisms and abnormal accruals. They report that firms 
with audit committees with at least one financial-accounting expert, high 
proportion of independent non-executive directors and with a clear mandate for 
oversight and monitoring of accounting preparation are significantly less likely to 
have high levels of abnormal accruals. Xie et al. (2003) demonstrate similar 
evidence for the composition and the activity of the board and the audit 
committee. Firms with higher proportions of independent non-executive directors 
and higher meeting frequency are associated with lower abnormal accruals. As 
demonstrated above, the literature investigating corporate governance and 
earnings management generally relies on accrual-estimation models to determine 
the portion of total accruals that is abnormal and indicative of earnings 
management. As demonstrated in section 4.3.3.1 above, these estimation models 
are highly criticised (e.g. McNichols 2000, Field et al. 2001). At best these models 
estimate earnings management with non-substantial errors, but at worst these 
models arbitrarily separate total accruals in abnormal and normal accruals (Guay 
et al. 1996). Some of these findings should, therefore, be interpreted with caution. 
 
There are a large number of indicators supposed to reflect corporate-governance 
mechanisms. For instance, Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007) discover no less 
than 39 indicators employed in the literature. In this subchapter, the corporate-
governance mechanisms are structured into board and audit-committee 
characteristics and other monitoring mechanisms. Compensation contracts and 
debt contracts are also potential corporate-governance candidates (Dey 2008). 
These contracts are indeed established to align the interests of managers, 
shareholders and debtholders. When efficient contracting is feasible, they will 
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reduce agency costs. Under inefficient contracting, however, they might motivate 
rather than prevent opportunism (Watts and Zimmerman 1990:136, Xie et al. 
2003). Still, it is argued that corporate-governance structures, such as independent 
board members, have the potential to be better at reducing opportunism than 
contracts written directly or indirectly on accounting numbers such as 
compensation contracts. The formal contracts are often narrow in scope and 
incomplete, which makes them inefficient to motivate and regulate managers’ 
actions in all potential states the firm might face (Armstrong et al. 2010). This will 
probably make such contractual arrangements less efficient than other corporate-
governance mechanisms. Taken together with the extensive literature discussed in 
this chapter, suggesting that these contracts are inefficient, compensation contracts 
and debt contracts are considered as potential sources of earnings-management 
incentives rather than corporate-governance mechanisms.  
 
4.4.2. Board size 
The number of directors is expected to influence the efficiency of the board. The 
UK Combined Code (FRC 2003:6, 2008:7) states that “[t]he board should not be 
unwieldy. The board should be of sufficient size that the balance of skills and 
experience is appropriate for the requirements of the business (…).” The board 
size is to some extent determined by the size of the firm and the complexity of the 
firm’s operations. A larger firm with more complex operations will require a more 
diverse expertise which demands more directors. Besides, the combined codes 
require that at least half of the board members are independent non-executive 
directors (e.g. FRC 2003:7, 2008:8, NYSE 2003:4). This requirement has in recent 
years increased the average board size (Linck, Netter and Yang 2006).  
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The common wisdom is that smaller boards are more efficient (Lipton and Lorsch 
1992, Yermack 1996, Jensen 2000) and less likely to be controlled by managers 
(Dechow et al. 1996, Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999, Jensen 2000). Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (2000) recommend an optimal board size of seven 
or eight directors. Blair (1995) argues that a board larger than 15 members is 
likely to waste time because a typical board meeting will last more than four 
hours. The free-rider problem may explain some of the inefficiency of large 
boards. As the number of board members increases, the burden of responsibility 
for each director is less strongly felt, which makes the board less efficient (Ronan 
and Yaari 2008: 244). Consistent with this notion, the literature demonstrates a 
negative association between board size and firm performance, where performance 
is measured as Tobin’s Q, return-on-assets, sales-to-asset ratio or other 
performance measures (e.g. Yermack 1996, Mak and Kusnadi 2002, Ødegaard and 
Bøhren 2004).  
 
The relationship between earnings management and board size, however, is not 
easily understood. If smaller boards are more efficient, it is reasonable to predict a 
positive association between board size and earnings management. However, 
larger boards will probably comprise more independent non-executive directors. 
This suggests a negative association between board size and earnings management 
(e.g. Xie et al. 2003, Ebrahim 2007). Evidence consistent with both predictions is 
found in the literature. Chtourou et al. (2001) document a significantly negative 
relationship between board size and abnormal accruals. Similar results are 
reported by Xie et al. (2003) and Bradbury et al. (2004). The literature has also 
found evidence of no or a weak association between board size and earnings 
management (e.g. Dechow et al 1996, Abbott, Parker and Peters 2000, Vafeas 
2005). This is the case if the board is nothing but a façade. And finally, the 
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literature has also demonstrated evidence that firms with larger boards are 
associated with more earnings management (Harris and Raviv 2008). The majority 
of previous studies report evidence consistent with smaller boards being more 
efficient monitors than larger boards. This suggests a negative association between 
board size and earnings management.  
 
4.4.3. Board activity 
Board activity is supposed to be indicated by number of board meetings. More 
board meetings suggest higher activity and less earnings management. This rests 
on the notion that more active boards are more efficient to prevent managerial 
opportunism (e.g. Xie et al. 2003). Some studies demonstrate a negative 
association between board meetings and abnormal accruals (e.g. Xie et al 2003). 
Anderson et al. (2004) find that the information content of earnings increases in 
board activity. They report that higher board activity leads to stronger market 
responses to a given level of unexpected earnings. Others, however, report 
evidence inconsistent with these findings. Vafeas (1999), for instance, report a 
negative association between board activity and firm value, and Davidson et al. 
(2005), Ebrahim (2007) and Koh et al. (2007) find a positive association between 
board activity and earnings management. These findings, however, can be driven 
by correlated-omitted variables and endogeneity problems. Number of board 
meetings could be an indicator of the board’s response to urgent business or 
performance circumstances. Given that the firm is financially distressed, it is 
likely that board activity will increase in terms of board meetings. Due to the 
distress, the firm value will fall and the incentives to engage in income-increasing 
earnings management will probably increase. This could explain a negative 
association between board activity and firm value and a positive association 
between board activity and earnings management. Given proper control for these 
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circumstances, a negative association is predicted between board meetings and 
earnings management.  
 
4.4.4. Board composition and independence  
Composition and independence of the board are critical for its efficiency. Fama 
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the composition of board members 
is an important factor in creating a board that is efficient in monitoring managers’ 
decisions. In the principal-agent framework, outside directors12 are believed to 
have incentives to avoid colluding with managers because the value of their 
human capital is partly determined by their monitoring performance. As outside 
directors generally are managers or important decision makers in other firms, they 
may use their directorships to signal to external markets for decision makers that 
they are decision experts, they understand the importance of decision control and 
they work with such decision-control systems (Fama and Jensen 1983, Beasley 
1996). This suggests that the inclusion of outside directors increases the likelihood 
that the board will maintain its monitoring function and decreases the likelihood of 
board members colluding with managers against shareholders’ interests.  
 
Three board characteristics are supposed to reflect board independence: the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors, chairman and CEO being 
separate and CEO being the founder of the firm. Other characteristics are also 
supposed to reflect independence such as the presence of an independent 
nomination committee (e.g. Chtourou and Bebard 2001) and an independent audit 
committee (Klein 2002, Xie et al 2003, Peasnell et al. 2005). The board is believed 
to comprise three types of directors: executive directors, independent non-
executive directors and affiliated non-executive directors (Beasley 1996, Klein 
                                           
12 The concept outside directors does not distinguish between independent and affiliated directors.  
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2002, Vafeas 2003, Xie et al. 2003, Mulgrew and Forker 2006). Independent non-
executive directors are directors without any affiliation with the firm other than 
being on its board. Affiliated directors are non-executive directors, but they are 
not considered independent. They are related to the firm as suppliers, consumers, 
employees of affiliated firms or as consultants, lawyers, investment bankers or as 
former executive directors. These directors are kind of a hybrid as they are less 
likely to monitor managers than independent directors. The UK Combined Code 
(FRC 2003:7, 2008:8) provides a list of indicators that is helpful in identifying an 
inside director (executive or affiliated): the director has been an employee within 
the last five years, has had a material business relationship to the firm within the 
last three years, has received stock options or performance-related payments, has 
close family ties to managers or directors, represents a significant shareholder or 
has severed on the board for more than nine years. Some studies merge non-
executive directors and independent directors (e.g. Beasley 1996, Dechow et al. 
1996). Recent studies, however, recognise the important distinction between 
independent directors and affiliated directors and therefore, indentify three 
different types of directors (e.g. Chtourou et al. 2001, Klein 2002, Vafeas 2003, 
Xie et al. 2003, Mulgrew and Forker 2006). 
 
It is useful to look at the relationship between board independence and firm 
performance when discussing board independence and earnings management. 
Some studies support the regulators’ view that independent directors improve the 
alignment between managers’ and shareholders’ interests (e.g. Weisbach 1988, 
Huson, Parrino and Starks 2001, Perry and Perry 2005, Perry and Shivdasani 
2005). Weisbach (1988) and Huson et al. (2001) find that poorly performing 
managers generally are removed if the boards have a majority of independent 
directors. Similarly, Perry and Shivdasani (2005) find that such boards are less 
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reluctant to make painful decisions on restructuring, redundancy and asset sales. 
Some studies, however, report no association between board independence and 
firm performance (e.g. Klein 1998, Core et al. 1999, Bhagat and Black 2002, 
Adams and Mehran 2005). Others find a significantly negative association 
between board independence and firm performance (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber 
1996). There are several explanations for no relation or a negative relation 
between board independence and firm performance. One explanation is that firms 
balance the advantages (i.e. tighter monitoring) and disadvantages (i.e. higher 
information costs) when deciding the board composition. For instance, 
biotechnology firms may prefer less board independence because the cost of 
conveying technical information to independent directors is very high, whereas 
food-processing firms may prefer greater board independence because information 
costs in this industry are rather low (Ronan and Yaari 2008:252). Another 
explanation is that the board is controlled by managers and not the other way 
around. Monks and Minow (2004) report on interviews with nomination-
committee members. The interviews reveal that board members usually consult 
managers about nominees of independent directors. Monks and Minov (2004:36) 
state that “[i]ndependent directors are an oxymoron because they are a group of 
self-selecting people. Having the status as a director is important to people. They 
are loyal to the rules of the club rather than to shareholders. If an independent 
director is bumptious or truly independent then they won’t get work.” A final 
explanation is that the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance might be non-linear. For instance, Block (1999), who studies 1026 
appointments of independent directors, finds that although the stock price 
responds favourably to the appointment of an outside director, this effect 
disappears beyond a certain limit of outside directors (more than 60%).  
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The above evidence questions whether outside directors improve the monitoring 
capabilities of the board. Still, the association between board independence and 
earnings management is predicted to be negative. This is based on the notion that a 
higher proportion of independent directors makes the board more efficient in 
monitoring the managers and thereby constrains the opportunities for managerial 
opportunism (e.g. Xie et al. 2003). Several studies have also demonstrated a 
negative association between independence and earnings management (e.g. 
Beasley 1996, Dechow et al. 1996, Klein 2002, Xie et al. 2003, Farber 2005, 
Vafeas 2005, Peasnell et al. 2005, Davidson et al. 2005, Ebrahim 2007, Koh et al. 
2007). Beasley (1996) compares a sample of 75 firms accused of financial fraud to 
a control sample of non-fraud firms. He reveals that higher proportions of non-
executive directors reduce the likelihood of financial fraud. In a similar vein, 
Dechow et al. (1996) report that firms are more likely to commit fraud when the 
board lacks a simple majority of outsiders. Klein (2002), Xie et al. (2003) and 
Ebrahim (2007) find evidence of a negative association between the proportion of 
independent directors and abnormal accruals. Peasnell et al. (2005) investigate the 
association between board independence and income-increasing abnormal 
accruals. They find that the likelihood of managers making earnings-increasing 
abnormal accruals to avoid reporting losses and earnings reductions is negatively 
related to the proportion of independent directors on the board. The results suggest 
that when pre-managed earnings are negative or below last year’s reported 
earnings, abnormal accruals are less positive if the proportion of independent 
directors on the board is relatively high. Moreover, the findings suggest that 
boards only seem to intervene in the case of earnings-increasing earnings 
management, not earnings-decreasing earnings management. Finally, Kent et al. 
(2010) report a positive association between board independence and accrual 
quality. Some studies, however, have failed to find a relationship between board 
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independence and earnings management (e.g. Chtourou et al. 2001, Mulgrew and 
Forker 2006). Chtourou et al. (2001) argue that the insignificant association could 
be the result of stock-option holdings of independent directors. They find that 
these stock-option holdings are positively associated with earnings management 
measured by abnormal accruals. In particular they state: “This result indicates that 
this type of compensation for directors does not necessarily improve monitoring, 
but may create incentives that reduce the quality of their control on financial 
statement reliability.” (Chtourou et al. 2001:30). Taken together, prior evidence 
suggests a negative association between board independence and earnings 
management.  
 
Another characteristic often associated with board independence is the duality of 
the chairman and the CEO. Regulatory bodies recommend that the roles of the 
chairman and the CEO should be held by separate individuals (e.g. FRC 2003:6, 
2008:7). A separation of these roles prevents a considerable concentration of 
power in the hands of the CEO. The power to control the board of directors comes 
from the fact that the chairman is responsible for setting the agenda and running 
the board meetings and from the importance of the board’s role in appointing and 
monitoring the managers. Dechow et al. (1996) provide evidence that firms whose 
CEO is also chairman of the board (COB) are more likely to be subject to SEC-
enforcement actions for overstated earnings. Park (1999) finds a positive 
association between CEO-chairman duality and the incidence of litigation against 
auditors. Goyal and Park (2002) report that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm 
performance is significantly lower when the roles of CEO and chairman are held 
by the same individual. Moreover, Anderson et al. (2004) report that the 
separation of CEO and chairman increases the information content of earnings. 
Others suggest no association. Beasley (1996) and Ebrahim (2007) find no 
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association between CEO-chairman duality and earnings management. Yet others 
argue that the association is negative since the CEO-chairman duality might be an 
efficient outcome in some firms (Brickley, Coles and Jarrell 1997). Still, mounting 
evidence suggests that CEO-chairman duality has a negative impact on the 
monitoring function of the board, which potentially leads to more earnings 
management.  
 
The last indicator of board independence discussed here is the CEO-founder 
duality. Dechow et al. (1996) and Mulgrew and Forker (2006) argue that if the 
CEO is the founder, the CEO is more likely to have strong influence over board 
decisions and operations and be less accountable to the board. Dechow et al. 
(1996) report that firms with CEOs being the founders, more likely will be subject 
to SEC-enforcement actions for reporting overstated earnings. Similar evidence is 
reported by Mulgrew and Forker (2006). This suggests a positive association 
between CEO being the founder and earnings management.  
 
4.4.5. Other board characteristics 
Other board characteristics than size, activity and board composition are also 
investigated, for instance the number of directorships and the managerial 
stockholdings. Multiple directorships are more common in larger, more successful 
firms with large boards (Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard 2003, Perry and Peyer 
2005). A director with multiple directorships will probably sit on boards with 
other directors with multiple directorships (Ferris et al. 2003). Multiple 
directorships held by independent directors may have two different impacts on 
board efficiency. It may reduce the time and effort the director dedicates to each 
firm, which in turn harms board efficiency (Morck, Schleifer and Vishny 1988, 
Beasley 1996). In contrast, it may provide independent directors with corporate 
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expertise and valuable networks (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990, Perry and Peyer 
2005). Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the outside directors’ 
incentives to monitor managers are provided by the market for directors. Their 
market values as directors increase if they can signal to the market that they are 
decision and monitoring experts. Evidence demonstrates that the market for 
directors does provide these directors with incentives to monitor the managers. For 
instance, Gilson (1990) reports that non-executive directors lose outside 
directorships after leaving the board of financially distressed firms. In a similar 
vein, non-executive directors of firms charged with accounting and disclosure 
violations by the SEC are more likely than others to lose their directorships 
(Gerety and Lehn 1997). This suggests that firms with independent directors 
holding more directorships have less earnings management. Consistent with this, 
Chtourou et al. (2001) find that the number of directorships is negatively 
associated with earnings management. Others, however, find a positive association 
between number of multiple directorships and financial fraud (e.g. Beasley 1996). 
Proper monitoring requires time and effort (e.g. Morck et al. 1988). As the number 
of additional directorships increases, the time available for the director to fulfill 
monitoring responsibilities at a single firm decreases. Beasley (1996) argues that 
the documented positive association between multiple directorships and financial 
fraud is consistent with additional directorships distracting outside directors from 
their monitoring responsibilities and thereby increasing the likelihood of financial 
fraud. Because of the inconsistent evidence, the sign of the association between 
multiple directorships and earnings management remains unclear.  
 
Managerial stockholdings are supposed to be efficient in aligning the interests of 
the managers with those of the shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama 
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) propose a positive linear relationship between 
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managerial stockholdings and firm performance. Managers with higher 
stockholdings are less inclined to divert resources away from value maximisation. 
Later studies have suggested that the relationship between managerial 
stockholdings and agency costs is non-linear (Morck et al. 1988, McConnell and 
Servaes 1990, 1995). It has been shown that low levels of managerial 
stockholdings align the interests of managers and shareholders by reducing 
managerial incentives for perks, utilising insufficient effort and engaging in non-
maximising projects, generally termed the alignment effect. However, after some 
level of managerial ownership, managers exert insufficient effort, collect private 
benefits and entrench themselves at the expense of other shareholders, generally 
termed the entrenchment effect. Morck et al. (1988) find a positive association 
between CEOs’ stockholdings and Tobin’s Q for low ownership levels between 
0% and 5% and for ownership levels above 25% for US-listed firms. This is 
consistent with an alignment effect. Evidence consistent with the entrenchment 
effect is found for ownership levels in the range of 5% to 25%. Yermack (1996) 
demonstrates a positive association between inside and outside directors’ 
stockholdings, suggesting an alignment effect. Short and Keasey (1999) 
investigate UK-listed firms rather than US-listed firms and find different 
ownership ranges for alignment and entrenchment effects. A positive association 
is demonstrated between managerial stockholdings and Tobin’s Q for ownership 
levels in the range of 0% to 40-50%.  
 
Evidence on the association between managerial stockholdings and earnings 
management is documented in the literature. For instance, Warfield et al. (1995) 
find a negative association between managerial stockholdings and abnormal 
accruals, suggesting that higher stockholdings reduce earnings management. 
Others such as Klein (2002) report a weak positive association between CEOs’ 
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stockholdings and earnings management. Still, it is reasonable to expect that 
managerial stockholdings to some extent have the potential to align the interests of 
the managers with those of the shareholders. This suggests that higher managerial 
stockholdings reduce earnings management, at least, earnings management which 
is opportunistic towards shareholders.  
 
4.4.6. Audit-committee characteristics  
The audit committee is believed to be in forefront to maintain the board’s role as a 
monitor of the financial-reporting process (e.g. DeFond and Francis 2005, 
Ebrahim 2007). Davidson et al. (2005) note that the specialised monitoring role of 
audit committee “(...) is likely to provide shareholders with the greatest protection 
in maintaining the credibility of a firm’s financial statement.” The audit 
committee shall “(...) review the significant financial reporting issues and 
judgments made in connection with the preparation of the company’s financial 
statements (...) significant accounting policies, any changes to them and any 
significant estimates and judgments” (FRS 2003:51). Four characteristics of audit 
committees have got particular attention in the literature: audit-committee 
independence, audit-committee expertise, audit-committee activity and audit-
committee size. Since the audit committee is a sub-committee of the board, it is 
assumed that the performance of the audit committee is closely related to the 
performance of the board. The audit committee is unlikely to be efficient if rest of 
the board is dysfunctional. The efficiency of the board and the audit committee 
are, therefore, complements rather than substitutes as corporate-governance 
mechanisms (e.g. DeFond and Francis 2005). For instance, Beasley and Salterio 
(2001) find a close relation between an independent board and the appointment of 
a higher quality audit committee.  
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The audit committee should only comprise independent non-executive directors 
(e.g. FRC 2003, 2008, DeFond and Francis 2005). The requirement that all audit-
committee members should be independent follows the conventional notion that 
independent directors are better monitors of managers than non-independent 
directors. Several studies have reported a negative association between audit-
committee independence, accounting fraud and earnings management. For 
instance, Chtourou et al. (2001), Klein (2002) and Xie et al. (2003) find a negative 
association between the proportion of independent directors on the audit 
committee and earnings management. Moreover, Ebrahim (2007) finds a negative 
association between an indicator variable for audit independence, all members 
being independent, and earnings management. Anderson et al. (2004) report a 
positive association between audit-committee independence and the information 
content of earnings and finally, Kent et al. (2010) find a positive association 
between audit independence and accrual quality. Still, DeFond and Francis (2005) 
question the need for an entirely independent audit committee. They argue that full 
independence is a corner solution and such solutions are rarely correct. They do 
admit that it is beneficial to have independent directors on the board and also as 
part of the audit committee, but not necessarily that all members should be 
independent. As for other research findings discussed in this subchapter (e.g. 
board size, board composition and board activity) the above findings might be 
driven by correlated-omitted variables and endogeneity problems. There are at 
least two plausible explanations of a negative association between audit-
committee independence and earnings management: Independent audit-committee 
members take actions to prevent opportunism and earnings management. Better 
performing firms with less incentives to manipulate earnings choose more 
independent audit-committee members because they have less to conceal (Cohen 
et al. 2004, DeFond and Francis 2005).  
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The primary role of the audit committee is to monitor the financial-reporting 
process which certainly demands some accounting expertise. Regulators 
recommend that audit committees should hold at least one financial expert (e.g. 
FRC 2003:16, DeFond and Francis 2005:18). For instance, UK Combined Code 
(FRC 2003:16) states that “[t]he board should satisfy itself that at least one 
member of the audit committee has relevant and reliable financial expertise.” 
Two types of financial experts will meet the above requirement: accounting-
financial experts and non-accounting-financial experts (Krishnan and Lee 2009). 
The former is an individual holding specific accounting expertise, for instance, 
experience as a chartered accountant, while the latter is a financial expert with 
more general knowledge and experience in analysing financial statements. Xie et 
al. (2003) argue that an audit committee without financially qualified members 
may turn out to be nothing more than ceremonial. They argue that an active, well-
functioning and well-established audit committee may be able to prevent earnings 
management. Independent and qualified audit-committee members are the most 
important ingredients. They find evidence consistent with these predictions. 
Similar evidence is reported by Chtourou et al. (2001). McMullan and 
Raghunanadan (1996) demonstrate a negative association between audit-
committee expertise and firms subject to SEC-enforcement actions. Some studies 
employ a narrow definition of audit-committee expertise comprising only 
financial-accounting experts. Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) find a 
negative association between financial-accounting expertise and earnings 
management, and Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2006) find a positive association 
between financial-accounting expertise and accrual quality. And finally, Krishnan 
and Visvanathan (2007) find evidence of a positive association between this 
measure of expertise and conservatism. DeZoort (1998) evaluate whether audit-
committee members with experience in auditing and internal control make 
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different internal-control evaluations than members without this experience. 
Consistent with predictions, they find that members with experience are more 
likely than members without experience to make control evaluations more in line 
with external auditors. The audit-committee members with greater experience are 
more consistent and demonstrate a higher degree of consensus. These results 
suggest that audit committees with members holding auditing and internal-control 
experience at least have a better understanding of the auditor’s side of disputes 
with managers and may lend support to the auditor in such disputes. Taken 
together, it is reasonable to predict a negative association between financial-
accounting expertise and earnings management.  
 
Two final characteristics are audit-committee activity measured as number of 
meetings and audit-committee size measured as number of members. As for the 
full board, higher frequency of meetings is believed to be indicative of the 
monitoring effort. The regulatory bodies generally recommend at least three audit-
committee meetings each year (e.g. FRC 2002:48, DeFond and Francis 2005:22).  
Chtourou et al. (2001:29) and Xie et al. (2003:309) find a negative association 
between audit-committee meetings and earnings management. Ebrahim (2007:52) 
finds evidence suggesting that firms with high audit-committee activity have less 
earnings management. McMullan and Raghunandan (1996) and Abbott et al. 
(2000) find that the likelihood of financial fraud and earnings restatements is 
lower if the firm has frequent audit-committee meetings. And finally, a positive 
association is found between audit-committee activity and the information content 
of earnings (e.g. Anderson et al. 2004). This suggests that the audit-committee 
activity measured as number of meetings is negatively associated with earnings 
management.  
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Some scarce evidence is also found for the association between audit-committee 
size measured as number of committee members and earnings management. A 
larger audit committee is believed to provide more resources and expertise, which 
in turn will improve the monitoring of the financial-reporting process (e.g. 
Karamanou and Vafeas 2005). The evidence on this matter is, however, limited 
and to some extent inconsistent. Bedard et al. (2004) find no evidence that audit-
committee size reduces earnings management. Xie et al. (2003) find a negative, 
but insignificant association between audit-committee size and earnings 
management, and Kent et al. (2010) report a positive association between 
committee size and accrual quality. In contrast, Anderson et al. (2004) report a 
negative association between audit-committee size and the information content of 
earnings. Still, it is believed that larger audit committees will have more expertise 
and more monitoring power. This suggests that larger audit committees should be 
associated with less earnings management.  
 
4.4.7. Other monitoring mechanisms 
The board of directors is not the only monitoring device of a firm. Potential 
candidates are external auditor (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam 
1998, Francis, Maydew and Sparks 1999, Ebrahim 2007), outside blockholders, 
regulatory bodies, the stock exchange (Stulz 1999, Lang, Lins and Miller 2003, 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 2003, Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz 2006) and finally, the 
press (Feroz, Park and Pastena 1991, Beneish 1997, Dyck, Morse and Zingales 
2008). Outside blockholders and cross-listing are considered here. Blockholders 
are believed to be important monitors of managers (e.g. Smith 1976, Jensen and 
Meckling 1976, Shleifer and Vishney 1986). They have greater motivation and 
ability to monitor managers than small shareholders (Smith 1976, Fama 1980, 
Shleifer and Vishney 1986, 1997, Dechow et al. 1996, Zhong et al. 2007). 
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Monitoring is more cost-efficient for blockholders. Shareholders that monitor the 
managers will obtain the benefits from monitoring only for the proportion of 
shares they own. Still, they have to bear all the costs of monitoring. A larger 
stockholding provides a larger share of benefits from monitoring and thus, a 
higher probability of covering the costs of monitoring. Besides, small shareholders 
can sell their shares quickly if they are not satisfied with the managers’ 
performance. The situation is different for large blockholders. Selling a large 
stockholding will probably decrease the stock price. Consequently, blockholders 
must adopt a long-term investment strategy. Dechow et al. (1996) find evidence 
that the existence of outside blockholders is negatively associated with financial 
fraud. Similar evidence is reported by Demsey, Hunt and Schroeder (1993) and 
Cheng and Reitenga (2009).  Zhong et al. (2007), however, argue that 
blockholders will try to prevent earnings management outside GAAP, but not 
necessarily earnings management within GAAP. The benefits of allowing earnings 
management within GAAP are expected to be higher than the costs of preventing 
it, suggesting that blockholders will make no attempt to prevent such within-
GAAP earnings management. They find evidence consistent with these 
predictions. Taken together, it is reasonable to predict that blockholders will 
monitor the managers and make an effort to prevent earnings management.  
 
Cross-listing on stock exchanges with strict disclosure regulations and 
enforcement such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ 
Stock Exchange are supposed to reduce the extent of earnings management. Lang, 
Raedy and Yetman (2003) find that firms cross-listed in the US are less aggressive 
in terms of earnings management, report accounting numbers that are more 
conservative, take account of bad news in a timely manner and report more value 
relevant accounting numbers. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) examine earnings 
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management across 31 countries and find that earnings reported in non-US firms 
show more evidence of earnings management than US firms. Burgstahler et al. 
(2006) report that earnings management is more pervasive in countries with weak 
legal enforcement. And finally, Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2006) find larger 
market responses to earnings announcements of firms cross-listed on US-stock 
exchanges. This suggests that firms cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
or the NASDAQ Stock Exchange on average have less earnings management. 
  
4.5. Accounting for goodwill – evidence of earnings 
management 
This part of the chapter discusses evidence of earnings management in reported 
goodwill-impairment losses. Included are also studies that report evidence of 
earnings management in impairment losses and write-downs other than in 
goodwill. Studies investigating earnings management in relation to the purchase or 
pooling choice (e.g. Aboody, Kasznik and Williams 2000, Weber 2004), purchase-
price allocation (e.g. Grinyer, Russel and Walker 1991, Dunstan 1999, Wong and 
Wong 2001) and length of the amortisation period of goodwill (e.g. Hall 1993, 
Henning and Shaw 2003) are considered outside the scope of this dissertation.  
 
4.5.1. Earnings management and impairment losses 
Earnings management and impairment losses are carefully investigated in the 
literature. Strong and Meyers (1987) are among the first researchers to investigate 
impairment losses, restructuring charges and earnings management. At that time 
there was scarce regulation on impairment losses which gave managers lots of 
discretionary freedom to identify, estimate and report impairment losses. Strong 
and Meyer (1987) compare 120 firms reporting impairment losses in the period 
1981-1985 with a matched sample of firms not reporting impairment losses. 
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Variables important for impairment decisions are examined such as economic 
variables like stock returns and market-to-book ratios, and variables reflecting 
earnings-management incentives such as management change and debt-to-equity 
ratios. The single most important explanatory variable of impairment losses is 
change in management: “The managerial effect is most pronounced when the new 
executive comes from outside the company. This relation is consistent with the 
hypothesis that managerial change induces restructurings, and that write-downs 
are more likely to occur when incoming management was not associated with 
prior investments and asset management decisions” (Strong and Meyer 
1987:651). Zucca and Campbell (1992) investigate impairment losses like Strong 
and Meyer (1987) in a setting with scarce regulation. 77 impairment losses 
reported by 67 US firms in the period 1978-1983 are examined. The big-bath and 
income-smoothing hypotheses are in particular focus. They classify all the write-
down firms as either bathers or smoothers. To determine whether the write-down 
is triggered by earnings management, a measure of expected earnings is estimated 
and compared with the reported earnings for each firm in the period in which the 
impairment is reported. Smoothers are firms with earnings in the pre-impairment 
period that are higher than expected, while bathers are firms with earnings that are 
lower than expected. 29% of the impairment firms are classified as smoothers 
whereas 58% are classified as bathers. This result gives some support to the claim 
that impairment losses are reported to manage earnings.  
 
The study by Francis et al. (1996) represents an important extension to the 
previous studies of Strong and Meyer (1987) and Zucca and Campbell (1992). 
Francis et al. (1996) investigate whether impairment losses are explained by 
variables reflecting economic impairment or earnings-management incentives. 
They also separate impairment losses into different categories of assets: 
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Impairment losses in goodwill, in property, plant and equipment, in inventory, in 
other assets and unspecified impairment losses. In addition, they include 
restructuring charges. 674 impairment losses in US firms reported in the period 
1989-1992 are investigated. To control for economic variables explaining the 
impairment, they include measures for past firm performance and past industry 
performance as explanatory variables. They also include variables for earnings-
management incentives such as an indicator variable for change in management 
and variables reflecting bathing and smoothing incentives. The results reveal that 
impairment losses increase with change in management, the firm’s and the 
industry’s history in reporting impairment losses and firm size. In contrast, 
impairment losses decrease in firm and industry performance. The investigation is 
also carried out for separate categories of assets believed to offer different degrees 
of reporting discretion. The results suggest that none of the variables are 
associated with reported impairment losses in inventory. In contrast, all the 
variables are significantly associated with impairment losses in goodwill. For 
instance, change in management is not associated with impairment losses in 
inventory, only marginally associated with impairment losses in property, plant 
and equipment, but strongly associated with goodwill-impairment losses and 
restructuring charges. Taken together, the results suggest “(…) that incentives 
have no influence on inventory write-offs, have marginal significance in 
explaining property, plant, and equipment (…), and play a substantial role in 
explaining goodwill write-offs and restructuring charges” (Francis et al. 
1996:134). Wilson (1996) criticises the research design employed in this study. He 
argues that most of the proxies for manipulation such as change in management 
could be proxies for economic impairment. For instance, the significant 
association between goodwill impairment and management change could be 
driven by poor firm performance, which leads to change in management and 
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recognition of impairment losses. It is reasonable to believe, however, that 
economic variables to some extent will control for economic impairment. This 
suggests that any association between change in management and reported 
impairment after controlling for these economic variables will reflect earnings-
management incentives rather than economic impairment.  
 
Inspired by Francis et al. (1996) several studies have investigated the extent to 
which impairment losses are explained by economic variables for impairment or 
earnings-management incentives (e.g. Loh and Tan 2002, Sellhorn 2003, Riedl 
2004, Kvaal 2005, Zang 2008, Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2008). Loh and Tan (2002) 
investigate impairment losses in property, plant and equipment, and investments 
reported in listed firms in Singapore. They include firm profitability, change in 
management and debt-covenant incentives measured as debt-to-equity ratios as 
explanatory variables. As an extension to Francis et al. (1996), they include 
macro-economic variables such as Gross Domestic Product, growth rate, property 
occupancy rate, interest rate and unemployment rate as explanatory variables of 
impairment losses. Their sample comprises 94 firms reporting impairment losses 
in the period 1983-1997. A pooled and cross-sectional logit and tobit regression is 
run along with a time-serial ordinary-least-square regression. Macro-economic 
variables are found to be important explanatory variables of impairment losses in 
investments, but of less importance when explaining impairment losses in 
property, plant and equipment. Not surprisingly, the occupancy rate is a significant 
explanatory variable for impairment losses in property, plant and equipment. 
Moreover, change in management is found to be positively associated with 
impairment losses in property, plant and equipment, but not impairment losses in 
investments. As investments are generally traded in capital markets, accounting 
for these investments offer less discretionary freedom. This may explain that 
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economic variables are more strongly associated with impairment losses in 
investments than in property, plant and equipment.  
 
Riedl (2004) investigates the extent to which the associations between impairment 
losses, variables for economic impairment and earnings-management incentives 
have changed upon the adoption of a new impairment standard, SFAS 121, under 
US-GAAP. 2754 impairment losses reported by 1035 firms during the period 
1992-1998 are examined. As in Francis et al. (1996), economic variables are 
intended to capture the underlying economic impairment. He includes economic 
variables at three levels: macro-economic level, industry level and firm level. 
Interestingly, prior year’s stock return is not included among these variables. He 
argues that an inclusion of stock return as an explanatory variable seems logically 
inconsistent, as reported impairment losses are considered as input into the market 
valuation of the firm, not as an effect of the market valuation. This rests on the 
assumption that accounting numbers are used as input in the estimation of the 
firm’s intrinsic value. This assumption, however, is arguable. Market values are 
often used as estimates of fair values when preparing the financial statement. This 
suggests that market values and stock returns could themselves influence 
accounting numbers, not only be influenced by accounting numbers (e.g. 
Machintosh, Shearer, Thompton and Welker 2000). In line with Strong and Meyer 
(1987) and Francis et al. (1996), Riedl (2004) includes change in management as a 
potential variable explaining the reported impairment. He also makes use of 
proxies for bathing and smoothing consistent with Francis et al. (1996). No 
proxies for contracting incentives are included except an indicator variable for 
private debt. The results reveal that economic variables are more closely 
associated with impairment losses in the pre-SFAS 121 period than in the post-
SFAS 121 period. This suggests that impairment losses under SFAS 121 do not 
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reflect economic impairment to the same extent as impairment losses under pre-
SFAS 121. Moreover, change in management, the proxy for big-bath incentives 
and the debt-covenant proxy are significantly associated with impairment losses 
under SFAS 121. Taken together, these findings suggest that the quality of 
impairment losses has declined upon the adoption of SFAS 121.  
 
Like Francis et al. (1996), Kvaal (2005) investigates whether impairment losses 
for different categories of assets reflect economic impairment or earnings-
management incentives. A sample of 238 UK firms reporting 84 impairment 
losses in 2002 is examined. Both the impairment decision and the reported 
impairment amount are investigated. The economic variables are stock return, firm 
size 13 , accounting return and price-to-book ratios. Earnings-management 
incentives are captured by debt-to-equity ratios and change in management. 
Another variable, the depreciation rate, expected to reflect the degree of 
conservatism, is also included. The decision to report an impairment loss is 
examined for each asset category. Impairment losses in tangible assets are heavily 
influenced by the depreciation rate, whereas debt-to-equity and price-to-book 
ratios explain impairment losses in non-goodwill intangible assets. For goodwill, 
accounting return and depreciation rate are important explanatory variables of 
impairment losses. An investigation of the size of impairment losses reveals 
somewhat different results. Industry dummies for telecom and IT-industry are the 
only variables significantly associated with impairment losses in tangible assets. 
For goodwill, several variables are significant, and among these: change in 
management.  
 
                                           
13 Firm size might be associated with biased or unbiased accounting of impairment losses (Kvaal 2005: 35-7). 
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Beatty and Weber (2006) investigate the implementation of SFAS 142 and the 
decision to report the transitional impairment loss in goodwill as an operating loss 
or as an effect of change in accounting principles. Earnings-based compensation 
incentives, debt-covenant incentives and stock-exchange requirements are 
included as explanatory variables. Two different regressions are run: A probit 
regression estimating the likelihood that the goodwill impairment is reported 
above-the-line as an operating loss, given variables for economic impairment and 
earnings-management incentives, and a tobit regression estimating the association 
between goodwill-impairment losses, variables for economic impairment and 
earnings-management incentives. The probit regression indicates that firms are 
less likely to report impairment losses above-the-line if they have little debt-
covenant slack and the slack is affected by accounting numbers. The likelihood of 
impairment losses is smaller for firms that have earnings-based compensation 
plans, not excluding the effects of special items such as change in accounting 
principles. Moreover, firms with managers with relatively longer tenures are less 
likely to report impairment losses. Beatty and Weber (2006) also demonstrate that 
firms listed on a stock exchange with accounting-based listing requirements are 
less likely to report impairment losses. In sum, the results suggest that earnings-
management incentives are important to explain goodwill-impairment losses.  
 
Bens (2006) criticises some of the earnings-management proxies employed by 
Beatty and Weber (2006). He argues that the proxies may suffer from 
measurement errors and self-selection bias. For instance, the tenure variable may 
proxy for the life of the firm. He argues with reference to Fama and French (2001) 
that firms which went public in the 1990s tended to be younger and less profitable 
than previous generations of initial-public offerings. As these firms were more 
aggressive in the take-over market, they will probably have more book goodwill 
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and managers with shorter tenures. This suggests that some of the results in Beatty 
and Weber (2006) should be interpreted with caution.  
 
Like Beatty and Weber (2006), Zang (2008) investigates transitional impairment 
losses in goodwill. He investigates 870 US-firms reporting 255 transitional 
impairment losses in 2001-2003. A tobit regression is employed to test whether 
impairment losses are associated with variables for economic impairment or 
earnings-management incentives, represented by change in management and debt-
to-equity. A negative association is reported between impairment losses and debt-
to-equity, and a positive association is reported between impairment losses and 
change in management. These results are consistent with findings in previous 
literature (Strong and Meyer 1987, Francis et al. 1996, Riedl 2004, Kvaal 2005). 
In a similar vein, Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) investigate incentives to report 
transitional impairment losses in 331 Canadian listed firms. Although this study 
has several similarities with previous research, it also provides extensions. Along 
with conventional measures such as change in management and measures for debt-
covenant incentives, the study includes equity-based incentives driven by stock-
option holdings and debt and equity issuances. In addition, the study includes 
constraining factors of earnings management such as audit-committee 
characteristics, blockholdings and cross-listing. The results from the tobit 
regression on variables for economic variables, earnings-management incentives 
and corporate-governance mechanisms show a negative association between 
transitional impairment losses and leverage, stock-option holdings, subsequent 
issuance of new debt or equity capital, cross-listing and blockholdings. No 
association, however, is found between the proportions of independent audit-
committee members and transitional impairment losses. Following Zang (2008), 
the impairment amount is separated into an unexpected and an expected portion 
where the expected portion is the predicted values from a regression of 
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impairment losses on economic variables. The proportion of independent audit-
committee members is found to be negatively associated with unexpected 
impairment losses.  
 
The above studies are concerned with impairment losses as reported in the 
financial statement. Discretionary impairment accounting, however, involves 
decisions to avoid and delay impairment losses just as decisions to overstate and 
accelerate impairment losses. Ramanna and Watts (2009) investigate a sample of 
firm-year observations where no goodwill-impairment losses are reported despite 
the fact that impairment losses likely are present. They are particularly concerned 
with the reluctance to report impairment losses and the extent to which this 
reluctance is explained by managers’ opportunism or managers’ private 
information about the firm’s future prospects. They construct a sample of firm 
years with book-to-market ratios greater than one for two subsequent years. The 
final sample consists of 124 firm-year observations over the period 2003-2006. 
They identify firms likely to have favourable private information as those firms 
with either positive net share-repurchase activity or positive net-insider buying. 
The non-impairment frequency among firms with favourable private information 
is undistinguishable from non-impairment frequency among all other firms. To 
investigate whether non-impairment is associated with earnings-management 
incentives, they test cross-sectional variation in goodwill-impairment losses with 
variables for earnings-based compensation, management reputation, equity-based 
incentives, exchange-delisting incentives and debt-covenant incentives. The 
regression reveals that the size of the reported impairment losses decreases with an 
increase in the number and size of cash-generating units (business segments) and 
the relative amount of discretionary net assets in cash-generating units. The debt-
covenant measure and managers’ tenure are negatively associated with size of 
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impairment losses. As summed up by Ramanna and Watts (2009:35): “The results 
in this article are consistent with managers exploiting unverifiable fair-value-
based discretion in SFAS 142 to avoid timely goodwill write-offs in circumstances 
where they have agency-based motives to do so (…). The results do not confirm 
standard setters’ arguments that unverifiable fair-value-based discretion in SFAS 
142 is used to convey private information on future cash flows.”  
 
The evidence discussed in this subchapter suggests that impairment losses are 
explained to some extent by variables for economic impairment and earnings-
management incentives (e.g. Strong and Meyer 1987, Elliot and Shaw 1988, 
Francis et al. 1996, Riedl 2004, Kvaal 2005, Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2008, Zang 
2008, Ramanna and Watts 2009). Earnings-management incentives are 
particularly important when explaining impairment losses in goodwill (e.g. Francis 
et al. 1996, Kvaal 2005). Some evidence also suggests that earnings management 
remains a challenge even after the adoption of the impairment-only method in US-
GAAP and Australian GAAP (Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2008, Zang 2008, Ramanna 
and Watts 2009). 
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5. Hypotheses   
This chapter presents the hypotheses in this dissertation. They are presented in 
subchapters for each research question.  
 
5.1. Value relevance of goodwill under the impairment-only 
method  
Prior literature has demonstrated that book goodwill is value relevant. These 
findings are consistent across a number of studies using different methodological 
designs and samples of observations (Amir et al. 1993, Wang 1993, Chauvin and 
Hirschey 1994, Jennings et al. 1996a, Huijgen 1996, Barth and Clinch 1996, 
Wilkins et al. 1998, Henning et al. 2000, Petersen 2001, 2002, Bugeja and Gallery 
2006). The evidence from these studies suggests that goodwill is perceived as an 
economic asset by the capital market and should be capitalised on the balance 
sheet. Book goodwill is, therefore, predicted to be value relevant under current 
IFRS. The new impairment-only method departs from prior accounting methods 
for goodwill in two respects: Goodwill should be tested for impairment losses at 
least annually, and systematic amortisation of goodwill is prohibited. Both FASB 
and IASB assert that annual impairment testing and no amortisation will provide 
more decision useful accounting numbers of goodwill. Several studies have 
examined the value relevance of reported goodwill-impairment losses. Some 
studies find evidence consistent with the notion that the new impairment-only 
method provides more decision-useful information. Bens and Heltzer (2005) find 
that goodwill-impairment losses are value relevant. Several studies have also 
demonstrated that these impairment losses have information content (Hirschey and 
Richardson 2002, Li, et al. 2005, Bens and Heltzer 2005, Li and Meeks 2006). 
There is also some evidence inconsistent with the above results.  
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Chen et al. (2004) investigate the value relevance of earnings with and without 
deduction from goodwill-impairment losses and report insignificant differences in 
explanatory power between these earnings measures. However, when employing a 
conventional price-book-earnings regression, they find some evidence consistent 
with these impairment losses being value relevant. Goodwill-impairment losses 
are, therefore, predicted to be value relevant under current IFRS. The hypotheses 
in table 5.1 are in two versions: One version with stock price as benchmark, and 
another version with stock return as benchmark of value relevance. The first set of 
hypotheses make predictions about the extent to which book goodwill represents 
economic goodwill and goodwill-impairment losses represent economic 
impairment reflected in stock prices. The second set of hypotheses make 
predictions about the extent to which goodwill-impairment losses represent timely 
information about economic impairment reflected in stock returns.   
 
Table 5.1 Hypotheses on value relevance of goodwill under the impairment-
only method 
Stock price as value-relevance 
benchmark 
Stock return as value-relevance 
benchmark  
H1a: Book goodwill under the impairment-
only method (current IFRS) is positively 
associated with stock prices. 
H1c: Reported goodwill-impairment losses 
under the impairment-only method (current 
IFRS) are negatively associated with stock 
returns.  H1b: Reported goodwill-impairment losses 
under the impairment-only method (current 
IFRS) are negatively associated with stock 
prices. 
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5.2. Value relevance of goodwill under alternative 
accounting methods  
Mixed results are found for value relevance of goodwill-amortisation charges. 
Some studies report that goodwill amortisation lacks value relevance and even 
impair the decision usefulness of earnings. Huigjen (1996) finds no significantly 
negative association between goodwill amortisation and stock prices, whereas 
Vincent (1997) reports an unexpected positive association between these charges 
and stock prices. In line with Huigjen (1996), Jennings et al. (2001) and Moehrle 
et al. (2001) find no value relevance in goodwill-amortisation charges and even 
conclude that these charges impair the decision usefulness of earnings. Other 
studies, however, such as those by Jennings et al. (1996a) and Petersen (2001, 
2002) suggest that goodwill amortisation might provide at least some value 
relevance. And finally, Wang (1993) and Bugeja and Gallery (2006) find evidence 
suggesting that goodwill should be amortised over short time periods.  
 
Most of these findings are inconsistent with the a priori predictions. Goodwill 
amortisation should reflect reductions in the cash-generating capacity of goodwill 
and thereby the net present value of goodwill. Reductions in net present values are 
by definition economic charges and should be significantly negatively associated 
with stock prices and stock returns, respectively. The insignificantly negative 
association and sometimes insignificantly or significantly positive association 
between amortisation charges and stock prices could be the result of econometrical 
problems. Likely candidates are heteroscedastic disturbance and correlated-
omitted variables. Correlated-omitted variables and scale effects may turn an 
otherwise significantly negative coefficient on goodwill-amortisation 
insignificantly negative, insignificantly positive or even significantly positive. The 
positive association could simply be driven by large firms with more book 
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goodwill and more goodwill-amortisation charges, that is, an uncorrected scale 
effect. Potential econometrical problems should, therefore, be given careful 
concern in the empirical analysis.  
 
Prior value-relevance research has generally investigated goodwill-impairment 
losses and goodwill-amortisation charges in isolation. These studies only provide 
limited guidance for evaluating the impairment-only method relative to alternative 
accounting methods for goodwill. Following Chambers (2007), a more powerful 
research design would be to compare the value relevance of goodwill numbers 
under current IFRS (the impairment-only method) with the value relevance of 
goodwill numbers under alternative accounting methods. This is possible if as-
reported goodwill numbers under the impairment-only method are compared with 
as-if adjusted goodwill numbers under alternative methods. Specifically, a 
comparison will be made between accounting numbers reported by an accounting 
system using impairment testing only (current IFRS-regulation), systematic 
amortisation with no impairment testing and a combination of systematic 
amortisation and impairment testing. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
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Table 5.2 Hypotheses on value relevance of goodwill under alternative 
accounting methods 
Stock price as value-relevance 
benchmark 
Stock return as value-relevance 
benchmark  
H2a: Goodwill-amortisation charges (as-if 
accounted) are not associated with stock 
prices when goodwill is accounted for 
under the amortisation-only method. 
H2b: Goodwill-amortisation charges (as-if 
accounted) are not associated with stock 
returns when goodwill is accounted for under 
the amortisation-only method. 
H2c: Goodwill-amortisation charges (as-if 
accounted) are not associated with stock 
prices when goodwill is accounted for 
under the amortisation-and-impairment 
method.  
H2d: Goodwill-amortisation charges (as-if 
accounted) are not associated with stock 
returns when goodwill is accounted for under 
the amortisation-and-impairment method. 
H2e: Goodwill-accounting numbers under 
the impairment-only method explain 
variation in stock prices to a larger extent 
than accounting numbers under the 
amortisation-only method or the 
amortisation-and-impairment method.  
H2f: Goodwill-accounting numbers under 
the impairment-only method explain 
variation in stock returns to a larger extent 
than accounting numbers under the 
amortisation-only method or the 
amortisation-and-impairment method. 
 
5.3. Earnings management and goodwill-impairment losses  
The degree of faithful reporting is believed to be partly determined by earnings-
management incentives and corporate-governance mechanisms. At least three sets 
of variables are predicted to be associated with impairment losses: economic 
variables reflecting economic impairment, variables for earnings-management 
incentives and variables for corporate-governance mechanisms.  
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5.3.1. Economic variables 
Market-value reductions or current-value reductions are direct measures of 
economic impairment. Goodwill has no separate market value and it is impossible 
to separately estimate the current value of goodwill. In a research setting economic 
impairment in goodwill might be estimated by variables that are supposed to be 
highly positively associated with the economic impairment. These economic 
variables make it possible to discriminate faithfully reported impairment losses 
from impairment losses potentially driven by earnings-management incentives. No 
inferences can be made upon the question of earnings management in goodwill-
impairment losses without a proper control for economic variables that might 
explain these losses. 
 
Economic variables are included from three levels of aggregation: macro-
economic level, industry-sector level and firm level. An economic recession, a 
reduction in industry performance or impaired firm performance is predicted to 
increase the likelihood of impairment losses. A substantial reduction in Gross 
Domestic Product or a major increase in unemployment rate is indicative of 
economic recession. A recession will probably have a negative impact on the 
economic performance of most firms. Impaired industry growth and industry 
performance will affect the economic performance of firms within that industry 
and increase the likelihood of impairment losses (Francis et al. 1996, Riedl 2002, 
Segal 2003). Measures such as industry return-on-assets and industry-stock returns 
are employed. And finally, poor firm performance is indicative of impaired firm-
asset values. At the firm level measures such as stock returns, changes in total 
sales, changes in pre-impairment return-on-assets, operating cash flows and pre-
impairment book-to-market ratios are employed (e.g. Francis et al. 1996, Segal 
2003, Sellhorn 2004, Riedl 2004, Kvaal 2005). As the true economic impairment 
  
227 
is unobservable, it is important to include a broad set of economic variables that 
reflect economic fundamentals. For that reason, market-based, accounting-based 
and cash-based measures are included. The likelihood of impairment losses is 
found to increase in the sequence of previous years’ impairment losses. There are 
at least two explanations for this. If the firm experiences financial distress for 
several years, successive impairment losses are likely. As time goes by, new 
impairment losses are recognised and recorded. An alternative explanation is that 
impairment losses are systematically understated. Francis et al. (1996) and Riedl 
(2004) find evidence that previous years’ economic performance could explain 
impairment losses in goodwill. This suggests a positive association between last 
year’s impairment losses and current year’s impairment losses. In contrast to the 
economic variables discussed previously, this variable could reflect economic 
fundamentals and/or earnings-management incentives. Most of the economic 
variables, except from changes in unemployment rates, book-to-market ratios and 
previous year’s impairment losses, are supposed to be negatively associated with 
the decision to report impairment losses and the size of impairment losses (takes 
positive values). The hypotheses in table 5.3 are in two versions: One version for 
impairment decisions and another version for size of impairment losses. As no 
causality can be ascertained, the hypotheses are expressed as associations.  
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Table 5.3 Hypotheses on economic variables  
Impairment decision  Size of impairment losses  
H3a: Changes in Gross Domestic Product 
are negatively associated with impairment 
decisions. 
H3b: Changes in Gross Domestic Product are 
negatively associated with size of 
impairment losses. 
H3c: Changes in unemployment rates are 
positively associated with impairment 
decisions. 
H3d: Changes in unemployment rates are 
positively associated with size of impairment 
losses. 
H3e: Changes in industry-sector return-
on-assets are negatively associated with 
impairment decision. 
H3f: Changes in industry-sector return-on-
assets are negatively associated with size of 
impairment losses. 
H3g: Changes in industry-sector stock 
returns are negatively associated with 
impairment decisions. 
H3h: Changes in industry-sector stock 
returns are negatively associated with size of 
impairment losses. 
H3i: Stock returns are negatively 
associated with impairment decisions.  
H3j: Stock returns are negatively associated 
with size of impairment losses. 
H3k: Changes in total sales are 
negatively associated with impairment 
decisions. 
H3l: Changes in total sales are negatively 
associated with size of impairment losses. 
H3m: Changes in pre-impairment 
return-on-assets are negatively 
associated with impairment decisions. 
H3n: Changes in pre-impairment return-
on-assets are negatively associated with 
size of impairment losses. 
H3o: Changes in operating cash flows 
are negatively associated with 
impairment decisions. 
H3p: Changes in operating cash flows are 
negatively associated with size of 
impairment losses. 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
H3q: Pre-impairment book-to-market 
ratios are positively associated with 
impairment decisions.  
H3r: Pre-impairment book-to-market 
ratios are positively associated with size 
of impairment losses. 
H3s: Last year’s impairment losses in 
goodwill are positively associated with 
current year’s impairment decisions. 
H3t: Last year’s impairment losses in 
goodwill are positively associated with 
current year’s size of impairment losses. 
 
5.3.2. Earnings-management incentives 
Goodwill-impairment losses might be understated, overstated or unbiased 
depictions of economic impairment in goodwill. If the reporting strategy is to shift 
earnings from future periods to the current period, impairment losses are 
understated and/or delayed. In contrast, if the reporting strategy is to shift earnings 
from present to future periods, impairment losses are overstated and/or 
accelerated. It is expected that managers have less incentives to overstate and/or 
accelerate impairment losses than understate and/or delay impairment losses 
(Kothari et al. 2010). This does not imply, however, that earnings management 
only concerns understated and/or delayed impairment losses. Big-bath and 
management changes might proxy for incentives that lead to overstated and/or 
accelerated impairment losses.   
 
Earnings management is likely when there are significant information asymmetry, 
conflicts of interest and discretionary reporting freedom (e.g Field et al. 2001). 
Under such conditions, accounting becomes a potential instrument used to mislead 
outside stakeholders. Contracting is one remedy that is supposed to align the 
interests of the managers with those of the outside stakeholder, e.g. shareholders. 
If the contracts are inefficient due to high information and contracting costs, a 
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paradoxical result occurs. The contracts may not reduce opportunism and agency 
costs as intended. Rather, they provide incentives to act opportunistically (e.g. 
Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1986, 1990, Healy and Wahlen 1999, Dechow and 
Skinner 2000, Field et al. 2001). If these inefficient contracts are written in terms 
of accounting numbers, e.g. net earnings, there is a risk that these numbers will be 
manipulated to affect the outcomes of these contracts. Conventional examples are 
earnings-based compensation contracts and debt-covenant contracts (e.g. Watts 
and Zimmerman 1978, 1986, 1990). Other contracts not written in accounting 
numbers, such as most equity-based compensation contracts, may also be affected 
by earnings management. If the capital market is less than semi-strongly efficient, 
the market participants are on average unable to detect the earnings management 
and to undo its effects on accounting numbers. Thus, accounting numbers might 
mislead the capital market, which in turn affects the outcomes of equity-based 
compensation contracts (e.g. Field et al. 2001). Non-contracting incentives may 
also lead to earnings management. Such incentives could be managers’ career 
concerns (Fama and Jensen 1983).  
 
Given inefficient contracting, earnings-based compensation contracts may lead to 
incentives for earnings management. Healy (1985), Gaver et al. (1995) and 
Holthausen et al. (1995) find evidence that managers manipulate earnings towards 
upper and lower thresholds for cash-bonus payments. Most research on bonus 
plans is based on a simplified assumption that there exists a linear relationship 
between earnings and cash-bonus payments. Beatty and Weber (2006), Lapointe-
Antunes et al. (2008) and Ramanna and Watts (2009) employ this assumption, 
although not explicitly stated, when investigating the association between cash-
bonus payments and impairment losses in goodwill. The results, however, are 
mixed. Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) and Ramanna and Watts (2009) document 
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an insignificant association, whereas Beatty and Weber (2006) find a significantly 
negative association between cash-bonus payments and goodwill-impairment 
losses. Given prior evidence, it is reasonable to predict that earnings-based 
compensation plans provide managers with incentives to understate and/or delay 
goodwill-impairment losses, which suggests a negative association between cash-
bonus payments and reported goodwill-impairment losses. 
 
The literature has demonstrated that cash-bonus incentives explain earnings 
management at a discount relative to equity-based incentives (Schipper and 
Vincent 2003, Graham et al. 2005, Yaari and Ronen 2008). Equity-based 
incentives might be triggered by equity-based compensation contracts such as 
executive stock-options and conditional stocks. The awards of stock options and 
conditional stocks are generally determined by market-based performance 
measures such as stock return. Besides, the value of executive stock options and 
conditional stocks will increase if stock prices increase. Market participants use 
accounting information such as earnings to form expectations about the firms’ 
future prospects. Given less than a semi-strongly efficient market, reported 
earnings have the potential to mislead market participants when they make 
deliberations about selling, buying or holding stocks. Prior evidence in the 
literature supports a positive association between stock-based compensation and 
earnings management. For instance, Gao and Shrieves (2002) find a positive 
association between executive stock options and abnormal accruals. Moreover, 
Denis et al. (2006), Erickson et al. (2006) and Johnson et al. (2008) show that the 
likelihood of being accused of fraud increases in the percentage of total 
compensation being stock-based. Equity-based incentives have received little 
attention in the asset-impairment literature. Two exceptions are referred to in the 
literature review. Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) investigate the association 
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between executive stock options and goodwill-impairment losses. They find a 
weakly significantly negative association between stock options and impairment 
losses. Ramanna and Watts (2009) include the earnings-response coefficient to 
investigate equity-pricing concerns. They argue that non-impairment decisions are 
more likely for firms having higher earnings-response coefficients. They find no 
significant association between these coefficients and impairment decisions. The 
likelihood of stock awards and stock-option awards and the value of these awards 
will increase when stock prices increase. It is, therefore, predicted that managers 
holding more executive stock options and conditional stocks are more inclined to 
understate and/or delay impairment losses. Negative associations are predicted 
between executive stock options holdings, conditional stockholdings and reported 
goodwill-impairment losses.  
 
There are at least three reporting strategies that are associated with accounting for 
goodwill impairment: target accounting, income smoothing and big-bath 
accounting. If pre-impairment earnings are above the earnings target, the 
managers may report impairment losses to obtain an earnings number closer to the 
target. Similarly, if pre-impairment earnings are unexpectedly high or low, this 
may provide incentives to either engage in income smoothing or big-bath 
accounting (Zucca and Campbell 1992, Francis et al. 1996, Rees et al. 1996, 
Massoud and Raiborn 2003, Riedl 2004, Van de Poel, Maijoor and Vanstrealen 
2009). Zucca and Campbell (1992) argue that big-bath impairment losses are 
reported in periods in which pre-impairment earnings are already below expected 
earnings. Managers may undertake a big bath in such periods to improve future 
earnings and provide a signal that bad times are behind them and better times will 
follow (Zucca and Campbell 1992, Alciatore et al. 1998). Income smoothing may 
occur in periods where pre-impairment earnings are higher than expected. By 
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reporting impairment losses, earnings will be closer to the level expected. Finally, 
Kirshenheiter and Melumad (2002) present a model in which both big bath and 
income smoothing can be seen as part of an equilibrium reporting strategy. A 
larger earnings surprise reduces the inferred precision of the earnings number and 
thereby reduces the effect on firm value. This creates a natural incentive for 
managers to take a bath as a greater negative surprise has a reduced overall effect 
on the firm value. Moreover, it also provides a rationale for managers to smooth 
earnings as the reduction in positive earnings surprises similarly leads to greater 
inferred precision of the reported earnings. In both cases, the reporting behaviour 
maximises the value of the firm. Target accounting, income smoothing and big-
bath accounting can all be explained by incentives triggered by earnings-based and 
equity-based compensation. Still, they are not the only candidates explaining these 
reporting strategies. Another candidate is reputation concerns. This suggests that 
additional variables for target accounting, income smoothing and big-bath 
accounting should be included to capture other incentives than those represented 
by earnings-based and equity-based compensation contracts.  
 
The literature has demonstrated that change in management is positively 
associated with impairment losses (e.g. Strong and Meyer 1987, Francis et al. 
1996, Riedl 2004, Kvaal 2005, Zang 2008). The evidence suggests that the 
incoming manager has an incentive to take a bath in the year of the change as low 
earnings may be blamed on the preceding manager. Moreover, the big bath will 
reduce earnings and net-asset values, which in turn will increase the likelihood of 
reporting higher earnings and improved firm performance in the future. An 
alternative argument suggests that the positive association between impairment 
losses and changes in management reflects economic fundamentals rather than 
managerial opportunism. New management may exercise greater scrutiny over 
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existing assets or change the firm’s strategic position, resulting in an impairment 
loss (Wilson 1996, Francis et al. 1996, Riedl 2004). A final argument suggests that 
the preceding manager is removed due to poor firm performance. Given proper 
control for economic impairment, a significant association between management 
change and impairment losses may capture the new manager’s incentives to take 
all potential charges and attribute them to the preceding manager. Prior research 
generally investigates the change of CEO only (e.g. Strong and Meyer 1987, Elliot 
and Shaw 1988, Francis et al. 1996, Cotter et al. 1998, Riedl 2004, Beatty and 
Weber 1996, Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2008, Zang 2008). This dissertation, 
however, investigates changes in the three top management positions: Chairman of 
the Board (COB), Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO). For all three there are predicted positive associations between management 
change and goodwill-impairment losses. 
 
The contracting literature considers debt contracts as a potential source of 
earnings-management incentives. As for earnings-based and equity-based 
compensation contracts, debt contracts will only trigger earnings management if 
they are inefficient in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders on the 
one hand with those of the debtholders on the other. Debt-covenant considerations 
are believed to represent incentives leading to a reporting strategy that seeks to 
increase earnings and net-asset values (Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1986, 1990, 
Beneish and Press 1993, Sweeney 1994, DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994, Dichev and 
Skinner 2002). This suggests that firms that are close to violating debt covenants 
will have incentives to avoid impairment losses (e.g Kvaal 2005, Zang 2008). In 
particular, firms with high debt-to-equity ratios are believed to be closer to 
violating debt covenants. These firms are predicted to avoid reporting decisions 
that increase debt-to-equity ratios, which suggests a negative association between 
  
235 
debt-to-equity ratios and goodwill-impairment losses (Beneish and Press 1993, 
Sweeney 1994, DeFond and Jimbalvo 1994, Dichev and Skinner 2002, Riedl 
2004).  
 
Political-cost considerations are another potential candidate for earnings 
management. These incentives stem from the fact that accounting numbers may 
influence the degree to which firms are subject to regulations that impose political 
costs on them. This is particularly prominent if the firm is large, has significantly 
high earnings, large fluctuations in earnings or a significant market share, which 
makes the firm politically visible (Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1986, 1990, 
Moses 1987, Gupta 1995). These firms are, therefore, predicted to report 
goodwill-impairment losses to depress earnings or reduce large positive changes 
in earnings. High levels of earnings or high fluctuations in earnings will probably 
be associated with income-smoothing incentives as much as political-cost 
considerations. Moreover, the firm’s market share is not readily observable. This 
leaves firm size as a variable that may indicate political-cost considerations. Firm 
size, however, is a crude measure of political costs. Any association between firm 
size and goodwill-impairment losses must, therefore, be interpreted with caution. 
Hypotheses on earnings-management incentives are presented in table 5.4 below. 
They are in two versions: One version for impairment decisions and another 
version for size of impairment losses.  
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Table 5.4 Hypotheses on earnings-management incentives  
Impairment decision  Size of impairment losses  
H3u: Cash-bonus payments to COB, CEO 
and CFO are negatively associated with 
impairment decisions.  
H3v: Cash-bonus payments to COB, CEO 
and CFO are negatively associated with size 
of impairment losses. 
H3w: Conditional stocks held by COB, 
CEO and CFO are negatively associated 
with impairment decisions. 
H3x: Conditional stocks held by COB, CEO 
and CFO are negatively associated with size 
of impairment losses. 
H3y: Executive stock options held by 
COB, CEO and CFO are negatively 
associated with impairment decisions.  
H3z: Executive stock options held by COB, 
CEO and CFO are negatively associated with 
size of impairment losses. 
H3aa: Target-accounting incentives (pre-
impairment earnings above target) are 
positively associated with impairment 
decisions. 
H3ab: Target-accounting incentives (pre-
impairment earnings above target) are 
positively associated with size of impairment 
losses. 
H3ac: Big-bath accounting incentives 
(low pre-impairment earnings) are 
negatively associated with impairment 
decisions.  
H3ad: Big-bath accounting incentives (low 
pre-impairment earnings) are negatively 
associated with size of impairment losses. 
H3ae: Income-smoothing incentives (high 
pre-impairment earnings) are positively 
associated with impairment decisions.  
H3af: Income-smoothing incentives (high 
pre-impairment earnings) are positively 
associated with size of impairment losses. 
H3ag: Changes in COB, CEO and CFO 
are positively associated with impairment 
decisions.  
H3ah: Changes in COB, CEO and CFO are 
positively associated with size of impairment 
losses. 
Table continues on next page. 
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H3ai: Debt-covenant incentives (debt-to-
equity ratio) are negatively associated 
with impairment decisions.  
H3aj: Debt-covenant incentives (debt-to-
equity ratio) are negatively associated with 
size of impairment losses. 
H3ak: Firm size is positively associated 
with impairment decisions.  
H3al: Firm size is positively associated with 
size of impairment losses. 
 
5.3.3. Abnormal-impairment losses, earnings management and corporate 
governance 
Goodwill-impairment losses might be overstated, understated or unbiased 
depictions of economic impairment in goodwill. The presence of earnings-
management incentives are believed to increase the likelihood of 
misrepresentation of economic impairment. Earnings-management incentives 
predicted to be positively associated with impairment decisions and size of 
impairment losses are predicted to be positively associated with overstated 
impairment losses. Likewise, earnings-management incentives predicted to be 
negatively associated with impairment decisions and size of impairment losses are 
predicted to be negatively associated with understated impairment losses.  
 
Elements of the remuneration package such as cash-bonus payments, conditional 
stocks and executive stock options are supposed to provide incentives for 
overstating net earnings. High cash-bonus payments, high conditional 
stockholdings and high stock-option holdings should, therefore, be associated with 
understated impairment losses. As understated impairment losses take negative 
values (Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2008, Zang 2008), negative associations are 
predicted between these remuneration elements and understated impairment 
losses. Debt-covenant incentives are supposed to provide incentives for 
understating net earnings. Similar to the remuneration elements, a negative 
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association is predicted between debt-to-equity ratios and understated impairment 
losses. Some incentives are supposed to be associated with more and larger 
impairment losses rather than fewer and smaller impairment losses. These are 
predicted to be positively associated with overstated impairment losses. This is the 
case for target accounting, income smoothing, change in management and firm 
size. As the proxy for big-bath accounting takes negative values, a negative 
association is predicted between big-bath accounting incentives and overstated 
impairment losses.  
 
The stated hypotheses, however, are not limited to predict associations between 
earnings-management incentives and either understated or overstated impairment 
losses. Rather, for a given earnings-management incentive, hypotheses are stated 
for associations between the earnings-management incentive and understated and 
overstated impairment losses, respectively. For instance, earnings-management 
incentives reflected by cash-bonus payments are believed to lead to understated 
impairment losses. A negative association is, therefore, predicted between these 
cash-bonus payments and understated impairment losses. To the extent these 
losses are overstated, the association between these cash-bonus payments and 
these losses should be negative. This is consistent with higher cash-bonus 
payments being associated with relatively less overstated impairment losses. All 
the hypotheses on associations between earnings-management incentives and 
understated or overstated impairment losses are derived in a similar way. The 
hypotheses on associations between earnings-management incentives and 
understated or overstated impairment losses are given in table 5.5 below: 
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Table 5.5 Hypotheses on earnings-management incentives and abnormal-
impairment losses 
Understated impairment losses  Overstated impairment losses  
H4a: Cash-bonus payments to COB, CEO 
and CFO are negatively associated with 
understated impairment losses (negative 
abnormal-impairment losses).  
H4b: Cash-bonus payments to COB, CEO 
and CFO are negatively associated with 
overstated impairment losses (positive 
abnormal- impairment losses). 
H4c: Conditional stocks held by COB, 
CEO and CFO are negatively associated 
with understated impairment losses 
(negative abnormal-impairment losses). 
H4d: Conditional stocks held by COB, CEO 
and CFO are negatively associated with 
overstated impairment losses (positive 
abnormal- impairment losses). 
H4e: Executive stock options held by 
COB, CEO and CFO are negatively 
associated with understated impairment 
losses (negative abnormal-impairment 
losses). 
H4f: Executive stock options held by COB, 
CEO and CFO are negatively associated with 
overstated impairment losses (positive 
abnormal- impairment losses). 
H4g: Target-accounting incentives (pre-
impairment earnings above target) are 
positively associated with understated 
impairment losses (negative abnormal- 
impairment losses). 
H4h: Target-accounting incentives (pre-
impairment earnings above target) are 
positively associated with overstated 
impairment losses (positive abnormal-
impairment losses). 
H4i: Big-bath accounting incentives 
(large reduction in pre-impairment 
earnings) are negatively associated with 
understated impairment losses (negative 
abnormal- impairment losses). 
H4j: Big-bath accounting incentives (large 
reduction in pre-impairment earnings) are 
negatively associated with overstated 
impairment losses (positive abnormal-
impairment losses). 
Table continues on next page. 
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H4k: Income-smoothing incentives (large 
increase in pre-impairment earnings) are 
positively associated with understated 
impairment losses (negative abnormal- 
impairment losses). 
H4l: Income-smoothing incentives (large 
increase in pre-impairment earnings) are 
positively associated with overstated 
impairment losses (positive abnormal-
impairment losses). 
H4m: Changes of COB, CEO and CFO 
are positively associated with understated 
impairment losses (negative abnormal- 
impairment losses). 
H4n: Changes of COB, CEO and CFO are 
positively associated with overstated 
impairment losses (positive abnormal-
impairment losses). 
H4o: Debt-covenant incentives (debt-to-
equity ratios) are negatively associated 
with understated impairment losses 
(negative abnormal-impairment losses). 
H4p: Debt-covenant incentives (debt-to-
equity ratios) are negatively associated with 
overstated impairment losses (positive 
abnormal- impairment losses). 
H4q: Firm size is positively associated 
with understated impairment losses 
(negative abnormal-impairment losses). 
H4r: Firm size is positively associated with 
overstated impairment losses (positive 
abnormal- impairment losses). 
 
Corporate governance is an instrument to reduce the risk of opportunism in 
principal-agent relationships (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Prior evidence has 
demonstrated that firms with efficient corporate governance have higher firm 
value, higher firm performance and suffer from lower agency costs (e.g. Weisbach 
1988, Huson et al. 2001, Perry and Perry 2005, Perry and Shivdasani 2005). A 
complementary line of literature has demonstrated a negative association between 
corporate-governance mechanisms and earnings management (e.g. Warfield et al. 
1995, Dechow et al. 1996, Beasley 1996, Chtourou et al. 2001, Klein 2002, Koh 
2003, Xie et al. 2003, Peasnell et al. 2005, Davidson et al. 2005, Mulgrew and 
Forker 2006, Ebrahim 2007, Koh et al. 2007). Managers disciplined by efficient 
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corporate-governance mechanisms will probably avoid opportunism and use their 
reporting discretion to reveal private information and report accounting numbers 
consistent with the firm’s underlying economics. In contrast, given incentives to 
manipulate and inefficient corporate-governance structures, managers are more 
inclined to exploit the reporting discretion and report accounting numbers that do 
not accurately reflect economic fundamentals.  
 
The literature provides lots of evidence suggesting that corporate-governance 
mechanisms are associated with less earnings management, less financial fraud 
and higher earnings quality and accrual quality (e.g. Warfield et al. 1995, Dechow 
et al. 1996, Beasley 1996, Chtourou et al. 2001, Klein 2002, Koh 2003, Xie et al. 
2003, Peasnell et al. 2005, Davidson et al. 2005, Mulgrew and Forker 2006, 
Ebrahim 2007, Koh et al. 2007). The literature has investigated a vast number of 
corporate-governance proxies. The most common proxies relate to board and 
audit-committee characteristics and other monitoring mechanisms represented by 
blockholders, external auditors and cross-listing. Compensation contracts and debt 
contracts are also potential corporate-governance candidates (e.g. Dey 2008). 
These contracts are indeed established to align the interests of the managers with 
those of the shareholders and the debtholders. If contracting is inefficient, 
however, they might well motivate for opportunism rather than prevent 
opportunism (Watts and Zimmerman 1990, Xie, et al. 2003). Given this 
assumption, they should be considered as potential sources of earnings-
management incentives rather than corporate-governance mechanisms.  
 
Several board and audit-committee characteristics are believed to reflect corporate 
governance such as size, independence, activity and expertise. Board size is a 
frequently investigated indicator of corporate governance. The evidence on board 
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size being a corporate-governance mechanism is mixed. The common notion is 
that smaller boards are more efficient (Lipton and Lorsch 1992, Yermack 1996, 
Jensen 2000) and less likely controlled by managers (Dechow et al. 1996, Core et 
al. 1999, Jensen 2000). Consistent with this, the literature demonstrates a negative 
association between board size and firm performance (e.g. Yermack 1996, Mak 
and Kusnadi 2002, Ødegaard and Bøhren 2004). The association between board 
size and earnings management is not easily understood. Smaller boards are 
supposed to be more efficient. At the same time, larger boards will probably have 
more experienced directors and more independent non-executive directors (Xie et 
al. 2003). The literature also demonstrates mixed results. Some studies report a 
negative association between board size and earnings management consistent with 
larger boards being more efficient monitors (e.g. Chtourou et al. 2001, Xie et al. 
2003, Ebrahim 2007). Others report a weak association or no association (e.g. 
Dechow et al. 1996, Abbott et al. 2000, Vafeas 2005). Given the above findings, it 
is expected that the incidence of earnings management will vary across firms with 
different board size. As the majority of the literature suggests that smaller boards 
are more efficient than larger boards, smaller boards are predicted to be associated 
with less misrepresentation of economic impairment (less understated or 
overstated impairment losses).  
 
Board independence and board activity are supposed to be important indicators of 
the monitoring efficiency of the board. The association between board 
independence and earnings management is expected to be negative. Higher 
proportion of independent directors is supposed to make the board more efficient 
in monitoring managers and thereby constrain the opportunities for managerial 
opportunism (e.g. Xie et al. 2003:306). Several studies have demonstrated a 
negative association between independence and earnings management (e.g. 
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Beasley 1996, Dechow et al. 1996, Klein 2002, Xie et al. 2003, Farber 2005, 
Vafeas 2005, Peasnell et al. 2005, Davidson et al. 2005, Ebrahim 2007, Koh et al. 
2007). Some studies, however, have failed to find a relationship between board 
independence and earnings management (e.g. Chtourou et al. 2001, Mulgrew and 
Forker 2006). Nevertheless, compelling evidence supports the notion that more 
independent non-executive directors lead to less earnings management. More 
independent non-executive directors are, therefore, predicted to be associated with 
less misrepresentation of economic impairment. 
 
Board activity is generally indicated by the number of board meetings. More board 
meetings suggest higher activity and less earnings management. This rests on the 
notion that more active boards are more efficient monitors of the managers, which 
in turn reduces managerial opportunism and earnings management (e.g. Xie et al. 
2003). Some studies demonstrate a negative association between board meetings 
and abnormal accruals (e.g. Xie et al. 2003). Others, however, report evidence 
inconsistent with these findings. Vafeas (1999), for instance, reports a negative 
association between board activity and firm value, and Davidson et al. (2005), 
Ebrahim (2007) and Koh et al. (2007) find a positive association between board 
meetings and earnings management. These findings, however, can be driven by 
correlated-omitted variables and endogeneity problems, which turns the 
association positive. Taken together, it is reasonable to predict that more board 
activity will lead to less misrepresentation of economic impairment. 
 
Managerial stockholdings are supposed to be efficient in aligning the interests of 
the managers with those of the shareholders and thus, an important remedy to 
prevent opportunism (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama 1980, Fama and 
Jensen 1983). Warfield et al. (1995) find a negative association between 
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managerial stockholdings and abnormal accruals suggesting that managerial 
stockholdings reduce earnings management. Others, such as Klein (2002), report a 
weak positive association between managers’ stockholdings and earnings 
management. Moreover, several studies have demonstrated that the relationship 
between managerial stockholdings and agency costs is non-linear (Morck et al. 
1988, McConnell and Servaes 1990, 1995, Short and Keasey 1999, Hutchinson 
and Leung 2007). Still, it is reasonable to expect that managerial stockholdings to 
some extent have the potential to align the interests of the managers with those of 
the shareholders. Taken together, it is predicted that larger managerial 
stockholdings will lead to less misrepresentation of economic impairment. 
 
Similar to the full board, audit-committee size, activity and expertise are supposed 
to indicate corporate governance. The primary role of the audit committee is to 
monitor the financial-reporting process, which certainly demands some expertise 
in accounting. Xie et al. (2003) find evidence that financial expertise reduces the 
likelihood of earnings management. Similar evidence is reported by McMullan 
and Raghunanadan (1996), Chtourou et al. (2001) and Bedard et al. (2004). 
Moreover, Dhaliwal et al. (2006) reports a positive association between financial 
expertise and accrual quality, and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2007) find evidence 
of a positive association between financial-accounting expertise and conservatism. 
In sum, it is predicted that more financial-accounting expertise on the audit 
committee will lead to less misrepresentation of economic impairment. 
 
The size of the audit committee and the audit-committee activity are also 
investigated in prior studies. The association between audit-committee size and 
earnings management is found to be rather weak and somewhat inconsistent (e.g. 
Xie et al. 2003, Bedard et al. 2004). Still, it is reasonable to believe that more 
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audit-committee members will lead to more expertise and monitoring resources, 
which in turn increases the efficiency of the committee. This suggests that larger 
audit committees are associated with less misrepresentation. The results for audit-
committee activity, however, are somewhat stronger. Chtourou et al. (2001), Xie 
et al. (2003) and Ebrahim (2007) find a negative association between the number 
of audit-committee meetings and earnings management. Moreover, McMullan and 
Raghunandan (1996) and Abbott et al. (2000) find that the likelihood of financial 
fraud and earnings restatements are lower if the firm has frequent audit-committee 
meetings. And finally, a positive association is found between audit-committee 
activity and the information content of earnings (e.g. Anderson et al. 2004). This 
suggests that more audit-committee activity is associated with less 
misrepresentation of economic impairment. 
 
Outside blockholders are believed to be an important monitor of the managers 
(e.g. Smith 1976, Jensen and Meckling 1976, Shleifer and Vishney 1986:462). 
Dechow et al. (1996) find evidence that outside blockholders are negatively 
associated with financial fraud, and Xie et al. (2003) report a negative, but 
insignificant association between blockholdings and earnings management. 
Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) report a significantly negative association between 
transitional goodwill-impairment losses and blockholders. Taken together, this 
suggests that blockholders will monitor the managers and make an effort to 
prevent earnings management. More blockholders are, therefore, predicted to be 
associated with less misrepresentation of economic impairment. 
 
Cross-listing on the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ Stock Exchange 
is supposed to reduce the incidence of opportunistic earnings management due to 
strict disclosure regulations and enforcement (Lang et al. 2003, Bailey et al. 2006). 
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Lang et al. (2003) find that firms cross-listed in the US are less aggressive in terms 
of earnings management. Bailey et al. (2006) report that cross-listing in the US 
leads to less earnings management due to better corporate-governance structures 
and more transparent information environment. This suggests that cross-listing on 
the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ Stock Exchange is associated 
with less misrepresentation of economic impairment. Hypotheses on corporate-
governance mechanisms and overstated and understated impairment losses are 
given in table 5.6 below: 
Table 5.6 Hypotheses on corporate-governance and abnormal-impairment 
losses 
Understated impairment losses  Overstated impairment losses  
H4s: Board size is positively associated 
with understated impairment losses 
(negative abnormal-impairment losses). 
H4t: Board size is negatively associated 
with overstated impairment losses 
(positive abnormal-impairment losses). 
H4u: Board independence is positively 
associated with understated impairment 
losses (negative abnormal-impairment 
losses). 
H4v: Board independence is negatively 
associated with overstated impairment 
losses (positive abnormal-impairment 
losses). 
H4w: Board activity is positively 
associated with understated impairment 
losses (negative abnormal-impairment 
losses). 
H4x: Board activity is negatively 
associated with overstated impairment 
losses (positive abnormal-impairment 
losses). 
H4y: Stocks held by COB, CEO and 
CFO are positively associated with 
understated impairment losses (negative 
abnormal- impairment losses). 
H4z: Stocks held by COB, CEO and 
CFO are negatively associated with 
overstated impairment losses (positive 
abnormal- impairment losses). 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
H4aa: Audit-committee expertise is 
positively associated with understated 
impairment losses (negative abnormal-
impairment losses). 
H4ab: Audit-committee expertise is 
negatively associated with overstated 
impairment losses (positive abnormal-
impairment losses). 
H4ac: Audit-committee size is 
positively associated with understated 
impairment losses (negative abnormal-
impairment losses). 
H4ad: Audit-committee size is 
negatively associated with overstated 
impairment losses (positive abnormal-
impairment losses). 
H4ae: Audit-committee activity is 
positively associated with understated 
impairment losses (negative abnormal-
impairment losses). 
H4af: Audit-committee activity is 
negatively associated with overstated 
impairment losses (positive abnormal-
impairment losses). 
H4ag: Blockholdings are positively 
associated with understated impairment 
losses (negative abnormal-impairment 
losses). 
H4ah: Blockholdings are negatively 
associated with overstated impairment 
losses (positive abnormal-impairment 
losses). 
H4ai: Blockholders are positively 
associated with understated impairment 
losses (negative abnormal-impairment 
losses). 
H4aj: Blockholders are negatively 
associated with overstated impairment 
losses (positive abnormal-impairment 
losses). 
H4ak: Cross-listing is positively 
associated with understated impairment 
losses (negative abnormal-impairment 
losses). 
H4al: Cross-listing is negatively 
associated with overstated impairment 
losses (positive abnormal-impairment 
losses). 
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6. Methodological choices 
 
This chapter discusses the methodological design. The chapter is structured into 
four subchapters: one for each research question.  
 
6.1. Model specification – value relevance of goodwill under 
the impairment-only method  
 
The first research question concerns the value relevance of goodwill under current 
IFRS. Three hypotheses are formulated: Book goodwill is positively associated 
with stock prices (hypothesis 1a), goodwill-impairment losses are negatively 
associated with stock prices (hypothesis 1b) and goodwill-impairment losses are 
negatively associated with stock returns (hypothesis 1c). Price-book-earnings 
regressions and return-earnings regressions are employed. The return-regression 
model is believed to suffer from less econometrical problems than the price-level 
regression model due to better control for correlated-omitted variables and less 
problems of heteroscedasticity (e.g. Kothari and Zimmerman 1995, Wooldridge 
2009:458-59). There is, however, no general consensus on which model to prefer. 
The choice of model should be based on the research questions and hypotheses to 
be tested by the model and potential econometrical problems of the model 
(Landsman and Magliolo 1988, Kothari and Zimmerman 1995, Barth 2001, Barth 
et al. 2001, Beaver 2002). The research questions in chapter one and the 
hypotheses in chapter five suggest that both regression models rather than just the 
return-regression model should be employed. Still, potential econometrical 
problems of these models will be carefully investigated in the empirical analysis.   
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The first and the second hypotheses, 1a and 1b, are tested by a price-book-
earnings regression based on the Feltham-Ohlson framework. This model is 
appropriate to investigate the extent to which accounting numbers reflect the same 
information as in stock prices (McCarthy and Schneider 1995, Barth 2000). 
Besides, this model is frequently used in prior research investigating the value 
relevance of goodwill (Jennings et al. 1996a, Huijgen 1996, Vincent 1997, 
Petersen 2001, 2002). The following pooled regression is employed to test 
hypotheses 1a and 1b (all independent variables are deflated by number of 
outstanding common stocks at fiscal-year end t): 
 
Table 6.1 Regression model to test hypotheses 1a and 1b 
 
The regression coefficients of main interest are 2  and 4 . A significantly 
positive coefficient on book goodwill (GW), 4 , supports hypothesis 1a. This 
suggests that goodwill should be classified as an asset and capitalised on the 
balance sheet. A significantly negative coefficient on goodwill-impairment losses 
(GIM), 2 , supports hypothesis 1b. This suggests that goodwill-impairment losses 
reflect economic impairment. The above regression model is deflated by number 
of outstanding common stocks. This is the common deflator in price-book 
 
titititititi GWGWEQGIMGIMEP ,1,41,3,2,10, )()(   
 
where
 
tiP ,  
= Stock price of firm i, time t (fiscal-year end). 
tiGIME ,)(   
= Pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t. 
tiGIM ,  
= Reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t. 
1,)(  tiGWEQ  
= Book value of equity less book value of goodwill of firm i, time t-1. 
1, tiGW  
= Book value of goodwill of firm i, time t-1. 
ti ,  
= Residual of firm i, time t. 
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earnings regressions (e.g. Jennings et al. 1996a, Huijgen 1996, Vincent 1997, 
Francis and Shipper 1999, Barth et al. 2008, Kang and Zhao 2010, Gjerde et al. 
2011). Still, the relation between number of outstanding common stocks and scale 
is not one-to-one. This suggests that the above model might be affected by scale 
effects even after deflating the variables with number of outstanding common 
stocks, which suggests that alternative scale proxies should be employed as 
robustness tests (e.g. Petersen 2001, 2002, Gjerde et al. 2011). 
 
Hypothesis 1c is tested by the return-earnings regression model. This model can 
be theoretically justified with reference to the Feltham-Ohlson framework (See 
appendix C) and is appropriate when investigating the extent to which accounting 
numbers reflect the same information as in stock returns (Barth 2000, Barth et al. 
2001). The model is frequently used in the literature investigating value relevance 
of goodwill-amortisation charges and goodwill-impairment losses (Jennings et al. 
1996a, Henning et al. 2000, Petersen 2001, 2002, Chen et al. 2004). The following 
regression is employed to test hypothesis 1c (all variables are deflated by market 
value at time t-1): 
 
Table 6.2 Regression model to test hypothesis 1c 
 
tittitittititi GIMGIMGIMEGIMER ,1,,4,31,,2,10, )()(     
 
where
 
tiR ,  
= Stock return/market return of firm i, period t (fiscal year). 
tiGIME ,)(   
= Pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t. 
1,,)(  ttiGIME  
= Changes in pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, from period t-1 to t. 
tiGIM ,  
= Reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t. 
1,,  ttiGIM  
= Changes in reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, from period t-1 to t. 
ti ,  
= Residual of firm i, time t. 
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The coefficient of main interest is 3 . A significantly negative coefficient on 
goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) supports hypothesis 1c, which suggests that 
these losses are timely reported and value relevant. Following the theoretical 
derivation of the return-earnings model in appendix C and previous work by 
Landsman and Magliolo (1988) and Easton and Harris (1991), both levels and 
changes in net earnings are included as explanatory variables. The reasoning 
behind this is that levels in net earnings are believed to capture the stable 
component of net earnings, whereas changes in net earnings represent the 
unexpected component of net earnings. The changes are calculated by deducting 
net earnings the previous year from net earnings the current year. Net-earnings 
levels (E+GIM) and net-earnings changes (GIM) are predicted to be positively 
associated with stock returns. For the sake of completeness, changes in goodwill-
impairment losses (GIM) are also included as explanatory variable. The return-
earnings model is supposed to be less affected by problems caused by scale, 
heteroscedasticity and correlated-omitted variables (e.g. Kothari and Zimmerman 
1995, Wooldridge 2009:458-59).  
 
6.2. Model specification – value relevance of goodwill 
reported under alternative accounting methods 
The second research question concerns the value relevance of goodwill reported 
under alternative accounting methods. Hypotheses 2a and 2b predict no 
association between goodwill-amortisation charges, stock prices and stock returns, 
respectively, when goodwill is accounted for under the amortisation-only method. 
Similarly, hypotheses 2c and 2d predict no association between goodwill-
amortisation charges, stock prices and stock returns, respectively, when goodwill 
is accounted for under the amortisation-and-impairment method. Hypothesis 2e 
and 2f concern the relative value relevance of goodwill when reported under 
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alternative accounting methods. Hypothesis 2e (2f) predicts that goodwill-
accounting numbers reported under an impairment-only method explain variation 
in stock prices (stock returns) to a larger extent than goodwill numbers reported 
under the amortisation-only method or the amortisation-and-impairment method. 
The relative value relevance is investigated by comparing adjusted R-squares from 
regressions of accounting numbers under these three methods. The test is 
conducted by comparing adjusted R-squares from value-relevance regressions on 
accounting numbers under the impairment-only method (current IFRS) with as-if 
adjusted numbers under alternative methods. This procedure is believed to provide 
a strong test of the relative value relevance. All potential variables affecting the 
value relevance across these accounting methods are controlled for by using the 
same set of firm-year observations (the same sample firms for the same time 
period) in all the regressions.  
 
An alternative approach would be to run a pre-post test where as-accounted 
numbers under the current regulation are compared with as-accounted numbers 
under previous regulation. This approach, however, has several caveats. A 
difference in value relevance of goodwill when moving from the pre-period to the 
post-period might be explained by correlated-omitted variables. A proper control 
must, therefore, be ensured for potentially correlated-omitted variables before 
addressing any difference in value relevance to change of accounting methods. 
Besides, using as-if accounted numbers makes it possible to investigate accounting 
methods that have not previously been implemented in financial accounting, for 
instance, an amortisation-only method for goodwill or a permant-retention 
method. In contrast to previous studies (e.g. Petersen 2001, 2002, Chambers 
2007), the firms’ own amortisation period is used when calculating the as-if 
amortisation charges of goodwill. In Chambers (2007) all firms are forced to 
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follow given amortisation periods of 5, 10, 15 or 20 years. This provides no basis 
for true comparisons of alternative accounting methods involving goodwill 
amortisation. Moreover, economic lifetime of goodwill is believed to vary across 
firms and industries, which even more justifies the use of actual amortisation 
periods rather than arbitrary periods when calculating as-if accounting numbers. 
To test hypothesis 2a, the following regression is employed (all independent 
variables are deflated by number of outstanding stocks at fiscal-year end time t): 
 
Table 6.3 Regression model to test hypothesis 2a 
 
Both book goodwill (GWCA) and book equity (EQCA) are affected by the chosen 
accounting method. Book goodwill and book equity are, therefore, included with 
their as-if calculated numbers in the above regression. An insignificant coefficient 
on goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM), 2 , supports hypothesis 2a, which 
suggests that these charges lack any association with stock prices. The following 
regression is employed to test hypothesis 2b (all variables are deflated by market 
value at time t-1): 
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where   
   
tiP ,  
= Stock price of firm i, time t (fiscal-year end). 
tiGIME ,)(   
= Pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t. 
tiGAM ,  
= As-if calculated goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t 
(amortisation-only method). 
1,)(  tiGWCAEQCA  
= As-if calculated book value of equity less as-if calculated book value of 
goodwill of firm i, time t-1 (amortisation-only method). 
1, tiGWCA  
= As-if calculated book value of goodwill of firm i, time t-1 (amortisation-
only method). 
ti ,  
= Residual of firm i, time t. 
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Table 6.4 Regression model to test hypothesis 2b 
 
The coefficient of main interest is 3 . Similar to hypothesis 2a, an insignificant 
coefficient on goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM), 3 , supports hypotheses 2b, 
which suggests that goodwill-amortisation charges lack any association with stock 
returns. Similar regressions are employed to test hypothesis 2c and 2d. These 
regressions test the value relevance of goodwill when reported under a combined 
amortisation-and-impairment method. The hypotheses predict that goodwill-
amortisation charges are not associated with stock prices (hypothesis 2c) or stock 
returns (hypothesis 2d) when goodwill is accounted for under the combined 
amortisation-and-impairment method. To test hypothesis 2c, the following 
regression is employed (all independent variables are deflated by number of 
outstanding stocks at fiscal-year end time t): 
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where
 
tiR ,  
= Stock return/market return of firm i, period t (fiscal year). 
tiGIME ,)(   
= Pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t. 
1,,)(  ttiGIME  
= Changes in pre-impairment earnings of firm i, from period t-1 to t.  
tiGAM ,  
= As-if calculated goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t 
(amortisation-only method). 
1,,  ttiGAM  
= Changes in as-if calculated goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, from 
period t-1 to t (amortisation-only method).  
ti ,  
= Residual of firm i, time t. 
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Table 6.5 Regression model to test hypothesis 2c 
 
The coefficient of main interest is 2 . An insignificant coefficient on goodwill-
amortisation charges (GAMC), 2 , supports hypotheses 2c that these charges lack 
any association with stock prices. Book goodwill (GWCAI) is predicted to be 
significantly positively associated with stock prices, whereas goodwill-impairment 
losses (GIMC) are predicted to be significantly negatively associated with stock 
prices. The following regression is employed to test hypothesis 2d (all variables 
are deflated by market value at time t-1): 
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where   
   
tiP ,  
= Stock price of firm i, time t (fiscal-year end). 
tiGIME ,)(   
= Pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t. 
tiGAMC ,  = 
As-if calculated goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t 
(amortisation-and-impairment method). 
tiGIMC ,  = 
As-if calculated goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t 
(amortisation-and-impairment method). 
1,)(  tiGWCAIEQCAI  = 
As-if calculated book value of equity less as-if calculated book value of 
goodwill of firm i, time t-1 (amortisation-and-impairment method). 
1, tiGWCAI  = 
As-if calculated book value of goodwill of firm i, time t-1 (amortisation-
and-impairment method). 
ti ,  
= Residual of firm i, time t. 
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Table 6.6 Regression model to test hypothesis 2d 
 
The coefficient of main interest is 3 . An insignificant coefficient on goodwill-
amortisation charges (GAMC), 3 , supports hypothesis 2d that these charges lack 
any association with stock returns. Levels and changes in goodwill-impairment 
losses (GIMC, GIMC) are predicted to be significantly negatively associated with 
stock returns. 
 
Hypotheses 2e and 2f predict differences in value relevance when goodwill is 
reported under alternative methods. Differences or changes in value relevance 
across accounting standards, industries, accounting regimes or over time are often 
investigated by R-square comparisons (e.g. Harris, Lang and Möller 1994, 
Jennings, Simko, Thompson  1996, Biddle, Seow and Siegel, 1995, Barth, 
Beaver and Landsman 1998, Ali and Hwang 2000, Ball, Kothari and Robin 2000, 
Jennings et al. 2001, Ball, Robin and Wu 2003, Chambers 2007). Brown, Lo and 
Lys (1999) demonstrate serious problems related to between-sample comparisons 
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where
 
tiR ,  
= Stock return/market return of firm i, period t (fiscal year). 
tiGIME ,)(   
= Pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t. 
1,,)(  ttiGIME  
= Changes in pre-impairment earnings of firm i, from period t-1 to t.  
tiGAMC ,  = 
As-if calculated goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t 
(amortisation-and-impairment method). 
tiGIMC ,  = 
As-if calculated goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t (amortisation-
and-impairment method). 
1,,  ttiGAMC  = 
Changes in as-if calculated goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, from 
period t-1 to t (amortisation-and-impairment method). 
1,,  ttiGIMC  = 
Changes in as-if calculated goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, from period 
t-1 to t (amortisation-and-impairment method).
ti ,  
= Residual of firm i, time t. 
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of R-squares. These comparisons might be invalid. Gu (2007) finds similar 
evidence and suggests that the standard-deviation of the residuals should be used 
as a measure of value relevance instead of R-square. The criticism expressed by 
Brown et al.  (1999) and Gu (2007) may have little relevance for this study. Rather 
than comparing R-squares of regressions on observations from two different 
samples, R-squares will be compared for two regressions run on the same sample. 
This mitigates the between-sample problems addressed by Brown et al. (1999) and 
Gu (2007).  
 
Several arguments support the use of R-square. The R-square statistic measures 
the value relevance of the accounting system. It signifies the extent to which 
variation in accounting numbers such as goodwill explain variation in stock prices 
or stock returns. As the accounting method of goodwill is what changes across the 
regressions, any differences in R-squares can be attributed to the shift in 
accounting methods. Besides, the use of R-square makes it possible to compare 
the results from this study using IFRS-data with prior results reported by 
Chambers (2007) on US-GAAP data. As the number of parameters varies across 
the regressions, the adjusted R-squares, not the simple R-squares, are compared. 
The following regressions will be run to test hypotheses 2e and 2f (all independent 
variables in price-book-earnings regressions are deflated by number of outstanding 
stocks at fiscal-year end time t, and all variables in return-earnings regressions are 
deflated by market value at time t-1): 
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Table 6.7 Regression models to test hypotheses 2e and 2f 
 
Net earnings, book equity, amortisation charges and impairment losses will be 
determined by the chosen accounting method for goodwill. Current year’s 
goodwill-impairment losses and goodwill-amortisation charges will affect the end 
of the year’s book equity and book goodwill. This makes it necessary to specify 
different variables under the as-accounting method (current IFRS) and the 
alternative as-if accounting methods for goodwill. Hypotheses 2e and 2f are 
supported if accounting numbers under the impairment-only method explain 
variation in stock prices or stock returns to a larger extent than alternative methods 
for goodwill. When comparing alternative accounting methods, the accounting 
system with the highest adjusted R-square is interpreted as the one providing the 
most value-relevant accounting numbers. At least two different procedures can be 
used to test differences in adjusted R-squares for pairs of regressions run on one 
sample: z-test based on bootstrapped standard errors of the difference in adjusted 
R-squares and z-test based on Vuong’s (1989) likelihood-ratio statistics.  
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The variables are specified previously. 
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= Residual of firm i, time t in regression m where 
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Bootstrapping is a common approach to obtain standard errors of an estimate 
where the probability distribution of the estimate is unknown or difficult to 
determine with accuracy.14 The estimation is done by drawing a large number of 
new samples with replacement from the original sample (Efron and Tibshirani 
1986). This results in samples consisting of the initial firm-year observations, but 
with observations appearing multiple times. The standard errors of the difference 
in adjusted R-squares are obtained by running each pair of regression on each 
sample, collect the R-squares from each regression and calculate the R-square 
difference. Rerunning this procedure 1000 times, leads to 1000 R-square 
differences. Given the Central Limit Theorem, the sampling distribution of the R-
square difference will become asymptotically close to a normal distribution as the 
number of samples increases. Using the variance of the estimated R-square 
differences as an estimate of the population variance, the difference in R-squares 
can be tested by a z-test. 
 
Vuong (1989) has derived a likelihood-ratio test for model selection to test the null 
hypothesis that a pair of two competing models is equally close to explaining the 
true data-generating process against the alternative hypothesis that one is closer 
than the other. The difference between the Vuong test and alternative tests for 
competing models is that Vuong has derived the distribution of the likelihood-ratio 
statistic under the null hypothesis that neither model is true. This means that the 
Vuong test allows both models to have explanatory power, but provides direction 
concerning which of the two is closer to the “true data-generating process”. The 
test model is based on the residual sum of squares from pairs of two competing 
models. As the models have the same dependent variables (and are run for the 
                                           
14  R-square estimates are known to be beta distributed. The beta distribution is a non-trivial two-parameter 
probability distribution (e.g. Miller and Miller 1999:204-205, Greene 2000:80). 
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same firm-year observations), the total sum of squares are identical. The residual 
sum of squares is used as a basis to form a log-likelihood statistic for each firm-
year observation. The sum and variance of the log-likelihoods are used to form a 
z-test (Vuong 1989, Dechow 1994).15  The test is directional in the sense that if the 
z-value indicates a significantly positive difference in likelihood-ratio statistics, 
the test suggests that the first model is the model of choice. If the z-value shows a 
significantly negative difference, the opposite conclusion should be drawn.  
 
6.3. Model specification – goodwill-impairment losses, 
economic variables and earnings-management incentives 
The third research question focuses on two sets of variables that might be 
associated with goodwill-impairment losses: economic variables reflecting 
economic impairment in goodwill and variables reflecting earnings-management 
incentives (e.g. Francis et al. 1996, Riedl 2004, Kvaal 2005, Zang 2008). As no 
causal relationship can be established, a demonstrated association between 
goodwill-impairment losses and these variables should not be interpreted as if 
these variables are determinants of impairment losses. Rather, significant 
associations should be interpreted as if these variables play a role in the reporting 
process of impairment losses.  
 
In the earnings-management literature, four different regression models are 
employed to investigate the extent to which impairment losses are associated with 
economic variables and/or earnings-management incentives: ordinary-least-square 
regression, tobit regression and probit and logit regression. The ordinary-least-
square regression is based on the assumption of linear parameters. The tobit, 
                                           
15The program code necessary to employ this test in STATA is available at 
http://personal.anderson.ucla.edu/judson.caskey/programs/vuong.ado.  
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probit and logit regression, however, are non-linear in their parameters 
(Wooldridge 2009). The choice of regression model is determined by the 
dependent variable. When this variable is continuous with unlimited range, the 
ordinary-least-square regression is the preferred choice. Censored regressions such 
as tobit regressions are preferable when the dependent variable is continuous, but 
censored at certain limits (Maddala 1991). Probit and logit regressions, however, 
are preferable when the dependent variable is binary. 
  
Two sets of hypotheses are formulated. The first set concerns the decision to 
report impairment losses, and the second set concerns the size of impairment 
losses. The first set of hypotheses is tested by a logit regression since the 
dependent variable, the choice to report an impairment loss, is binary. A probit 
regression is an alternative choice. Maddala (1991) argues, however, that the 
probit-regression coefficients will be affected when the sampling rates are unequal 
(the number of impairment observations versus non-impairment observations). In 
contrast, the logit-regression coefficients are unaffected and should be the chosen 
model here. The logit regression will estimate the likelihood of reporting an 
impairment loss in goodwill given economic variables and variables for earnings-
management incentives. The second set of hypotheses is tested by a tobit 
regression. This regression is preferable to truncated regression as the dependent 
variable, the reported impairment loss, is censored at zero whereas the explanatory 
variables are unlimited (Maddala 1991). The tobit regression will estimate 
associations between goodwill-impairment losses, economic variables and 
variables for earnings-management incentives.  
 
There might be problems of self-selection. Self-selection bias occurs when 
observations self-select into discrete groups, for instance a group of impairers and 
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non-impairers. A control for self-selection bias might be performed by employing 
a two-stage Heckman-selection model (Heckman 1979). The first stage runs the 
selection regression with impairment decision (IMP_DECISION) as the dependent 
variable. This regression includes those variables that are expected to explain the 
impairment decision. The next stage runs a regression with impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT) as dependent variable. This regression includes those variables 
that are supposed to explain the size of impairment losses. Recent studies have 
employed this approach when investigating determinants of impairment losses 
(e.g. Beatty and Weber 2006, Lys, Vincent and Yehuda 2011). These studies 
employ almost identical sets of explanatory variables in stage one and two and 
provide no theoretical or intuitive arguments for why variables are excluded in 
regression two.  
 
A recent paper by Francis, Lennox and Wang (2010) investigates the use of 
selection models in financial-accounting research. They examine 58 articles 
published in top accounting journals over the period 2000-2009. These studies are 
found to have implemented the selection models in a rather mechanical way with 
limited arguments for the choice of variables explaining or not explaining the 
selection process. The selection regression needs at least one unique variable that 
is expected to explain the selection, that is, the impairment decision. Strong 
arguments must be provided for why these variables are important determinants of 
the selection process. When it comes to the impairment decision, no such strong 
arguments can be found for any of the economic variables or earnings-
management variables. Rather, it is likely that most if not all of the economic 
variables and earnings-management variables are potential candidates explaining 
the impairment decisions and the size of impairment losses. Besides, the choice of 
which variables to include and exclude from either of these two regressions, will 
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strongly affect the results (e.g. Francis et al. 2010). The two-step Heckman 
selection model should, therefore, be used with caution, especially in cases where 
there are no strong arguments for which variables to use as selection variables. 
This suggests that the same sets of explanatory variables should be employed to 
explain the impairment decision (IMP_DECISION) and the size of the impairment 
losses (IMP_AMOUNT). Rather than being run jointly, using the two-stage 
Heckman selection model, the logit regressions (IMP_DECISION) and the tobit 
regressions (IMP_AMOUNT) are run separately. 
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Table 6.8 Regression models to test hypotheses 3a to 3al 
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where 
 
tiDECISIONIMP ,_  
= Equals 1 if firm i reports goodwill-impairment losses for period t; otherwise 
0.  
tiAMOUNTIMP ,_  
= Reported goodwill-impairment losses (a positive amount) of firm i, period t, 
scaled by total assets at time t-1. 
1,  ttGDP  
= Average-monthly changes in Gross Domestic Product of UK, from period 
t-1 to t. 
1,%  ttUNEMPLOY  = Percentage average-monthly changes in unemployment rates of UK, from 
period t-1 to t. 
1,,  ttiINDROA  
= Median changes in industry-sector pre-impairment return-on-assets from 
period t-1 to t where industry sector is defined according to FTSE codes to 
which firm i belongs. 
1,,  ttiINDRET  
= Median changes in industry-sector stock returns from period t-1 to t where 
industry sector is defined according to FTSE codes to which firm i belongs. 
tiRET ,  
= Stock returns of firm i, period t. 
1,,%  ttiSALES  = Percentage changes in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t. 
Table continues on next page. 
  
266 
 
  
Table continues from previous page. 
1,,  ttiROA  
= Changes in pre-impairment return-on-assets of firm i,  from period t-1 to t. 
1,,%  ttiOCF  = Percentage changes in operating cash flows of firm i,  from period t-1 to t. 
tiBM ,  
= Pre-impairment book-to-market ratios of firm i, time t.  
tiDIFFBM ,  
= Equals 1 if pre-impairment book equity of firm i, time t, is above market 
value of equity, time t; otherwise 0.  
tiHIST ,  
= Equals 1 if goodwill-impairment losses are reported for firm i, period t-1; 
otherwise 0. 
tiBONCOB ,_  
= Cash-bonus payments to COB of firm i period t, scaled by total cash 
compensation to COB period t. 
tiBONCEO ,_  
= Cash-bonus payments to CEO of firm i period t, scaled by total cash 
compensation to CEO period t. 
tiBONCFO ,_  
= Cash-bonus payments to CEO of firm i period t, scaled by total cash 
compensation to CFO period t. 
tiCOSTOCKCOB ,_  = Number of conditional stocks held by COB of firm i time t, scaled by 
number of common stocks held by COB at time t. 
tiCOSTOCKCEO ,_  = Number of conditional stocks held by CEO of firm i time t, scaled by 
number of common stocks held by CEO at time t. 
tiCOSTOCKCFO ,_  = Number of conditional stocks held by CFO of firm i time t, scaled by 
number of common stocks held by CFO at time t. 
tiOPTCOB ,_  = Number of executive stock options held by COB of firm i time t, scaled by 
number of common stocks held by COB at time t. 
tiOPTCEO ,_  = Number of executive stock options held by CEO of firm i time t, scaled by 
number of common stocks held by CEO at time t. 
tiOPTCFO ,_  = Number of executive stock options held by CFO of firm i time t, scaled by 
number of common stocks held by CFO at time t. 
tiTARGET ,  
= Equals to 1 if the pre-impairment earnings of firm i, period t, is above 
earnings for firm i, period t-1; otherwise 0.
tiBATH ,  
= Changes in pre-impairment earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t, scaled by 
total assets at time t-1, when below the median of nonzero negative values 
of this variable; otherwise 0. 
tiSMOOTH ,  
= Changes in pre-impairment earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t, scaled by 
total assets at time t-1, when above the median of nonzero positive values 
of this variable; otherwise 0. 
tiCOB ,  = Equals to 1 if firm i changes COB in period t; otherwise 0. 
tiCEO ,  = Equals to 1 if firm i changes CEO in period t; otherwise 0.  
tiCFO ,  = Equals to 1 if firm i changes CFO in period t; otherwise 0. 
tiDEBT ,  
= Pre-impairment debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t. 
tiMVlnSIZE ,_  
= Natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t. 
tim ,,

 
= Residual of firm i, time t in regression m where 
 2,1m . 
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The regression coefficients from the logit regression are interpreted to either 
increase (a positive coefficient) or decrease (a negative coefficient) the likelihood 
of reporting goodwill-impairment losses. The magnitude of the regression 
coefficients, however, is more complicated to interpret as the effect one 
explanatory variable has on the dependent variable (here: the impairment decision) 
varies with the values of the other explanatory variables. The effect one 
explanatory variable has on the binary dependent variable is conditional on the 
values at which the other explanatory variables are held constant. To investigate 
the impact one explanatory variable has on the binary dependent variable, 
marginal effects should be calculated, holding the other explanatory variables at 
fixed relevant values (Wooldridge 2009). The regression coefficients from the 
tobit regression can to a large extent be interpreted as ordinary-least-square 
coefficients (Gujarati 2003:618). 
 
Two dependent variables are specified in the above regressions. A binary indicator 
variable which signifies whether the firm has reported an impairment loss in 
goodwill or not (IMP_DECISION) and a continuous, censored variable which 
equals the impairment-loss amount scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
fiscal year (IMP_AMOUNT). Scaling with total assets is consistent with scaling 
employed in previous studies employing a similar test design (e.g. Francis et al. 
1996, Sellhorn 2004:226, Riedl 2004, Garrod, Kosi and Valentincic 2008). The 
first eleven (ten) 16  independent variables are supposed to reflect economic 
impairment in goodwill. Two issues must be considered when selecting and 
measuring the variables for economic impairment: the aggregation level at which 
the variables are selected, and the time period over which the variables are 
measured. Economic impairment is an event triggered by current-value reductions. 
                                           
16 It is debatable whether a sequence of impairment losses indicates economic impairment or earnings management.  
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In most cases current-value reductions are unobservable for researchers or at least 
difficult to estimate, which makes it necessary for pragmatic reasons to employ 
economic variables measured ex post as indicators of economic impairment. These 
variables are supposed to be highly positively correlated with the fair value of 
goodwill. Francis et al. (1996) argue and find support for an association between 
historical performance and impairment losses. They make use of performance 
variables measured over a period five years preceding the current impairment loss 
ending the year prior to the current impairment loss. This approach demands long 
time-series of data and will not be applied here. Instead, the variables will be 
measured over a period including the year prior to the current impairment loss and 
the year of the current impairment loss. This follows the approach conducted by 
Riedl (2004). Such a measurement procedure rests on the assumption that 
economic variables triggering the impairment will be present the year before 
and/or the same year as the impairment loss is reported.  
 
The other issue to discuss is the aggregation level at which variables of economic 
impairment is selected. The eleven (ten) economic variables included in the above 
regressions are supposed to reflect economic conditions at three of four levels that 
may cause an impairment loss in goodwill: macro-economic level, industry-sector 
level, firm-specific level and asset-specific level (Francis et al. 1996, Riedl 2004). 
The economic value of goodwill is believed to be highly correlated with the 
overall firm value. For impairment-testing purposes, goodwill is disaggregated to 
cash-generating unit(s) or group(s) of cash-generating units. Still, goodwill is 
tested at an aggregate level compared to most other assets in the firm. This 
suggests that the economic factors affecting goodwill are to a large extent found at 
the macro-economic level, the industry-sector level and the firm level. This 
justifies leaving out variables at the asset-specific level.  
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In order to capture macro-economic effects, two variables are employed: changes 
in Gross Domestic Product of UK (GDP) and percentage changes in 
unemployment rates of the UK (UNEMPLOY%) (Loh and Tan 2002, Riedl 
2004). Decreased Gross Domestic Product and increased unemployment rates are 
indicative of an overall macro-economic recession, suggesting that goodwill may 
suffer from economic impairment. This is based on the assumption that listed 
firms are mainly operating in the UK. Negative coefficients on changes in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), 1  and 1	 , support hypotheses, 3a and 3b, that 
changes in Gross Domestic Product are negatively associated with impairment 
decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). 
Likewise, positive coefficients on changes in unemployment rates 
(UNEMPLOY%), 2  and 2	 , support hypotheses, 3c and 3d, that changes in 
unemployment rates are positively associated with impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). At the 
industry-sector level, the median changes in industry pre-impairment-return-on-
assets (INDROA) and the median changes in industry-stock returns (INDRET) 
are supposed to capture industry-specific changes in the firms’ underlying 
economics (Francis et al. 1996, Riedl 2004, Dai, Mao and Deng 2007). These 
industry variables are formed on firm-year observations in the sample. The 
industry-sector classification is based on the FTSE-code system and consists of 10 
industry sectors. For a more careful discussion of the industry-sector 
classification, see section 7.1.1 below. Firms in financially declining industry 
sectors are believed to report more impairment losses relative to firms in 
expanding industry sectors. Negative coefficients, 3  and 3	 , and 4 and 4	  , 
support hypotheses, 3e and 3f, and 3g and 3h, that changes in industry-sector 
return-on-assets (INDROA) and changes in industry-sector stock returns 
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(INDRET) are negatively associated with impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT).   
 
Stock return (RET), percentage changes in total sales (SALES%), changes in pre-
impairment return-on-assets (ROA) and percentage changes in operating cash 
flows (OCF%) are expected to reflect firm-specific changes in asset values. 
These variables are frequently used in prior studies (Francis et al. 1996, Loh and 
Tan (2002, Kvaal 2005, Dai et al. 2007, Jarva 2009). The inclusion of stock return 
is, however, controversial. Stock return is thought to be a comprehensive measure 
of the firm’s underlying economics. Given semi-strong market efficiency and 
limited private information, the stock price will reflect economic impairment, 
which is later reported as impairment losses in the financial statement. Some 
evidence suggests that most of the information is reflected in stock prices prior to 
the impairment-loss announcement (Elliot and Shaw 1988, Chen et al. 2004). A 
complementary line of evidence suggests that impairment losses have information 
content as their announcements lead to significant changes in stock prices in 
narrow windows centered on the announcement day (Strong and Meyer 1987, 
Elliot and Shaw 1988, Francis et al. 1996, Li et al. 2005). These last findings 
contradict the notion that impairment losses are pre-emptied for all information 
before these losses are announced and/or recognised. Thus, stock returns may 
trigger recognition of impairment losses in the first place. At the same time, these 
impairment losses may hold some private information that affects stock prices and 
thereby stock returns. In the former case stock returns become an indicator of 
impairment losses whereas in the latter case impairment losses are used (or at least 
could be used) as input to determine the market value of the firm. Moreover, stock 
returns are employed elsewhere in this dissertation as a benchmark for testing 
value relevance and in particular value relevance of goodwill-impairment losses. 
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Allowing stock return to be included at both sides of the regressions seems 
logically inconsistent. Still, it could be argued that stock return should be included 
as an economic variable. The reason why is that stock return probably correlates 
with economic-value changes in goodwill. These changes represent an 
unobservable, latent variable. To the extent stock return is correlated with this 
latent variable, it should be included as an economic control variable.  
 
The other firm-level variables measure firm performance in alternative ways. 
Percentage changes in total sales (SALES%) and changes in pre-impairment 
return-on-assets (ROA) capture accounting-based performance, whereas 
percentage changes in operating cash flows (OCF) capture cash-based 
performance. Changes in total sales represent gross performance or gross 
recoverability of total assets whereas changes in return-on-assets and changes in 
operating cash flows represent net measures of performance. Negative 
coefficients, 5  and 5	 , 6  and 6	  and 7  and 7	 , and 8  and 8	 , support 
hypotheses 3i to 3p that firm-level economic variables (RET, SALES%, ROA, 
OCF%) are negatively associated with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) 
and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). The last two economic variables 
are more closely related to the impairment-testing procedure. An indicator of 
goodwill impairment would be the cash-generating unit’s book-to-market ratio. If 
this ratio is higher than one, the book value of the cash-generating unit can no 
longer be justified and an impairment loss must be reported (Sellhorn 2004, 
Ramanna and Watts 2008, Jarva 2009). Unfortunately, cash-generating units’ 
market values are generally unobservable. However, as argued previously in this 
section, economic events affecting the value of the cash-generating units will 
probably affect the overall firm value as well, making it reasonable to employ the 
firms’ pre-impairment book-to-market ratios as indicator of goodwill impairment. 
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Two variables are included: Book-to-market ratios (BM) and a variable taking the 
value one when book equity values are higher than equity-market values 
(DIFFBM). The latter variable indicates whether the firms are in impairment 
positions or not. Positive coefficients, 9  and 9	 , and 10 and 10	 , support 
hypotheses 3q and 3r that pre-impairment book-to-market ratios (BM, DIFFBM) 
are positively associated with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of 
impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT).  
 
Previous years’ impairment losses are associated with current year’s impairment 
losses. Francis et al. (1996) include a variable signifying the number of years of 
impairment losses in a period of five years prior to the current fiscal year. They 
find that the history of impairment losses is a significant variable explaining 
current year’s impairment losses. Elliot and Hanna (1996) investigate the 
information content of earnings when reporting successive impairment losses. 
They find that the information content of earnings is impaired for firms reporting 
impairment losses for several years. An indicator variable (HIST) is generated to 
investigate whether last year’s impairment losses are associated with current 
year’s impairment losses. This variable takes the value one if goodwill-impairment 
losses are reported last year and otherwise zero. Positive coefficients, 11  and 11	 , 
support hypotheses 3s and 3t that last year’s impairment losses in goodwill (HIST) 
are associated with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of 
impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). 
 
The next seventeen variables are expected to reflect earnings-management 
incentives. They are intended to capture managers’ incentives to overstate or 
understate goodwill-impairment losses. The first nine variables are supposed to 
reflect earnings-management incentives triggered by inefficient earnings-based 
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and equity-based compensation contracts. The first of these concerns cash-bonus 
payments to COB, CEO and CFO (COB_BON, CEO_BON, CFO_BON). In 
previous literature, cash-bonus payments have been indicated by a dummy 
variable which takes the value one if the firm pays cash bonus and otherwise zero 
(e.g. Beatty and Weber 2006, Ramanna and Watts 2009). These variables are not 
based on any details about the managers’ remuneration. The cash-bonus variables 
employed here measure the relative portion of cash-bonus payments to total cash 
compensation. These variables are believed to be better at reflecting the relative 
importance of cash-bonus payments to other cash-based compensation.  
 
Some studies have employed a lagged bonus-indicator variable (e.g. Beatty and 
Weber 2006) whereas others have employed a contemporaneous indicator variable 
(e.g. Ramanna and Watts 2009). The cash-bonus variables in the above 
regressions, however, are measured without time lag. This rests on the assumption 
that the decision to report impairment losses will be associated with current year’s 
bonus payment. If managers are close to receiving a bonus payment or earnings 
are just above the target for bonus payment, they have incentives to increase 
current year’s earnings by avoiding and/or understating goodwill-impairment 
losses. If earnings are far below the bonus target, however, managers may report 
impairment losses to increase the likelihood of meeting the bonus target in the 
future. This is consistent with big-bath accounting. Incentives to take a bath are 
expected to be captured by the big-bath variable (BATH) and the management-
change variables (COB, CEO, CFO). Any incremental association between 
the bonus-incentive variables and impairment losses are predicted to be negative. 
Negative coefficients, 12  and 12	 , 13 and 13	 , 14 and 14	 , support hypotheses 3u 
and 3v that cash-bonus payments (COB_BON, CEO_BON, CFO_BON) are 
negatively associated with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of 
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impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). For robustness reasons, changes rather than 
levels of cash-bonus payments are used as bonus-incentive variables. Changes in 
cash-bonus payments are supposed to reflect the extent to which the bonus target 
is reached the current fiscal year relative to the previous fiscal year. An increase in 
cash-bonus payments the current year suggests that net earnings 17  are higher 
relative to the threshold of bonus payment this year than the previous year. A 
decrease in cash-bonus payments the current year suggests the opposite that net 
earnings are lower relative to the threshold for cash-bonus payments this year than 
the previous year. Changes in cash-bonus payments are expected to be negatively 
associated with impairment decisions and size of impairment losses.  
 
The next six variables are supposed to reflect equity-based incentives to avoid 
goodwill-impairment losses. Equity-based incentives might be triggered by equity-
based compensation contracts such as executive-stock option plans and 
conditional-stock award plans. The awards are generally determined by market-
based performance measures such as stock return. Both conditional stocks 
(COB_COSTOCK, CEO_COSTOCK, CFO_COSTOCK) and executive stock 
options (COB_OPTION, CEO_OPTION, CFO_OPTION) are included as 
explanatory variables in the above regressions. Conditional stocks are stocks that 
will vest if certain performance criteria are met within a specific time period. An 
ideal measure of incentives triggered by conditional stocks and stock options 
should reflect changes in managers’ wealth in conditional stocks and stock options 
to a given change in stock price. For instance, the value of in-the-money stock 
options will be a valid indicator of managers’ sensibility to reductions in stock 
price. When stock options are in-the-money, any reduction in stock price will 
directly result in a reduction of managers’ wealth. However, such measures will 
                                           
17 This is based on the premise that net earnings represent the target variable for bonus payments. 
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demand executive stock-option values. As no market exists for executive stock 
options, market values are not available. The same is the case for conditional 
stocks. Core and Guay (2001) and Burns and Kedia (2006) measure the sensitivity 
of one monetary-unit change in stock-option value relative to one percent change 
in stock price. They use the Black-Scholes option pricing model to obtain values 
on executive stock options. The use of this model is rather demanding because 
details are required on all the input variables needed in the model. The 
appropriateness of this model for estimating executive stock-option values is also 
debatable (e.g. Huddart and Lang 1996, Brown and Szimayer 2008, Leung and 
Sircar 2009). Incentives triggered by conditional stocks and executive stock 
options are instead measured as the managers’ holdings of conditional stocks and 
stock options, scaled by the number of common stocks held by the managers, both 
measured at the end of the fiscal year. These variables are believed to reflect the 
importance of conditional stocks and stock options relative to common stocks held 
by the managers. Given that goodwill-impairment losses have the potential to 
negatively influence stock prices, it is expected that managers with substantial 
holdings of conditional stocks and stock options will avoid and/or understate 
goodwill-impairment losses. Negative coefficients, 15  to 20 , and 15	 to 20	 , 
support hypotheses 3w to 3z that conditional stocks (COB_COSTOCK, 
CEO_COSTOCK, CFO_COSTOCK) and stock options (COB_OPTION, 
CEO_OPTION, CFO_OPTION) are negatively associated with impairment 
decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). 
 
The next three variables are supposed to capture earnings-management incentives 
related to target accounting, big-bath accounting and income smoothing. The first 
of these three variables is trying to capture incentives to manage earnings to meet 
or beat earnings targets (TARGET). Three different targets are generally 
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investigated in the literature: last year’s analysts’ forecasts, last year’s earnings 
and zero earnings (e.g. Degeorge at al. 1999). One target is considered here: last 
year’s net earnings.18 If pre-impairment earnings is above the target (last year’s 
earnings), managers are expected to engage in earnings management that decrease 
earnings to a level equal to or just above the target. According to this, managers 
may report an impairment loss equal to or slightly less than the amount by which 
the pre-impairment earnings are above the target. If pre-impairment earnings fall 
short of the target, the managers may have incentives to report excessive 
impairment losses in order to increase the probability that earnings targets will be 
met in the future. This last case is consistent with big-bath accounting and 
discussed below. The target variable is dichotomous as it takes the value one if 
current year’s pre-impairment earnings are above last year’s earnings and 
otherwise zero. This suggests a positive association between the target variable, 
the impairment decision and size of impairment losses, respectively. Significantly 
positive coefficients, 21  and 21	 , support hypotheses 3aa and 3ab that pre-
impairment earnings above target (TARGET) are positively associated with 
impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT).  
 
The next two variables are supposed to capture incentives for big-bath accounting 
(BATH) and income smoothing (SMOOTH). These reporting strategies are to some 
extent related to target accounting. Income smoothing can be used to smooth 
earnings towards a target, and if earnings fall well below target, this gives 
incentives for big-bath accounting. To distinguish income smoothing and big-bath 
accounting, separate variables are included to reflect incentives for each reporting 
strategy (e.g. Bartov 1993, Francis et al. 1996, Riedl 2004, Van de Poel et al. 
                                           
18 Although relevant, analysts’ forecasts are not included because of lack of data.  
  
277 
2009).  The bathing variable equals changes in pre-impairment earnings when 
these changes are below the median of nonzero negative values of changes in pre-
impairment earnings and otherwise zero (Riedl 2004). Negative coefficients, 22  
and 22	 , support hypotheses 3ac and 3ad that negative earnings changes (BATH) 
are negatively associated with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of 
impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). The income-smoothing variable equals 
changes in pre-impairment earnings when these changes are above the median of 
nonzero positive values of changes in pre-impairment earnings and otherwise zero 
(Riedl 2004). Positive coefficients, 23  and 23	 , support hypotheses 3ae and 3af 
that positive earnings changes (SMOOTH) are positively associated with 
impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT). 
 
The next three variables capture current year’s changes in top management 
(COB, CEO, CFO). The association between management changes and 
impairment losses may reflect economic impairment or earnings management. The 
above regression models are supposed to control and thereby discriminate between 
these alternative explanations. If changes in management are significantly 
positively associated with impairment losses after controlling for economic 
variables, this is interpreted as evidence that new managers are overstating 
impairment losses to increase future years’ net earnings (Riedl 2004, Kvaal 2005). 
Management changes are measured by variables indicating current year’s changes 
of Chairman of the Board (COB), current year’s changes of Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) and current year’s changes of Chief Financial Officer (CFO). The 
variables take the value one if the manager is changed in the current fiscal year. 
This is based on the assumption that incoming managers (COB, CEO and CFO) 
appointed within the fiscal year are in a position to influence the final preparation 
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of the financial statement, which involves impairment testing of goodwill. Positive 
coefficients, 24  and 24	 , 25  and 25	 , 26  and 26	 , support hypotheses 3ag and 
3ah that changes in management (COB, CEO, CFO) are positively associated 
with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT). A more careful investigation of management change should 
have disentangled forced from non-forced changes in management and internal 
from external changes in management. Kvaal (2010) demonstrates that 
impairment losses are not associated with non-forced CEO changes, but strongly 
associated with forced CEO changes. However, classifying management changes 
as either non-forced or forced is demanding and time consuming as the 
information needed for the classification must be collected by hand from business 
journals (e.g. Financial Times), annual reports or other public available sources. 
  
The last two variables are supposed to reflect debt-covenant incentives (DEBT) 
and to some extent political-cost incentives (lnSIZE_MV). The covenant details in 
debt contracts are generally not available for researchers. This necessitates the use 
of proxies that reflect incentives to avoid debt-covenant violations. The common 
variable used in the literature is debt-to-equity ratio. This variable is believed to be 
quite crude (Field et al. 2001, Dichev and Skinner 2001). However, there is no 
general consensus on the degree of misspecification using this variable as a 
measure of debt-covenant incentives. For instance, in the literature investigating 
earnings management in reported impairment losses, debt-equity ratios are 
frequently used as proxies for debt-covenant incentives (e.g. Sellhorn 2004, Kvaal 
2005, Zang 2008, Ramanna and Watts 2009). Still, when employing this variable 
some assumptions are needed. First, it is necessary to assume that goodwill-
impairment losses are not totally ignored when calculating the debt covenants. In 
general, the modifications done to GAAP when calculating these covenants are 
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conservative implying that the modifications decrease rather than increase 
reported net earnings and net-asset values. Given the above reasoning, this 
suggests that goodwill-impairment losses are included rather than added back 
when calculating debt covenants. Second, the firm’s expected cost of covenant 
violation is assumed to increase in its financial leverage. Following previous 
studies, the debt-covenant variable is set equal to the pre-impairment debt-to-
equity ratios (Sellhorn 2004, Zang 2008, Ramanna and Watts 2009). A 
significantly negative sign on 27  and 27	 supports hypotheses 3ai and 3aj that pre-
impairment debt-to-equity ratios (DEBT) are positively associated with 
impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT). 
 
The last variable is generally included to reflect political-cost considerations. 
Given the discretion in impairment accounting, impairment losses might be used 
to decrease net earnings or dampen positive changes in net earnings. This makes 
high pre-impairment net earnings or positive pre-impairment net earnings changes 
obvious proxies for political-cost incentives. However, as high level of pre-
impairment net earnings or positive pre-impairment net earnings changes most 
likely are strongly correlated with the income-smoothing proxy, political-cost 
incentives are rather indicated by firm size: natural logarithm of equity-market 
values. This variable is rather crude and will potentially reflect other latent 
variables than political-cost considerations. For instance, it might reflect the fact 
that large firms have more resources available for the preparation of their annual 
report and would be better equipped to discover impairment losses, which justifies 
a positive association between firm size and impairment losses. Another reason for 
a positive association, other than political-cost considerations, is that larger firms 
may have more diversified businesses than smaller firms. The probability that an 
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economic impairment will hit one of these businesses is, therefore, higher for 
larger, more diversified firms than for smaller less, diversified firms. This suggests 
that associations between size, impairment decisions and size of reported 
impairment losses should be interpreted with caution. A significantly positive sign 
on 28  and 28	  supports hypotheses 3ak and 3al that firm size (lnSIZE_MV) is 
positively associated with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of 
impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT).  
 
6.4. Model specification – abnormal-impairment losses, 
earnings management and corporate-governance 
mechanisms 
The last research question concerns the associations between goodwill-impairment 
losses, earnings-management incentives and corporate-governance mechanisms. 
As earnings- management incentives are supposed to increase the likelihood of 
impairment losses being biased depictions of economic impairment, corporate-
governance mechanism are supposed to have the opposite effect on the accounting 
of impairment losses. Efficient corporate-governance mechanisms are supposed to 
constrain opportunism and reduce the incidence of earnings management and 
thereby increase the representative faithfulness of accounting information (e.g. 
Weisbach 1988, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Huson et al. 2001, Perry and Perry 
2005, Perry and Shivdasani 2005). This suggests that managers of firms with 
stronger corporate-governance structures are more inclined to report impairment 
losses that better reflect economic impairment. In order to investigate the 
association between impairment losses and corporate-governance mechanisms a 
different set of regressions are employed than when investigating research 
question three. The dependent variable is not impairment losses per se, but a 
variable that reflects understated or overstated impairment losses. This variable 
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will reflect the degree of misrepresentation in reported impairment losses. 
Corporate-governance mechanisms and earnings-management incentives are 
believed to be important when explaining the degree of misrepresentation. The 
choice of this test design must be clarified. 
 
Corporate-governance mechanisms and impairment accounting might be 
investigated by several test designs. The most obvious design would be to use 
interaction terms consisting of corporate-governance variables, earnings-
management incentive variables and/or economic variables. A similar design is 
used by Kallapur and Kwan (2004) to investigate how earnings management 
influences value relevance of capitalised brand assets. Corporate-governance 
variables would then be included as variables moderating the associations between 
earnings-management variables and impairment losses and/or the associations 
between economic variables and impairment losses. The general idea is to 
investigate whether firms with weak versus strong corporate-governance 
structures have more or less misrepresentation of impairment losses. There are two 
reasons why this design is not employed. First, including interactions of corporate-
governance variables, earnings-management variables and/or economic variables 
in one single regression will lead to an excessive number of estimation parameters. 
For instance, a regression with all 12 corporate-governance variables interacting 
with all ten economic variables19 will need to estimate 83 parameters (including 
the intercept) as all the interacting variables must be included as separate variables 
(12+10) along with the unique interactions of the corporate-governance variables 
and economic variables [(12*10)/2] (e.g. Aguinis 2004). It is, therefore, possible 
to investigate only one or a few corporate-governance variables simultaneously. 
Such a test design will provide limited evidence on how the total corporate-
                                           
19 The variable indicating impairment losses the previous year (HIST) is not included.  
  
282 
governance structure affects impairment accounting. Second, interactions in 
nonlinear models such as the logit and tobit models are demanding to interpret. 
The sign, magnitude and significance of the interaction variables cannot be 
determined by the sign, magnitude and significance of the interaction coefficients 
(e.g. Ai and Norton 2003, Norton, Wang and Ai 2004, Hoetker 2007). The 
interaction effect might be positive for some observations, zero for others and 
negative for yet others. This implies that the hypotheses concerning the interaction 
effects may be rejected for some observations, but not for others.20  
 
This calls for alternative test designs. The earnings-management literature in 
general (e.g. Dechow et al. 1995, Guay et al. 1996, Kothari et al. 2005) and the 
literature investigating the association between corporate-governance mechanisms 
and earnings management in particular (Dechow et al. 1996, Beasley 1996, 
Chtourou et al. 2001, Klein 2002, Koh 2003, Xie et al. 2003, Peasnell et al. 2005, 
Davidson et al. 2005, Mulgrew and Forker 2006, Ebrahim 2007, Koh et al. 2007) 
rely heavily on abnormal accruals as indicators of earnings management. The 
abnormal-accrual estimation models have been criticised for years for being too 
crude and/or aggregate to say anything about earnings management (e.g. Dechow 
et al. 1995, Guay et al. 1996, Beneish 1999, 2001, Field et al. 2001). The idea of 
estimating the component of accruals that might be managed or more generally, 
misrepresented, has still appeal among accounting researchers (e.g. Peasnell et al. 
2005, Davidson et al. 2005, Mulgrew and Forker 2006, Ebrahim 2007, Koh et al. 
2007, Jones et al. 2008). One important problem, however, lies in the estimation 
of the component being managed or the component being misrepresented. A 
                                           
20 Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al. (2004) have developed a STATA code called inteff for the interpretation 
of interaction effects in logit and probit models. This only works for one interaction effect at the time. The STATA 
code is available at: http://www.stata-journal.com/software/sj4-2/st0063/inteff.ado. At least to my knowledge, no 
command or STATA code is available for the interpretation of interaction effects in tobit regressions.  
  
283 
general procedure to estimate the component of accruals being managed is to 
regress total accruals on variables supposed to reflect unmanaged (i.e. normal or 
nondiscretionary) accruals and assume that the regression residuals reflect 
managed accruals (i.e. abnormal or discretionary). Previous studies employ both 
time-serial and cross-sectional estimation models (e.g. Kothari 2001). 
Measurement errors when estimating normal accruals might lead to abnormal 
accruals that comprise both managed and unmanaged accruals (e.g. McNichols 
2000, Field et al. 2001, Beaver 2002).  
 
Inspired by the previous accrual-based literature and by recent extensions made by 
Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) and Zang (2008), an estimate of abnormal-
impairment losses is employed to indicate the extent to which goodwill-
impairment losses reflect economic impairment. In contrast to most earnings-
management literature, this measure is for a specific accrual, impairment losses, 
which is consistent with the recommendations of Healy and Wahlen (1999), 
McNichols (2000) and Field et al. (2001). They argue that future progress in the 
earnings-management literature will require a departure from extensive reliance on 
aggregate-accrual models. Moreover, it is probably easier to obtain a valid 
estimate of the degree of misrepresentation in goodwill-impairment losses than 
aggregate accounting numbers such as net earnings. Economic impairment 
represents current-value reductions. These losses are, therefore, expected to be 
strongly correlated with economic variables reflecting deteriorated economic 
performance at the macro-economic level, the industry-sector level and the firm-
specific level. Some problems of measurement errors may still occur. First, 
current-value reductions in goodwill are not directly observable. There are no 
observable market values for goodwill and it is generally impossible to estimate a 
current value for goodwill. Second, economic impairment in goodwill may occur 
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at lower levels than the firm level. Still, it is argued that economic goodwill to a 
larger extent than other assets is related to overall firm performance (e.g. Francis 
et al. 1996, Riedl 2004). This justifies leaving out economic variables at the asset-
specific level.  
 
All economic variables included in regression 6.8 above are employed to estimate 
the normal or expected goodwill impairment. The only exception is the indicator 
variable (HIST) for last year’s impairment losses. This variable may reflect 
earnings-management incentives for understating and/or delaying impairment 
losses rather than economic impairment. Estimates of normal or expected 
impairment losses are obtained by running a regression of reported impairment 
losses on economic variables. Fitted values from this regression become the 
estimates of normal or expected impairment. Differences between reported 
impairment losses and estimated impairment losses give abnormal-impairment 
losses. These serve as estimates of the degree of misrepresentation in reported 
impairment losses. The regression used to estimate normal or expected impairment 
losses is specified in table 6.9 below: 
 
Table 6.9 Regression model – abnormal-impairment losses 
Residuals from this ordinary-least square regression 21  serve as estimates of 
abnormal or unexpected impairment losses. This is the component of reported 
                                           
21 An ordinary-least square regression is run instead of a tobit regression as the residuals in tobit regressions are not 
well defined (Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2008). 
 
tititi uIMPAIRMENTFORVARIABLESECONOMICAMOUNTIMP ,,1010, )(_  
 
ECONOMIC VARIABLES FOR IMPAIRMENT are all specified in table 6.8. 
 
tiu ,  = Residual of firm i, time t. Estimate of abnormal-impairment losses in goodwill. 
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impairment losses that is not explained by economic variables. Abnormal-
impairment losses are positive if reported impairment losses are higher than 
expected impairment losses. This suggests that reported impairment losses are 
overstated. If abnormal-impairment losses are negative, reported impairment 
losses are lower than expected impairment losses, which suggests that reported 
losses are understated. And finally, if abnormal-impairment losses equal zero, it 
suggests that reported losses are unbiased. Expected impairment losses are 
censored at zero if the predicted values of impairment losses are negative. 
Negative values for expected impairment losses indicate positive revaluations of 
goodwill which are not permitted under current IFRS. To be consistent with 
GAAP, these negative expected impairment losses are set equal to zero. This 
means that the related reported losses are considered as overstated impairment 
losses. Given that the economic variables are capable of reflecting the economic 
impairment in goodwill, differences between reported impairment losses and 
expected impairment losses can be interpreted as unintended and intended 
measurement errors. Intended measurement errors, not explained by accounting 
regulation, will most likely be the result of earnings management.  
 
Earnings-management incentives are predicted to be associated with both 
understated and overstated impairment losses (see hypotheses 4a to 4r). As 
corporate-governance mechanisms are believed to constrain earnings 
management, it is reasonable to expect that the absolute value of abnormal losses 
will decrease with corporate governance. Positive associations are, therefore, 
predicted between corporate-governance mechanisms and understated impairment 
losses (negative abnormal-impairment losses) and negative associations are 
predicted between these mechanisms and overstated impairment losses (positive 
abnormal-impairment losses). Separate regressions are run for understated 
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impairment losses (Negative abnormal-impairment losses) and overstated 
impairment losses (Positive abnormal-impairment losses). Understated impairment 
losses are right censored at zero whereas overstated impairment losses are left 
censored at zero. The independent variables, however, are continuous, discrete or 
binary. This suggests a tobit regression model rather than an ordinary-least-square 
regression model. The following tobit regressions are run for understated and 
overstated impairment losses in order to test hypotheses 4a to 4al: 
 
Table 6.10 Regression model to test hypotheses 4a to 4al 
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VARIABLES FOR EARNINGS-MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES are all specified in table 6.8. 
 
tiNEGIMPAB ,__  
= Equals negative differences between reported impairment losses period t 
scaled by total assets at time t-1 and estimated normal (expected) 
impairment losses of firm i period t (see table 6.9 above).  If the estimated 
normal (expected) impairment losses are negative, they are censored at 
zero.  
tiPOSIMPAB ,__  
= Equals positive differences between reported impairment losses period t 
scaled by total assets at time t-1 and estimated normal (expected) 
impairment losses of firm i period t (see table 6.9 above). If the estimated 
normal (expected) impairment losses are negative, they are censored at 
zero.  
tiSIZElnBOARD ,_  
= Natural logarithm of number of board members of firm i time t. 
tiNONEXE ,  
= Number of independent non-executive directors, scaled by total number of 
board members of firm i time t. 
tiMEETlnBOARD ,_  
= Natural logarithm of number of board meetings of firm i time t. 
Table continues on next page. 
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All earnings-management and corporate-governance variables are included as 
explanatory variables of understated impairment losses (negative abnormal-
impairment losses) or overstated impairment losses (positive abnormal-
impairment losses). Higher values on corporate-governance variables are 
indicative of stronger corporate governance. The associations between these 
variables and understated impairment losses (take negative values) are predicted to 
be positive. In contrast, the associations between these variables and overstated 
impairment losses (take positive values) are predicted to be negative (see 
hypotheses 4s to 4al).  
 
The earnings-management incentives, however, are supposed to lead to 
understated or overstated impairment losses (see hypotheses 4a to 4r). Elements of 
the remuneration package such as cash-bonus payments (COB_BON, CEO_BON, 
CFO_BON), conditional stocks (COB_COSTOCK, CEO_COSTOCK, 
Table continues from previous page. 
tiSTOCKCOB ,_  
= Number of common stocks held by COB of firm i time t, scaled by total 
number of outstanding common stocks at time t. 
tiSTOCKCEO ,_  
= Number of common stocks held by CEO of firm i time t, scaled by total 
number of outstanding common stocks at time t. 
tiSTOCKCFO ,_  
= Number of common stocks held by CFO  of firm i time t, scaled by total 
number of outstanding common stocks at time t. 
tiACCEXP,  
= Equals to 1 if firm i time t has at least one audit-committee member being 
financial-accounting expert; otherwise 0.     
tiSIZElnAUDIT ,_  
= Natural logarithm of number of audit-committee members of firm i time t. 
tiMEETlnAUDIT ,_  
= Natural logarithm of number of audit-committee meetings of firm i time t. 
tiBLOCK ,%  
= Cumulative percentage of outstanding common stocks held by 
blockholders owning at least 5% of outstanding common stocks of firm i 
time t. 
tiNUMlnBLOCK ,_  
= Natural logarithm of number of blockholders owning at least 5% of 
outstanding common stocks of firm i time t. 
tiCROSS ,  
= Equals to 1 if firm i is cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange or 
the NASDAQ Stock Exchange time t; otherwise 0.     
tim ,,

 
= Residual of firm i, time t in regression m where 
 2,1m . 
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CFO_COSTOCK) and stock options (COB_OPTION, CEO_OPTION, 
CFO_OPTION) are all predicted to be associated with fewer and smaller 
impairment losses, which suggests that these variables should be negatively 
associated with understated (AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_POS) (hypotheses 4a to 4f). Similarly, debt-covenant incentives 
indicated by debt-to-equity ratios (DEBT) are predicted to be associated with 
fewer and smaller impairment losses, which suggests that this variable is 
negatively associated with understated (AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated 
impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) (see hypotheses 4o and 4p). Some incentives 
are expected to lead to more and larger impairment losses. These are incentives for 
big-bath accounting (BATH), income smoothing (SMOOTH), target accounting 
(TARGET), management change (COB, CEO, CFO) and firm size 
(lnSIZE_MV). The big-bath accounting variable takes negative values, which 
suggests a negative association between this variable and understated 
(AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS). Income 
smoothing (SMOOTH), target accounting (TARGET), management change 
(COB, CEO, CFO) and firm size (lnSIZE_MV) are all predicted to be 
positively associated with understated (AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated impairment 
losses (AB_IMP_POS) (see hypotheses 4k to 4n and 4q and 4r). 
 
The chosen specifications of corporate-governance variables can all be justified 
with reference to prior literature. Board size (lnBOARD_SIZE) is generally 
measured as the number of directors at the end of the fiscal year (Dechow et al. 
1996, Chtourou and Bedard 2001, Xie et al. 2003, Dey 2008, Krishnan and Lee 
2009), and board activity (lnBOARD_MEET) as the number of board meetings 
during the fiscal year (Xie et al. 2003, Dey 2008). Board independence is in some 
cases measured as the ratio of non-executive directors to total board members (e.g. 
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Beasley 1996, Dechow et al. 1996). Recent studies, however, recognise the 
important distinction between independent directors and affiliated directors (e.g. 
Chtourou et al. 2001, Klein 2002, Vafeas 2003, Xie et al. 2003, Mulgrew and 
Forker 2006). In this study board independence (NONEXE) is measured as the 
ratio of independent non-executive directors to total directors, which is consistent 
with recent recommendations (e.g. Krishnan and Lee 2009). Managerial 
stockholdings (COB_STOCK, CEO_STOCK, CFO_STOCK) are measured as the 
ratio of common stockholdings held by COB, CEO and CFO respectively, to 
outstanding common stocks, which is consistent with prior literature (Beasley 
1996, Core et al. 1999, Chtourou and Bedard 2001, Goyal and Park 2002, Vafeas 
2003, Xie et al. 2003, Krishnan and Lee 2009).  
 
Three variables are chosen to reflect audit-committee characteristics: Audit-
committee expertise, audit-committee size and audit-committee activity. 
Conventional measures are used. Audit-committee expertise (ACCEXP) is 
measured as a dummy variable which takes the value one if the firm has at least 
one audit-committee member being financial-accounting expert (Chtourou and 
Bedard 2001, Dey 2008, Krishnan and Lee 2009). A narrow definition is 
employed here. In order to qualify as a financial-accounting expert the director 
must be a chartered accountant, which is consistent with recommendations made 
by Krishnan and Lee (2009). Audit-committee size (lnAUDIT_SIZE) is the 
number of audit-committee members (Xie et al. 2003, Kent et al. 2008, Krishnan 
and Lee 2009), and audit-committee activity (lnAUDIT_MEET) is measured as 
number of audit-committee meetings (Chtourou and Bedard 2001, Xie et al. 2003, 
Kent et al. 2008, Dey 2008). The two next variables are reflecting cumulative 
blockholdings (BLOCK%) and number of blockholders (lnBLOCK_NUM). Both 
variables are employed in previous literature (Beasley 1996, Core et al. 1999, 
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Chtourou and Bedard 2001, Goyal and Park 2002, Vafeas 2003, Xie et al 2003, 
Krishnan and Lee 2009). And finally, cross-listing is indicated by a dummy 
variable taking the value one if the firm is cross-listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange or NASDAQ Stock Exchange (e.g. Lang et al. 2003, Bailey et al. 2006). 
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7. Empirical analysis 
This chapter is structured into three subchapters. The first subchapter presents the 
sample-selection process and the sample characteristics. The second subchapter 
discusses evidence on research question one and two, whereas the last subchapter 
discusses evidence on research question three and four.  
 
7.1. Sample selection  
Listed firms included in the FTSE-350 index at the London Stock Exchange are 
chosen as sample frame for this study. These firms are the 350 largest firms 
ranked by market value and are probably among the firms which have the highest 
stock liquidity, the smallest bid-ask spreads and the most analysts’ followings on 
the London Stock Exchange. This suggests more informational efficient stock 
prices (Bhushan 1994, Kothari 2001, Fung et al. 2010). Firm-year observations are 
collected for the fiscal years 2004-2009. The chosen time period includes one year 
of non-IFRS observations (2004) and five years of IFRS observations (2005-
2009). The latter period represents the core investigation period. The inclusion of 
2004 observations serves two purposes. First, some regression variables need 
observations for two subsequent years, which necessitates the inclusion of 2004 
firm observations. Second and more specifically, 2004 annual reports give access 
to information about the chosen amortisation period for goodwill prior to IFRS 
adoption.  
 
Three data sources are employed to collect firm-year observations. The initial data 
source is Thomson Datastream. This database provides information necessary for 
the sample selection such as firm name, calendar year, industry classification, 
applied accounting principles and whether the firm has book goodwill on its 
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balance sheet. The database also provides stock-market data. The second source is 
the firms’ annual reports. All accounting data, remuneration data and corporate-
governance data are hand collected from the firms’ annual reports. The reports are 
either down-loaded from Northcote annual-report service22  or from the firms’ 
investor-information websites. Missing annual reports are requested on mail. 
Accounting data are hand collected from financial statements. Data for 
remuneration and corporate-governance variables are hand collected from three 
distinctive supplementary reports, generally included as part of the annual report. 
These are the director’s report, the remuneration report and the corporate-
governance report. The third and last of these three data sources is the UK-
National Statistics23, which provides data on the macro-economic variables.  
 
In order to reach to the final sample of firm-year observations, some additional 
selection criteria are employed. The first selection criterion concerns book 
goodwill. The objective of this dissertation is to investigate the decision usefulness 
of goodwill-accounting numbers. Firm-year observations with no book goodwill 
in any of the years 2004-2009 are, therefore, excluded from the final sample. The 
second criterion concerns firms classified as banks or insurance companies. These 
firms have generally been excluded from samples in previous studies unless these 
firms have been of particular interest for the research question (e.g. Jennings et al. 
1996a, Huigjen 1996, Francis et al. 1996, Bunis 1997, Ibrahim 1999, Petersen 
2001, 2002, Riedl 2004, Kvaal 2005). The same is the case for firms in the 
petroleum industry (e.g. Bunis 1997, Kvaal 2005). A general argument is that 
these firms have substantially different annual reports because of industry-specific 
accounting regulation. Another argument is that these firms have operations which 
                                           
22 See http://www.northcote.co.uk/. 
23 See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/economy/index.html. 
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substantially differ from other firms. None of these arguments are valid for the 
exclusion of petroleum firms. These firms must prepare annual reports that 
comply with IFRS. Moreover, their operations do not seem to differ substantially 
from other firms, for instance, firms in mining and steel production. Banks and 
insurance companies, however, are excluded. These firms do have operations that 
differ substantially from most other firms. Even though listed banks and insurance 
companies must prepare annual reports that comply with IFRS, their odd nature 
combined with industry-specific regulations make annual reports of these firms 
less comparable to annual reports of other firms. These firms are, therefore, 
excluded from the final sample. It should be remarked that firms within real estate 
(FTSE code 86), financial services (FTSE code 87) and investment instruments 
(FTSE code 89) are included in the final sample.24 
 
The third criterion concerns accounting regime. Firms preparing annual reports 
under different GAAP than IFRS for years other than 2004 are excluded. The 
fourth criterion concerns early voluntary adopters. Firms adopting IFRS prior to 
the fiscal year 2005 are classified as early IFRS adopters. These firms will 
probably have stronger motivation for IFRS implementation than firms forced to 
adopt IFRS. Consistent with this notion, the literature demonstrates that voluntary 
IFRS adopters prepare annual reports with higher accounting quality than 
mandatory adopters (Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi 2007). Some of these voluntary 
adopters may adopt IFRS as part of a broader strategy that increases their 
commitment to transparency, for instance, they may hire higher quality auditors, 
improve corporate governance or seek cross-listing in stricter regimes along with 
IFRS adoption (Ball 2006, Daske et al. 2007). Voluntary adopters should either be 
controlled for in the empirical analysis or excluded from the final sample. The last 
                                           
24 These codes are the new FTSE codes from 1st of January 2006.  
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alternative is chosen here. The fifth criterion concerns access to annual reports. 
Firms included in the final sample must have available annual reports or available 
financial statements for one of the years 2004-2009. Firms without available 
annual reports or financial statements are generally delisted or merged with 
another listed or unlisted firm during the years 2004-2009. A few firms do not 
have available annual reports or financial statements, but available annual reviews. 
These firms are excluded as these annual reviews generally provide insufficient 
data for the accounting variables. In contrast to some previous studies, firms 
reporting in foreign currency (currency other than British Pounds £) are included 
in the final sample. Likewise, firms with a fiscal year that differs from the 
calendar year are also included. 158 out of 1293 firm-year observations have 
accounting numbers in different currencies than British Pounds (£), most of these 
in US Dollars ($) (149 firm years). Accounting numbers in different currencies are 
converted to British Pounds (£) at the end of the fiscal years.25 Firms with fiscal 
years other than calendar years are quite common. Close to half of the sample 
firms report financial statements over periods that differ from the calendar year 
(49.65%). Most firms end fiscal years on the 31st of March or on the 30th of June. 
Fiscal-year ends, however, are not limited to these two dates and months. Fiscal-
year end dates are in fact found in all twelve months. Excluding firms with fiscal 
years that differ from calendar years would have serious effects on the final 
sample. To prevent selection bias, these firms are included. This makes the data 
collection more demanding. All variables not reported in the annual reports must 
be measured according to the fiscal year. Stock prices at the end of the fiscal 
years, for instance, will not necessarily be stock prices at the end of the calendar 
                                           
25 The currency rates are collected from Oanda-Forex Trading and Exchange-Rates Service.  
See http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/. 
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years. Similarly, changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and percentage 
changes in unemployment rates (UNEMPLOY%) must be calculated over fiscal 
years rather than calendar years. To range the firm-year observations by year, 
annual reports which end earlier than 1st of July are assigned to the previous 
calendar year, while annual reports which end later than 30th of June are assigned 
to the current calendar year.  
 
The results of the sample-selection process are given in table 7.1. Panel A reports 
the effect of the sample-selection process on firm-year observations, whereas 
panel B reports the effect of this process on the number of unique sample firms. A 
firm-year observation is excluded if the observation fails to meet one of the above 
criteria. If the firm-year observation fails to meet several criteria, the excluded 
firm-year is only counted once. Not meeting several criteria, however, is quite 
common. 233 firm-year observations (26.91% of total excluded firm years) failed 
on one criterion, 482 firm-years (55.66%) on two criteria, 124 firm-years 
(14.32%) on three criteria, and finally, 27 firm-years (3.12%) failed on four 
criteria.  
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Table 7.1 Sample selection  
 
A total of 2159 FTSE-350 firm-year observations are available on Thomson 
Datastream for the period 2004-2009. 463 firm-year observations have no book 
goodwill on the balance sheet and for additional 76 firm-year observations no 
information is available on book goodwill. These firm-year observations are all 
excluded. Firms are also excluded if they are classified as banks or insurance 
companies. This criterion reduces the sample with 81 firm years. The next two 
criteria concerns firms reporting under different GAAP than IFRS in the fiscal 
years 2005-2009 and early voluntary-IFRS adopters. 13 firm-year observations are 
    
Panel A – Firm-year observations 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2004-2009 
 N N N N N N  N % 
Firm-years for  FTSE-350 f irms 
available on Thomson Datastream 
 
359 356 357 361 369 3 57  
 
2159 100.00 
          
Book goodwill          
Firm years  with no book goodwil l 86 81 74 67 76 7 9  463 21.45 
Firm years  with no available 
informa tion on book g ood will  
 
10 9 7 11 20 1 9  
 
76 3.53 
Excluded firm-years with no goodwill 
or no available information 
 
96 90 81 78 96 9 8  
 
539 24.97 
Banks and insurance companies          
Firm years  for banks 8 8 8 0 0 0  24 1.11 
Firm years  for insurance companies 12 13 13 8 6 5  57 2.64 
Excluded firm years for firms classi fied 
as banks and insurance companies 
 
20 21 21 8 6 5  
 
81 3.75 
Different accounting regimes than 
IFRS          
Firm years  with different accou nting 
regimes  than IFRS (2005 – 2009) 0 0 1 3 4 3  11 0.51 
Excluded firm years for firms following 
dif ferent accounting reg imes 
 
0 0 1 3 4 3  
 
11 0.51 
Early voluntary-IFRS adopters          
Excluded firm years for firms which  
have voluntari ly adopted IFRS early 
 
2 0 0 0 0 0  
 
2 0.09 
Annual reports missing          
Excluded firm years due to missing 
annual reports  or financial statements 
 
70 
 
47 
 
32 
 
33 
 
21 
 
3 0  
 
233 
 
10.79 
Total fi rm years excluded        866 40.11 
          
Sample of firm-year observations 171 198 222 239 242 2 21  1293 59.89 
          
Panel B – Unique firms          
          
FTS E-350 firms  availab le on Thomson 
Datastream (2004 –2009)         
 
522 100 
Excluded firms        234 44.83 
Total sample of firms        288 55.17 
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excluded due to these two criteria. And finally, firms that do not have available 
annual reports or financial statements reduce the sample with additional 233 firm 
years. This leaves the final sample at 1293 firm-year observations. The IFRS-
period, 2005-2009, has 1122 firm years. The number of unique firms has fallen 
from an initial sample frame of 522 firms for the period 2004-2009 to 288 firms in 
the final sample. 
 
7.1.1. Book goodwill and goodwill-impairment losses 
Descriptive statistics on book goodwill and goodwill-impairment losses are 
reported in table 7.2. Panel A provides descriptive statistics on the size of book 
goodwill and goodwill-impairment losses. It also gives information on the 
frequency of goodwill-impairment losses across industry sectors. Panel B provides 
the number of goodwill-impairment losses across fiscal years, and finally, panel C 
provides the number of goodwill-impairment losses per firm. 10 industry sectors 
are formed based on FTSE Global Classification System. The industry codes 
included in each industry sector are given in panel A. 
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Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics – book goodwill and goodwill-impairment 
losses 
 
Firms in general industrials, information technology and cyclical services are 
those with the largest book goodwill relative to total assets. Book goodwill 
constitutes more then one third of total assets for the average firm in general 
Panel A – Book goodwill and goodwill-impairment losses – by industry sectors 
 Industry sector  
Book goodwill Goodwill-impairment losses 
Goodwill to total assets% 
Goodwill-
impairment losses 
to pre-impairment 
net earnings% 
% of 
obs. 
 FTSE code N Mean Median Mean Median  
Resources 4, 5, 7, 17 88 6.01 4.22 4 .2 7 0 3 7.50 
Ba sic industries 11, 13, 15, 18 57 12.78 12.38 1 .2 6 0 1 7.54 
General industr ials 21, 23, 25, 26, 27 401 38.71 19.63 -1 .97 0 1 5.46 
Cyclical-con sumer goods 31, 34, 37 13 8.48 7.44 6 .4 4 1.32 6 1.54 
Non-cyclical consumer goods 35, 41, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49 103 19.77 17.82 4 .1 3 0 2 2.33 
Cyclical services 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59 365 25.88 17.76 38.51 0 2 3.84 
Non-cyclical services 63, 67 11 13.40 5.04 125.80 0 1 8.18 
Utilities 65, 72, 75, 77 66 8.08 5.04 3 .6 3 0 1 8.18 
Information technology 93, 95, 97 53 36.69 33.20 9 .5 5 0 7 .5 5 
Finance 86, 87, 89 136 7.87 1.96 4 .3 1 0 2 6.47 
Total  1293      
Panel B – Number of goodwill-impairment losses by fiscal years 
         
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  Total 
Number of  goodwill-impairment losses 33 47 49 31   71 48  2 79 
          
Panel C – Number of goodwill-impairment losses reported per firm 
         
Goodwill-impairment losses per firm 0 1 2 3 4 5 6  
Number of  firms  146 66 38 16 9 8 4  
     
The industry sector resources comprises firms in mining, oil and gas; ba sic industries comprises firms in chemicals, construction and building 
materials, forestry and steel and other metals; general industrials comprises firms in aerospace and d efense, electron ic and electrical equipment 
and engineering and machinery; cyclical-consumer goods comprises  firms in automobiles and parts and  h ou sehold goods and textiles;  
non-cyclical consumer goods comprises firms in beverages, food p roducers and processors, health, personal care and household products, 
pharmaceuticals  and biotechnology and tobacco; cyclical services comprises firms in general retailers, leisure and hotels, media and 
entertainment, support  services and transp ort;  non -cyclical services comprises firms in foods and dru g retai lers and telecommunication services; 
Utilities comprises fi rms in electrici ty and  other util ities; info rmation technology comprises firms in  information-technology hardware and 
software and computer services ; finance comprises firms in investment and finance sector other than  b anks and insurance companies. Goodwil l-
impairment losses take positive values. 
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industrials (Mean: 38.71%) and information technology (Mean: 36.69%).  
Goodwill is, therefore, a material asset in some industry sectors. In other industry 
sectors, however, goodwill is less significant. This is particularly the case in the 
industry sectors: resources (Mean: 6.01%) and finance (Mean: 7.87%).  
 
Firms in cyclical services are among those reporting the largest impairment losses 
relative to pre-impairment net earnings. Firms in this sector have average 
impairment losses which constitute 38.51% of pre-impairment net earnings. When 
it comes to the frequency of impairment losses, the firms within the industry 
sectors cyclical-consumer goods (61.54%), resources (37.50%) and finance 
(26.47%) are those with the highest frequency of impairment losses. This suggests 
that the size of book goodwill and the size and frequency of goodwill-impairment 
losses are industry specific. Book goodwill represents a significant asset in some 
industry sectors, but not in others, and goodwill-impairment losses are relatively 
larger and less frequent in some industry sectors, e.g. information technology, and 
smaller and more frequent in others, e.g. cyclical-consumer goods and resources. 
The number of impairment losses is rather constant each year. The 2008 fiscal 
year, however, is an exception. This year is extraordinary due to the financial 
recession. Most sample firms report no goodwill-impairment losses in the years 
2004-2009 (62.39%). Among those that do, one or two losses are most common. 
Still, there are four firms reporting impairment losses in all years 2004-2009, 
which suggests that impairment losses might be understated in some firms. 
 
7.2. Empirical analysis of research question 1 and 2 
This subchapter investigates value relevance of goodwill reported under the 
impairment-only method (current IFRS), the amortisation-only method and the 
combined amortisation-and-impairment method. Research question one concerns 
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value relevance of goodwill numbers reported under the impairment-only method 
(current IFRS). Hypotheses 1a to 1c are tested in order to answer research 
question one. Research question two concerns value relevance of goodwill 
numbers reported under the impairment-only method compared to value relevance 
of goodwill numbers reported under alternative methods. Hypotheses 2a to 2f are 
tested in order to answer research question two.  
 
7.2.1. Calculation of the as-if accounting numbers 
Hypotheses 2a to 2f concerns value relevance of goodwill numbers reported under 
the amortisation-only method and the combined amortisation-and-impairment 
method. In order to test these hypotheses, accounting numbers must be adjusted as 
if they are reported under these methods. Complete adjustments are only possible 
if annual reports (or financial statements) for firms with book goodwill are 
available for all the fiscal years back to the pre-IFRS adoption year 2004. A 
subsample of firms that meet this requirement will make it possible to undo all 
changes in book goodwill that have occurred under the impairment-only method. 
The 2004 annual reports will also provide information on the chosen amortisation 
period for goodwill. 762 firm-year observations meet this additional criterion. 
 
A careful explanation of the adjustment procedure is needed. The first step is to 
undo effects of impairment-only method in net earnings, book goodwill and book 
equity. Current year’s impairment losses must be added back in net earnings. 
Goodwill and equity are included in the value-relevance regressions with their 
book values at the beginning of the fiscal years. This implies that current year’s 
impairment losses should not be added back in these book values. Previous years’ 
impairment losses, however, must be added back in order to reach a non-
impairment method position. Only impairment losses reported under IFRS are 
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added back, not impairment losses reported prior to IFRS adoption. When all 
effects of impairment losses are undone, accounting numbers will be in line with 
an accounting method with no recognition of amortisation charges and impairment 
losses: the permanent-retention method.   
 
Amortisation charges are calculated as a percentage26 of the goodwill-cost price at 
fiscal-year end. When calculating the numbers under the amortisation-only 
method, the goodwill-cost price will be the cost price at the time of IFRS adoption 
adjusted for all subsequent net changes in book goodwill other than reported 
impairment losses. The amortisation periods used to calculate as-if accounting 
numbers are identical to those used by the firms prior to IFRS adoption. Some 
firms, however, do not report the exact amortisation period. They simply state that 
the maximum amortisation period is 20 years under UK-GAAP.27 For these firms, 
the amortisation periods are set equal to 20 years. This choice can be justified. 
Most sample firms use an amortisation period of 20 years (57.93%). Besides, 
Jennings et al. (2001) demonstrate that UK-listed firms generally amortise 
goodwill over periods of 20 years.  
 
Calculated amortisation charges are deducted from pre-impairment net earnings. 
Accumulated amortisation charges from the time of IFRS adoption to the fiscal 
year are deducted from pre-impairment book equity and pre-impairment book 
goodwill. This gives net earnings, book goodwill and book equity under the 
amortisation-only method. It is more demanding, however, to adjust accounting 
numbers to a combined amortisation-and-impairment method. Under this method, 
both as-if accounted amortisation charges and as-if accounted impairment losses 
                                           
26 Given linear amortisation, the percentage equals (1/n)*100 where n is the economic lifetime in number of years.  
27 UK-GAAP has a presumption that goodwill shall not be amortised over more than 20 years (ASB 1997).  
  
302 
must be calculated. Impairment losses reported under current IFRS will only be 
reported under the combined amortisation-and-impairment method if they are not 
already covered by current year’s and previous years’ amortisation charges. If 
accumulated as-accounted impairment losses are larger than accumulated as-if 
accounted amortisation charges, differences between these two accumulated 
amounts should be reported as impairment losses under the combined 
amortisation-and-impairment method. To make the adjustments complete, these 
losses are allowed to affect subsequent amortisation charges and impairment 
losses by deducting these impairment losses from the goodwill-cost price. 
 
7.2.2. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation  
This section discusses descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation of variables 
employed in price-book-earnings regressions and return-earnings regressions. 
Table 7.3 below gives the descriptive statistics. The statistics are for deflated 
versions of the variables. Price-book-earnings variables are deflated by number of 
outstanding common stocks, whereas return-earnings variables are deflated by 
market value at the beginning of the fiscal year. The variables for goodwill-
impairment losses and goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. 
Changes in these variables are calculated on these positive values. 
 
Four alternative sets of firm-year observations are employed: total available 
observations with and without outliers and non-missing observations with and 
without outliers. The non-missing set of observations is used to test differences in 
adjusted R-squares in section 7.2.7 below. For the sake of brevity, only descriptive 
statistics and correlation analyses for total available observations (with outliers) 
are reported here. Descriptive statistics and correlation analyses for the non-
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missing observations (with outliers) are reported in table A1 and A2 in appendix 
A.   
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The number of firm-year observations is reduced compared to the overall number 
of observations in the final sample (1122 firm-year observations for the period 
2005-2009). There are two reasons for this reduction: Missing values and the 
additional criterion for as-if accounting numbers. As-if accounting numbers 
require complete series of annual reports (or financial statements) all back to the 
pre-IFRS adoption year 2004. 767 firm-year observations are meeting this 
requirement. Any reduction below 767 observations is due to missing values in the 
variables.  
 
Earnings-per-share (E+GIM) is on average positive (Mean: 0.47, Median: 0.28). 
67 out of 909 firm-year observations (7.37%) have negative net earnings numbers. 
Goodwill-impairment per share (GIM) has a mean value of 0.03. The median 
value is zero as more than half of the firm-year observations have no goodwill-
impairment losses. Book equity reduced by book goodwill per share (EQ-GW) has 
a positive mean value of 1.44 (Median: 0.59) and a substantial variation around 
the mean suggesting that some firms have negative equity values after the 
deduction of book goodwill. This is the case for 212 out of 909 firm-year 
observations (23.32%). As-if accounting numbers per share differs as expected 
from as-accounting numbers. Amortised goodwill (GWCA) has a lower book value 
on average (Mean: 0.89, Median: 0.42) than goodwill tested for impairment losses 
(GW) (Mean: 0.95, Median: 0.435), which is as expected. Amortisation charges 
are recognised each year following a systematic amortisation plan. Impairment 
losses, however, are more transitory. Average amortisation charges (GAM) are 
also larger (Mean: 0.07) than average impairment losses (GIM) (Mean: 0.03). This 
is due to the frequency of amortisation charges rather than amortisation charges 
being larger in magnitude than impairment losses. There are 766 calculated 
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amortisation charges, but only 221 recognised impairment losses.28 The rest of the 
impairment losses are zero. When excluding impairment losses and amortisation 
charges that equal zero, average impairment-losses per share (Mean. 0.13) far 
outweighs average amortisation-charges per share (Mean: 0.07). 
 
Amortised and impairment-tested goodwill (GWCAI) has on average lower book 
value (Mean: 0.86, Median: 0.41) than goodwill reported under the impairment-
only method (GW) (Mean: 0.95, Median: 0.44) or the amortisation-only method 
(GWCA) (Mean: 0.89, Median: 0.42). This is also as expected. Impairment losses 
are calculated as the positive difference between the book value of goodwill after 
the deduction of any amortisation charges, and the recoverable amount. 
Impairment losses are additional charges to those already recognised as 
amortisation charges. These additional charges will in turn affect subsequent 
amortisation charges and subsequent impairment losses. Consistent with this, both 
goodwill-amortisation charges per share (GAMC) (Mean: 0.07) and goodwill-
impairment losses per share (GIMC) (Mean: 0.03) are on average lower under the 
combined amortisation-and-impairment method than amortisation charges and 
impairment losses under the other methods with amortisation or impairment 
testing. Equity reduced by book goodwill per share is not affected by the chosen 
method as the accumulated effects of each method are deducted from the equity 
number. The descriptive statistics of book equity less book goodwill (EQ-GW) are 
different, but this is simply because more observations are included when 
calculating the descriptive statistics for this variable than for the two other equity 
variables.  
                                           
28 There are 246 impairment losses in the final sample for the years 2005-2009, but 25 of these impairment losses 
are not included because they are recognised in firms without complete series of annual reports (financial 
statements) back to the IFRS-adoption year (See the additional sample criterion discussed in section 7.2.1 above).  
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The descriptive statistics for the variables in the return-earnings regressions differ 
due to different scaling and to some extent different sets of firm-year observations. 
As price-book-earnings regressions are deflated by number of outstanding 
common stocks, return-earnings regressions are deflated by market value at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Only some of these descriptive statistics are 
commented. Changes in goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) have a negative 
mean value of -0.006, suggesting that impairment losses the current year is on 
average lower than impairment losses the previous year. This is due to the 2009 
observations. If these are excluded, the mean value of this variable turns positive 
(Mean: 0.004). Changes in amortisation charges (GAM) have a mean value close 
to zero (Mean: 5.23*10-4). This indicates that amortisation charges are rather 
constant from one year to another.  
 
Table 7.4 reports Pearson and Spearman correlations between variables in the 
value-relevance regressions. For easier interpretation of the correlation 
coefficients, all the variables for goodwill-impairment losses and goodwill-
amortisation charges take positive values. Changes in these variables are 
calculated on these positive values. A negative association between goodwill-
impairment losses and stock returns means that large absolute values of goodwill-
impairment losses are associated with lower stock returns. Correlations are 
estimated on all available observations in the period 2005-2009. The correlation 
coefficients for non-missing observations are given in table A2. 
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Panel A reports the correlations between variables in the price-book-earnings 
regressions. Several of the variables have predicted correlations. Pre-impairment 
net earnings (E+GIM), book goodwill (GW) and book equity less book goodwill 
(EQ-GW) are all significantly positively correlated with stock prices as predicted. 
The same is true for the as-if accounted book goodwill (GWCA, GWCAI) and as-if 
accounted book equity less book goodwill (EQCA-GWCA, EQCAI-GWCAI) under 
the amortisation method and the amortisation-and-impairment method. Goodwill-
impairment losses (GIM) and as-if accounted impairment losses (GIMC), 
however, have positive, but insignificant correlation coefficients. These results are 
consistent for Pearson and Spearman correlations. 
 
As-if-amortisation charges (GAM, GAMC) are found to be significantly positively 
correlated with stock prices. This suggests that firms with higher amortisation 
charges on average have higher stock prices. A closer examination of this positive 
association is necessary. There are two essential parameters determining 
amortisation charges: depreciable amounts and amortisation periods. Firms having 
higher depreciable amounts of goodwill have higher amortisation charges and 
higher stock prices. The correlation between depreciable amounts and stock prices 
is significantly positive (Pearson-coeff. 0.334, p-value 0.000). The correlation 
between length of amortisation periods and stock prices, however, is found to be 
positive (Pearson-coeff. 0.127, p-value 0.000), not negative, which would have 
been consistent with a positive association between amortisation charges and stock 
prices. Longer amortisation periods imply lower, not higher amortisation charges. 
There are several possible explanations for a positive correlation between 
amortisation charges and stock prices. One explanation is that goodwill 
amortisation reflects something else than consumption of goodwill. One 
possibility is that these charges might proxy some unrecognised economic value. 
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An alternative explanation might be that the correlation is driven by econometrical 
problems such as scale effects. A more careful investigation of this positive 
association is given in section 7.2.5 below.  
 
Panel B reports the correlations between variables in the return-earnings 
regressions for the period 2005-2009. Pre-impairment net earnings (E+GIM) and 
changes in pre-impairment net earnings (E+GIM) are significantly positively 
correlated with stock returns as predicted. In contrast to the price-book earnings 
regression, goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) are significantly negatively 
correlated with stock returns, indicating that impairers suffer from lower stock 
returns on average than non-impairers. Changes in impairment losses (GIM) are 
also significantly negatively correlated with stock returns. This is also consistent 
with predictions. An increase in impairment losses the current year relative to the 
previous year signifies an additional and even larger reduction in the economic 
value of goodwill. If these reported impairment losses reflect economic 
impairment, they should be mapped in current stock return. Goodwill-amortisation 
charges (GAM), however, are significantly positively correlated with stock returns. 
This result is limited to Pearson correlation. The Spearman correlation coefficient 
is insignificantly positive. Possible explanations why firms with higher 
amortisation charges also have higher stock returns are given in section 7.2.5 
below. 
 
7.2.3. Value-relevance regressions – introduction   
The regression analyses in the following sections are conducted on firm-year 
observations for the fiscal years 2005-2009. Several sets of observations are 
investigated: samples of non-missing observations for single regressions with and 
without outliers and samples of non-missing observations across several 
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regressions with and without outliers. Samples of non-missing observations for 
single regressions will vary by the variables included in these regressions. These 
samples will be the total number of available non-missing observations for main 
variables and control variables in single regressions. Samples of non-missing 
observations across several regressions are employed to compare adjusted R-
squares for regressions run on accounting numbers reported under alternative 
accounting methods. For these comparisons to be valid, the regressions must be 
run on the same set of firm-year observations. Two samples are established: One 
with non-missing observations for all main variables in the price-book-earnings 
regressions, and one with non-missing observations for all main variables in 
return-earnings regressions. Main variables are those specified in the value-
relevance regressions in chapter six. All regressions are run with and without 
outliers. Outliers are those observations having a value on Cook’s distance larger 
than 4/n where n is the total number of observations in the given regression (e.g. 
Cook 1977, 1979, Bollen and Jackman 1990).  
 
Tests of heteroscedasiticity indicate that price-book-earnings regressions suffer 
from heteroscedastic disturbance. This could be the result of scaling problems. 
Two tests of heteroscedasticity are conducted: The White test (1980) and Breusch-
Pagan test (1979) (Results of these tests are not tabulated). The White test is a 
joint test of heteroscedastic disturbance and misspecification (Greene 2000:508, 
Gujarati 2003:412). The test may reveal heteroscedasticity, but it may also reveal 
some specification errors in the regression model. This suggests that the White test 
should be used together with other tests of heteroscedastic disturbance, for 
instance, the Breusch-Pagan test. To reduce impact of heteroscedasticity, standard 
errors are White-adjusted (White 1980) and clustered at firm-level. White-adjusted 
standard errors will suffer from less cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. Clustering 
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at firm-level is supposed to mitigate the effect of time-dependency in residuals. 
White-adjusted standard errors clustered at firm-level are, therefore, employed to 
form all the t-statistics. This gives conservative estimates of the standard errors 
(e.g. Rogers 1993, Hoechle 2007, Petersen 2009). Additional investigation of 
potential scaling problems is conducted when carrying out the analysis.  
 
One set of control variables are employed in price-book-earnings regressions and 
another in return-earnings regressions. Variables for economic growth, firm size 
and industry sector are employed as control variables in price-book-earnings 
regressions. Economic growth is expected to be positively associated with book 
goodwill, as economic goodwill by definition is expectations of future economic 
growth (Barth et al. 2001, Holthausen and Watts 2001). It is, therefore, important 
to investigate whether value relevance of book goodwill is driven by growth 
prospects. Firm size is included to investigate whether stock prices vary by size. 
Positive associations between firm size and stock prices might indicate problems 
of scale effects. Industry-sector dummies are supposed to reflect systematic 
differences in stock prices across industry sectors. Variables for economic growth, 
firm size, financial leverage and industry sector are employed as control variables 
in return-earnings regressions. Growth is profitable if return on equity is higher 
than required return on equity. Higher profitable growth should, therefore, be 
associated with higher stock returns. Financial leverage measured by debt-to-
equity ratios is expected to reflect financial risk. Any increases in financial 
leverage are predicted to increase cost of equity capital and thereby expected rate 
of return on equity (Miller and Modigliani 1958). This suggests a positive 
association between financial leverage and stock returns. Although, less 
theoretically founded than financial leverage, firm size is also believed to proxy 
for risk. Smaller firms are found to have higher stock returns on average than 
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larger firms (Fama and French 1992, 1993, 1995) which suggests a negative 
association between firm size and stock returns. A positive association between 
firm size and stock returns might indicate problems due to scale effects. And 
finally, stock returns are supposed to vary across industry sectors due to industry-
sector characteristics such as financial health and growth opportunities (Barth et 
al. 2001). 
 
7.2.4. Value relevance of goodwill under the impairment-only method 
This section investigates value relevance of book goodwill and goodwill-
impairment losses reported under current IFRS. The results from price-book-
earnings regressions for the fiscal years 2005-2009 are given in table 7.5 below. 
Two regression models are tested: the basic price-book-earnings model in table 
6.1 and the basic model with control variables for economic growth, firm size and 
industry sector. 
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Table 7.5 Value relevance of goodwill-impairment losses – hypotheses 1a and 
1b 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
Outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.529*** ( 7.28) 
2.117*** 
(9.45) 
2.354*** 
(6.04)
1.993*** 
(8.51)
-15.670*** 
(-2.66)
-11.680*** 
(-3.25)
-17.181** 
(-2.59) 
-11.251*** 
(-2.82)
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.616*** ( 4.72) 
3.758*** 
(9.13) 
3.211*** 
(3.63) 
4.644*** 
(8.05) 
2.039*** 
(3.96) 
3.470*** 
(7.86) 
2.493*** 
(2.79) 
4.259*** 
(7.35) 
GIMi,t - -4.401*** (-3.30) 
-3.812*** 
(-2.97) 
-4.363** 
(-2.54)
-3.177** 
(-2.55)
-3.630*** 
(-2.73)
-2.542*** 
(-2.67)
-3.550** 
(-2.20) 
-2.275** 
(-2.51)
(EQ-GW)i,t-1 + 0.752*** (5.25) 
0.737*** 
(12.39) 
0.696** 
(2.60) 
0.601*** 
(5.85) 
0.683*** 
(4.56) 
0.648*** 
(10.56) 
0.621** 
(2.45) 
0.553*** 
(5.06) 
GWi,t-1 + 1.625*** (5.17) 
1.194*** 
(6.73) 
1.528*** 
(4.18)
0.985*** 
(5.67)
1.373*** 
(4.58)
1.034*** 
(6.29)
1.292*** 
(3.73) 
0.882*** 
(5.29)
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.677*** (2.76) 
0.988** 
(2.54) 
0.613** 
(2.56) 
1.154*** 
(2.71) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      1.002*** (3.56) 
0.747*** 
(4.33) 
1.078*** 
(3.44) 
0.725*** 
(3.76) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.156 (-0.92) 
-1.948* 
(-1.81) 
-2.552 
(-0.87) 
-2.351* 
(-1.82) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  
 
 -2.447** (-2.04) 
-1.659** 
(-2.34) 
-2.807** 
(-2.13) 
-1.916** 
(-2.51) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -3.397** (-2.54) 
-2.864*** 
(-3.60) 
-3.511** 
(-2.56) 
-2.939*** 
(-3.47) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -0.950 (-0.60) 
-0.649 
(-0.74) 
-1.091 
(-0.62) 
-0.585  
(-0.59) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.309*** (-2.63) 
-2.268*** 
(-3.08) 
-3.461** 
(-2.51) 
-2.273*** 
(-2.85) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  
 
 -5.412*** (-3.38) 
-4.282*** 
(-4.83) 
-6.976*** 
(-4.38) 
-4.190*** 
(-4.17) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.041*** (-2.69) 
-2.699*** 
(-2.68) 
-4.337** 
(-2.60) 
-2.861** 
(-2.51) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  
 
 -3.732*** (-2.85) 
-2.820*** 
(-3.45) 
-4.167*** 
(-2.98) 
-3.005*** 
(-3.44) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.941** (-2.28) 
-1.794** 
(-2.25) 
-2.762** 
(-2.00) 
-1.799** 
(-2.06) 
N  909 844 762 715 909 851 762 721 
F-value  21.48*** 84.10*** 18.17*** 53.30*** 10.10*** 42.62*** 10.26*** 26.18*** 
Adjusted R2  0.489 0.536 0.480 0.570 0.548 0.643 0.537 0.650 
Max VIF  1.22 1.18 1.40 1.48 5.27 5.43 5.26 5.51 
Mean VIF  1.16 1.13 1.26 1.28 2.23 2.21 2.22 2.24 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment 
losses of firm i, period t; (EQ-GW)i,t-1 is book equity reduced by book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GWi,t-1 is book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity market value of firm i, time t. 
RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES,UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION _TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% 
level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s 
distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. All independent variables in price-book-earnings regressions 
are deflated by number of outstanding common stocks at time t. 
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Table 7.5 reports results from testing hypothesis 1a and 1b. Hypothesis 1a predicts 
that book goodwill is positively associated with stock prices, whereas hypothesis 
1b predicts that goodwill-impairment losses are negatively associated with stock 
prices. As reported in the above table, all variables in the basic model are 
significantly associated with stock prices. Pre-impairment net earnings (E+GIM) 
and book equity less book goodwill (EQ-GW) are positively associated with stock 
prices in all eight regressions. This is consistent with predictions. Higher pre-
impairment net earnings should be associated with higher stock prices. Higher 
book equity signals more economic net assets and should be associated with 
higher stock prices.  
 
Consistent with predictions in hypothesis 1a book goodwill (GW) is found to be 
significantly positively associated with stock prices in all eight regressions. This 
suggests that book goodwill reflects value-relevant information when accounted 
for under the current impairment-only method. A significantly positive coefficient 
on book goodwill (GW) also supports the notion that goodwill represents an 
economic asset that should be capitalised on the balance sheet. Similar results are 
reported in previous studies (e.g. Amir et al. 1993, Wang 1993, Chauvin and 
Hirschey 1994, Jennings. et al, 1995, Huijgen 1996, Barth and Clinch 1996, 
Wilkins et al. 1998, Henning et al. 2000, Petersen 2002, Bugeja and Gallery 
2006). Given a measurement perspective, not only the sign and significance, but 
also the magnitude of the regression coefficients should be interpreted (e.g. Barth 
2000). The regression coefficient on book goodwill (GW) is significantly higher 
than +1 in some of these regressions. This indicates that book goodwill is 
significantly lower than the economic goodwill (Total available sample with 
outliers: F-value 3.95 using the Wald-test). One possible explanation is that stock 
prices reflect total goodwill, the total of internally-generated and purchased 
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goodwill, not just purchased goodwill. The balance sheet, however, will only 
recognise purchased goodwill.  
 
Consistent with predictions in hypothesis 1b, goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) 
are significantly negatively associated with stock prices. This suggests that 
impairment losses reported under the impairment-only method reflect value-
relevant information. These losses are, therefore, reflecting economic losses in 
stock prices. This result, however, only holds on average. These losses might be 
subject to earnings management in certain firms and in certain periods of time 
where incentives for manipulation are strong. The regression coefficients of these 
losses are significantly lower than -1 suggesting that average economic losses 
recognised by the capital market are larger in absolute values than reported 
impairment losses (Total available sample inclusive without: F-value 6.48 using 
the Wald-test). There are at least three interpretations of these findings. The 
capital market recognises impairment losses in total goodwill, the total of 
internally-generated goodwill and purchased goodwill, rather than just purchased 
goodwill. As total goodwill on average is larger than book goodwill, impairment 
losses will probably be larger than those reported in the financial statements. A 
different argument is that impairment losses are systematically understated due to 
accounting regulation or earnings management. Impairment losses are found to be 
reported with a time lag relative to the recognition of such losses in stock prices 
(e.g. Heflin and Warfield 1997, Hirschey and Richardson 2002, 2003, Li et al. 
2004). Previous years’ impairment losses are also found to be associated with 
current year’s impairment losses (e.g. Elliot and Hanna 1996, Francis et al. 1996). 
This is consistent with impairment losses being systematically understated. 
Managers may have incentives to understate impairment losses in order to 
overstate net earnings and net-asset values. Given semi-strong market efficiency, 
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the capital market is not on average misled by such earnings management, which 
implies that impairment losses reflected in stock prices reflect economic 
impairment. A final argument, inconsistent with market efficiency, is that the 
capital market on average overreacts to impairment losses.  
 
Most of the control variables are significantly associated with stock prices. 
Growth in sales (GROWTH_SALES) is indicative of higher future cash flows, 
which suggests a positive association between growth and stock prices. Evidence 
consistent with these predictions is shown in table 7.5. A significantly positive 
association is found between growth and stock prices in all four regressions with 
control variables. Book goodwill (GW) is still significantly positively associated 
with stock prices when growth is included as a control variable. This implies that 
book goodwill has incremental value relevance beyond the relevance provided by 
growth in sales. A significantly positive association is also found between firm 
size (lnSIZE_MV) and stock prices in all four regressions with control variables. 
This might indicate that the regressions suffer from scale effects. The literature 
suggests a number of remedies to mitigate or prevent scale effects (e.g. Christie 
1987, Landsman and Magliolo 1988, Easton and Sommers 2003). Alternative 
scaling proxies supposed to be more highly associated with the true, but 
unobservable scale factor are suggested. A recent study by Barth and Clinch 
(2009), however, conclude that the conventional scale proxy, number of common 
stocks, is as efficient to mitigate scale effects as any other scale remedy. However, 
even after scaling by number of common stocks, the above results suggest that 
there might be problems with scale effects. This calls for robustness tests using 
alternative scale proxies such as total asset and total sales. Scale effects are 
discussed more carefully below. Other control variables are also found to be 
significantly associated with stock prices. Most of the industry-sector dummies are 
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negatively associated with stock prices, suggesting that these industries have firms 
with lower stock prices on average than the benchmark-industry sector: basic 
industries. Taken together, including control variables has no substantial effect on 
main results from the basic regression.  
 
Additional analyses are conducted to investigate the robustness of the results in 
table 7.5. The results might be affected by observations from certain years or 
certain firms, alternative time lags in stock prices and alternative scaling proxies. 
The first robustness test concerns the impact of observations from certain years. 
Two sets of analyses are conducted: Including dummy variables for each year to 
investigate systematic differences in stock prices across years and excluding firm-
year observations from the financial-recession year 2008 (See table A3 and A4 in 
appendix A). The inclusion of year-dummies allows the regressions to have 
separate intercepts for each year. The dummy for the financial-recession year 
(YEAR_2008) is significantly negatively associated with stock prices in all eight 
regressions (See table A3). This is as expected. Stock prices are on average 
significantly lower in this year compared to the benchmark year 2005. However, 
the inclusion of year-dummies has no overall effect on the main results.  
 
The financial-recession year 2008 is extraordinary when it comes to the number 
and size of impairment losses. More than 26.5% of impairment losses over the 
period 2005-2009 are reported in 2008. According to the ratio of 2008 observation 
to all firm-year observations, 19.3% of impairment losses should have been 
reported this year. Besides, average impairment losses is 99.7 million British 
Pounds (£) in 2008 compared to 61.3 million British Pounds (£) for the whole 
period (without 2008 observations). Excluding 2008-firm observations gives 
weaker results than those reported in table 7.5 (See table A4). Goodwill-
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impairment losses (GIM) are only significantly associated with stock prices in two 
out of eight regressions. In those regressions with insignificant coefficients, 
goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) are barely insignificantly or strongly 
insignificantly associated with stock prices. This suggests that the results in table 
7.5 to some extent are driven by impairment losses reported in 2008. The results in 
table 7.5 might also be driven by firms having substantial book goodwill. To 
investigate whether value relevance varies by the size of book goodwill and 
goodwill-impairment losses, firm-year observations are separated in subsamples 
with substantial and non-substantial book goodwill and substantial and non-
substantial goodwill-impairment losses. Those firms with book goodwill relative 
to total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year above the third quartile of that 
variable are considered to have substantial goodwill. Similarly, those firms with 
goodwill-impairment losses relative to total assets at the beginning of the fiscal 
year above the 95th percentile of that variable are considered to have substantial 
impairment losses. 29  The exclusion of firm-year observations with substantial 
book goodwill has no significant effect on the results reported in table 7.5 (See 
table A5). The same is not the case when excluding firm-year observations with 
substantial impairment losses (See table A6). The coefficient on goodwill-
impairment losses (GIM) is now highly insignificant. These results demonstrate 
that the value relevance of goodwill-impairment losses is driven by the largest 
impairment losses.  
 
Stock prices are collected at the end of the fiscal years. This is based on the 
assumption that all price-relevant accounting information for the fiscal year is 
reflected in stock prices at the end of that fiscal year. Some, however, have argued 
                                           
29 The split is not made at the same percentile. The reason is that goodwill-impairment losses are heavily skewed 
towards large absolute values, whereas book-goodwill values are more symmetrically distributed.   
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that stock prices should be measured with a time lag after the end of the fiscal year 
(e.g. Huigjen 1996:80, Jennings et al. 1996a, Collins et al. 1997, Ibrahim 1999:83, 
Petersen 2002:9, Bugeja and Gallery 2006, Barth et al. 2008, Beisland 2009:121). 
Lagged stock prices are used to ensure that price-relevant accounting information 
is reflected in stock prices. The time lag varies from zero to six months (e.g. 
Huigjen 1996:80. Barth et al. 2008), but the most common is a time lag of three 
months in stock prices (e.g. Jennings et al. 1996a, Collins et al. 1997, Ibrahim 
1999:83, Bugeja and Gallery 2006, Beisland 2009:122). Graham and King (1998) 
find that a time lag between two months and four months provides the strongest 
associations between accounting numbers and stock prices. The choice between 
stock prices at the end of the fiscal year versus lagged stock prices is a trade off 
(Barth et al. 2001). Lagged stock prices have the advantage that prices more fully 
reflect information found in financial statements. At the same time, lagged stock 
prices may reflect price-relevant information for the subsequent fiscal year. If the 
capital market is strongly efficient, all information concerning the fiscal year 
should be reflected in stock prices at the fiscal-year end. In case of semi-strong 
market efficiency, this is not necessarily the case (Graham and King 1998). As no 
strong arguments are found for choosing one time lag rather than another, time 
lags of two, three and four months are employed for robustness-test reasons. The 
results of these robustness tests are reported in table A7 to table A9 in appendix A. 
As shown in these tables, the results are generally weaker with a time lag in stock 
prices. With a time lag of two months, the coefficients on goodwill-impairment 
losses (GIM) become insignificant in two out of eight regressions (See table A7). 
When the time lag increases to three months, three out of eight regressions report 
insignificant coefficients on goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) (See table A8). 
Somewhat surprisingly, only one out of eight regressions report insignificant 
coefficients on impairment losses when the time lag is four months (See table A9).  
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Firm size (lnSIZE_MV) has significantly positive coefficients in table 7.5 and in 
all robustness regressions reported in table A3 to table A9. This indicates that the 
results may suffer from scale effects. Different types of scale effects and how to 
detect and mitigate them are carefully discussed in the literature. Some main 
results from this literature will be discussed here. Scale effects occur in value-
relevance regressions because firms having high market values generally have 
high book-equity values and high net earnings. A positive association between 
market values and book-equity values can, therefore, be explained by the fact that 
large firms tend to have high market values and high book-equity values (e.g. 
Christie 1987). Stated otherwise, the positive association between market values 
and book-equity values is not necessarily explained by the economic association 
between market values and book-equity values. Rather, the association might 
simply reflect differences in scale. However, scale and size are not synonymous 
constructs. Scale is differences in size that lacks interest to the research question. 
In value-relevance context this means that scale is differences in size that do not 
reflects differences in firms’ economic fundamentals (Barth and Clinch 2009). In 
order to disentangle the effect of differences in size from pure scale effects, 
researchers must know the type of scale effect that is present in the observations 
and decide how this scale effect can be mitigated. In most cases the true scale 
factor is unobservable and thereby unknown. The literature suggests a number of 
remedies to mitigate potential scale effects. Most researchers argue that scale 
effects can best be dealt with by deflating all the variables with a scale proxy 
(Christie 1987, Landsman and Magliolo 1988, Easton 1998, Brown, Lo and Lys 
1999, Lo and Lys 2000, Easton and Sommers 2003, Lara, Grambovas and Walker 
2007, Barth and Clinch 2009). Others argue that scale effects can be mitigated by 
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including the scale proxy as an independent variable (Barth and Kallupar 1996, Gu 
2005). 
 
A number of different scale proxies are suggested in the literature. The most 
common scale proxy in price-level regressions is number of outstanding common 
stocks. Other used scale proxies are total assets, book-equity values, total sales, 
net-capital contributions and stock prices at the beginning of the fiscal year (Barth 
and Kallapur 1996, Barth and Clinch 2001, Easton and Sommers 2003). Barth and 
Clinch (2009) make a careful investigation of different scale effects, how to detect 
them and mitigate them. Six different regressions are tested on simulated data: 
undeflated market-book-earnings regressions, deflated price-book-earnings 
regressions, deflated price-earnings regressions, return-earnings regressions and 
regressions scaled by contemporaneous market values. The degree of 
misspecification in these regressions are investigated by several metrics such as 
the frequency with which the t-statistics correctly reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients equal zero, the average-coefficient bias measured as the estimated 
coefficient minus the true coefficient and the average-absolute error measured as 
the absolute value of the coefficient bias. When no scale effects are present, the 
undeflated regressions perform the best. Price-level regressions are the second best 
whereas return-earnings regressions perform the worst. When several scale effects 
are present, the undeflated regressions perform worse than any other 
specifications. Price-level regressions, deflated by number of outstanding common 
stocks, seem to be the specification that performs well in presence of a variety of 
scale effects. Barth and Clinch (2009) argue that there are some features of the 
number of outstanding stocks and changes in them that link them to scale. For 
instance, when firms are raising equity capital, price per share remains the same, 
which leads to an increase in market values and numbers of outstanding stocks. 
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However, as demonstrated in table 7.5, scale does seem to be an issue in the above 
regressions even after deflating the variables with number of outstanding common 
stocks. This calls for robustness tests.  
 
Two alternative scale proxies are employed: total assets at the beginning of the 
fiscal year and total sales for the fiscal year. The unscaled versions, not the per-
share versions of the variables, are deflated with these proxies. The results for the 
regressions with total assets as deflator are heavily affected by outliers (See table 
A10). Book equity less book goodwill (EQ-GW), goodwill-impairment losses 
(GIM) and book goodwill (GW) are generally insignificantly associated with 
market value deflated by total assets, when outliers are included. When outliers 
are excluded, all the main variables are significant with their predicted signs. The 
coefficient on firm size (lnSIZE_MV) is now insignificant. The results from 
regressions with total sales as deflator are similar to those reported in table 7.5 
(See table A11). The coefficient on firm size (lnSIZE_MV), however, is 
significantly positive or barely insignificant, suggesting that there, still, is some 
risk of scale effects.  
 
According to Easton and Sommers (2003), scale is in the dependent variable, the 
stock prices, not the independent variables. They call for other remedies than 
deflating to mitigate scale effects. One procedure is to remove the correlation 
between stock prices and firm size. Following Barth et al. (2008:486), stock prices 
are first regressed on size and unstandardised residuals from that regression are 
collected. These residuals are employed as a dependent variable in a regression on 
accounting numbers per share. This procedure provides a strong control for 
potential scale effects, since the unstandardised residuals and size are 
orthogonalised. This does not imply, however, that there will be no association 
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between these unstandardised residuals and size in a multiple regression, as the 
association between an independent variable (e.g. size) and the dependent variable 
depends on the correlations between this independent variable and all the other 
independent variables (Wooldridge 2009:80). The results from rerunning the 
regressions in table 7.5 are shown in table A12. The dependent variable is now the 
unstandardised residuals from the regression of stock prices on size. The overall 
results are unchanged. Book goodwill (GW) has a significantly positive coefficient 
and goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) a significantly negative coefficient in all 
eight regressions. Size (lnSIZE_MV), however, is significantly associated with 
ustandardised residuals. This is due to the non-trivial correlations between size 
and the other independent variables. When running a regression of these residuals 
on size only, the regression coefficient is almost perfectly zero and highly 
insignificant (coeff. 2.91*10-9, t-value: 0.000. Results not tabulated). Taken 
together, the results in table 7.5 are unaffected or mainly unaffected by the 
exclusion of outliers, alternative time lags in stock prices, scaling by total assets 
and total sales and control for size by orthogonalisation. The results, however, are 
to some extent driven by large impairment losses mainly reported in the financial-
recession year 2008.  
 
Table 7.6 reports results from testing hypothesis 1c. Two regression models are 
tested: the basic return-earnings model in table 6.2 and the basic model with 
control variables for economic growth, firm size, financial leverage and industry 
sector. 
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Table 7.6 Value relevance of goodwill-impairment losses – hypothesis 1c 
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.010 (0.29) 
8.28*10-5
(-0.00) 
3.75*10-4
 (0.01) 
-0.011  
(-0.61) 
-0.678*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.694*** 
(-3.12) 
-1.026*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.867*** 
(-3.67) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.639*** (3.16) 
1.255*** 
(6.87) 
1.685*** 
(3.62) 
1.440*** 
(6.61) 
1.502*** 
(2.84) 
1.184*** 
(5.45) 
1.395*** 
(3.09) 
0.986*** 
(4.25) 
 (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 
+ -0.413 
(-0.89) 
0.375*** 
(2.29) 
-0.037  
(-0.13) 
0.613*** 
(3.60) 
-0.365 
-0.76) 
0.208 
(1.12) 
0.070 
(0.25) 
0.536*** 
(3.30) 
GIMi,t - -0.758*** (-4.23) 
-1.084* 
(-1.81)
-0.704*** 
(-4.17)
-1.792*** 
(-2.90)
-0.635*** 
(-3.56)
-0.147 
(-0.20) 
-0.579*** 
(-3.47)
-1.321** 
(-2.52)
GIMi,t,t-1 
- -0.447*** 
(-7.80) 
-1.651*** 
(-3.34) 
-0.449*** 
(-7.35) 
-0.534*** 
(-16.72) 
-0.471*** 
(-8.19) 
-1.835*** 
(-3.47) 
-0.472*** 
(-7.83) 
-0.556***  
(-13.27) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.037 (1.14) 
-0.010 
(-0.18) 
0.010  
(0.33) 
-0.037  
(-0.60) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.039*** (3.32) 
0.041*** 
(3.89) 
0.055*** 
(4.07) 
0.049*** 
(4.39) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1 
 
    
1.17*10-
4*** 
(4.03)
-7.19*10-4 
 (-1.05) 
1.08*10-
4*** 
(3.49)
-8.43*10-4 
 (-1.15) 
RESOURCESi,t 
     -0.052  (-0.60) 
-0.160** 
(-2.26) 
0.004 
(0.05) 
-0.055 
(-0.62) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.132*** (-3.16) 
-0.162*** 
(-4.39) 
-0.145*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.157*** 
(-4.90) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.154*** (-2.84) 
-0.140*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.140*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.111*** 
(-2.65) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.198***  (-4.66) 
-0.221*** 
(-5.56) 
-0.216***  
(-5.40) 
-0.218*** 
(-5.74) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.166*** (-4.62) 
-0.200*** 
(-5.54) 
-0.139*** 
(-4.11) 
-0.160*** 
(-4.75) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.162** (-2.43) 
-0.152** 
(-2.15) 
-0.236  
(-3.52) 
-0.195*** 
(-2.84) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.195***  (-4.18) 
-0.229*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.240***  
(-4.99) 
-0.226*** 
(-4.85) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.030  (-0.36) 
-0.168***  
(-2.63) 
-0.014  
(-0.15) 
-0.137**  
(-2.29) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.110** (-2.61) 
-0.160*** 
(-4.23) 
-0.087** 
(-2.18) 
-0.104*** 
(-2.63) 
N  895 862 762 728 895 858 762 729 
F-value  23.85*** 38.01*** 21.40*** 124.55*** 12.79*** 11.54*** 12.02*** 19.87*** 
Adjusted R2  0.127 0.148 0.132 0.180 0.135 0.145 0.149 0.175 
Max VIF  1.69 1.99 1.52 1.57 5.25 5.10 5.19 5.03 
Mean VIF  1.39 1.66 1.30 1.30 2.16 2.19 2.09 2.05 
Stock return of firm i, period t is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t; GIMi,t,t-1 is changes in reported 
goodwill-impairment losses of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, period from t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural 
logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, 
UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and 
otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are 
unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** 
indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as 
outliers. 
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All the main variables except from changes in pre-impairment earnings (E+GIM) 
and goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) are significantly associated with stock 
returns in all eight regressions. Changes in pre-impairment earnings (E+GIM) 
are significantly positively associated with stock returns in three out of eight 
regressions when regressions are run on firm-year observations without outliers. 
Goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) have a significantly negative coefficient in 
seven out of eight regressions. The insignificant coefficient is found when the 
regression is run on total available observations without outliers. A closer 
investigation reveals that the exclusion of 41 outliers removes some of the largest 
impairment losses in the sample which turns the regression coefficient 
insignificant. This supports the previously stated argument that value relevance of 
these losses is driven by the largest impairment losses. Taken together, these 
results support hypothesis 1c that impairment losses are negatively associated with 
stock returns. Not only levels of these losses (GIM), but also changes in these 
losses (GIM) are negatively associated with stock returns. This result is robust 
across all eight regressions in table 7.5. A negative coefficient makes sense since 
an increase in impairment losses the current year relative to the previous year 
represents additional and even larger reductions in cash-generating capacity in 
goodwill compared to the previous year, which should be mapped in current year’s 
stock returns.  
 
Growth measured as changes in total sales (GROWTH_SALES) has no significant 
association with stock returns. This means that firms experiencing high sales 
growth, do not necessary perform higher stock returns. Moreover, larger firms 
tend to have higher stock returns as demonstrated with a positive coefficient on 
firm size (lnSIZE_MV). This might be indicative of scale effects. Financial 
leverage (LEVERAGE), a proxy of financial risk, is positively associated with 
  
331 
stock returns, which makes sense since higher financial risk on average should be 
associated with higher cost of capital and thereby higher stock returns. Most of the 
industry-sector dummies are negatively associated with stock returns, suggesting 
that there are some industry-sector differences when it comes to stock 
performance. In general, these industry sectors perform worse on average than 
firms in the benchmark-industry sector: basic industries. 
 
As for price-book-earnings regressions, some robustness tests are conducted to 
investigate whether the results in table 7.6 are systematically affected by 
observations from certain years, from certain firms or the time period over which 
stock returns are measured. For instance, it might be the case that the results are 
driven by impairment losses reported in the financial-recession year 2008. Two 
sets of analyses are conducted: Including dummy variables for each year to 
investigate systematic differences across years and excluding firm-year 
observations from the financial-recession year 2008 (See table A13 and A14). The 
inclusion of year dummies has no substantial effect on the results in table 7.6 (See 
table A13). Pre-impairment net earnings (E+GIM), goodwill-impairment losses 
(GIM) and changes in these losses (GIM) are significantly associated with stock 
returns. Changes in pre-impairment net earnings (E+GIM) are significant in six 
out of eight regressions. All the regression coefficients have their predicted signs. 
The coefficients on the year dummies are significantly negative except the 2009-
year dummy (YEAR_2009). This suggests that the average stock returns are 
significantly lower in 2006, 2007 and 2008 compared to the average stock return 
in 2005. In 2009, however, average stock return is significantly higher than in 
2005.  
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When excluding observations from the financial-recession year 2008, the 
coefficients on goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) turn insignificant (See table 
A14). The coefficient on changes in impairment losses (GIM), however, is 
negative and highly significant. This might be the result of multicollinearity 
between goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) and changes in goodwill-impairment 
losses (GIM), since most of the observations of goodwill-impairment losses 
(GIM) and changes in these losses (GIM) are identical when the 2008 
observations are excluded. The correlation coefficient between these variables is 
high and significant (Pearson-coeff. 0.613, p-value 0.000). A low VIF-value 
(Variance Inflation Factor), however, indicates otherwise. The highest VIF-value 
for the main regressions is 1.58 and 4.86 in regressions with control variables.  
 
The results in table 7.6 might be driven by firms having substantial book goodwill 
and/or firms reporting substantial goodwill-impairment losses. To examine these 
possibilities, the same procedures are employed here as for the previous price-
book-earnings regressions. The sample of firm-year observations is split into 
subsamples with substantial and non-substantial book goodwill and substantial and 
non-substantial goodwill-impairment losses. The regressions in table 7.6 are rerun 
for the non-substantial subsamples (See table A15 and A16). When firm-year 
observations with substantial book goodwill are excluded, goodwill-impairment 
losses (GIM) are found to be significantly associated with stock returns in five out 
of eight regressions. The significance is generally lower in regressions excluding 
outliers. Changes in impairment losses (GIM), however, show quite the opposite 
pattern. The coefficients on this variable are significantly negative only in those 
regressions excluding outliers (See table A15). When firm-year observations with 
substantial impairment losses are excluded, goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) are 
insignificant in seven out of eight regressions (See table A16). 
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Stock returns are measured over the fiscal years in the regressions in table 7.6. 
Alternative return periods are suggested and applied in the literature. Rather than 
measuring stock returns over a period of twelve months (e.g. Plenborg 1999, Rees 
et al. 1996, Henning et al. 2000), it might be argued that stock returns should be 
measured over the fiscal year with an additional time lag (e.g. Huigjen 1996:80). 
This means that a time lag of three months leads to a total return period of 15 
months. However, this specification may lead to autocorrelation problems due to 
overlapping return periods. Return periods of 12 months are applied here with a 
lag of two, three and four months. As expected, the results are sensitive to the 
period over which stock returns are measured (See table A17 to table A19). 
Goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) and changes in these losses (GIM) are 
significantly negatively associated with stock returns, when the return period has a 
lag of two months relative to the fiscal year. The only exception is the coefficient 
on goodwill-impairment losses (GIM), which has an insignificant coefficient on 
goodwill-impairment losses, when the main regression is run for the non-missing 
sample without outliers. This coefficient is close to zero and insignificant. The 
reason is that the outliers from this regression comprise firm-year observations 
with the largest impairment losses. When these are excluded, the coefficient turns 
insignificant. A time lag of three or four months turns the coefficients on these 
variables insignificant in most of the regressions. With a time lag of three months, 
none of the coefficients on goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) are significant. Six 
of eight coefficients on changes in goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) are 
significantly negative (See table A18). With a time lag of four months, two of the 
coefficients on goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) and two of the coefficients on 
changes in these losses (GIM) are significantly negative (See table A19). 
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Scale effects are expected to be less serious in return-earnings regressions 
compared to price-book-earnings regressions (Christie 1987, Kothari and 
Zimmerman 1995, Easton 1998). Still, return-earnings regressions are not entirely 
free from scale effects (Barth and Clinch 2009). In table 7.6 there are indications 
that scale effects might be a problem. Size (lnSIZE_MV) is positively associated 
with stock returns in all four regressions suggesting that firms with higher market 
values also have higher stock returns. In contrast to price-book-earnings 
regressions, there are no obvious alternative candidates that can serve as scale 
proxy (e.g. Christie 1987). Market values or stock prices are the apparent scale 
candidates as stock returns, the dependent variable in these regressions, are 
measured as changes in stock prices (market values), adjusted for current net 
dividends, over the initial stock prices (market values) for the return period. 
Rather than deflating all the variables with an alternative scale proxy, the 
unstandardised residuals from a regression of stock returns on firm size 
(lnSIZE_MV) are used as dependent variable. As demonstrated in table A20, the 
results in table 7.6 are mainly unaffected. Goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) and 
changes in goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) are still negatively associated with 
stock returns. Moreover, the coefficient on firm size (lnSIZE_MV) is now 
insignificant. This suggests that potential scale effects do not have substantial 
effect on the results in table 7.6. The robustness tests demonstrate that the results 
in table 7.6 are driven at least to some extent by firm-year observations from the 
financial-recession year 2008 and firm-year observations with substantial book 
goodwill and/or substantial goodwill-impairment losses. Besides, the results are 
sensitive to the period over which stock returns are measured. With a lag of three 
months or more after the fiscal-year end, the coefficients on levels (GIM) and 
changes in goodwill-impairment losses (GIM) turn insignificant in most 
regressions. Taken together, the results support hypothesis 1c. Goodwill-
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impairment losses provide information that is reflected in current stock returns. 
This suggests that these losses are value relevant and to some extent timely 
reported. 
 
7.2.5. Value relevance of goodwill under the amortisation method 
This section investigates the value relevance of goodwill-amortisation charges. 
The accounting numbers from 2005-2009 are adjusted as-if goodwill is reported 
under a method with amortisation, but no impairment testing. The results from 
price-book-earnings regressions for the fiscal years 2005-2009 are given in table 
7.7 below. Two regression models are tested: the basic price-book-earnings model 
in table 6.3 and the basic model with control variables for economic growth, firm 
size and industry sector.  
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Table 7.7 Value relevance of book goodwill and amortisation charges – 
hypothesis 2a 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
 Available sample Non-missing  Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.290*** (6.21) 
1.857*** 
(7.78) 
2.280*** 
(6.19)
1.864*** 
(7.78)
-17.312** 
(-2.47)
-13.055*** 
(-3.34)
-17.596** 
(-2.51) 
-13.325*** 
(-3.39)
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.148*** (3.52) 
4.310*** 
(8.18) 
3.176*** 
(3.50) 
4.302*** 
(8.18) 
2.430** 
(2.60) 
3.666*** 
(7.34) 
2.452** 
(2.60) 
3.671*** 
(7.33) 
GAMi,t  12.839** (2.40) 
5.025 
(1.54) 
12.783** 
(2.39) 4.953 (1.51) 
12.843** 
(2.46)
10.514*** 
(2.96)
12.791** 
(2.45) 
10.472*** 
(2.94) 
(EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 + 0.628*** (2.69) 
0.715*** 
(8.57) 
0.636*** 
(2.74) 
0.712*** 
(8.52) 
0.569*** 
(2.61) 
0.648*** 
(6.96) 
0.577*** 
(2.64) 
0.653*** 
(6.99) 
GWCAi,t-1 + 0.714* (1.90) 
0.848*** 
(3.39) 
0.715* 
(1.89)
0.853*** 
(3.40)
0.466 
(1.42)
0.360 
(1.51)
0.463 
(1.41) 
0.339 
(1.43) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.446** (2.04) 
0.549*** 
(3.31) 
0.445** 
(2.03) 
0.547*** 
(3.29) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      1.088*** (3.27) 
0.810*** 
(4.27) 
1.100*** 
(3.30) 
0.831*** 
(4.36) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.921 (-1.03) 
-1.848 
(-1.43) 
-2.830  
(-1.00) 
-2.070 
(-1.60) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  
 
 -2.878** (-2.15) 
-1.740** 
(-2.11) 
-2.859** 
(-2.09) 
-1.894** 
(-2.32) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -3.679*** (-2.69) 
-2.867*** 
(-3.46) 
-3.663***  
(-2.65) 
-3.036*** 
(-3.73) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -1.034  (-0.60) 
-0.913  
(-0.92) 
-1.043  
(-0.60) 
-0.934  
(-0.93) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.553** (-2.58) 
-2.322*** 
(-2.73) 
-3.541**  
(-2.51) 
-2.487*** 
(-2.93) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  
 
 -7.448*** (-4.19) 
-4.711*** 
(-4.48) 
-7.472***  
(-4.11) 
-4.952*** 
(-4.69) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.345** (-2.53) 
-2.321** 
(-2.01) 
-4.366**  
(-2.49) 
-2.531** 
(-2.20) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  
 
 -4.653*** (-3.38) 
- 3.173*** 
(-3.71) 
-4.629***  
(-3.31) 
-3.338*** 
(-3.91) 
FINANCEi,t      -3.013** (-2.19) 
-1.929** 
(-2.17) 
-2.985**  
(-2.12) 
-2.084*** 
(-2.35) 
N  767 712 762 708 767 722 762 718 
F-value  22.48*** 57.58*** 22.77*** 57.36*** 11.73*** 31.11*** 11.88*** 31.35*** 
Adjusted R2  0 .476 0.577 0.474 0.575 0.537 0.640 0.536 0.640 
Max VIF  3.91 3.94 3.92 3.95 5.14 5.34 5.24 5.60 
Mean VIF  2.64 2.60 2.63 2.60 2.59 2.57 2.61 2.63 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-
amortisation charges of firm i, period t; (EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by as-if accounted book goodwill under the 
amortisation method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation method of firm i, time t-1; 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. 
RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 
10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s 
distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table 7.7 shows that most of the main variables are significantly associated with 
stock prices. There are some exceptions. Book goodwill (GWCA) is significantly 
associated with stock prices in four out of eight regressions and goodwill-
amortisation charges (GAM) are significant in six out of eight regressions. 
Inconsistent with predictions in hypothesis 2a, goodwill-amortisation charges 
(GAM) are found to be significantly associated with stock prices. This result 
contradicts some earlier findings, but supports others. Jennings et al. (1996a) find 
some weak support for goodwill-amortisation charges reflecting value-relevant 
information. The charges are only value relevant in the fixed-effect versions of the 
regressions. In the year-by-year regressions, goodwill-amortisation charges are 
insignificantly associated with stock prices. More interestingly, the coefficient is 
positive, although insignificant in five out of seven year-by-year regressions. 
Similar results are reported by Huigjen (1996), Vincent (1997), Jennings et al. 
(2001), Petersen (2001, 2002) and Chambers (2007). Huigjen (1996) reports 
positive, but insignificant coefficients on goodwill-amortisation charges in most 
regressions. Stronger results are reported by Vincent (1997). She finds a 
significantly positive association between goodwill-amortisation charges and stock 
prices and attributes these unexpected findings to econometrical problems. Also 
recent studies have reported a positive association between goodwill-amortisation 
charges and stock prices. Chambers (2007), for instance, reports significantly 
positive coefficients on goodwill-amortisation charges without elaborating on 
these results. Others find weak support for a negative association. This is the case 
in the study by Henning et al. (2000). They demonstrate that some components of 
goodwill amortisation are negatively associated with stock prices.  
 
By definition, goodwill-amortisation charges should reflect the systematic 
consumption of the cash-generating capacity of goodwill. In other words, if 
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goodwill-amortisation charges turn out to be significantly associated with stock 
prices, i.e. value relevant, they should have a negative, not a positive coefficient. 
There are, however, at least two explanations for no associations between these 
charges and stock prices. One explanation is that these charges are calculated for 
an arbitrary amortisation period. They do not reflect the consumption of economic 
goodwill. They are only pure noise and should, therefore, have no associations 
with stock prices (e.g. Jennings et al. 1996, 2001). A different explanation is that 
insignificant associations are driven by econometrical problems. A positive 
association, however, is inconsistent with these charges reflecting economic 
charges or pure noise. Rather, a positive association suggests that these charges 
proxy some unrecognised economic value reflected in stock prices. In a setting 
with incomplete accounting, net earnings might proxy for asset and liability values 
that are not currently recognised on the balance sheet (Barth and Landsman 1995, 
Barth 2000). There are two reasons why economic value is kept unrecognised. 
Assets are often recognised at values lower than their fair values in the balance 
sheet. This is generally the case under historical-cost accounting and conservative 
accounting. Moreover, assets are kept unrecognised because they fail to meet 
recognition criteria for capitalisation (given balance-sheet orientation). These 
assets might be considered as internally-generated goodwill. 
 
Firms with lots of hidden reserves in recognised assets and unrecognised assets 
might have higher economic performance, higher economic growth and fewer 
impairment losses in book goodwill than firms with less hidden reserves. Four 
variables are selected to indicate economic performance and economic growth: 
stock returns, return-on-assets, growth in sales and market-to-book ratios. The 
firm-year observations are assigned to subsamples with high, medium and low 
values on stock returns, return-on-assets, growth in sales or market-to-book ratios. 
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Firm-year observations with values that are above the third quartile of these 
variables are assigned to the group with high economic performance and/or high 
economic growth. Similarly, firm years with values below the first quartile of 
these variables are assigned to the group with low economic performance and/or 
low economic growth. The subsample with high stock returns has a significantly 
positive coefficient on goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) (coeff. 19.555,  
t-value: 2.66), whereas the subsample with low stock returns has an insignificantly 
positive coefficient (coeff. 11.166, t-value: 1.51) (See table A21). The same 
pattern is found for return-on-assets. The subsample with high return-on-assets has 
a significantly positive coefficient on goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) 
(coeff. 19.609, t-value: 1.70). The subsample with low return-on-assets has an 
insignificantly positive coefficient (coeff. 6.347, t-value: 1.44).  
 
More striking evidence is found for growth in sales and market-to-book ratios. 
Firms with high growth in sales have a positively significant coefficient on 
goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) (coeff. 21.900, t-value: 2.73). Firms with 
low growth in sales have an insignificantly negative coefficient (coeff. -1.545,  
t-value: -0.10). Market-to-book is an indicator of economic goodwill. If market-to-
book ratios are higher than 1, this signifies that expected return on equity is higher 
than required return on equity. In contrast, if market-to-book ratios are lower than 
1, this signifies that expected return on equity is lower than required return on 
equity. Firms assigned to the high market-to-book subsample have market-to-book 
ratios above three, which means that equity-market values are more than three 
times book-equity values. Firms assigned to the low subsample have market-to-
book values lower than 1.50. These firms have an insignificantly negative 
coefficient on goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) (coeff. -7.342, t-value:  
  
340 
-1.49). The coefficient on book goodwill (GWCA), however, is significantly 
positive (coeff. 0.912, t-value: 2.50) and lower than one. This indicates that the 
market perception of economic goodwill per share is lower than reported book 
goodwill per share. For firms with high market-to-book ratios, the coefficient on 
goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) is positive and significant (coeff. 17.865, t-
value: 2.84). A significantly positive coefficient is also found on book goodwill 
(GWCA) (coeff. 2.805, t-value: 3.56). This coefficient is higher than one, which 
indicates that the market perception of economic goodwill per share is higher than 
reported book goodwill per share. Alternative cut-off points for high and low 
market-to-book values have no major influence on the results in table A21. The 
results are qualitatively unchanged if high market-to-book values are defined as 
values above two or above 2.5. Likewise, the results are qualitatively unchanged if 
low market-to-book values are defined as below 1.25, below one or below 0.75 
(Results not tabulated). Moreover, the inclusion of control variables among these 
industry-sector dummies has no significant effect (See table A22).30  
 
Similar results are found when firm-year observations are separated into those 
with goodwill-impairment losses and those without goodwill-impairment losses. 
Firms not reporting impairment losses have a highly significantly positive 
coefficient on goodwill-amortisation charges (coeff. 19.064, t-value: 3.08), 
whereas firms reporting impairment losses have an insignificant coefficient on 
these charges (coeff. 3.994, t-value: 0.36). Taken together, the above results 
suggest that goodwill-amortisation charges proxy for some economic value. The 
positive association between these charges and stock prices are driven by firms 
with high economic performance, high economic growth and/or firms not 
reporting impairment losses in goodwill. Goodwill-amortisation charges do not 
                                           
30 The t-statistics are not clustered at firm-level due to lack of degrees of freedom.  
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seem to reflect consumption of goodwill at least not on average. Rather, these 
charges might proxy for economic value, such as economic assets not recognised 
on the balance sheet. A potential candidate might be internally-generated goodwill 
(e.g. Senthilnathan 2009:171). Some of the results indicate, however, that 
goodwill-amortisation charges might reflect economic charges. This is the case for 
firms with low market-to-book ratios. A barely insignificantly negative coefficient 
is found on goodwill-amortisation charges for these firms.  
 
Additional analysis is conducted to investigate whether accumulated goodwill-
amortisation charges are positively associated with stock prices. Stock prices are 
regressed on net earnings less current year’s goodwill amortisation, book equity 
less accumulated goodwill amortisation and accumulated goodwill-amortisation 
charges. Following Kang and Zhao (2010:236), a positive coefficient on 
accumulated amortisation charges is consistent with over-amortisation. Net 
earnings less goodwill amortisation (coeff. 2.957, t-value: 2.91. Results are not 
tabulated) and book equity less accumulated goodwill amortisation (coeff. 0.7603, 
t-value: 2.77. Resultat are not tabulated) are positively associated with stock 
prices. Consistent with over-amortisation, a significantly positive coefficient is 
found on accumulated goodwill-amortisation charges (coeff. 3.157, t-value: 2.29. 
Results are not tabulated). This supports the notion that goodwill amortisation 
reflects economic value rather than economic charges. Taken together, 
amortisation of goodwill does not seem to be consistent with faithful reporting of 
goodwill. Given that these results are unaffected by econometrical problems, they 
reject hypothesis 2a that goodwill-amortisation charges have no associations with 
stock prices.   
 
  
342 
Several robustness tests are conducted to investigate whether the results in table 
7.7 are affected by observations from certain years, are driven by firms with 
substantial book goodwill or are sensitive to alternative time lags in stock prices. 
The inclusion of separate intercepts for each year (year dummies) has no major 
effect on the results in table 7.7 (See table A23). The only exception is the results 
for book goodwill (GWCA). The coefficients on book goodwill are insignificantly 
positive in four out of eight regressions. Somewhat similar results are reported 
when financial-recession observations are excluded (See table A24). Goodwill-
amortisation charges (GAM) are significantly positive in all regressions, whereas 
book goodwill (GWCA) is significantly positive in six out of eight regressions. In 
the remaining two regressions, book goodwill (GWCA) is insignificant (See table 
A24). The exclusion of observations with substantial book goodwill has a more 
material effect on the results in table 7.7 (See table A25). The coefficient on book 
goodwill (GWCA) is now insignificant in all eight regressions. The coefficient on 
goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM), however, is still significantly positive.  
 
In contrast to the impairment-only method, goodwill numbers under the 
amortisation-only method have never been reported. They are as-if accounted 
numbers. One general argument for collecting stock prices with time lags relative 
to the fiscal-year end is to ensure that the capital market has fully reflected the 
accounting information. This suggests no need for investigating alternative time 
lags in stock prices. Still, there are arguments in favour of such an investigation. 
Employing stock prices at the fiscal-year end must be based on the premise that all 
relevant information is reflected in stock prices at that time. This is not necessarily 
the case. The information may not be publicly available (the information is 
private) or it may be available, but stock prices are not fully adjusted to the 
available information. The latter case is inconsistent with semi-strong market 
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efficiency. This suggests that an investigation of alternative time lags might have 
relevance even for as-if accounted numbers. The reason is that these numbers are 
supposed to or not supposed to depict economic fundamentals reflected in stock 
prices. The information concerning these economic fundamentals might be 
reflected with a time lag relative to the fiscal-year end. The results in table 7.7 are 
found to be rather robust to alternative time lags in stock prices. In table A26 to 
table A28 all the regressions are rerun with stock prices collected two, three and 
four months after fiscal-year end. Goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) are 
positively associated with stock prices in 20 out of 24 regressions. Book goodwill 
(GWCA), however, is in some regressions significant, in others barely 
insignificant. The significance of these coefficients is generally weaker when 
control variables are included.  
 
Before drawing the conclusion that goodwill-amortisation charges are positively 
associated with stock prices, the results in table 7.7 must be examined for potential 
scale effects. Any demonstrated positive association between these charges and 
stock prices, can be driven by the fact that large firms with large equity-market 
values tend to have more book goodwill and thereby higher goodwill-amortisation 
charges (e.g. Lo 2005). Without sufficient correction for scale, the association 
between stock prices and goodwill-amortisation charges may turn positive even if 
the economic association is non-existent or negative. The regressions in table 7.7 
(along with robustness regressions in table A23 to table A28) all demonstrate a 
positive association between size and stock prices. This signifies risk of scale 
effects. Two methods are conducted to mitigate scale effects in the regressions in 
table 7.7: Total assets and total sales are used as alternative scale proxies, and 
unstandardised residuals from a regression of stock prices on size are used as an 
alternative dependent variable in the price-book-earnings regressions. The 
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regression results, with alternative scaling than number of outstanding common 
stocks, are reported in table A29 and table A30. The results are weaker than those 
reported in table 7.7 when the variables are scaled by total assets. Book equity less 
book goodwill (EQCA-GWCA) is insignificant in four out of eight regressions, 
whereas book goodwill (GWCA) is insignificant in all eight regressions (See table 
A29). Goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) are still significantly positively 
associated with stock prices in all eight regressions. Size (ln_SIZE), however, is 
insignificant, suggesting that potential scale effects are removed. Somewhat 
stronger results are reported when the variables are scaled by total sales (See table 
A30). Goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) are highly positively significant. 
Size (ln_SIZE) is significantly positive in two out of four regressions, indicating 
that there still might be some remaining scale effects. An alternative remedy to 
mitigate scale effects is employed. As described previously, unstandardised 
residuals from a regression of stock prices on size are used as control for potential 
scale effects. The results from rerunning the regressions give weaker results (See 
table A31). Goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) are still positively associated 
with stock prices, and book goodwill (GWCA) is positively significant in the main 
model, but turns insignificant in the model with control variables. Size (ln_SIZE), 
however, is still associated with stock prices. This is due to the high correlation 
between size and the other independent variables in these regressions. When size 
is included as the only explanatory variable of unstandardised residuals, the 
coefficient is almost perfectly zero and highly insignificant (coeff. 2.91*10-9: t-
value: 0.000. Results not tabulated).  
 
A final step is to investigate the scale effect for firm-year observations with high 
and low values on variables for economic performance and/or economic growth. 
The dependent variable is, still, the unstandardised residuals from the regression of 
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stock prices on size. For firm-year observations with high stock returns, the 
coefficient on goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) is significantly positive 
(coeff. 17.201, t-value: 2.47. Results not tabulated). The coefficient, however, is 
insignificant for observations with low values on stock returns (coeff. 4.629, t-
value: 0.73. Results not tabulated). Similar results are found when observations 
are split on return-on-assets. Firm-year observations with high values on return-
on-assets have a significantly positive coefficient on goodwill-amortisation 
charges (GAM) (coeff. 17.360, t-value: 1.67. Results not tabulated) and an 
insignificant coefficient for observations with low values on return-on-assets 
(coeff. 3.136, t-value: 0.42. Results not tabulated). The results when the 
observations are split on growth in sales and market-to-book ratios are consistent 
with those above. High growth observations have a significantly positive 
coefficient on goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) (coeff. 19.538, t-value: 2.83. 
Results not tabulated), whereas low growth observations have an insignificant 
coefficient (coeff. 1.661, t-value: 0.12. Results not tabulated). And finally, firm-
year observations with high market-to-book ratios have a significantly positive 
coefficient (coeff. 15.295, t-value: 2.81. Results not tabulated), whereas firm-year 
observations with low market-to-book ratios have an insignificantly negative 
coefficient (coeff -12.985, t-value: -1.03. Results not tabulated). Taken together, 
scale effects do not seem to explain the positive coefficient on goodwill-
amortisation charges. Rather, the positive coefficient seems to be driven by firms 
with high economic performance and/or growth. This indicates that goodwill-
amortisation charges proxy for some economic value not recognised on the 
balance sheet.  
 
Results consistent with those reported for price-book earnings regressions in table 
7.7 are reported for return-earnings regressions in table 7.8 below. Two regression 
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models are tested: the basic return-earnings model in table 6.4 and the basic model 
with control variables for economic growth, firm size, financial leverage and 
industry sector. The total available sample of observations is here identical to the 
non-missing sample of observations employed to test differences in adjusted R-
squares. 
 
Table 7.8 Value relevance of goodwill-amortisation charges – hypothesis 2b 
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample / Non-missing sample Available sample / Non-missing sample 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive  
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive  
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  -0.054 (-1.57) 
-0.073*** 
(-3.50) 
-1.119*** 
 (-3.48) 
-0.924*** 
(-3.59) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.704*** (3.69) 
1.731*** 
(7.83)
1.358*** 
(3.08)
1.202*** 
(5.00) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1 
+ 0.005 
(0.02) 
0.392** 
(2.48) 
0.130  
(0.52) 
0.447*** 
(2.66) 
GAMi,t  2.603*** (5.28) 
2.190*** 
(5.65)
2.817*** 
(5.61)
2.559***  
(7.81) 
GAMi,t,t-1  
0.416  
(0.33) 
-3.890**  
(-2.09) 
0.282 
 (0.23) 
-0.465  
(-0.58) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t    0.010 (0.32) 
-0.029 
(-0.49) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t    0.058*** (3.78) 
0.050*** 
(4.09) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1    1.15*10
-4*** 
(3.29)
9.26*10-4 
(-1.25) 
RESOURCESi,t 
   0.014 (0.15) 
-0.054  
(-0.59) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  -0.167*** (-4.37) 
-0.186*** 
(-5.49) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.151***  (-2.69) 
-0.109**  
(-2.44) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.233*** (-5.37) 
-0.230*** 
(-5.74) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t 
   -0.175*** (-4.69) 
-0.189*** 
 (-5.13) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  -0.342*** (-2.81) 
-0.271***  
(-5.42) 
UTILITIESi,t    -0.255*** (-4.15) 
-0.228*** 
(-4.44) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  -0.097  (-1.27) 
-0.178*** 
(-3.05) 
FINANCEi,t    -0.101** (-2.31)
-0.137*** 
(-3.25) 
N  762 728 762 727 
F-value  12.94*** 38.16*** 11.91*** 12.05*** 
Adjusted R2  0.126 0.159 0.148 0.170 
Max VIF  1.53 1.46 5.20 5.07 
Mean VIF  1.27 1.23 2.09 2.04 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock return of firm i, period t, is the dependent variable. (E+GIM) i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in 
pre-impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i, period t; GAMi,t,t-1 is 
changes in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from 
period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-
1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 
10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with 
Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
 
Table 7.8 shows that pre-impairment net earnings (E+GIM) and to some extent 
changes in pre-impairment net earnings (E+GIM) are significantly positively 
associated with stock returns.  Inconsistent with predictions in hypothesis 2b, 
goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) are positively associated with stock returns. 
This indicates that goodwill-amortisation charges proxy for economic benefits 
reflected in stock returns. These benefits might be generated by unrecognised 
assets such as internally-generated goodwill. The results reported for return-
earnings regressions when splitting the firm-year observations on high and low 
values of stock returns are consistent with those reported for price-book earnings 
regressions. For firm-year observations with high stock returns, goodwill-
amortisation charges (GAM) have a highly significantly positive coefficient (coeff. 
2.302, t-value: 5.72. Results not tabulated). For firm-year observations with low 
stock returns, goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) have a barely insignificantly 
negative coefficient (coeff. -1.462, t-value: -1.63. Results not tabulated). Similar 
results are found when splitting firm-year observations into those with goodwill-
impairment losses and those without impairment losses. The association between 
goodwill-amortisation charges and stock returns is significantly positive for those 
firms not reporting impairment losses (coeff. 3.213, t-value: 5.89. Results not 
tabulated), whereas the association is insignificantly negative for those firms 
reporting impairment losses (coeff. -1.183, t-value: -0.87. Results not tabulated).  
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A similar set of robustness tests are conducted here as for the price-book-earnings 
regressions. First, the regressions are rerun to investigate whether the results in 
table 7.8 are driven by firm-year observations from certain years. The inclusion of 
year dummies has no substantial effect on the results. Goodwill-amortisation 
charges (GAM) are still significantly associated with stock returns in three out of 
four regressions. Moreover, changes in these amortisation charges (GAM) are 
significantly positively associated with stock returns in three out of four 
regressions (See table A32). The exclusion of financial-recession observations has 
some influence on the results. Goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) are still 
significantly positively associated with stock returns. Changes in these charges 
(GAM), however, are insignificant (See table A33). The results in table 7.8 might 
be affected by firms having substantial book goodwill. However, this does not 
seem to be the case. An exclusion of firm-year observations with substantial book 
goodwill has limited effect on the results shown in table 7.8 (See table A34). 
Three alternative time lags are also investigated: two months, three months and 
four months subsequent to the fiscal-year end (See table A35 to table A37). 
Goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) are positively associated with stock returns 
when these returns are measured with a time lag of two months (See table A35). 
When time lag is three months, the coefficients on goodwill-amortisation charges 
(GAM) are barely significant in two out of eight regressions (See table A36). For 
time lag of four months, none of the coefficients on amortisation charges are 
significant (See table A37). Changes in goodwill amortisation charges (GAM) 
are in some cases significantly negatively associated in other cases insignificantly 
associated with stock returns (See table A35 to table A37). The last set of 
robustness tests conducted here investigates the risk of scale effects. As discussed 
previously, the positive sign of the coefficient on goodwill-amortisation charges 
might be driven by scale effects. In order to control for size, the unstandardised 
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residuals from a regression of stock returns on size are used as dependent variable. 
As revealed in table A38, control for size has limited effect on the main results. 
Goodwill-amortisation charges (GAM) are still positively associated with stock 
returns. Changes in these charges (GAM), however, are insignificant. Size 
(ln_SIZE) is now insignificantly associated with stock returns (See table A38). In 
summary, the positive coefficient on goodwill amortisation is robust to a large set 
of additional tests. In particular, no evidence is found that the positive association 
between goodwill-amortisation charges, stock prices and stock returns is driven by 
scale effects. 
 
7.2.6. Value relevance of goodwill under the amortisation-and-
impairment method 
This section investigates value relevance of goodwill numbers reported under the 
combined amortisation-and-impairment method. As for the amortisation-only 
method, the actual amortisation periods used by the firms prior to the IFRS 
adoption are employed to calculate the as-if accounted amortisation charges. For a 
careful discussion of the adjustment procedure, see section 7.2.1 above. 
Hypotheses 2c and 2d predict no significant associations between amortisation 
charges and stock prices or stock returns under a combined amortisation-and-
impairment method. The results of price-book-earnings regressions and return-
earnings regressions for the period 2005-2009 are given in table 7.9 and table 7.10 
below.  
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Table 7.9 Value relevance of goodwill, amortisation charges and impairment 
losses –hypothesis 2c  
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.218 (5.93) 
1.877*** 
(8.08) 
2.205*** 
(5.94)
1.807*** 
(7.24)
-16.393** 
(-2.46)
-11.418*** 
(-3.00)
-16.681** 
 (-2.51) 
-11.404*** 
(-2.99)
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.089*** (3.64) 
4.549*** 
(8.06) 
3.120*** 
(3.63) 
4.632*** 
(7.94) 
2.398*** 
(2.77) 
4.064*** 
(7.12) 
2.421*** 
(2.78) 
4.062*** 
(7.11) 
GAMCi,t   
12.665** 
(2.43) 
4.363 
(1.35) 
12.595** 
(2.42)
9.158** 
(2.22)
12.989** 
(2.55)
9.439*** 
(2.67)
12.929** 
 (2.55) 
9.436*** 
(2.65) 
GIMCi,t - -4.488** (-2.04) 
-2.848*** (-
3.39) 
-4.520** 
(-2.04) 
-3.676*** (-
3.17) 
-3.624* 
(-1.78) 
-2.380** 
 (-2.52) 
-3.664* 
(-1.77) 
-2.389** 
(-2.53) 
(EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 + 0.694*** (2.67) 
0.649*** 
(6.45) 
0.704*** 
(2.71)
0.631*** 
(5.49)
0.616** 
(2.54)
0.583*** 
(5.41)
0.626** 
(2.57) 
0.581*** 
(5.38) 
GWCAIi,t-1 + 0.929** (2.33) 
0.907*** 
(3.40) 
0.932** 
(2.33) 
0.672** 
(2.35) 
0.628* 
(1.80) 
0.429* 
(1.79) 
0.628* 
(1.80) 
0.429* 
(1.78) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.446** (2.28) 
0.531*** 
(3.44) 
0.445** 
(2.28) 
0.532*** 
(3.43) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      1.032*** (3.29) 
0.728*** 
(3.97) 
1.045*** 
(3.32) 
0.726*** 
(3.94) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.489 (-0.87) 
-1.955 
(-1.51) 
-2.382  
(-0.83) 
-1.924 
(-1.47) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -2.712** (-2.09) 
-1.767** 
(-2.20) 
-2.686** 
(-2.04) 
-1.742** 
(-2.11) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.447**  (-2.52) 
-2.796*** 
(-3.36) 
-3.423**  
(-2.48) 
-2.775*** 
(-3.24) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.930 (-0.55) 
-0.732  
(-0.74) 
-0.933 
(-0.54) 
-0.706  
(-0.70) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.385** (-2.51) 
-2.238***  
(-2.70) 
-3.366** 
(-2.44) 
-2.213**  
(-2.59) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -6.908*** (-4.26) 
-4.070***  
(-4.02) 
-6.920*** 
(-4.16) 
-4.043***  
(-3.88) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.076** (-2.46) 
-2.307** 
(-2.02) 
-4.089** 
(-2.42) 
-2.280* 
(-1.96) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.477*** (-3.35) 
-3.068*** 
(-3.66) 
-4.443*** 
(-3.27) 
-3.047*** 
(-3.55) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.747** (-2.02) 
-1.751* 
(-1.95) 
-2.711* 
(-1.95) 
-1.712* 
(-1.86) 
N  767 715 762 716 767 720 762 716 
F-value  17.84*** 46.03*** 18.24*** 42.45*** 10.86*** 28.62*** 11.07*** 28.39*** 
Adjusted R2  0.492 0.587 0.490 0.596 0.547 0.648 0.546 0.646 
Max VIF  3.97 4.09 3.97 3.94 5.16 5.34 5.26 5.46 
Mean VIF  2.36 2.41 2.35 2.35 2.52 2.49 2.53 2.52 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-
amortisation charges of firm i, period t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment loss under the amortisation-and-impairment method of 
goodwill of firm i, period t; (EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-
impairment method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of firm i, 
time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, 
time t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
impairment losses and goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level 
(two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
 
All main variables are statistically significant. Goodwill-amortisation charges 
(GAMC) have a significantly positive coefficient and goodwill-impairment losses 
(GIMC) a significantly negative coefficient. The only exception is the coefficient 
on goodwill-amortisation charges (GAMC) which is insignificant in one out of 
eight regressions. The results are unaffected when including control variables. As 
for the previous regressions investigating goodwill-amortisation charges, these 
results contrast with the predictions. Goodwill-amortisation charges (GAMC) have 
significantly positive coefficients, not insignificant coefficients as predicted in 
hypothesis 2c.  
 
Several robustness tests are conducted to investigate whether the results are driven 
by firm-year observations from certain years, whether they are driven by firm-year 
observations with substantial book goodwill or substantial impairment losses, 
whether the results are sensitive to alternative time lags in stock prices and 
whether they are driven by potential scale effects. An inclusion of year dummies 
has limited effect on the result in table 7.9 (See table A39). The only exceptions 
are the results for goodwill-impairment losses (GIMC) and book goodwill 
(GWCAI). The coefficient on goodwill-impairment losses turns insignificant in 
one out of eight regressions, whereas book goodwill turns insignificant in 
regressions with control variables. Somewhat stronger effects are found when 
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excluding firm-year observations from the financial-recession year (See table 
A40). All the coefficients on goodwill-impairment losses (GIMC) are now 
insignificant, which is somewhat consistent with results reported previously (See 
for instance table A4). Besides, the coefficients on book goodwill are insignificant 
in regressions with control variables (GWCAI). The exclusion of firm-year 
observations with substantial book goodwill, however, seems to have a stronger 
impact. When these observations are excluded, the coefficient on goodwill-
impairment losses (GIMC) turns insignificant in four out of eight regressions, 
whereas book goodwill (GWCAI) is insignificant in all regressions (See table 
A41). When excluding large impairment losses, the coefficients on impairment 
losses turn insignificant in six out of eight regressions (See table A42). 
Surprisingly, the two coefficients that are significant have a positive, not a 
negative coefficient. These results are found exclusively when the regressions are 
run on observations without outliers.  
 
Other robustness tests concern alternative time lags in stock price, alternative scale 
proxies and additional control for size. The results are affected when stock prices 
are collected two months after the fiscal-year end (See table A43). Book goodwill 
(GWCAI) is insignificantly associated with stock prices in regressions with control 
variables. Moreover, goodwill-impairment losses (GIMC) are either barely 
significant or insignificant. When time lag increases from two months to three 
months, the results are somewhat changed. Book goodwill (GWCAI) is 
significantly positively associated with stock prices in all regressions. Goodwill-
impairment losses (GIMC) are significant in two out of eight regressions, whereas 
goodwill-amortisation charges (GAMC) are insignificant in four out of eight 
regression. In the remaining regressions, these charges are significantly positively 
associated with stock prices (See table A44). For time lag of four months, the 
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results are almost similar to those reported for time lags of three months (See table 
A45). Alternative scale proxies have limited impact on the results in table 7.9. 
When the variables are scaled by total assets, coefficients on book goodwill 
(GWCAI) turn insignificant (See A46). The results for the other main variables are 
mainly unaffected. Scaling by total sales has no impact on the results (See table 
A47). Somewhat weaker results are reported when standardised residuals from a 
regression of stock prices on size are used as dependent variable (See table A48). 
Goodwill-amortisation charges (GAMC) have a significantly positive coefficient 
in all regressions, whereas goodwill-impairment losses (GIMC) are insignificant in 
two out of eight regressions. Scale effects do not seem to be the driving force 
behind the results in table 7.9. In sum, the above results reject hypothesis 2c that 
goodwill-amortisation charges are insignificantly associated with stock prices 
under a combined amortisation-and-impairment method.  
 
Table 7.10 reveals the results from running the return-earnings regressions. These 
regressions test hypothesis 2d. The total available sample of observations is here 
identical to the non-missing sample of observations employed to test differences in 
adjusted R-squares.  
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Table 7.10 Value relevance of amortisation charges and impairment losses – 
hypothesis 2d  
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample / Non-missing sample Available sample / Non-missing sample 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive outliers Exclusive Outliers Inclusive outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  -0.053  (-1.42) 
-0.040* 
(-1.86)
-1.022*** 
(-3.43)
-0.847*** 
(-3.60) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.696*** (3.68) 
1.534*** 
(7.14) 
1.357*** 
(3.11) 
1.166*** 
(5.06) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  + 
-0.026  
(-0.10) 
0.520***  
(3.16)
0.102  
(0.40)
0.462*** 
(2.74) 
GAMCi,t  3.161*** (3.34) 
1.481***  
(2.80) 
3.440*** 
(3.61) 
1.987*** 
 (3.37) 
GAMCi,t,t-1  0.518 (0.41) 
-3.563*  
(-1.72)
0.454 
(0.38)
-0.380 
(-0.49) 
GIMCi,t - -1.571*** (-3.58) 
-3.152*** 
(-3.94) 
-1.501*** 
(-3.59) 
-2.206** 
(-2.50) 
GIMCi,t,t-1 - -0.124  (-0.89) 
-0.103  
(-0.61)
-0.111  
(-0.79)
-0.322*  
(-1.73) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t    0.005 (0.16) 
-0.034  
(-0.57) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t    0.053*** (3.76) 
0.047*** 
(4.22) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1    1.27*10
-4*** 
(3.50) 
-9.05*10-4 
(-1.23) 
RESOURCESi,t    0.033 (0.36) 
-0.049  
(-0.55) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  -0.165*** (-4.37) 
-0.183*** 
(-5.64) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.151**  (-2.47) 
-0.107**  
(-2.28) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.223*** (-5.22) 
-0.217***  
(-5.72) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t    -0.164*** (-4.56)
-0.176*** 
(-4.98) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  -0.262***  (-3.07) 
-0.205*** 
(-3.27) 
UTILITIESi,t    -0.239*** (-4.07) 
-0.215*** 
(-4.67) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  -0.105  (-1.40) 
-0.154***  
(-2.73) 
FINANCEi,t    -0.097** (-2.18) 
-0.134*** 
(-3.23) 
N  762 727 762 724 
F-value  23.15*** 21.86*** 13.46*** 8.48*** 
Adjusted R2  0.148 0.150 0.168 0.153 
Max VIF  2.36 1.55 5.21 5.06 
Mean VIF  1.66 1.31 2.14 1.95 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock return of firm i, period t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-
impairment method of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-impairment 
method of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i, 
period t; GIMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i from period t-1 
to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, 
time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER 
_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, 
INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. 
BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector.Goodwill-amortisation charges and goodwill-impairment losses take positive values in 
these regressions. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses.*indicates significant at 10% level (two-tailed), 
**indicates significant at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significant at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations having a value of Cook’s distance 
larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
 
Pre-impairment earnings (E+GIM), goodwill-amortisation charges (GAMC) and 
goodwill-impairment losses (GIMC) are significantly associated with stock returns 
in all regressions. The change variables are associated with stock returns in some 
of the regressions run on observations without outliers. The results are inconsistent 
with predictions in hypothesis 2d. Goodwill-amortisation charges are predicted to 
be insignificantly associated, not significantly positively associated with stock 
returns. 
 
A set of robustness tests are conducted. The inclusion of year-dummies has minor 
effect on the results in table 7.10. Goodwill-amortisation charges (GAMC) are 
positively associated with stock returns in three out of four regressions, whereas 
goodwill-impairment losses (GIMC) are negatively associated with stock returns 
in all four regressions (See table A49). Surprisingly, the exclusion of financial-
recession observations has no significant effect on the coefficients on goodwill-
impairment losses (GIMC) (See table A50). These coefficients are still 
significantly negative. The next two robustness tests exclude firm-year 
observations with large book goodwill or large impairment losses. Excluding 
observations with large book goodwill has some minor effect on the results in 
table 7.10 (See table A51). Goodwill-impairment losses are insignificant when 
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regression with control variables is run on observations without outliers. However, 
firm-year observations with large impairment losses have a more substantial effect 
on the significance of the coefficients on goodwill-impairment losses (See table 
A52). When firm-years with large impairment losses are excluded, the coefficient 
on impairment losses (GIMC) becomes insignificant in all regressions. Alternative 
time lags in stock returns have some impact on the results in table 7.10 (See table 
A53 to table A55). The coefficients on goodwill-amortisation charges (GAMC) 
and goodwill-impairment losses (GIMC) become less significant as the time lag 
increases from two months to three and four months. And finally, a control for 
potential scale effects by using unstandardised residuals from a regression of stock 
returns on size does not significantly affect the results in table 7.10 (See table 
A56). Goodwill-amortisation charges (GAMC) are significantly positively 
associated with stock returns, and goodwill-impairment losses (GIMC) are 
significantly negatively associated with stock returns. Thus, the results in table 
7.10 do not seem to be driven by scale effects. All in all, goodwill-amortisation 
charges are found to be positively associated with stock returns, which is 
inconsistent with predictions in hypothesis 2d. Goodwill-impairment losses are 
found to be negatively associated with stock returns, which suggests that these 
losses are incrementally value relevant to goodwill-amortisation charges.  
 
7.2.7. Value relevance of goodwill under alternative accounting methods 
Hypotheses 2e and 2f make predictions about value relevance of goodwill reported 
under alternative accounting methods. The hypotheses predict that goodwill 
numbers reported under the impairment-only method better explain variation in 
stock prices (stock returns) than goodwill numbers reported under the amortisation 
or the amortisation-and-impairment method. Four different accounting systems are 
investigated: no amortisation and impairment testing (permanent-retention 
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method), impairment testing only (current IFRS-regulation), amortisation with no 
impairment testing and a combination of amortisation and impairment testing. The 
method with no amortisation and impairment testing is included for reasons of 
completeness. Results from price-book-earnings regressions and return-earnings 
regressions under this method are reported in table A57 and table A58.  
 
Following previous value-relevance studies, adjusted R-squares are employed as 
overall measures of value relevance (Harris et al. 1994, Ali and Hwang 2000, Ball 
et al. 2003, Chambers 2007). Differences in adjusted R-squares between two 
competing regressions are tested by the Vuong test and by using z-tests based on 
bootstrapped standard errors of differences in adjusted R-squares. Both price-
book-earnings regressions and return-earnings regressions are run. Robustness 
tests are conducted to investigate whether the main results are influenced by 
alternative time lags in stock prices or stock returns and potential scale effects. 
Table 7.11 reveals the results from testing differences in adjusted R-squares on 
firm-year observations for the period 2005-2009 using the Vuong test and z-tests 
based on bootstrapped standard errors. As these tests demand the same set of firm-
year observations across regressions, the non-missing sample of 762 firm-year 
observations is employed in all price-book-earnings and return-earnings 
regressions.  
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The accounting method with no impairment losses or amortisation charges, the 
permanent-retention method, is the one providing least value-relevant information. 
Adjusted R-squares from this accounting system are significantly lower than 
adjusted R-squares from almost any other accounting system. One exception is the 
amortisation-only method. The adjusted R-square differences between this method 
and the permanent-retention method are not statistically significant when running 
return-earnings regressions. This result, however, is sensitive to the time lag in 
stock returns. With a time lag of two months subsequent to the fiscal-year end, 
these adjusted R-square differences are strongly significant, suggesting that the 
amortisation method provides more value-relevant information than the 
permanent-retention method (See table A 59). When time lag increases to three 
and four months, the differences in adjusted R-squares are generally insignificant 
for return-earnings models, but significant for price-book-earnings regressions 
(See table A60 and table A61). Taken together, these results suggest that any other 
method than permanent retention of book goodwill provides more value-relevant 
information.   
 
The results in table 7.11, however, do not provide any order of preference 
concerning the other accounting methods. Almost none of the differences in 
adjusted R-squares are statistically significant. The only exception is the 
difference in adjusted R-squares between the amortisation-only method and the 
combined amortisation-and-impairment method. This result, however, is limited to 
the return-earnings regressions when testing the difference by the Vuong test. 
Alternative time lags in stock prices and stock returns give similar results as those 
reported in table 7.11 (See table A59 to table A61). There are few significant 
differences between adjusted R-squares for any of the accounting methods other 
than permanent retention. The only exceptions are between the amortisation-only 
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method and the impairment-only method and between the amortisation-only 
method and the combined amortisation-and-impairment method. With a time lag 
of two months in stock returns, a significantly positive difference is found between 
the amortisation-only method and the impairment-only method (See table A59). 
This indicates that the amortisation-only method provides more value-relevant 
information than the impairment-only method. With a time lag of three and four 
months in stock returns, a significantly positive difference is found between the 
amortisation-and-impairment method and the amortisation-only method. These 
latter results are similar to those reported in table 7.11. They indicate that a 
combined method, allowing both amortisation and impairment testing, provides 
more value-relevant accounting numbers than a method that only allows 
amortisation (See table A60 and table A61). Evidence from prior sections, 
however, demonstrates that size is positively associated with stock prices and 
stock returns. This suggests that scale effects might be a problem. Two alternative 
remedies are employed to investigate how scale effects may impact the results in 
table 7.11. First, price-book-earnings regressions are rerun with all variables 
scaled by either total assets or total sales. Second, unstandardised residuals from a 
regression of either stock prices or stock returns on size are used as dependent 
variables. The results from scaling with total assets or total sales are reported in 
table A62. These results may provide some order of preference concerning the 
accounting methods. When the variables are scaled by total assets, there are 
indications that both the combined amortisation-and-impairment method and the 
amortisation-only method provide more value-relevant information than the 
impairment-only method and the permanent-retention method. The order of 
preference is not as evident when it comes to the amortisation-only method and 
the combined amortisation-and-impairment method. The differences in adjusted 
R-squares for these methods are insignificant. When scaling by total sales, it is 
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possible to rank the combined amortisation-and-impairment method as the best 
method when it comes to explaining variation in stock prices. The adjusted R-
square for this method is significantly higher than for any other method (See table 
A62). 
 
As for the previous value-relevance regressions, an alternative procedure to 
scaling is conducted to control for potential scale effects. The unstandardised 
residuals from regressions of stock prices or stock returns on size are used as 
dependent variables. The results from these additional tests are somewhat weaker 
than those reported in table 7.11 (See table A63). Still, the results indicate a 
pattern. There are indications that accounting methods with amortisation and/or 
impairment testing perform better in terms of value relevance than the permanent-
retention method. This result, however, is weakest for the amortisation-only 
method. The differences in adjusted R-squares between this method and the 
permanent-retention method are significant only when running price-book-
earnings regressions. The Vuong test indicates significant differences, but not the 
bootstrapped z-test. Weak results are also found for differences between the 
impairment-only method and the permanent-retention method. The adjusted R-
square differences are only statistically significant when running return-earnings 
regressions, indicating that the impairment-only method provides more value-
relevant information than the permanent-retention method. The results when 
comparing the other accounting methods are also rather weak. Most of the 
adjusted R-square differences are insignificant. The only exception is the adjusted 
R-square difference between the combined amortisation-and-impairment method 
and the amortisation-only method when running return-earnings regressions. The 
Vuong test indicates significant differences, but not the bootstrapped z-test. 
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The above results do not suggest that the impairment-only method is superior to 
the amortisation-only or the combined amortisation-and-impairment method in 
terms of value relevance. Rather, some of the results indicate that an accounting 
method with amortisation and impairment testing provides accounting numbers 
that better explain variation in stock prices and stock return. This rejects 
hypotheses 2e and 2f. Still, this does not imply that the amortisation method (or a 
combined method) is better in terms of faithful representation of economic 
fundamentals than the impairment-only method. As demonstrated in previous 
sections, the amortisation charges do not seem to reflect economic charges. They 
rather proxy for economic value or economic benefits reflected in stock prices and 
stock returns. Reporting these as charges is, therefore, inconsistent with faithful 
reporting. Goodwill-impairment losses, however, are found to be significantly 
negatively associated with stock prices and stock return, which is consistent with 
these charges reflecting economic impairment in stock prices and stock returns. 
This brings support for the impairment-only method.    
 
7.3. Empirical analysis of research question 3 and 4 
This subchapter investigates the associations between goodwill-impairment losses 
and variables for economic impairment, earnings-management incentives and 
corporate-governance mechanisms. Research question three concerns associations 
between goodwill-impairment losses, variables for economic impairment and 
earnings-management incentives. Hypotheses 3a to 3al are tested in order to 
answer research question three. Research question four concerns associations 
between abnormal-impairment losses, variables for earnings-management 
incentives and corporate-governance mechanisms. Hypotheses 4a to 4al are tested 
in order to answer research question four.  
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7.3.1. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation  
This section discusses descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation for variables 
employed in regressions investigating associations between goodwill-impairment 
losses, economic impairment, earnings-management incentives and/or corporate-
governance mechanisms. Table 7.12, table 7.13 and table 7.14 below report 
descriptive statistics for these variables. The variables are included as they are 
specified in the regressions in chapter six. Mean values, median values and 
standard deviations are reported in percentages for those variables that are 
commonly referred to as percentages. These are signified with %. Some variables 
are ln-transformed when employed in the regressions. Descriptive statistics for 
both ln-transformed and untransformed versions of these variables are reported.  
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Goodwill-impairment losses (IMP_DECISION) are reported in 21.93% of the 
firm-year observations. Average impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT%) comprise 
0.42% of total assets. When excluding financial-recession observations from the 
fiscal year 2008, the percentage of firm-years with impairment losses decreases to 
19.89%. Average impairment losses are now 0.27% of total assets. This is 
consistent with previous results, suggesting that number and size of impairment 
losses are affected by financial-recession observations. Changes in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP%) and changes in unemployment rates 
(UNEMPLOY%) are supposed to indicate macro-economic fluctuations. Average 
growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP%) over the fiscal years31 2005-2009 is 
0.53% (Median: 2.17%). If financial-recession observations are excluded, average 
growth increases to 0.87% (Median: 2.51%) for the remaining years. Average 
growth in unemployment rates (UNEMPLOY%) is 0.59% (Median: 0.36%) over 
the fiscal years 2005-2009. Excluding the financial-recession observations has 
basically no influence on average changes in unemployment rates. Mean changes 
is still 0.60% (Median: 0.35%) for the remaining years. A substantial increase in 
unemployment rates are found only in the fiscal year 2009. Percentage changes in 
this year are 1.83% (Median: 1.93%). This suggests that the financial-recession 
effect on unemployment is found in 2009 rather than 2008.  
 
Two variables of economic performance are included at the industry-sector level: 
median changes in industry-sector stock returns (INDRET%) and median 
changes in industry-sector return-on-assets (INDROA%).  The median is 
measured for industry-sector changes in stock returns and return-on-assets from 
period t-1 to t, where industry sector is defined according to the FTSE codes (For 
                                           
31 These variables are measured over the fiscal years rather than the calendar years (See subchapter 7.1 above). 
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details, see section 7.1.1 above). Average changes in industry-sector stock returns 
(INDRET%) is 9.21% (Median: 18.00%) over the fiscal years 2005-2009, 
whereas average changes in industry-sector return-on-assets (INDROA%) is  
-0.24% (Median: 0.07%). These results are strongly affected by financial-
recession observations. When excluding the fiscal year 2008, the average changes 
in industry-sector stock returns (INDRET%) increases to 20.38% (Median: 
20.80%). The same number for changes in industry-sector return-on-assets 
(INDROA%) is 0.31% (Median: 0.38%).  
 
Six variables of economic performance are included at the firm level: stock returns 
(RET), changes in total sales (SALES%), changes in pre-impairment return-on-
assets (ROA), percentage changes in operating cash flows (OCF%), and finally, 
two variables based on pre-impairment book-to-market ratios (BM, DIFFBM). 
Average stock returns (RET%) is 13.86% (Median 11.42%), and average changes 
in total sales (SALES%) is 12.97% (Median: 8.32%), both measured over the 
fiscal years 2005-2009. Average changes in return-on-assets (ROA%) and 
operating cash flows (OCF%) are both negative with values at -0.20% (Median:  
-0.13%) and -2.08% (Median: 5.81%), respectively. Changes in operating cash 
flows (OCF%), however, are strongly affected by outliers. The lowest 
observation of this variable is -46000.00% whereas the largest observation is 
26987.31%. The distribution of this variable is also heavily left skewed. This 
demonstrates the need for careful investigation of outliers when running the 
regression models. All firm-level variables are affected by observations from the 
financial-recession year 2008. Average stock returns (RET%), for instance, 
increases to 26.31% (Median: 19.68%) when observations from the financial-
recession year are excluded. Similar impact can be found for the other variables. 
Average changes in return-on-assets (ROA%) increases to 0.81% (Median: 
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0.18%), and average changes in operating-cash flows (OCF%) is 42.12% 
(Median: 3.63%) when excluding observations from this year.  
 
The last two economic variables are pre-impairment book-to-market ratios (BM) 
and an indicator variable based on book-to-market ratios (DIFFBM). The indicator 
variable equals 1 if pre-impairment book equity is higher than market value of 
equity. This variable is supposed to signify whether firms are in an impairment 
position or not. Average book-to-market ratios is 0.56 (Median: 0.37), and 11.32% 
of the firm-years have pre-impairment book equity higher than market value of 
equity (DIFFBM). And finally, 18.54% of the firm-years have impairment losses 
in at least two subsequent years (HIST).   
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Table 7.13 reports descriptive statistics for variables on earnings-management 
incentives. Four sets of variables are employed to reflect alternative incentives for 
overstating and/or understating impairment losses in goodwill. The first set 
comprises variables based on elements from the remuneration package. Three 
elements from this package are investigated: cash-bonus payments, conditional 
stocks and executive stock options. The next set of variables is supposed to reflect 
reporting strategies such as target accounting, big-bath accounting and smoothing. 
The third set comprises indicator variables for COB changes, CEO changes and 
CFO changes. The last set comprises two variables where each of these is 
supposed to reflect debt-covenant incentives and political-cost incentives.  
 
Cash-bonus payments are a more important part of total cash compensation for 
CEOs (CEO_BON%) and CFOs (CFO_BON%) than COBs (COB_BON%). For 
COBs average cash bonus constitutes only 3.67% of total cash compensation. In 
contrast, average cash bonus for CEO and CFO constitutes 37.13% (Median: 
37.57%) and 34.98% (Median: 36.59%) of total cash compensation for each of 
these managers. While CEOs and CFOs receive cash bonus in 981 firm years 
(87.43% of total firm years) and 976 firm years (86.99% of total firm years), 
COBs only receive cash bonus in 105 firm years (9.36% of total firm years). The 
picture seems somewhat different when it comes to conditional stocks. The 
average COB holds 27.76 times more conditional stocks than common stocks 
(COB_COSTOCK), whereas the average CEO has 18.02 times more conditional 
stocks (CEO_COSTOCK). This does not mean, however, that COBs hold far more 
conditional stocks than CEOs. COBs hold conditional stocks in only 114 firm 
years (10.16% of total firm years). The same numbers for CEOs and CFOs are 953 
firm years (84.94% of total firm years) and 1099 firm years (97.95% of total firm 
years). Moreover, in absolute terms, both CEOs and CFOs receive and hold far 
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more conditional stocks than COBs. While CEOs hold 893 176 conditional stocks 
on average (Median: 389 357), the average conditional stockholding of COBs is 
only 96 907 stocks (median: 0).  
 
Even more striking differences are found for executive-stock options. The average 
COB holds stock options which constitute 0.29 times of his common stocks 
(COB_OPTION). CEOs and CFOs, in contrast, have stock-option holdings which 
constitute 17.83 times (CEO_OPTION) and 17.56 times (CFO_OPTION) their 
stockholdings on average. In fact COBs hold stock options in only 120 firm years 
(10.70% of total firm years). The same numbers are 785 firm years for CEOs 
(69.96% of total firm years) and 751 firm years for CFOs (66.93% of total firm 
years). This suggests that executive-stock options are a far more important part of 
total remuneration for CEOs and CFOs than for COBs. The three next variables 
are supposed to reflect target-accounting (TARGET), big-bath accounting (BATH) 
and income-smoothing incentives (SMOOTH). The mean value of the target proxy 
gives the percentage of pre-impairment net earnings that is higher than previous 
year’s net earnings. 62.66% of the firm-year observations have pre-impairment 
earnings that are higher than last year’s earnings. The big-bath proxy (BATH) 
equals changes in pre-impairment earnings when below the median of nonzero 
negative values of pre-impairment earnings changes. Likewise, the smoothing 
proxy (SMOOTH) equals changes in pre-impairment earnings when above the 
median of nonzero positive values of these earnings changes. As expected, the 
big-bath proxy (BATH) has a substantially lower mean than the smoothing proxy 
(SMOOTH). Changes in top-management positions are covered by three indicator 
variables (COB, CEO, CFO). The frequency in top-management changes is 
rather constant across the three top-management positions. Around 12-14% of the 
firm years have changes in at least one of these three positions. The last two 
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variables are supposed to reflect debt-covenant incentives (DEBT) indicated by 
debt-to-equity ratios and political-cost incentives indicated by firm size 
(lnSIZE_MV). The debt-covenant variable equals pre-impairment debt-to-equity 
ratios at the end of the fiscal year. Book value of debt is 2.55 times larger than pre-
impairment book equity for the average firm. And finally, the average market 
value among the sample firms is 4.87*109 British Pounds (£) (SIZE_MV). 
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Table 7.14 reports descriptive statistics for variables on corporate-governance 
mechanisms. Some of these variables are ln-transformed and their descriptive 
statistics may have little interest except from providing information on their 
distribution qualities. For these variables, the descriptive statistics for 
untransformed versions are referred to here. Number of board members 
(BOARD_SIZE) ranges from five to 20 (Not tabulated) (Standard deviation: 2.51) 
with a median of nine members (Mean: 9.34). Independent non-executive 
directors (NONEXE%) constitute on average at least half of the board (Mean: 
50.77%, Median: 50.00%) and the median annual number of board meetings is 
eight (Mean: 8.71). The average stockholdings of COBs and CEOs constitute 
around 2% of total common stocks (COB_STOCKS%, CEO_STOCKS%) and 
around 0.1% for CFOs (CFO_STOCKS%). Median values of these stockholdings, 
however, are much smaller, suggesting that the distributions are positively 
skewed. 76.7% of the audit committees have financial-accounting experts 
(ACCEXP). Moreover, number of audit-committee members (AUDIT_SIZE) 
ranges from two to eight members (Results not tabulated) (Standard deviation: 
0.94) with a median of four members (Mean: 3.71). Median size of the audit 
committees is, therefore, less than half of the median size of the boards. Like for 
the board, audit-committee activity is measured by number of meetings 
(AUDIT_MEET). The median firm has four audit-committee meetings (Mean: 
4.13), which equals the half of the number of board meetings. The last three 
variables are supposed to measure corporate governance, as reflected by 
blockholders (BLOCK%, BLOCK_NUM) and cross-listing (CROSS). Average 
cumulative percentage of blockholdings is 25.92% (Median: 23.20%). Moreover, 
the median firm has three blockholders (Mean: 2.62). And finally, 11.23% of the 
firms are listed on either the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ Stock 
Exchange.  
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Table 7.15, table 7.16 and table 7.17 below report Pearson and Spearman 
correlations between goodwill-impairment losses, variables for economic 
impairment, earnings-management incentives and corporate-governance 
mechanisms.  
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Table 7.15 reports correlations between impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION), 
size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) and economic variables for 
impairment. All correlations are estimated on observations for the fiscal years 
2005-2009. Pearson correlations between impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) 
and economic variables are in most cases significant with their predicted signs. 
The results are even stronger for Spearman correlations. All these correlations are 
statistically significant and with their predicted signs. The only exception is 
changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which are insignificantly correlated 
with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION). The indicated negative association, 
however, is consistent with predictions. Percentage changes in unemployment 
rates (UNEMPLOY%) are positively correlated with the decision to report 
impairment losses (IMP_DECISION). This is as predicted. Higher unemployment 
rates indicate overall economic decline, which probably will have a negative 
impact on economic performance at the firm level, which leads to the recognition 
of more impairment losses. The result is, however, rather weak since only the 
Spearman-correlation coefficient, not the Pearson-correlation coefficient is 
statistically significant. Impairment decisions are also correlated with economic 
variables at industry-sector level and at firm level. As predicted, changes in 
industry-specific return-on-assets (INDROA) and industry-sector stock returns 
(INDRET) are negatively correlated with impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION). Both Pearson and Spearman-correlation coefficients are 
statistically significant. This suggests that impairment losses are more likely to be 
reported in industry sectors suffering from impaired return-on-assets and impaired 
stock returns.  
 
Also consistent with predictions, firm-specific stock returns (RET), percentage 
changes in total sales (SALES%), changes in return-on-assets (ROA) and 
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percentage changes in operating cash flows (OCF%) are all negatively correlated 
with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION). As for industry-sector variables, 
both Pearson and Spearman correlations are statistically significant. The 
likelihood of impairment losses is, therefore, higher in firms with impaired 
economic performance. This result holds for market-based, accounting-based and 
cash-based measures of firm performance. Impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION) are also significantly correlated with book-to-market variables 
(BM, DIFFBM). As predicted, book-to-market ratios (BM) and book-to-market 
indicators (DIFFBM) are significantly positively correlated with impairment 
decisions (IMP_DECISION). Both Pearson and Spearman correlations are 
statistically significant. The higher the pre-impairment book-to-market ratios, the 
more likely is the recognition of impairment losses. Consistent with predictions, a 
positive Pearson and Spearman correlation are found between impairment losses 
the previous year (HIST) and recognition of impairment losses the current year 
(IMP_DECISION). This is consistent with previous findings that impairment 
losses are reported in a sequence over several years.  
 
The economic variables are also significantly correlated with size of impairment 
losses (IMP_AMOUNT). Impairment losses increase in economic variables 
indicating impaired economic performance. This result holds for variables at 
macro-economic level, industry-sector level and firm level. Both Pearson and 
Spearman correlations have predicted signs, but the results for Pearson 
correlations are somewhat weaker. The correlations between macro-economic 
variables, changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and percentage changes in 
unemployment rates (UNEMPLOY%), and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT), are insignificant for Pearson correlations, but significant and 
with predicted signs for Spearman correlations. As predicted, impaired industry-
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sector return-on-assets (INDROA) and industry-sector stock returns (INDRET) 
are negatively correlated with size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). Both 
Pearson and Spearman correlations are statistically significant. As for industry-
sector variables, stock returns (RET) have significantly negative Pearson and 
Spearman correlations. Somewhat weaker results are reported for correlations 
between accounting-based performance measures, cash-based performance 
measures (SALES%, ROA, OCF%) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT). All these correlations have negative signs as predicted, but only 
Spearman correlations are statistically significant. Book-to-market variables (BM, 
DIFFBM) have positive Pearson and Spearman correlations as predicted. And 
finally, impairment losses the previous year (HIST) increase size of impairment 
losses the current year. This is demonstrated by positively significant Pearson and 
Spearman correlations.  
 
There are also some significant correlations between pairs of economic variables. 
Some of these correlations are unexpected and should be commented. The 
correlation between changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and changes in 
industry-sector stock returns (INDRET) should be significantly positive, not 
significantly negative. The same results are found for correlations between 
changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and stock returns (RET). These are 
also significantly negative, not significantly positive as expected. Some 
unexpected correlations between percentage changes in unemployment rates 
(UNEMPLOY%), changes in industry-sector stock returns (INDRET) and stock 
returns (RET) are also found. These are expected to be negative, not positive. One 
possible reason for these unexpected correlations could be that economic decline 
is reflected in macro-economic variables such as Gross Domestic Product and 
unemployment rates with a time lag relative to stock-based performance measures. 
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Additional, not tabulated, evidence supports this argument. If stock returns are 
measured over the previous fiscal year, the correlation between changes in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and stock returns (RET) is significantly positive 
(Pearson-coeff. 0.564, p-value: 0.000) as expected. Expected correlations are also 
revealed between percentage changes in unemployment rates (UNEMPLOY%) 
and stock returns (RET) (Pearson-coeff. -0.490, p-value 0.000). 
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Table 7.16 reports correlations between impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION), 
size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) and variables for earnings-
management incentives. All the correlations are estimated on observations for the 
fiscal years 2005-2009. Some of the correlations are as predicted, others are not. 
CFO cash-bonus payments (CFO_BON) are negatively correlated with 
impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION). Both Pearson and Spearman correlations 
are statistically significant. The higher the cash-bonus payments, the lower the 
probability of impairment losses, which is consistent with predictions. The 
correlations between conditional stocks, executive-stock options and impairment 
decisions are mainly insignificant. Some weak evidence is found for a positive 
correlation between COB conditional stocks (COB_COSTOCK) and impairment 
decisions (IMP_DECISION) which is inconsistent with predictions. This result, 
however, is only limited to Pearson correlations as Spearman correlations are 
insignificant. Unpredicted negative correlations are also found between target 
proxy (TARGET), smoothing proxy (SMOOTH) and impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION). A negative correlation between target proxy (TARGET) and 
impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) suggests that pre-impairment earnings 
above previous year’s pre-impairment earnings are associated with fewer, not 
more impairment losses. Similarly, a negative correlation between smoothing 
proxy (SMOOTH) and impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) suggests that 
large positive fluctuations in pre-impairment earnings are associated with fewer, 
not more impairment losses. Both results are inconsistent with predictions. The 
negative correlation between big-bath proxy (BATH) and impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION), however, is as predicted. The more pre-impairment net 
earnings fall, the more likely are impairment losses.  
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Also consistent with predictions is the positive correlation between CEO changes 
(CEO) and impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION). This result, however, is 
rather weak since only Spearman correlations are statistically significant. The 
Pearson correlation between pre-impairment debt-to-equity ratios (DEBT) and 
impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) is insignificant. The Spearman 
correlation, however, is significantly positive, which is inconsistent with 
predictions. A negative, not a positive coefficient is expected between this variable 
and the decision to report impairment losses. One possible explanation might be 
that highly leveraged firms suffer from low economic performance, which leads to 
the recognition of more, not fewer impairment losses. If this is the case, 
impairment losses are faithfully reported rather than being the result of earnings 
management. This is further investigated in the next section. Consistent with 
predictions, a positive Pearson and Spearman correlation are found between firm 
size (lnSIZE_MV) and impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION). This suggests that 
larger firms, measured by their equity-market values, report more impairment 
losses.  
 
CEO cash-bonus payments (CEO_BON) and CFO cash-bonus payments 
(CFO_BON) are negatively correlated with size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT). This is consistent with predictions. Both Pearson and Spearman 
correlations are statistically significant. COB conditional stocks 
(COB_COSTOCK) and CFO stock options (CFO_OPTION) are positively 
correlated with size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT), which is inconsistent 
with predictions. Also unpredicted, the target proxy (TARGET) is found to be 
negatively, not positively correlated with size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT). Big-bath proxy (BATH) is also found to have a negative 
correlation. This result, however, is consistent with predictions. Positive 
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correlations, consistent with predictions, are also found between CEO changes 
(CEO), CFO changes (CFO) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). 
The Spearman-correlation coefficient is significant for CEO changes, whereas the 
Pearson-correlation coefficient is significant for CFO changes. And finally, firm 
size (lnSIZE_MV) is significantly positively correlated with size of impairment 
losses (IMP_AMOUNT).  
  
There are also some significant correlations between pairs of variables for 
earnings-management incentives. Some of these correlations should be 
commented. COB cash-bonus payments, CEO cash-bonus payments and CFO 
cash-bonus payments (COB_BON, CEO_BON, CFO_BON) are significantly 
positively correlated. The only exception is the insignificant Spearman correlation 
between COB and CFO cash-bonus payments (COB_BON, CFO_BON). The 
significantly positive correlations make sense since most of the firms use the same 
bonus targets when determining cash-bonus payments to COBs, CEOs or CFOs.  
The most common targets are earnings before taxes (EBT), earnings before 
interest and taxes, (EBIT), earnings before interest, taxes and amortisation 
(EBITA) or earnings-per-share. Significantly positive Pearson and Spearman 
correlations are also found between bonus payments to CEOs (CEO_BON) and 
CFOs (CFO_BON) and the target proxy (TARGET), big-bath proxy (BATH) and 
smoothing proxy (SMOOTH). Higher net pre-impairment earnings are associated 
with more cash-bonus payments. This explains the positive correlation between 
these variables. There are also some positive correlations between CEO and CFO 
conditional stocks (CEO_COSTOCK, CFO_COSTOCK) and CEO and CFO stock 
options (CEO_OPTION, CFO_OPTION). The targets trigging conditional-stock 
awards and stock-option awards are generally a combined earnings target and 
stock-return target. Strong associations are also indicated between CEO and CFO 
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stock options (CEO_OPTION, CFO_OPTION), big-bath proxy (BATH) and 
smoothing proxy (SMOOTH). There is also some evidence suggesting that cash-
bonus payments, conditional stocks and stock options are more important parts of 
top managers’ remuneration package in larger firms than in smaller firms. CEO 
and CFO cash-bonus payments (CEO_BON, CFO_BON) increase with firm size 
(lnSIZE_MV). Similar results are found for the other elements of the remuneration 
package. Larger firms tend to rely more heavily on conditional stocks 
(CEO_COSTOCK, CFO_COSTOCK) and stock options (CEO_OPTION, 
CFO_OPTION) as part of the remuneration of CEOs and CFOs than smaller 
firms. 
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Table 7.17 reports correlations between impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION), 
size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) and variables for corporate-
governance mechanisms. Number of board members (lnBOARD_SIZE) and ratio 
of independent non-executive board members (NONEXE) are significantly 
positively correlated with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION). Only the 
Pearson correlation is significant for independent non-executive board members 
(NONEXE). 
 
This suggests that firms with larger boards and more independent board members 
generally report more impairment losses than firms with smaller boards and fewer 
independent board members. COB, CEO and CFO stockholdings (COB_STOCK, 
CEO_STOCK, CFO_STOCK), however, are not significantly correlated with 
impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION). The only exception is CEO 
stockholdings (CEO_STOCK) which are negatively correlated with impairment 
decisions. This result is limited to the Spearman correlation. Number of audit-
committee members (lnAUDIT_SIZE), audit-committee activity 
(lnAUDIT_MEET) and financial-accounting expertise (ACCEXP) on the audit 
committee are supposed to be important indicators of corporate governance. Only 
one of these variables is found to be significantly correlated with impairment 
decisions and that is audit-committee activity. This suggests that audit-committee 
size (lnAUDIT_SIZE) and financial-accounting expertise (ACCEXP) have no 
associations with impairment decisions. Audit-committee activity 
(lnAUDIT_MEET), however, is found to be positively correlated with impairment 
decisions (IMP_DECISION). This indicates that firms with more audit-committee 
activity report more impairment losses than firms with less audit-committee 
activity. Number of blockholders (lnBLOCK_NUM) and impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION) are found to be negatively correlated. This suggests that firms 
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with more blockholders are inclined to report more impairment losses. A positive 
correlation, however, is found between cross-listing on either the New York Stock 
Exchange or the NASDAQ Stock Exchange (CROSS) and impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION). A cross-listed firm is, therefore, inclined to report more 
impairment losses. 
 
Somewhat similar results are found for size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT). Board size (lnBOARD_SIZE), ratio of independent non-
executive board members (NONEXE) and board activity (lnBOARD_MEET) are 
positively correlated with size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). Board size 
(lnBOARD_SIZE) has significant Spearman correlation, whereas ratio of 
independent non-executive board members (NONEXE) and board activity 
(lnBOARD_MEET) have significant Pearson correlations. COB, CEO and CFO 
stockholdings (COB_STOCK, CEO_STOCK, CFO_STOCK) are not significantly 
correlated with size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) except CEO 
stockholdings (CEO_STOCK) which have a negative Spearman correlation. 
Among the audit-committee characteristics, the only variable with significant 
correlation is audit-committee activity (lnAUDIT_MEET). Both Pearson and 
Spearman correlations are significant. Cumulative percentage of blockholdings 
(BLOCK%) is positively correlated with size of impairment losses (Pearson 
correlation), whereas number of blockholders (lnBLOCK_NUM) is negatively 
correlated with size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) (Spearman 
correlation). A closer investigation reveals that the positive correlation between 
cumulative percentage of blockholdings (BLOCK%) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT) is driven by firms with very large cumulative blockholdings. 
The correlation between a variable which equals cumulative blockholdings if 
below 50% of common stocks and otherwise zero, and size of impairment losses, 
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is highly insignificant (Pearson-coeff. 0.010, p-value: 0.728. Results not 
tabulated). In contrast, the correlation between a variable which equals cumulative 
blockholdings if above 50% of common stocks and otherwise zero, and size of 
impairment losses, is positive and significant (Pearson-coeff. 0.054, p-value 0.075. 
Results not tabulated). And finally, positive Pearson and Spearman correlations 
are found between cross-listing (CROSS) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT). 
 
Taken together, this suggests that firms with stronger corporate-governance 
structures as indicated by more independent non-executive directors (NONEXE), 
more audit-committee activity (lnAUDIT_MEET) and cross-listing (CROSS) 
report more and larger impairment losses (IMP_DECISION, IMP_AMOUNT) 
relative to firms with weaker corporate-governance structures. There are also 
indications that firms with larger boards (lnBOARD_SIZE) report more and larger 
impairment losses (IMP_DECISION, IMP_AMOUNT), and firms with more board 
activity (lnBOARD_MEET) report larger impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). 
Moreover, firms with a higher number of blockholders report fewer and smaller 
impairment losses. The cumulative percentage of blockholdings (BLOCK%), 
however, has a positive correlation with size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT). This positive correlation is driven by firms with large 
cumulative blockholdings.  
 
There are also significant correlations between some of the corporate-governance 
variables. Board size (lnBOARD_SIZE) and audit-committee size 
(lnAUDIT_SIZE) is positively correlated. Both Pearson and Spearman correlations 
are statistically significant. A positive correlation makes sense since the audit 
committee is a sub-committee of the board. A larger board will probably have 
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more members in the audit committee. Board activity (lnBOARD_MEET) is 
negatively correlated with board size (lnBOARD_SIZE). One possible explanation 
is that larger boards generally have more committees to help performing the board 
activities. Another possible explanation is that more board members simply make 
it more difficult to schedule frequent meetings.  
 
A positive correlation is found between audit-committee activity 
(lnAUDIT_MEET) and audit-committee size (lnAUDIT_SIZE), suggesting that 
larger audit committees have more, not fewer meetings. Moreover, the ratio of 
independent non-executive directors (NONEXE) is negatively correlated with 
board size (lnBOARD_SIZE), suggesting that larger boards on average have fewer 
independent directors. One possible explanation for the negative correlation 
between board size (lnBOARD_SIZE) and independent directors (NONEXE) might 
be that independent directors are harder to recruit to board positions than 
individuals that already are affiliated to the firm. The negative correlation also 
indicates that board size is not necessarily explained by the need of more 
independent directors. Rather, board size seems to be driven by firm size since the 
correlation between board size (lnBOARD_SIZE) and firm size (lnSIZE_MV) is 
highly positively significant (Pearson-coeff. 0.527, p-value: 0.000. Results not 
tabulated). The ratio of independent non-executive directors (NONEXE) is found 
to be positively correlated with audit-committee size (lnAUDIT_SIZE). This 
makes sense since audit committees generally have independent non-executive 
directors.  
 
COB, CEO and CFO stockholdings (COB_STOCK, CEO_STOCK, CFO_STOCK) 
are all negatively correlated with ratio of independent non-executive directors 
(NONEXE), board activity (lnBOARD_MEET), audit-committee size 
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(lnAUDIT_SIZE) and audit-committee activity (lnAUDIT_MEET). All the 
Spearman correlations are statistically significant, but only some of the Pearson 
correlations. This result suggests that firms with top managers holding more 
stocks on average have weaker board structures. In contrast, cross-listed firms 
have on average stronger board structures signified by positive Pearson and 
Spearman correlations between cross-listing (CROSS), ratio of independent non-
executive directors (NONEXE), audit-committee size (lnAUDIT_SIZE) and audit-
committee activity (lnAUDIT_MEET).  
 
7.3.2. Goodwill-impairment losses, economic impairment and earnings-
management incentives 
This section investigates associations between goodwill-impairment losses and 
variables for economic impairment and earnings-management incentives (e.g. 
Francis et al. 1996, Riedl 2004). As no causal relationships can be established, 
caution should be taken when interpreting the results. Both explanatory variables 
for impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT) are investigated. The dependent variable, impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION), equals 1 for reported impairment losses and 0 otherwise. 
Regressions with binary dependent variables must be estimated by using other 
regression models than linear-parameter models with ordinary-least square 
estimation techniques. A preferable choice is the logit-regression model. This 
model is non-linear in its parameters and based on maximum-likelihood 
estimation. The dependent variable, size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT), is 
censored at zero, which makes the tobit-regression model the preferred choice. 
Arguments for the choice of the logit and the tobit-regression model are given in 
subchapter 6.3 above.  
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Two alternative sets of explanatory variables are included. The first set comprises 
variables for economic impairment, whereas the second set comprises variables 
for economic impairment and earnings-management incentives. The regressions 
are run on observations for the fiscal years 2005-2009. To investigate the effect of 
outliers, additional regressions are run on variables winsorised at 5th and 95th 
percentile (e.g. Lang et al. 2003, Christensen, Lee and Walker 2008, Barth et al. 
2008). Some variables are continuous for observations below zero (BATH) or 
above zero (SMOOTH). These are either winsorised at 5th percentile (continuous 
below zero) or winsorised at 95th percentile (continuous above zero). To reduce 
the impact of heteroscedasticity and time dependency, standard errors are White-
adjusted (White 1980) and clustered at firm level (Rogers 1993, Hoechle 2007, 
Petersen 2009).  
 
Some of the explanatory variables are strongly positively correlated, which may 
lead to multicollinearity problems and unreliable regression results. As reported in 
table 7.15, changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and percentage changes in 
unemployment rates (UNEMPLOY%) are strongly negatively correlated 
(Pearson-coeff. -0.875, p-value: 0.000). Strong positive correlations are found 
between median changes in industry-sector stock returns (INDRET) and stock 
returns (RET) (Pearson-coeff. 0.589, p-value: 0.000) and between pre-impairment 
book-to-market ratios (BM) and the pre-impairment book-to-market indicator 
(DIFFBM) (Pearson-coeff. 0.552, p-value: 0.000). Strong correlations are also 
found between some of the earnings-management incentive variables (See table 
7.16). Pearson-correlation between target proxy (TARGET) and big-bath proxy 
(BATH) is 0.400 (p-value: 0.000). A similar correlation is revealed between target 
proxy (TARGET) and smoothing proxy (SMOOTH) (Pearson-coeff. 0.441, p-
value: 0.000). Strong correlations are also found between some of the variables for 
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economic impairment and earnings-management incentives (Not tabulated). This 
is the case for correlations between changes in pre-impairment return-on-assets 
(ROA) and target proxy (TARGET) (Pearson-coeff. 0.461, p-value: 0.000), 
between changes in pre-impairment return-on-assets (ROA) and big-bath proxy 
(BATH) (Pearson-coeff. 0.627, p-value: 0.000), and finally, between changes in 
pre-impairment return-on-assets (ROA) and smoothing proxy (Pearson-coeff. 
0.428: p-value: 0.000). To mitigate serious problems of multicollinearity, it is 
necessary to leave out some of the explanatory variables in the below regressions. 
The decision to leave out variables for multicollinearity reasons, however, must be 
weighed against the risk of leaving out important explanatory variables from the 
regressions. All explanatory variables are included with reference to prior 
literature. This implies that variables should not be excluded mechanically.  
 
There are two variables that are supposed to reflect macro-economic fluctuations: 
changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and percentage changes in 
unemployment rates (UNEMPLOY%). These variables are closely related, which 
is demonstrated by a very strong positive correlation. Leaving out one of these two 
variables will probably not affect the explanatory power of the regressions. Based 
on this argument and the risk of multicollinearity, changes in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) are excluded, which means that table 7.18 below will lack test 
results for hypotheses 3a and 3b. When changes in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) are included rather than percentage changes in unemployment rates 
(UNEMPLOY%), an insignificantly negative association is found between this 
variable and impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) (t-value: -0.54) and size of 
impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) (t-value: -0.76), which suggests that 
hypotheses 3a and 3b should be rejected. These results are from regressions run on 
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explanatory variables listed in table 7.18 exclusive percentage changes in 
unemployment rates (UNEMPLOY%) (Results are not tabulated).  
 
Changes in industry-sector stock returns (INDRET) and stock returns (RET) are 
also strongly correlated. At the industry-sector level, there are two variables: 
changes in industry-sector stock returns (INDRET) and changes in industry-
sector return-on-assets (INDROA). These serve two different purposes. Changes 
in industry-sector stock returns (INDRET) are supposed to reflect market-based 
return-on-equity at the industry-sector level, whereas changes in industry-sector 
return-on-assets (INDROA) are supposed to reflect accounting-based return-on-
assets at this level. The strong correlation between changes in industry-sector 
stock returns (INDRET) and firm-stock returns (RET) signifies that these two 
variables share almost the same information. Taken together with potential 
multicollinearity problems, this suggests that one of these two variables should be 
excluded. At the margin, it is reasonable to believe that firm-stock returns (RET) 
are a more important indicator of economic impairment in goodwill than changes 
in industry-sector stock returns (INDRET), which implies that industry-sector 
stock returns should be excluded from the below regressions. This means that 
table 7.18 below lacks test results for hypotheses 3g and 3h. If changes in 
industry-sector stock returns (INDRET) are included rather than firm-stock 
returns (RET), an insignificantly negative association is found between this 
variable and impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) (t-value: -0.54) and size of 
impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT)  (t-value: -0.83). These results are from 
regressions run with explanatory variables listed in table 7.18 exclusive firm-stock 
returns (RET) (Results are not tabulated). The above results suggest that 
hypotheses 3g and 3h should be rejected.  
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Strong correlations are also revealed between pre-impairment book-to-market 
ratios (BM) and the pre-impairment book-to-market indicator variable (DIFFBM). 
The indicator variable equals 1 if pre-impairment book equity is higher than 
market value of equity. This suggests that the pre-impairment book-to-market 
ratios (BM) and the indicator variable (DIFFBM) share almost the same 
information. As pre-impairment book-to-market (BM) is a continuous variable, not 
a binary variable, this variable is chosen. Regressions including the indicator 
variable (DIFFBM) rather than the pre-impairment book-to-market ratios (BM), 
reveal an insignificantly positive association between this variable and impairment 
decisions (IMP_DECISION) (t-value: 1.45) and size of impairment losses (t-value: 
1.17). These results are found when the regressions are run with explanatory 
variables in table 7.18 exclusive pre-impairment book-to-market ratios (BM) 
(Results are not tabulated).  
 
The target proxy (TARGET) is strongly correlated with the other reporting-strategy 
variables (BATH, SMOOTH). This variable is a crude proxy for target-accounting 
incentives. The variable equals 1 when pre-impairment net earnings the current 
year is above previous year’s net earnings. The big-bath proxy (BATH) and the 
smoothing proxy (SMOOTH) are believed to be better at reflecting earnings-
management incentives to overstate impairment losses, which suggests that the 
target proxy (TARGET) rather than the two other proxies (BATH, SMOOTH) 
should be excluded from the below regressions. If the target proxy (TARGET) is 
included rather than the two other reporting-strategy variables (BATH, SMOOTH), 
an insignificantly negative association is revealed between this variable and 
impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) (t-value: -0.33) and size of impairment 
losses (IMP_AMOUNT) (t-value: -0.40). These results are found when the 
regressions are run with explanatory variables in table 7.18 exclusive the big-bath 
  
401 
proxy (BATH) and the smoothing proxy (SMOOTH) (Results are not tabulated). 
The above results suggest that hypotheses 3aa and 3ab should be rejected.  
 
And finally, some strong correlations are also revealed between changes in pre-
impairment return-on-assets (ROA) and reporting-strategy variables (TARGET, 
BATH, SMOOTH). At the firm level, there are five (six)32 variables for firm-
specific economic performance. There are two market-based proxies (RET, BM), 
two accounting-based proxies (SALES%, ROA) and one cash-based proxy 
(OCF%). Each of the two accounting-based proxies (SALES%, ROA) is 
believed to provide unique economic information. Percentage changes in total 
sales (SALES%) are supposed to measure changes in gross-recoverability from 
one year to another, whereas changes in return-on-assets (ROA) are supposed to 
measure changes in net performance on assets from one year to another. This 
suggests that each of these variables is important as proxies for economic 
performance and should be included in the below regressions.  
 
Regressions in table 7.18 below are run with and without winsorised variables. 
Two sets of explanatory variables are included: variables for economic 
impairment, and variables for economic impairment and earnings-management 
incentives. The below discussion will emphasise results from regressions 
including variables for both economic impairment and earnings-management 
incentives.  
  
                                           
32 It is debatable whether a sequence of impairment losses indicates economic impairment or earnings management.  
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Table 7.18 Goodwill-impairment losses, economic impairment and earnings-
management incentives – hypotheses 3c to 3al33 
  
 Impairment-decision Size of impairment losses 
  Economic Economic and EM Economic Economic and EM 
Test variables Pred Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Intercept  -2.051*** (-15.02) 
-2.036*** 
(-12.42) 
-6.517*** 
(-4.18) 
-6.508*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.065*** 
(-4.77) 
-0.016*** 
(-9.57) 
-0.119*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.033** 
(-2.83) 
UNEMPLOY%i,t,t-
1 
+ 0.177 
(1.54) 
0.155 
(1.29) 
0.273* 
(1.94) 
0.223 
(1.56) 
0.006** 
(2.03) 
0.002** 
(2.18) 
0.007** 
(2.49) 
0.003** 
(2.47) 
INDROAi,t,t-1 - -9.646* 
(-1.91) 
-4.949 
(-0.65) 
-10.11* 
(-1.77) 
-7.398 
(-0.85) 
-0.154 
(-1.21) 
-0.029 
(-0.58) 
-0.109 
(-1.27) 
-0.044 
(-0.88) 
RETi,t - -0.698*** 
(-3.42) 
-0.875*** 
(-3.44) 
-0.710*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.759*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.024*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.008*** 
(-4.05) 
-0.017*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.82) 
SALES%i,t,t-1 - -0.002 
(-0.68) 
-0.006 
(-1.24) 
-0.005 
(-1.15) 
-0.006 
(-1.15) 
-3.31*10-5 
(-0.38) 
-5.02*10-5 
(-1.45) 
-1.56*10-4* 
(-1.75) 
-6.31*10-5* 
(-1.73) 
ROAi,t,t-1 - 0.171 
(0.18) 
-0.455 
(-0.26) 
0.228 
(0.19) 
1.169 
(0.31) 
0.015 
(0.50) 
0.004 
(0.31) 
0.007 
(0.32) 
0.004 
(0.18) 
OCF%i,t,t-1 - -1.53*10
-4 
(-0.91) 
-0.002 
(-1.41) 
-1.13*10-4* 
(-1.88) 
-0.002* 
(-1.67) 
-7.67*10-7**
(-2.63) 
-1.00*10-5 
(-1.17) 
-5.78*10-7*** 
(-2.77) 
-1.36*10-5 
(-1.53) 
BMi,t + 0.323** 
(2.93) 
0.554* 
(2.45) 
0.417*** 
(3.29) 
0.792*** 
(2.76) 
0.010*** 
(3.19) 
0.005*** 
(2.82) 
0.008*** 
(3.24) 
0.005*** 
(2.70) 
HISTi,t + 2.064*** 
(10.46) 
2.014*** 
(10.04) 
2.108*** 
(9.07) 
2.040*** 
(8.66) 
0.049*** 
(4.19) 
0.012*** 
(8.22) 
0.033*** 
(6.50) 
0.0120*** 
(7.68) 
COB_BONi,t -   1.604** 
(2.47) 
1.733 
(1.38) 
  0.029** (2.16) 
0.012 
(1.43) 
CEO_BONi,t -   0.277 (1.01)
2.819*** 
(2.63)   
0.004 
(1.45) 
0.020** 
(3.04)
CFO_BONi,t -   -1.214* (-1.89) 
-3.714*** 
(-3.18)   
-0.038*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.029*** 
(-4.14) 
COB_ 
COSTOCKi,t 
- 
  
-0.450 
(-1.40) 
-0.459 
(-0.25)   
-0.005 
(-0.71) 
-0.011 
(-0.85) 
CEO_ 
COSTOCKi,t 
- 
  
-2.11*10-5 
(-0.52) 
0.010 
(0.37)   
-9.52*10-7 
(-0.92) 
8.02*10-5 
(0.48) 
CFO_ 
COSTOCKi,t 
- 
  
-0.003 
(-1.12) 
-0.016 
(-1.34)   
-7.32*10-5** 
(-2.15) 
-5.34*10-5 
(-0.66) 
COB_OPTIONi,t -   -0.154 (-1.53)
-0.080 
(-0.11)   
-0.007 
(-1.28) 
9.60*10-4 
(0.18)
CEO_OPTIONi,t -   0.003 (1.09) 
-0.018 
(-0.87)   
2.02*10-5 
(1.01) 
-8.82*10-5 
(-0.60) 
CFO_OPTIONi,t -   0.002** (2.15)
0.009 
(1.03)   
8.56*10-5*** 
(3.28) 
8.88*10-5 
(1.47)
BATHi,t -   -0.134 (-0.07)
-5.537 
(-1.07)   
0.011 
(0.33) 
-0.017 
(-0.51)
SMOOTHi,t +   0.259 (1.08) 
0.230 
(0.80)   
0.008* 
(1.71) 
0.002 
(1.29) 
COBi,t +   -0.584* (-1.69) 
-0.488 
(-1.46)   
-0.009* 
(-1.69) 
-0.003 
(-1.51) 
CEOi,t +   0.303 (1.04) 
0.322 
(1.07)   
0.007 
(1.56) 
0.003 
(1.61) 
CFOi,t +   0.111 (0.37) 
-0.004 
(-0.01)   
0.002 
(0.36) 
-3.20*10-4 
(-0.18) 
DEBTi,t -   0.006 (0.64) 
0.120*** 
(2.77)   
1.07*10-4 
(1.12) 
5.79*10-4** 
(2.24) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t +   0.209*** (2.93) 
0.196** 
(2.57)   
0.004** 
(2.46) 
8.99*10-4* 
(1.77) 
Table continues on next page. 
 
  
                                           
33 No test results are provided for hypotheses 3a and 3b, 3g and 3h, and 3aa and 3ab.  
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Table continues from previous page. 
N  1068 1068 869 869 1068 1068 869 869 
Log-likelihood  -475.347 -481.598 -364.102 -370.240 122.079 408.981 192.989 363.601 
Wald Chi2-test  149.35*** 154.43*** 181.49*** 173.82*** 3.28*** 13.97*** 4.56***  6.09*** 
Pseudo R2  0.161 0.149 0.209 0.195 -1.929 -0.226 -1.359 -0.318 
Max VIF  1.29 1.51 1.85 4.36 1.29 1.51 1.85 4.36 
Mean VIF  1.11 1.24 1.24 1.79 1.11 1.24 1.24 1.79 
IMP_DECISIONi,t equals 1 if firm i reports goodwill-impairment losses for period t; otherwise 0; IMP_AMOUNTi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses (a 
positive amount) of firm i, period t, scaled by total assets at time t-1; UNEMPLOY%i,t,t-1 is average-monthly percentage changes in unemployment rates 
from period t-1 to t; INDROAi,t,t-1 is median changes in industry-sector pre-impairment return-on-assets from period t-1 to t where industry-sector is defined 
according to FTSE codes to which firm i belongs; RETi,t is stock returns of firm i, period t; SALES%i,t,t-1 is percentage changes in total sales of firm i, from 
period t-1 to t; ROAi,t,t-1 is changes in pre-impairment return-on-assets of firm i, from period t-1 to t; OCF%i,t,t-1 is percentage changes in operating cash 
flows of firm i, from period t-1 to t; BMi,t is pre-impairment book-to-market ratios of firm i, time t; HISTi,t  equals 1 if goodwill-impairment losses are 
reported for firm i, period t-1; otherwise 0; COB_BONi,t is cash-bonus payment to COB of firm i period t, scaled by total cash compensation to COB period t; 
CEO_BONi,t is cash-bonus payment to CEO of firm i period t, scaled by total cash compensation to CEO period t; CFO_BONi,t is cash-bonus payment to 
CFO of firm i period t, scaled by total cash compensation to CFO period t; COB_COSTOCKi,t is number of conditional stocks held by COB of firm i time t, 
scaled by number of common stocks held by COB at time t; CEO_COSTOCKi,t is number of conditional stocks held by CEO of firm i time t, scaled by 
number of common stocks held by CEO at time t; CFO_COSTOCKi,t is number of conditional stocks held by CFO of firm i time t, scaled by number of 
common stocks held by CFO at time t; COB_OPTi,t is number of executive stock options held by COB of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks 
held by COB at time t; CEO_OPTi,t is number of executive stock options held by CEO of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks held by CEO at 
time t; CFO_OPTi,t is number of executive stock options held by CFO of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks held by CFO at time t; BATHi,t is 
changes in pre-impairment earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t, scaled by total assets at time t-1, when below the median of nonzero negative values of this 
variable; otherwise 0; SMOOTHi,t is changes in pre-impairment earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t, scaled by total assets at time t-1, when above the 
median of nonzero positive values of this variable; otherwise 0; COBi,t equals 1 if firm i changes COB in period t; otherwise 0; CEOi,t equals 1 if firm i 
changes CEO in period t; otherwise 0; CFOi,t equals 1 if firm i changes CFO in period t; otherwise 0; DEBTi,t is pre-impairment debt-to-equity ratio of firm 
i, period t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i time t. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level 
(two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). To investigate the effect of outliers, all the 
continuous variables are winsorised at 5th and 95th percentile.  
 
Table 7.18 reports associations between goodwill-impairment losses, variables for 
economic impairment and variables for earnings-management incentives. Both 
logit and tobit regressions are run. Tobit-regression coefficients can be interpreted 
in much the same way as ordinary-least-square regression coefficients (Gujarati 
2003:618). Logit-regression coefficients, however, cannot. In such cases marginal 
effects should be calculated. The marginal effect of one explanatory variable on 
the dependent binary variable is calculated by holding the other explanatory 
variables constant at relevant values. For the purpose of this investigation, 
however, sign and significance of the associations are of interest, not the absolute 
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and relative strength of the associations. There is, therefore, no need for 
calculating and interpreting marginal effects. 
 
The above regressions are supposed to test four sets of hypotheses: Two sets of 
hypotheses for associations between impairment decisions, size of impairment 
losses and variables expected to reflect economic impairment, and two sets of 
hypotheses for associations between impairment decisions, size of impairment 
losses and variables expected to reflect earnings-management incentives. 
Economic variables are included at three aggregation levels: macro-economic 
level, industry-sector level and firm level. There is only one variable included at 
the macro-economic level: percentage changes in unemployment rates 
(UNEMPLOY%). The association between this variable and impairment 
decisions (IMP_DECISION) is significantly positive (t-value: 1.94) when 
regression is run on non-winsorised variables (See table 7.18). This suggests that 
impairment losses are more likely reported in fiscal years with increased 
unemployment. The result is to some extent affected by extreme observations. 
Winsorising turns the association barely insignificant (t-value: 1.56). Stronger 
results are found for the associations between percentage changes in 
unemployment rates (UNEMPLOY%) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT). Coefficients are significantly positive when the regression is 
run on winsorised and non-winsorised variables. This suggests that large increases 
in unemployment are associated with large impairment losses in goodwill, which 
is as predicted. The results are also robust to the exclusion of financial-recession 
observations (See table B1), but not robust to the exclusion of observations with 
large goodwill-impairment losses (See table B2). The results are also unaffected 
by alternative specifications of some of the variables for earnings-management 
incentives (See table B3). When changes rather than levels of cash-bonus 
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payments are included as bonus-incentive variables, the coefficients on percentage 
changes in unemployment rates (UNEMPLOY%) remain significantly positive. 
Taken together, these results support hypotheses 3c and 3d that percentage 
changes in unemployment rates (UNEMPLOY%) are positively associated with 
impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT).  
 
Like at the macro-economic level, one economic variable is included at the 
industry-sector level: changes in industry-sector return-on-assets (INDROA). A 
significantly negative association is found between this variable and impairment 
decisions (IMP_DECISION) (See table 7.18). The association is insignificant 
when variables are winsorised and when financial-recession observations are 
excluded (See table B1). The association, however, turns significantly negative 
again for non-winsorised variables when the firm-year observations exclude 
observations with large impairment losses (See table B2). Similar results to those 
reported in table 7.18 and table B2 are also found when alternative specifications 
are employed for bonus-incentive variables (See table B3). Taken together, these 
results provide some support for hypothesis 3e. No significant association, 
however, is found between changes in industry-sector return-on-assets 
(INDROA) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) (See table 7.18). The 
only exception is when variables are non-winsorised and the regression is run on a 
sample that excludes large impairment losses (See table B2). This last result is too 
weak to support a negative association between changes in industry-sector return-
on-assets (INDROA) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). Hypothesis 
3f is, therefore, rejected.  
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Several of the firm-level economic variables are found to be associated with 
impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT) (See table 7.18). Impairment losses are more likely and 
generally larger in firms with impaired stock returns (RET). The associations are 
significantly negative in all regressions, which means that they are unaffected by 
winsorising. These results are also robust to the exclusion of financial-recession 
observations (See table B1), robust to alternative specifications of bonus-incentive 
variables (See table B3) and rather robust to the exclusion of observations with 
large impairment losses (See table B2). Hypotheses 3i and 3j are, therefore, 
supported. A significantly negative association is also found between percentage 
changes in total sales (SALES%) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) 
(See table 7.18). This indicates that impairment losses are larger in firms where 
total sales have fallen relative to the previous year. The association between 
percentage changes in total sales (SALES%) and impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION), however, is insignificant. These results are more supportive to 
the hypotheses when regressions are run on observations excluding financial-
recession observations. Percentage changes in total sales (SALES%) are found to 
be significantly negatively associated with impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) when these 
observations are excluded (See table B1). Similar results are found when changes 
rather than levels of cash-bonus payments are used as explanatory variables (See 
table B3). Taken together, these results provide some support for hypothesis 3l, 
suggesting a negative association between percentage changes in total sales 
(SALES%) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). Hypothesis 3k, 
however, should be rejected. No significantly negative association is found 
between percentage changes in total sales (SALES%) and impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION).  
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Changes in pre-impairment return-on-assets (ROA) are not found to have any 
significant association with either impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) or size 
of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). All the coefficients are insignificant in 
table 7.18. These results are also robust to the exclusion of observations for the 
financial-recession year (See table B1) and observations with large impairment 
losses (See table B2). Insignificant coefficients are also found when changes 
rather than levels of bonus-incentive variables are employed (See table B3). These 
results reject hypotheses 3m and 3n that changes in pre-impairment return-on-
assets are negatively associated with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and 
size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). More supportive results are found for 
percentage changes in operating cash flows (OCF%). A significantly negative 
association is found between this variable and impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) (See table 
7.18). Excluding the financial-recession observations, turns the association 
between percentage changes in operating cash flows (OCF%) and impairment 
decisions (IMP_DECISION) insignificant in most of the regressions (See table 
B1). The association between this variable and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT) is significant, however, for winsorised variables (See table B1). 
For observations excluding large impairment losses, all associations are 
significantly negative (See table B2). Supportive results are also found when 
alternative specifications bonus-incentive variables are employed (See table B3). 
Taken together, these results provide support for hypotheses 3o and 3p, suggesting 
that changes in operating cash flows are negatively associated with 
(IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). Significantly 
positive associations are found between pre-impairment book-to-market ratios 
(BM), impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT) (See table 7.18). This suggests that firms with higher pre-
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impairment book-to-market ratios generally report more and larger impairment 
losses. These results are rather robust to the exclusion of financial-recession 
observations (See table B1), the exclusion of large impairment losses (See table 
B2) and alternative specifications of bonus-incentive variables (See table B3). 
Hypotheses 3q and 3r are, therefore, supported, suggesting positive associations 
between pre-impairment book-to-market ratios (BM), impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). 
 
Strong evidence is found for a positive association between previous year’s 
impairment losses (HIST) and current year’s impairment losses 
(IMP_DECISION). If the firm reports impairment losses in goodwill one year, it is 
likely that this firm will report impairment losses the next year. A positive 
association is also found between previous year’s impairment losses (HIST) and 
size of current year’s impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). This suggests that not 
only the likelihood of reporting an impairment loss increases when impairment 
losses are reported the previous year, but also the likelihood of reporting relatively 
larger impairment losses. Moreover, these results are unaffected by the exclusion 
of financial-recession observations (See table B1), the exclusion of observations 
with large impairment losses in goodwill (See table B2) and alternative 
specifications of bonus-incentive variables (See table B3). Hypotheses 3s and 3t 
are, therefore, supported. All in all, the results in table 7.18 along with additional 
results in appendix B (table B1 to table B3) support the notion that goodwill-
impairment losses reported under current IFRS reflect economic impairment in 
goodwill. Strong support are found for predicted associations between variables 
for economic impairment (measured at three different aggregation levels), the 
decision to report impairment losses and size of reported impairment losses.  
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The associations between variables for earnings-management incentives and 
impairment losses are generally insignificant (See table 7.18). Given that these 
variables reflect incentives to misrepresent impairment losses in goodwill, the 
insignificant associations provide further support for the notion that goodwill-
impairment losses reflect economic impairment in goodwill rather than earnings-
management incentives. The included incentive variables can be categorised as 
remuneration variables (cash-bonus payments, conditional stocks and stock 
options), reporting-strategy variables (big-bath accounting and income 
smoothing), management-change variables and variables reflecting debt-covenant 
incentives and political-cost incentives34. Table 7.18 demonstrates some predicted 
and some unpredicted associations between remuneration variables and 
impairment losses. Cash bonus payments to COB, CEO and CFO (BON_COB, 
BON_CEO, BON_CFO) are supposed to be negatively associated with impairment 
decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). 
Consistent with these predictions, CFO cash-bonus payments (CFO_BON) are 
negatively associated with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and 
negatively associated with size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) (See table 
7.18). A negative association is also revealed between these cash-bonus payments 
and impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT) when financial-recession observations are excluded (See table 
B1). Similar results are found when large impairment losses are excluded (See 
table B2) and when conditional stocks and stock options are scaled by number of 
outstanding stocks rather than the stocks held by the managers (See table B3).  
 
                                           
34 The extent to which firm size (lnSIZE_MV) truly reflect political-cost incentives is, however, debatable and will 
be discussed later in this section. 
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Changes rather than levels of cash-bonus payments are employed as alternative 
specifications for the cash-bonus variables. Changes in cash-bonus payments are 
supposed to reflect the extent to which the bonus target is reached the current 
fiscal year relative to the previous fiscal year. An increase in cash-bonus payments 
the current year suggests that net earnings35 are higher relative to the threshold of 
bonus payment this year than the previous year. A decrease in cash-bonus 
payments the current year suggests the opposite that net earnings are lower 
relative to the threshold for cash-bonus payments this year than the previous year. 
Changes in CFO cash-bonus payments (CFO_BON) are negatively associated 
with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT) (See table B3). This suggests that increases in CFO cash-bonus 
payments are less likely associated with impairment losses and if impairment 
losses are reported, relatively smaller impairment losses, which is consistent with 
expectations. Taken together, the above results provide some support to 
hypotheses 3u and 3v concerning CFO cash-bonus payments.  
 
The results for COB cash-bonus payments (COB_BON), however, are surprising. 
These cash-bonus payments are positively associated with impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) (See table 
7.18). The higher the COB cash-bonus payment, the more likely is the incidence 
of goodwill-impairment losses and relatively larger goodwill-impairment losses. 
These results are sensitive to winsorising and the exclusion of financial-recession 
observations. When variables are winsorised at 5% level, the associations turn 
insignificant (See table 7.18). The same is the case when financial-recession 
observations are excluded (See table B1). Firm-year observations with large 
impairment losses, however, do not seem to have any substantial effect on the 
                                           
35 This is based on the premise that net earnings represent the target variable for bonus payments. 
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results in table 7.18. The associations are still positive when these observations are 
excluded (See table B2). The coefficients on changes in COB cash-bonus 
payment, however, are insignificant (See table B3).  
 
The unpredicted results need further investigation. COB cash-bonus payments are 
rather rare. These payments are only found in 105 out of 1109 firm-years (9.47%) 
with available cash-bonus information. The reason is that COBs generally receive 
board fees and expense benefits rather than bonus payments. This makes it 
interesting to investigate whether there is something peculiar about COBs 
receiving cash-bonus payments. A regression is run with COB cash-bonus 
payments (COB_BON) as dependent variable on two explanatory variables 
reflecting COB characteristics. As the dependent variable, COB cash-bonus 
payments (COB_BON), is continuous and censored at zero, a tobit regression is 
run. COB characteristics are measured by an indicator variable for COB-CEO 
duality and a variable for COB tenure, which equals the natural logarithm of the 
number of years the COB has held his current position. Both COB-CEO duality (t-
value: 2.31) and COB tenure (t-value: 2.61) are positively associated with COB 
cash-bonus payments (Results are not tabulated). Cash-bonus payments are 
generally given to COBs that simultaneously function as CEOs and to COBs that 
have held their position for a longer period of time than the average COB.  
 
Cash-bonus payments are expected to be positively associated with conventional 
performance measures. Stock returns and earnings-per-share are included as 
additional variables in the above tobit regression to investigate whether COB cash-
bonus payments are explained by these performance measures. The inclusion of 
these variables have no effect on the positive association between COB cash-
bonus payments (COB_BON), COB-CEO duality (t-value: 2.22) and COB tenure 
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(t-value: 2.58) (Results are not tabulated). Even more striking, these performance 
measures have no significantly positive association with COB cash-bonus 
payments. The coefficients on stock returns (t-value: 1.57) and earnings-per-share 
(t-value: 1.16) are insignificantly positive (Results are not tabulated). Moreover, 
the above results are robust to alternative specifications of these performance 
measures. To remove any effect of goodwill-impairment losses, a pre-impairment 
earnings measure is employed rather than a post-impairment measure. COB cash-
bonus payments are, still, positively associated with COB-CEO duality (t-value: 
2.23) and COB tenure (t-value: 2.58) (Results are not tabulated). The coefficient 
on pre-impairment earnings, however, is insignificant (t-value: 1.10). Similar 
results are revealed when these cash-bonus payments are regressed on annual 
changes in the performance measures (Results are not tabulated). Thus, these cash-
bonus payments cannot be explained by conventional performance measures. 
Rather, the above results suggest that these bonus payments are explained by the 
significant concentration of power on the hands of some COBs.   
 
Positive associations are also found between CEO cash-bonus payments 
(CEO_BON), impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment 
losses (IMP_AMOUNT) (See table 7.18). These associations are only significantly 
positive when variables are winsorised. A positive association is also found 
between these payments and size of impairment losses when winsorised variables 
are run on observations excluding the financial-recession year (See table B1). A 
significantly positive association is also found between changes in CEO cash-
bonus payments (CEO_BON) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) 
(See table B3). The associations, however, are insignificant when observations 
with large impairment losses are excluded (See table B2). In contrast to COB 
cash-bonus payments, CEO cash-bonus payments (CEO_BON) are not associated 
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with COB-CEO duality (t-value: -1.47) and CEO tenure (t-value: 0.83). Besides, 
there are significantly positive associations between these CEO cash-bonus 
payments (CEO_BON), stock returns (t-value: 2.79) and earnings-per-share (t-
value: 3.21) (Results are not tabulated). These results are also robust to alternative 
specifications of net earnings such as changes rather than levels of net earnings per 
share or the use of pre-impairment earnings per share rather than post-impairment 
earnings per share. The results are unchanged. The positive association between 
CEO cash-bonus payments and impairment losses remains, therefore, a puzzle. 
 
The other elements of the remuneration package are generally insignificantly 
associated with impairment losses (See table 7.18). There are some exceptions. 
CFO conditional stocks (CFO_COSTOCK) are found to be negatively associated 
with size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) for non-winsorised variables (See 
table 7.18). This is also the case if changes rather than levels of cash-bonus 
payments are included as explanatory variables (See table B3). A significantly 
negative association, however, is not found if variables are run on observations 
excluding financial-recession observations (See table B1) or when observations 
with large goodwill-impairment losses are excluded (See table B2). This provides 
some weak support for hypothesis 3w and 3x, suggesting a negative association 
between CFO conditional stocks (CFO_COSTOCK), impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). Some 
unpredicted positive associations are found between CEO conditional stocks 
(CEO_COSTOCK), impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of 
impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT). These results are limited to some of the 
regressions run on observations excluding financial-recession observations or 
observations excluding large impairment losses (See table B1 and table B2). This 
suggests that hypothesis 3w and 3x should be rejected for COB conditional stocks 
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and CEO conditional stocks. Some weak support, however, is found for a negative 
association between CFO conditional stocks and impairment losses in goodwill. 
 
Some associations between stock options and impairment losses are unpredicted, 
others are consistent with predictions. Some weak evidence is found for negative 
associations between COB stock options (COB_OPTION) and size of impairment 
losses (IMP_AMOUNT). These significantly negative associations, however, are 
limited to regressions excluding firm-year observations with large goodwill-
impairment losses (See table B2). There is also found some weak evidence of a 
negative association between these stock options and impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION) when financial-recession observations are excluded. Some 
unpredicted positive associations are found when changes rather than levels of 
cash-bonus payments are included as explanatory variables (See table B3). These 
results are to some extent sensitive, however, to the exclusion of financial-
recession observations (See table B1) and the exclusion of firm-year observations 
with large impairment losses (See table B2). Taken together, the above results 
suggest that hypotheses 3y and 3z should be rejected.  
 
The reporting-strategy variables (BATH, SMOOTH) are generally insignificantly 
associated with impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment 
losses (IMP_AMOUNT). The only exception is the positive association between 
smoothing proxy (SMOOTH) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) (See 
table 7.18), which is consistent with predictions. High positive fluctuations in pre-
impairment net earnings are expected to be associated with larger impairment 
losses. The association, however, is only significant for non-winsorised variables. 
Similar results are found when financial-recession observations are excluded (See 
table B1) and when changes rather than levels of cash-bonus payments are 
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employed (See table B3). However, the coefficient on the smoothing proxy 
(SMOOTH) turns insignificant if observations with large impairment losses are 
excluded (See table B2). This suggests that the associations between the 
smoothing proxy (SMOOTH) and impairment losses are not very robust. The 
associations between the big-bath proxy and impairment losses are all 
insignificant (See table 7.18 and table B1 to table B3). Taken together, the above 
results provide some weak support for hypothesis 3af, suggesting a positive 
association between smoothing incentives and size of impairment losses. 
Hypothesis 3ae, suggesting a positive association between smoothing incentives 
(SMOOTH) and impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION), however, is rejected. 
Hypotheses 3ac and 3ad, suggesting a negative association between big-bath 
incentives (BATH) and impairment losses (IMP_DECISION, IMP_AMOUNT), 
should also be rejected. 
 
COB changes (COB) are found to be negatively associated with impairment 
decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) for 
non-winsorised variables (See table 7.18). These results, however, are sensitive to 
the exclusion of financial-recession observations and observations with large 
impairment losses (See table B1 and table B2). The coefficient on COB changes 
(COB) is insignificant or barely insignificant in these regressions. Some of these 
results are inconsistent with predictions in hypotheses 3ag and 3ah. Top 
management changes are expected to be associated with more and larger 
impairment losses. Some weak evidence consistent with these predictions, 
however, is reported for CEO changes (CEO). The association between these 
changes and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) is barely insignificant  
(t-value: 1.61) when the regression is run for winsorised variables (See table 7.18). 
When changes rather than levels of cash-bonus payments are used as explanatory 
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variables, the association becomes significantly positive (See table B3). The 
association is insignificant, however, when financial-recession observations and 
observations with large impairment losses are excluded (See table B1 and table 
B2). Taken together, this provides some support for hypothesis 3ah that CEO 
changes (CEO) are positively associated with size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT).  
 
Debt-covenant incentives measured by pre-impairment debt-to-equity ratios 
(DEBT) are found to be positively associated with impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses (IMP_AMOUNT) when 
regressions are run on winsorised variables (See table 7.18). This unpredicted 
positive association is robust to the exclusion of financial-recession observations 
(See table B1), the exclusion of observations with large impairment losses (See 
table B2) and when changes rather than levels of cash-bonus payments are 
included in the regressions (See table B3). The positive association between debt-
to-equity and impairment losses may indicate financial distress. Firms exposed to 
financial distress may have high leverage and report more and larger impairment 
losses. Little support, however, is found for this claim. When debt-to-equity 
(DEBT) is regressed on firm-level performance variables, such as stock returns 
(RET), percentage changes in total sales (SALES%), changes in pre-impairment 
return-on-assets (ROA) and percentage changes in operating cash flows 
(OCF%), all associations are insignificant (Results are not tabulated). This is 
somewhat different for firms having high debt-to-equity ratios. An indicator 
variable is generated which equals 1 when debt-to-equity ratios are above the 75th 
percentile of the debt-to-equity ratios and otherwise 0. This indicator variable is 
logit regressed on the above performance variables. A significantly negative 
association is found between the debt-indicator variable and stock returns (RET) 
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(t-value: -2.58), suggesting that firms with high leverage generally have lower 
stock returns. The other associations are insignificant (Results are not tabulated).  
 
The results in table 7.18 are unchanged if the above indicator variable is employed 
as explanatory variable of impairment losses rather than debt-to-equity ratios 
(DEBT). The association between this indicator variable and impairment decisions 
(IMP_DECISION) is significantly positive (t-value: 2.95) (non-winsorised 
variables). Similar results are found when the tobit regression in table 7.18 is rerun 
with this indicator variable. The association between this indicator variable and 
size of impairment losses is also significantly positive (IMP_AMOUNT) (t-value: 
2.83) (Results are not tabulated). Rather, if the regressions in table 7.18 are rerun 
on firm-year observations with debt-to-equity ratios below the 75th percentile, the 
associations between the pre-impairment debt-to-equity ratios (DEBT), 
impairment decisions (IMP_DECISION) and size of impairment losses 
(IMP_AMOUNT) become highly insignificant (t-values: -0.78 and -0.13, 
respectively). These results suggest that the positive associations between debt-to-
equity ratios and impairment losses are driven by firms with very high debt-to-
equity ratios. These firms seem to suffer from lower market performance than the 
average firm which may indicate financial distress. Taking these results together, 
hypotheses 3ai and 3aj should be rejected. Debt-covenant incentives indicated by 
debt-to-equity ratios (DEBT) are not negatively associated with impairment losses 
(IMP_DECISION, IMP_AMOUNT).  
 
The final results concern associations between firm size (lnSIZE_MV) and 
impairment losses. Larger firms tend to report more and larger impairment losses. 
These results are to some extent robust to the exclusion of financial-recession 
observations (See table B1), the exclusion of observations with large impairment 
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losses (See table B2) and when changes rather than levels in cash-bonus payments 
are employed (See table B3). These results support hypotheses 3ak and 3al, 
suggesting a positive association between firm size (lnSIZE_MV) and impairment 
losses (IMP_DECISION, IMP_AMOUNT). There might be several explanations of 
these results where political-cost considerations are one. An alternative 
explanation is that larger firms hold more financial-accounting expertise, which 
results in the recognition of more impairment losses. A related explanation is that 
larger firms are followed by more market participants, which leads to higher 
accounting quality and the recognition of more impairment losses. These two 
arguments are based on the assumption that firms generally understate rather than 
overstate impairment losses (e.g. Ramanna 2008, Ramanna and Watts 2009). A 
final explanation is that larger firms tend to be diversified over multiple segments, 
which increases the likelihood of impairment losses. To make an attempt to 
disentangle between these possible explanations, a regression with firm size 
(lnSIZE_MV) as dependent variable is run on three explanatory variables: natural 
logarithm of audit-committee members (lnAUDIT_SIZE), an indicator variable 
which equals 1 if the firm has a financial-accounting expert on the board 
(ACCEXP), and the natural logarithm of the number of business segments. The 
audit-committee members (t-value: 7.19) and the number of business segments  
(t-value: 1.82) are significantly positively associated with firm size. The 
coefficient on the indicator variable, financial-accounting expertise, is negative  
(t-value: -2.03), however, suggesting that larger firms tend to lack financial-
accounting experts on the board. This last result is not sufficient to conclude that 
larger firms lack financial-accounting expertise in general. Without additional 
data, it is difficult to disentangle one reason from the other. Nevertheless, 
hypotheses 3ak and 3al are supported. 
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All in all, the results in table 7.18, along with additional results in table B1 to table 
B3, suggest that goodwill-impairment losses reported under current IFRS are 
associated with variables for economic impairment. This is demonstrated by 
significant associations between these impairment losses and variables supposed 
to reflect economic impairment. Some rather weak results, however, indicate that 
these losses might be associated with CFO cash-bonus payments, CFO conditional 
stocks, smoothing incentives and CEO changes. The other incentive variables 
have insignificant associations or unpredicted significant associations with 
impairment losses. Caution, however, should be exercised when interpreting the 
insignificant associations. There might be at least two explanations for 
insignificant associations between variables for earnings-management incentives 
and impairment losses: Reported impairment losses have no significant association 
with the true, but unobservable, earnings-management incentives, which suggests 
that these impairment losses are not influenced by earnings management. Or these 
insignificant associations might be the result of econometrical problems, 
potentially caused by measurement errors in the earnings-management incentive 
variables.  
 
7.3.3. Abnormal-impairment losses, earnings-management incentives 
and corporate-governance mechanisms 
This section investigates associations between goodwill-impairment losses, 
variables for earnings-management incentives and corporate-governance 
mechanisms. Abnormal-impairment losses are estimated as the difference between 
reported impairment losses and estimates of normal-impairment losses. These 
normal-impairment losses are fitted values from a regression of reported 
impairment losses on variables for economic impairment. An ordninary-least-
square regression is employed rather than a tobit regression since the former 
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regression model has better specified residuals than the latter regression model 
(Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2008). Given that these normal-impairment losses reflect 
economic impairment, any positive or negative deviation from these estimated 
normal-impairment losses should be interpreted as misrepresentation of the the 
underlying economic impairment. Misrepresentation might reflect unintended and 
intended measurement errors. Intended measurement errors will probably reflect 
earnings management.  
 
Estimates of abnormal-impairment losses are determined by the set of economic 
variables employed to estimate normal-impairment losses. To investigate the 
robustness of this estimation, three alternative sets of economic variables are 
employed. In contrast to previous analysis, multicollinearity is not a concern here. 
Muliticollinearity is only a concern when estimating and interpreting the strength 
and the significance of associations between a dependent variable and explanatory 
variables, not when estimating fitted values on estimated regression parameters. 
No economic variables should, therefore, be excluded from the estimation of 
normal-impairment losses based on arguments of multicollinearity.  
 
The first of these three sets of variables comprises all, but one, of the economic 
variables specified in subchapter 6.3 above. The variable excluded is the indicator 
variable for previous year’s impairment losses (HIST). As argued above, this 
variable might reflect economic impairment (successive economic impairment) as 
well as incentives to avoid and/or delay impairment recognition. The second set of 
variables comprises only market-based variables of firm-performance: stock 
returns (RET) and pre-impairment book-to-market ratios (BM). These variables are 
sometimes perceived as the sole indicators of impairment. Deteriorated stock 
returns signify lower firm performance, and thereby, lower future earnings 
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capacity. Pre-impairment book-to-market ratios indicate whether firms are in an 
impairment position or not. Fitted values from a regression of impairment losses 
on these two market-based variables will provide market-based estimates of 
normal, and thereby, abnormal-impairment losses in goodwill. The results for the 
regressions employing these abnormal-impairment losses as dependent variable 
are reported in table B5 in appendix B. The third set of economic variables 
comprises firm-level economic variables (RET, SALES%, ROA, OCF%, BM). 
Normal and abnormal-impairment losses are estimated on market-based, 
accounting-based and cash-based economic variables. The results from regressions 
employing these abnormal-impairment losses as dependent variable are reported in 
table B6 in appendix B.  
 
Abnormal-impairment losses take negative and positive values. Negative 
abnormal-impairment losses imply that reported impairment losses are lower than 
expected impairment losses. This indicates understated losses. In contrast, positive 
abnormal-impairment losses imply that reported impairment losses are larger than 
expected impairment losses, which indicates overstated losses. Expected 
impairment losses are censored at zero if predicted values of impairment losses are 
negative. Negative values on estimated impairment losses are consistent with 
positive revaluations of goodwill, which are prohibited under current IFRS. To be 
consistent with GAAP, these values are set equal to zero. Estimation of abnormal-
impairment losses (based on the full set of economic variables) reveals that 
understated impairment losses are more frequent among the sample firms than 
overstated impairment losses. Impairment losses are found to be understated in 
886 out of 1086 firm-year observations. The picture is somewhat different, 
however, for overstated impairment losses. Indications of overstated losses are 
only found in 125 firm years. If normal-impairment losses are estimated on the 
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second set of market-based impairment variables (numbers for the third set are 
given in parentheses), the ratio of understated and overstated impairment losses is 
rather unchanged. There are indications that 896 (902) out of 1093 (1068) reported 
impairment losses are understated, whereas 132 (124) are overstated.  
 
The high frequency of understated impairment losses relative to overstated 
impairment losses might have several reasons. One reason is that managers exploit 
the discretionary freedom in reporting impairment losses to avoid and/or delay 
recognition of impairment losses. Some evidence in the previous section indicates 
that impairment losses might be understated (See table 7.18, results for variable 
HIST). An alternative reason is that impairment losses are systematically 
understated relative to impairment losses in total goodwill as a result of the 
impairment-testing procedure. Several factors may shield an impairment loss from 
being recognised in goodwill. First, positive differences between book values and 
recoverable amounts of assets constitute impairment losses. Goodwill is tested in 
an indirect way where recoverable amounts of cash-generating units to which 
goodwill is allocated are compared to book values of the assets (inclusive book 
value of goodwill) of the cash-generating units. If recoverable amounts of these 
assets (exclusive goodwill) are higher than their book values, the extra benefits 
associated with these assets increase the recoverable amounts of the cash-
generating units where goodwill is tested and may shield impairment losses in 
goodwill. Second, a related issue is that internally-generated goodwill may replace 
impaired purchased goodwill. The impairment test requires no distinction to be 
made between internally-generated goodwill and purchased goodwill when 
estimating recoverable amounts.  
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Third, estimates of normal-impairment losses will likely reflect impairment losses 
in total goodwill, that is, the sum of impairment losses in internally-generated 
goodwill and book goodwill. The estimated impairment losses might be too large 
on average to reflect economic impairment in book goodwill, which apparently 
leads to the estimation of more understated than overstated impairment losses. 
This represents a potential source of measurement errors in normal and abnormal-
impairment losses. As stated above, alternative sets of economic variables are 
employed to estimate abnormal-impairment losses in order to investigate the 
robustness of the results. However, these robustness tests do not seem to face the 
core of the problem, that is, to estimate the portion of total economic impairment 
losses to be deducted from book goodwill. Such estimates are hard to obtain. The 
problem of their estimation is related to the fundamental challenge of 
distinguishing internally-generated goodwill from remaining purchased goodwill.  
 
The regressions are run for two sets of explanatory variables: variables for 
earnings-management incentives only, and variables for earnings-management 
incentives along with corporate-governance mechanisms. The results from 
regressions with variables for earnings-management incentives and corporate-
governance mechanisms will be emphasised in the discussion below. Regressions 
are run separately for negative and positive abnormal-impairment losses. When 
negative abnormal-impairment losses are used as dependent variable, they are 
right censored at zero. Similarly, when positive abnormal-impairment losses are 
used as dependent variable, they are left censored at zero. Since the dependent 
variables are either right or left censored, a tobit regression is employed. In order 
to investigate the influence of outliers, the regressions are rerun with continuous 
variables censored at 5th and 95th percentile. Firm-year observations over the 
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period 2005-2009 are employed, and all t-statistics from the regressions are 
White-adjusted and clusted at firm level. 
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Table 7.19 reports some predicted and some unpredicted associations between 
abnormal-impairment losses, variables for earnings-management incentives and 
corporate-governance mechanisms. Negative abnormal-impairment losses are 
supposed to be associated with earnings-management incentives to avoid and/or 
delay recognition of impairment losses, whereas positive abnormal-impairment 
losses are supposed to be associated with incentives to accelerate and/or overstate 
recognition of impairment losses. However, hypotheses are not limited to predict 
associations between earnings-management incentives and either understated or 
overstated impairment losses. Rather, for a given incentive, they predict 
associations between this incentive and both understated and overstated 
impairment losses (See hypotheses 4a to 4r). The absolute size of abnormal 
impairment losses, that is, the degree of misrepresentation, is believed to be 
constrained by corporate-governance mechanisms (e.g. Warfield et al. 1995, 
Dechow et al. 1996, Beasley 1996, Chtourou et al. 2001, Klein 2002, Koh 2003, 
Xie et al. 2003, Peasnell et al. 2005, Mulgrew and Forker 2006, Ebrahim 2007). 
This suggests that stronger and more efficient corporate-governance mechanisms 
should be associated with less abnormal-impairment losses (See hypotheses 4s to 
4al).  
 
Elements of the remuneration package such as cash-bonus payments, conditional 
stocks and stock options are predicted to reflect incentives for reporting 
understated impairment losses (See hypotheses 4a, 4c and 4e). If impairment 
losses are overstated, these remuneration variables are predicted to be associated 
with less overstated impairment losses (See hypotheses 4b, 4d and 4f).  
 
Table 7.19 provides limited support for these hypotheses. Most of the associations 
are insignificant. Among those associations which are significant, some are 
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significantly negative, whereas others are significantly positive. COB, CEO and 
CFO cash-bonus payments (COB_BON, CEO_BON, CFO_BON) are supposed to 
be negatively associated with impairment losses (e.g. Beatty and Weber 2006, 
Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2008, Ramanna and Watts 2009). These cash-bonus 
payments are, therefore, predicted to be negatively associated with understated 
(take negative values) (AB_IMP_NEG) and negatively associated with overstated 
impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS). Table 7.19 shows that none of the associations 
between these cash-bonus payments and understated impairment losses are 
statistically significant. The results are unchanged when financial-recession 
observations are excluded (See table B4). Somewhat different results, however, 
are found when abnormal-impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG, AB_IMP_POS) are 
estimated on alternative sets of economic variables. If normal, and thereby, 
abnormal-impairment losses are estimated on stock returns (RET) and book-to-
market ratios (BM), CFO cash-bonus payments (CFO_BON) are close to be 
significantly negatively associated with understated impairment losses (See table 
B5). Surprisingly, CEO cash-bonus payments (CEO_BON) are found to be 
positively associated with understated impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG) when 
regressions are run on winsorised variables (See table B5). Somewhat weaker 
results are found for COB cash-bonus payments (COB_BON). The coefficient on 
COB cash-bonus payments (COB_BON) is barely insignificantly positive (See 
table B5). Stronger results are found when normal and abnormal-impairment 
losses are estimated on a broader set of firm-level economic variables (RET, 
SALES%, ROA, OCF%, BM). CFO cash-bonus payments (CFO_BON) are 
now significantly negatively associated with understated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_NEG), whereas COB cash-bonus payments (COB_BON) and CEO 
cash-bonus payments (CEO_BON) are positively associated with understated 
impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG) (See table B6). The coefficient on COB cash-
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bonus payments (COB_BON) is significant when regressions are run on non-
winsorised variables, whereas CEO cash-bonus payments and CFO cash-bonus 
payments are significant when regressions are run on winsorised variables. Taking 
these results together, they provide some support for a negative association 
between CFO cash-bonus payments (CFO_BON) and understated impairment 
losses (AB_IMP_NEG). No support is found for a negative association between 
COB cash-bonus payments (COB_BON), CEO cash-bonus payments 
(CEO_BON), respectively, and understated impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG). 
Hypothesis 4a is, therefore, to some extent supported for CFO cash-bonus 
payments, but not COB and CEO cash-bonus payments. 
 
Some predicted and some unpredicted associations are also found between cash-
bonus payments and overstated impairment losses. CFO cash-bonus payments 
(CFO_BON) are negatively associated with overstated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_POS), which is consistent with predictions in hypothesis 4b. A positive 
regression coefficient, however, is found on COB cash-bonus payments 
(COB_BON) when regression is run on non-winsorised variables and CEO cash-
bonus payments (CEO_BON) when regression is run on winsorised variables (See 
table 7.19). These results are unpredicted. If financial-recession observations are 
excluded, the coefficients on COB cash-bonus payments (COB_BON) and CEO 
cash-bonus payments (CEO_BON) turn insignificant, whereas the coefficient on 
CFO cash-bonus payments (CFO_BON) remains significantly negative (See table 
B4). When normal and abnormal-impairment losses are estimated on stock returns 
(RET) and book-to-market ratios (BM), the results are somewhat more significant 
than those reported in table 7.19. Both COB cash-bonus payments (COB_BON) 
and CEO cash-bonus payments (CEO_BON) are positively associated with 
overstated impairment losses, while CFO cash-bonus payments (CFO_BON) are 
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negatively associated with these losses (See table B5). Also somewhat stronger 
results than those reported in table 7.19 are found when normal and abnormal-
impairment losses are estimated on a broader set of firm-level economic variables 
(See table B6). The above results suggest that CFO cash-bonus payments are 
negatively associated with overstated impairment losses. Hypothesis 4b is, 
therefore, supported for CFO cash-bonus payments, but not COB and CEO cash-
bonus payments. 
 
The significantly positive coefficients on COB and CEO cash-bonus payments, 
however, are rather puzzling. These positive associations are basically found 
between COB and CEO cash-bonus payments and overstated impairment losses, 
when these overstated losses are estimated on alternative sets of economic 
variables (See table B5 and table B6). Results reported in the previous section 
suggest that COB cash-bonus payments (COB_BON) have no associations with 
levels or changes in earnings-per-share or any other earnings measure. Besides, 
the COBs that actually receive bonus payments have some special characteristics. 
They generally serve as both COBs and CEOs and have held their position as 
COBs longer than the average COB. This raises the question whether these bonus 
payments are related to earnings at all.  
 
This does not explain, however, any positive association between CEO cash-bonus 
payments (CEO_BON) and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS). A 
closer investigation is, therefore, needed. In the asset-impairment literature the 
bonus-plan hypothesis (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman 1986, 1990) is usually tested 
by including an indicator variable for bonus payment or a variable which equals 
the actual bonus payment scaled by fixed salary as explanatory variables of 
impairment losses (e.g. Beatty and Weber 2006, Lapointe-Antudes et al. 2008, 
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Ramanna and Watts 2009). These tests are based on the assumption that there 
exists a simple linear relationship between the bonus payments and the earnings-
based bonus target. This test design, however, fails to reflect the more complex 
structure usually found in earnings-based compensation contracts. In order to 
receive a bonus payment, the bonus target, e.g. earnings-per-share, must exceed a 
lower bound for bonus payment. In some cases, the contract also involves an 
upper bound which determines the maximum bonus payment. For instance, Healy 
(1985) reports that when earnings fall between the upper and the lower bound, 
managers tend to make earnings-increasing decisions. When earnings are expected 
to be either above the upper bound or below the lower bound, managers shift 
earnings to future periods to maximise the expected bonus payment. Similar 
results are reported by Gaver et al. (1995) and Holthausen et al. (1995).  Incentives 
to avoid and/or delay impairment losses are, therefore, present only when earnings 
are expected to fall between the lower and the upper bound of bonus payment. In 
other cases, there might be incentives to overstate rather than understate 
impairment losses.  
 
Rather than investigating the bonus payments for the current year, annual changes 
in bonus payments scaled by the current year’s total cash compensation are used to 
reflect bonus-payment incentives. These variables reflect the extent to which the 
bonus target is reached the current and the previous year. Positive changes in 
bonus payments the current year suggest that earnings are higher relative to the 
threshold of bonus payment this year than the previous year. Negative changes in 
bonus payments the current year suggest the opposite, namely that earnings are 
lower relative to the threshold for bonus payment this year than the previous year. 
Significantly negative associations will be consistent with the notion that bonus 
payments are negatively associated with reported impairment losses. If cash-bonus 
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payments increase, they are supposed to be associated with fewer impairment 
losses, smaller impairment losses and potentially understated impairment losses. A 
negative association is, therefore, expected between changes in cash-bonus 
payments and both understated and overstated impairment losses. When rerunning 
for the regressions in table 7.19, changes in COB cash-bonus payments 
(COB_BON) and changes in CEO cash-bonus payments (CEO_BON) are 
generally insignificantly associated with understated (AB_IMP_NEG) and 
overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) (See table B7). There are some 
exceptions. COB cash-bonus payments (COB_BON) and understated impairment 
losses (AB_IMP_NEG) are negatively associated when the regression is run on 
non-winsorised variables. Changes in CFO cash-bonus payments (CFO_BON), 
however, are significantly negatively associated with both understated 
(AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) (See table B7). 
These results are consistent with the notion that impairment losses are avoided 
and/or understated in order to increase bonus payments.  
 
Conditional stocks and stock options are generally not found to have significant 
associations with understated or overstated impairment losses. COB, CEO and 
CFO conditional stocks (COB_COSTOCK, CEO_COSTOCK, CFO_COSTOCK) 
are all insignificantly associated with understated (AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated 
impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) in table 7.19. Similar results are found when 
financial-recession observations are excluded (See table B4). There are found 
some significant associations, however, when alternative estimates of abnormal-
impairment losses are employed. If normal and abnormal-impairment losses are 
estimated on stock returns (RET) and book-to-market ratios (BM), a significantly 
negative association is found between CFO conditional stocks (CFO_COSTOCK) 
and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) (See table B5). Even stronger 
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evidence for a negative association is found when normal and abnormal-
impairment losses are estimated on firm-level economic variables (See table B6). 
When changes rather than levels of cash-bonus payments are included, the 
associations between conditional stocks and overstated and understated 
impairment losses are all insignificant (See table B7). Some support is, therefore, 
found for a negative association between CFO conditional stocks 
(CFO_COSTOCK) and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS), which is 
consistent with predictions for CFO conditional stocks in hypothesis 4d. 
Hypothesis 4c, however, is rejected. 
 
Results for stock options are in some cases consistent with predictions, in other 
cases not. No significant associations are found between COB stock options 
(COB_OPTION) and understated (AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated impairment 
losses (AB_IMP_POS) (See table 7.19). These results, however, are not robust to 
alternative estimates of abnormal-impairment losses. If abnormal-impairment 
losses are estimated on stock returns (RET) and book-to-market ratios (BM), the 
association between COB stock options (COB_OPTION) and understated 
impairment losses turns significantly positive (See table B5). Moreover, if 
abnormal-impairment losses are estimated on firm-level economic variables, COB 
stock options (COB_OPTION) are found to be positively associated with 
understated impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG) and negatively associated with 
overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS)  when these regressions are run on 
non-winsorised variables (See table B6). Taken together, no support is found for a 
negative association between COB stock options (COB_OPTION) and understated 
and overstated impairment losses. This is inconsistent with predictions for COB 
stock options in hypotheses 4e and 4f. 
  
  
436 
CEO stock options (CEO_OPTION) are in some cases found to be insignificantly 
associated with understated and overstated impairment losses and in other cases 
significantly negatively associated. The latter results are consistent with 
predictions in hypotheses 4e and 4f. CEO stock options (CEO_OPTION) are 
found to be negatively associated with understated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_NEG) when regressions are run on non-winsorised variables and 
negatively associated with overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) when 
regressions are run on winsorised variables (See table 7.19). A significantly 
negative association is also found between CEO stock options (CEO_OPTION) 
and understated impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG) when regressions are run on a 
sample of firm years without financial-recession observations (See table B4). This 
result is limited to the regression with non-winsorised variables. If abnormal-
impairment losses are estimated on alternative sets of economic variables, the 
coefficient on CEO stock options (CEO_OPTION) turns insignificant (See table 
B5 and table B6).  
 
Rather surprising results, however, are found for CFO stock options 
(CFO_OPTION). The association between these stock options and and overstated 
impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) are generally positive, which is unpredicted. 
The association between these stock options and understated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_NEG) is negative, however, consistent with predictions (See table 7.19). 
These results, however, are to some extent driven by financial-recession 
observations. When these observations are excluded, the associations generally 
turn insignificant. The only exception is the association between these stock 
options and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) when the regression is 
run on winsorised variables (See table B4). This might suggest that the surprising 
positive association CFO stock options and overstated impairment losses might be 
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driven by firms with CFOs receiving substantial amounts of stock options in the 
years prior to the financial-recession year 2008. Postive associations between CFO 
stock options (CFO_OPTION) and understated (AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated 
impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) are also found when alternative estimates of 
abnormal-impairment losses are employed (See table B5 and table B6). A positive 
association is also found between CFO stock options (CFO_OPTION) and 
overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) when changes rather than levels of 
cash-bonus payments are included in the regressions (See table B7). Taken 
together, some weak support is found for a negative association between CEO 
stock options and understated impairment losses, which is consistent with 
predictions in hypothesis 4e. No support, however is found for hypothesis 4e 
concerning COB stock options and CFO stock options. And finally, no support is 
found for negative associations between stock options and overstated impairment 
losses. Hypothesis 4f is, therefore, rejected.   
 
The reporting-strategy variable, big bath (BATH), is predicted to be negatively 
associated with understated (AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_POS), whereas smoothing  (SMOOTH), is predicted to be positively 
associated with understated (AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_POS) (See hypotheses 4i to 4l). If there are large negative changes in 
pre-impairment net earnings, the big-bath hypothesis predicts that impairment 
losses will be relatively larger. Similarly, if there are large positive changes in pre-
impairment net earnings, the income-smoothing hypothesis predicts relatively 
larger impairment losses (e.g. Zucca and Campbell 1992, Francis et al. 1996, Rees 
et al. 1996, Massoud and Raiborn 2003, Riedl 2004). Both reporting strategies will 
potentially lead to the recognition of overstated impairment losses. Some evidence 
is consistent with these predictions, whereas other evidence is inconsistent. Table 
  
438 
7.19 reports a significantly negative association between the smoothing proxy 
(SMOOTH) and understated impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG) when regressions 
are run on non-winsorised variables. This is inconsistent with hypothesis 4k. A 
negative association is also found between the big-bath proxy (BATH) and 
overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) when regressions are run on 
winsorised variables, which is consistent with predictions in hypothesis 4j (See 
table 7.19). Excluding financial-recession observations has basically no influence 
on the results in table 7.19. The smoothing proxy (SMOOTH) is negatively 
associated with understated impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG), and the big-bath 
proxy (BATH) is negatively associated with overstated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_POS) (See table B4). Alternative estimates of abnormal-impairment 
losses and some of the explanatory variables, however, do have substantial effect 
on the results in table 7.19. When abnormal-impairment losses are estimated on 
stock returns (RET) and book-to-market ratios (BM), the smoothing proxy 
(SMOOTH) becomes positively associated with understated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_NEG), which is consistent with hypothesis 4k (See table B5). 
Inconsistent with predictions, however, the big-bath proxy (BATH) is now 
significantly positively associated with both understated (AB_IMP_NEG) and 
overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS). These results are again somewhat 
altered when abnormal-impairment losses are estimated on firm-level economic 
variables (See table B6). The smoothing proxy (SMOOTH) is, still, significantly 
positively associated with understated impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG). The 
other associations between big-bath proxy (BATH), smoothing proxy (SMOOTH) 
and impairment losses are now insignificant (See table B6). And finally, results 
consistent with those reported in table 7.19 for big-bath proxy (BATH) and 
smoothing proxy (SMOOTH) are found when alternative cash-bonus variables are 
employed (See table B7). As demonstrated above, the results for these reporting-
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strategy variables are not very robust. This suggests that hypotheses 4i to 4l should 
all be rejected.   
 
Impairment losses are expected to be associated with management changes. Prior 
literature has demonstrated that impairment losses are more likely in years with 
such changes and that these impairment losses on average are larger and 
potentially overstated (e.g. Strong and Meyer 1987, Francis et al. 1996, Riedl 
2004, Kvaal 2005, Zang 2008). Consistent with these predictions, a significantly 
positive association is found between CEO changes (CEO) and overstated 
impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) (See table 7.19). This result is limited to 
winsorised variables. COB changes (COB), however, are found to be negatively 
associated with overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS), which is 
inconsistent with predictions. When financial-recession observations are excluded, 
no significant associations are found between management changes and 
understated (AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) 
(See table B4). More supportive results are found when abnormal-impairment 
losses are estimated on stock returns (RET) and book-to-market ratios (BM). CEO 
changes (CEO) are now significantly positively associated with both understated 
(AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) (See table B5). 
Similar results are found when these losses are estimated on a broader set of firm-
level economic variables (See table B6). A positive association between CEO 
changes (CEO) and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) is also 
demonstrated when changes rather than levels of cash-bonus payments are used as 
explanatory variables (See table B7). Some weak results are found for a negative 
association between COB changes (COB) and overstated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_POS) (See table 7.19, table B6 and table B7). These results are limited 
to non-winsorised variables. Taken together, the above results support a positive 
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association between CEO changes and understated and overstated impairment 
losses. This is consistent with hypotheses 4m and 4n.  No support, however, is 
found for positive associations between other management changes and 
understated or overstated impairment losses. This suggests that hypotheses 4m and 
4n should be rejected for COB changes and CFO changes.  
 
Higher debt-to-equity (DEBT) is predicted to be associated with fewer impairment 
losses, smaller impairment losses and potentially understated impairment losses. 
Debt-to-equity is believed to be positively associated with the risk of violating 
debt covenants (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1986, 1990, Beneish and Press 
1993, Sweeney 1994, DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994, Dichev and Skinner 2002, 
Kvaal 2005, Zang 2008, Ramanna and Watts 2009). This suggests that debt-to-
equity ratios (DEBT) should be negatively associated with understated 
(AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS). Table 7.19, 
however, indicates that debt-to-equity (DEBT) is positively rather than negatively 
associated with overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS). Even stronger 
results for a positive association between debt-to-equity ratios (DEBT) and 
overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) are found when financial-recession 
observations are excluded (See table B4). Similar results to those reported in table 
7.19 are found when alternative specifications are employed for bonus-incentive 
variables (See table B7). Mixed results, however, are reported when regressions 
are run on alternative estimates of abnormal-impairment losses (See table B5 and 
table B6).  
 
There might be more than one reason for these results. One explanation is that the 
positive association between debt-to-equity ratios (DEBT) and overstated 
impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) are driven by firms being financially 
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distressed. An indicator variable, which equals 1 when debt-to-equity ratios are 
above the 75th percentile of that variable and otherwise 0, is employed instead of 
the conventional debt-to-equity ratio (DEBT). As demonstrated in the previous 
section, this indicator variable is negatively associated with stock returns, which 
suggests that firms with high debt-to-equity might be financially distressed. 
Splitting the firm-year observations on this indicator variable, however, does not 
support the notion that the positive association between debt-to-equity (DEBT) 
and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) is driven by firms with high 
debt-to-equity ratios. An insignificantly negative association is found between 
debt-to-equity (DEBT) and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) when 
the regression is run on firm years with high debt-to-equity (t-value: -0.77) 
(Results are not tabulated). When running this regression on firm years with debt-
to-equity below the 75th percentile, the association is insignificantly positive (t-
value: 1.07) (Results are not tabulated). Thus, the positive association between 
debt-to-equity ratios and overstated impairment losses remains a puzzle. 
Nevertheless, these results are inconsistent with predictions in hypotheses 4o and 
4p.  
 
Firm size (lnSIZE_MV) is found to be negatively associated with overstated 
impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS). This suggests that impairment losses are less 
overstated in large firms compared to small firms, which is inconsistent with 
predictions in hypothesis 4r. Still, this is consistent with the notion that larger 
firms have less misrepresentation and higher accounting quality. No significant 
association is found between firm size (lnSIZE_MV) and understated impairment 
losses (AB_IMP_NEG) in table 7.19. These results are not robust to the exclusion 
of firm-year observations or alternative estimates of abnormal-impairment losses. 
When financial-recession observations are excluded, the significantly negative 
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association in table 7.19 turns insignificantly negative (See table B4). Alternative 
estimates of abnormal-impairment losses have some effect on the results in table 
7.19. Firm size (lnSIZE_MV) is now positively associated with understated 
impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG), which is consistent with hypothesis 4q (See 
table B5 and table B6). At the same time, no significantly positive association is 
found between firm size (lnSIZE_MV) and overstated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_POS), which is inconsistent with hypothesis 4r. And finally, negative 
associations are found between firm size (lnSIZE_MV) and understated 
(AB_IMP_NEG) and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) when changes 
rather than levels of cash-bonus payments are included in the regressions (See 
table B7). Taken together, this suggests that larger firms are less inclined to 
overstate and to some extent understate impairment losses in goodwill. This might 
be consistent with the notion that larger firms have higher accounting quality. 
Nevertheless, the above results reject hypotheses 4q and 4r.  
 
Corporate-governance structures are believed to constrain opportunism and the 
extent of misrepresentation in financial accounting (e.g. Warfield et al. 1995, 
Dechow et al. 1996, Beasley 1996, Chtourou et al. 2001, Klein 2002, Koh 2003, 
Xie et al. 2003, Peasnell et al. 2005, Mulgrew and Forker 2006, Ebrahim 2007). 
Strong corporate-governance mechanisms are, therefore, supposed to be 
associated with less misrepresentation of impairment losses. Most corporate-
governance variables are found to be insignificantly associated with understated 
and overstated impairment losses (See table 7.19). Only one corporate-governance 
variable is associated with understated impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG) and 
that is cross-listing (CROSS). Firms that are cross-listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange or the NASDAQ Stock Exchange seem to understate impairment losses 
to a less extent than the average sample firm. This is indicated by a positive 
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association between cross-listing (CROSS) and understated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_NEG) (See table 7.19). A positive association is also found when 
financial-recession observations are excluded (See table B4) and when alternative 
specifications of cash-bonus variables are employed (See table B7). The results in 
table 7.19, however, are sensitive to alternative estimates of abnormal-impairment 
losses (See table B5 and table B6). The associations between cross-listing 
(CROSS) and understated impairment losses turn insignificant when abnormal-
impairment losses are estimated on stock returns (RET) and book-to-market ratios 
(BM) (See table B5) or firm-level economic variables (See table B6). Taken 
together, the above evidence provides some support for hypothesis 4ak.  
 
None of the other corporate-governance variables are associated with understated 
impairment losses in table 7.19, but some significant associations between these 
variables and understated impairment losses are found in robustness tests and 
these should be commented. For instance, board size (lnBOARD_SIZE) is found to 
be negatively associated with understated impairment losses when abnormal-
impairment losses are estimated on stock returns (RET) and book-to-market ratios 
(BM) (See table B5) and firm-level economic variables (See table B6). These 
associations, however, are insignificant when alternative specifications of cash-
bonus payments are employed as explanatory variables (See table B7). A negative 
association is inconsistent with predictions in hypothesis 4s. This suggests that 
firms with larger boards tend to understate impairment losses more than firms with 
smaller boards. These results, however, are limited to alternative estimates of 
abnormal-impairment losses and should, therefore, be interpreted with caution. 
 
Some significant associations are also found between COB stockholdings 
(COB_STOCK), CEO stockholdings (CEO_STOCK) and understated impairment 
  
444 
losses (AB_IMP_NEG). A positive association is found between COB 
stockholdings (COB_STOCK) and understated impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG) 
when abnormal-impairment losses are estimated on stock returns (RET) and book-
to-market ratios (BM) (See table B5). Similar results are found for COB 
stockholdings when abnormal-impairment losses are estimated on firm-level 
economic variables (See table B6). These results provide some support for 
hypothesis 4y. However, CEO stockholdings (CEO_STOCK) are found to be 
negatively associated with understated impairment losses in table B5 and table B6. 
This suggests the opposite of what is predicted. Firms with CEOs holding more 
stocks generally understate impairment losses in goodwill. This evidence is, 
therefore, inconsistent with predictions for CEO stockholdings in hypothesis 4y. 
There is also some evidence suggesting that larger audit committees 
(lnAUDIT_SIZE) are associated with more understated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_NEG). This evidence, however, is limited to alternative estimates of 
abnormal-impairment losses when regressions are run on winsorised variables 
(See table B5 and table B6). A negative association is also found between the 
number of audit-committee meetings (lnAUDIT_MEET) and understated 
impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG) when financial-recession observations are 
excluded (See table B6) and when alternative specifications are used for bonus-
incentive variables (See table B7). This evidence is not very robust and should be 
interpreted with caution. And finally, a positive association, consistent with 
predictions in hypothesis 4ag, is found between cumulative percentage of 
blocholdings (BLOCK%) and understated impairment losses (AB_IMP_NEG). 
This result, however, is only found when alternative bonus-incentive variables are 
employed (See table B7). Taken together, limited support is found for predicted 
associations between corporate-governance variables and understated impairment 
losses. This suggests that all hypotheses concerning associations between 
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corporate-governance variables and understated impairment losses should be 
rejected except hypothesis 4ak which predicts a positive association between 
cross-listing and understated impairment losses.   
 
Stronger results are found for corporate-governance variables and overstated 
impairment losses. Board size (lnBOARD_SIZE) is found to be significantly 
positively associated with overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS) (See table 
7.19), which is inconsistent with predictions in hypothesis 4t. Even stronger 
evidence of a positive association is found when changes rather than levels of 
cash-bonus payments are used as explanatory variables (See table B7). The results 
in table 7.19, however, are sensitive to the exclusion of financial-recession 
observations (See table B4) and alternative estimates of abnormal-impairment 
losses (See table B5 and table B6). Taken together, this suggests that hypothesis 4t 
should be rejected. Similar positive associations are found between independent 
non-executive directors (NONEXE) and overstated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_POS). More independent non-executive directors on the board are 
associated with more overstated impairment losses (See table 7.19). These 
findings, however, are limited to the main results in table 7.19 and the robustness 
results where changes rather than levels of cash-bonus payments are used as 
explanatory variables (See table B7). Hypotheses 4v is, therefore, rejected. 
Number of board meetings (lnBOARD_MEET) is generally found to be 
insignificantly associated with overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS). 
There are two exceptions suggesting a negative association between number of 
board meetings and overstated impairment losses. The first exception is found in 
main results (See table 7.19) and the second exception is found when changes 
rather than levels of cash-bonus payments are used as explanatory variables (See 
B7). This latter evidence is considered too weak to support a negative association 
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between board meetings and overstated impairment losses as predicted in 
hypothesis 4x.  
  
COB, CEO and CFO stockholdings (COB_STOCK, CEO_STOCK, CFO_STOCK) 
have no significant associations with overstated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_POS) (See table 7.19). These results, however, are not robust to 
alternative estimates of abnormal-impairment losses. When these losses are 
estimated on stock returns (RET) and book-to-market ratios (BM), a positive 
coefficient is found on COB stockholdings (COB_STOCK) and a negative 
coefficient is found on CEO stockholdings (CEO_STOCK) and CFO 
stockholdings (CFO_STOCK) (See table B5 and table B6). When changes rather 
than levels of cash-bonus payments are employed, the associations between 
managerial stockholdings and overstated impairment losses are generally 
insignificant (See table B7). This provides some weak support that CEO and CFO 
stockholdings are associated with less overstated impairment losses, which is 
consistent with hypothesis 4z.  
 
Audit-committee characteristics are generally found to be insignificantly 
associated with overstated impairment losses. Somewhat surprisingly, no 
significant association is found between the indicator variable for financial-
accounting expert (ACCEXP) and overstated impairment losses (AB_IMP_POS). 
This result is very robust (See table B4 to table B7). This suggests that having a 
financial-accounting expert on the audit committee does not prevent 
misrepresentation of impairment losses. Hypothesis 4ab should, therefore, be 
rejected. Audit-committee size measured by number of audit-committee meetings 
(lnAUDIT_SIZE) is insignificantly associated with overstated impairment losses 
(AB_IMP_POS) in table 7.19. This result is sensitive to alternative estimates of 
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abnormal-impairment losses (See table B5 and table B6). When alternative 
estimates of abnormal-impairment losses are employed, larger audit committees 
are found to be associated with less overstated impairment losses, which is 
consistent with predictions in hypothesis 4ad. A negative association, however, is 
only found when these alternative estimates are employed. This suggests that 
hypothesis 4ad should be rejected. Audit-committee activity measured by number 
of audit-committee meetings (lnAUDIT_MEET) is found to be positively 
associated with overstated impairment losses (See table 7.19). This result is rather 
robust. It is robust to the exclusion of financial-recession observations (See table 
B4) and to alternative estimates of abnormal-impairment losses (See table B5 and 
table B6). This suggests that firms with more audit-committee activity generally 
overstate impairment losses in goodwill. This evidence is surprising as it suggests 
that more audit-committee activity leads to more rather than less misrepresentation 
of goodwill-impairment losses. One potential explanation is conservative 
accounting. Conservatism is seen as a remedy to constrain the tendency to 
opportunistically overstate net earnings and net-asset values (e.g. Watts 2003). A 
more active audit committee may lead to more conservative accounting, and 
thereby, potentially overstated impairment losses. Nevertheless, these results reject 
hypothesis 4af.  
 
Cumulative percentage of blockholdings (BLOCK%) is not found to be associated 
with overstated impairment losses in any of the regressions, which rejects 
hypothesis 4ah. Number of blockholders (lnBLOCK_NUM), however, is found to 
be negatively associated with overstated impairment losses (See table 7.19). A 
negative association is also found when alternative specifications are employed for 
bonus-incentive variables (See table B7). The associations turn, however, 
insignificant when financial-recession observations are excluded (See table B4), 
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and when alternative estimates of abnormal-impairment losses are used as 
dependent variables (See table B5 and table B6). Taken together, these results 
provide some support for hypothesis 4aj that more blockholders are associated 
with less overstated impairment losses. And finally, the indicator variable for 
cross-listing (CROSS) is not found to be associated with overstated impairment 
losses in the main results (See table 7.19). Some significant associations, however, 
are found in robustness tests. A significantly positive association is found when 
financial-recession observations are excluded (See table B4). Similar results are 
reported when alternative estimates of abnormal-impairment losses are employed 
(See table B5 and table B6). These associations, however, turn insignificant when 
alternative specifications are employed for bonus-incentive variables (See table 
B7). This indicates that cross-listed firms overstate impairment losses in goodwill. 
The reason why this association is positive, rather than negative, might be that 
cross-listing leads to more conservative accounting. Like audit-committee activity 
(lnAUDIT_MEET), a positive association may signify that these firms follow more 
conservative accounting principles, which leads to potentially overstated 
impairment losses. Nevertheless, the above results reject hypothesis 4al.  
 
The results from this section suggest that understated and overstated impairment 
losses have some associations with variables reflecting earnings-management 
incentives and corporate-governance mechanisms. There is, for instance, a 
tendency that firms paying large cash-bonus payments to CFOs and/or CEOs that 
hold more stock options generally understate goodwill-impairment losses. There is 
also some evidence suggesting that CEO changes are associated with less 
understated and more overstated impairment losses. These results indicate that 
misrepresentation of impairment losses might reflect reporting incentives triggered 
by CEO and CFO remuneration and CEO changes. There is found limited 
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evidence suggesting that misrepresentation of impairment losses is constrained by 
corporate-governance mechanisms. There are some exceptions, however. Higher 
CEO and CFO stockholdings are found to be associated with less overstated 
impairment losses. Other corporate-governance mechanisms, however, are found 
to be associated with more overstated impairment losses. This is the case for board 
size, audit-committee activity and cross-listing. A positive association between 
board characteristics, cross-listing and overstated impairment losses might be the 
result of conservative accounting. Stronger monitoring performed by the board 
and the audit committee along with cross-listing at stock exchanges with strict 
disclosure regulations and enforcement, may lead to more conservative and 
potentially overstated impairment losses.  
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8. Discussion, conclusion and future research 
This dissertation investigates the decision usefulness of goodwill-accounting 
number under current IFRS. Decision usefulness is interpreted as the extent to 
which these numbers reflect relevant and reliable information for equity valuation. 
The argument put forward by the leading standard setters, IASB and FASB, is that 
the new impairment-only method provides more decision-useful information than 
the previous amortisation-and-impairment method. Three not mutually exclusive 
factors are essential when it comes to decision usefulness of accounting numbers: 
the extent to which accounting numbers reflect economic fundamentals, the 
measurement uncertainty in these numbers and the risk of opportunistic earnings 
management in these numbers (e.g. Wilson 1996, Healy and Wahlen 2001).  
 
The impairment-only method is based on a screening test where goodwill is 
impaired only if the total of purchased and internally-generated goodwill no longer 
can justify book goodwill. This test procedure does not distinguish remaining 
purchased goodwill from internally-generated goodwill, which may lead to 
indirect capitalisation of internally-generated goodwill. Some of the accounting 
asymmetry between purchased and internally-generated goodwill is, therefore, 
removed. This suggests that the impairment-only method gives room for more 
faithful representation of total goodwill than the previous amortisation method, 
which improves decision usefulness. However, the lack of verifiability and the risk 
of opportunistic earnings management in these reported losses may impair 
reliability, relevance and decision usefulness of these goodwill numbers (Watts 
2003, Ramanna 2008, Ramanna and Watts 2009).  
 
Goodwill-amortisation charges are believed to be void of any decision usefulness 
(e.g. Jennings et al. 2001, Moehrle et al. 2001). The reason for this claim is not 
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that purchased goodwill is supposed to have unlimited economic lifetime. Rather, 
the reason is found in considerable measurement challenges when determining the 
pattern and the time period over which goodwill is consumed (IASB 2004b, 
2004d). Still, some guidance might be found for the estimation of these 
amortisation charges. Purchased goodwill, as all other assets, represents expected 
future benefits. On acquiring these benefits, the managers will have some 
expectations as to the period and the pattern over which these benefits are to be 
received. These expectations may serve as reference when choosing the 
amortisation period and amortisation method for goodwill.  
 
Three lines of literature serve as theoretical and methodological foundation for this 
dissertation: value relevance and information-content literature, earnings-
management literature and literature investigating the link between corporate 
governance and earnings management. The value-relevance methodology provides 
tests of relevance and to some extent reliability of accounting numbers by 
examining associations between these numbers and stock prices or stock returns 
(e.g. Barth 2000, Barth et al. 2001, Beaver 2002). Demonstrated value relevance 
suggests that accounting numbers provide information reflected in the capital 
market, that is, information that has valuation usefulness. Still, it is important to 
emphasise that demonstrated value relevance is not sufficient to make accounting-
policy recommendations (e.g. Barth 2000, Scott 2012:153).  
 
This dissertation provides evidence on value relevance of goodwill numbers 
reported under alternative accounting methods. This evidence is believed to 
provide some aid and support on standard setters’ accounting decisions regarding 
goodwill. Goodwill-accounting numbers reported under the impairment-only 
method (current IFRS) is found to be value relevant. Book goodwill is positively 
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associated with stock prices, and goodwill-impairment losses are negatively 
associated with stock prices and stock returns. This suggests that both book 
goodwill and goodwill-impairment losses provide incremental value-relevant 
information to book equity (less book goodwill) and net earnings (less goodwill-
impairment losses). It also suggests that goodwill-impairment losses are not totally 
unreliable although accounting for these losses involves significant discretion. 
These results are robust to alternative time lags in stock prices and stock returns 
and alternative remedies to mitigate scale effects. In sum, the impairment-only 
method provides information that are relevant, timely and sufficient reliable to be 
reflected in stock prices. This suggests that the accounting numbers reported under 
this method provide useful information. 
 
With reference to prior research, goodwill-amortisation charges are predicted to 
lack any associations with stock prices and stock returns, which suggests that these 
charges are void of any relevant information (e.g. Jennings et al. 2001, Moehrle et 
al. 2001). Inconsistent with predictions, however, these charges are found to be 
significantly associated with stock prices and stock returns. More surprisingly, the 
associations are significantly positive, not negative, which suggests that these 
charges do not reflect economic charges. Somewhat similar results are also found 
in prior literature, but are generally explained by potential econometrical 
problems, for instance, the influence of scale effects (Huigjen 1996, Vincent 1997, 
Jennings et al. 2001, Petersen 2002). A careful investigation of scale effects, 
however, suggests that these results are not driven by insufficient correction for 
scale. Rather, additional analysis reveals that goodwill-amortisation charges are 
driven by firms that have high economic performance, high economic growth or 
firms not reporting goodwill-impairment losses. The sample firms are assigned to 
three groups: a group with high economic performance or growth, medium 
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economic performance or growth and low economic performance or growth. 
Variables used to reflect performance are stock returns and return-on-assets, and 
variables used to reflect growth are growth in sales and market-to-book ratios. A 
significantly positive association is found between goodwill-amortisation charges 
and stock prices for firms with high performance and/or growth. For firms with 
low performance and/or growth, the coefficient on goodwill-amortisation charges 
are in some cases insignificantly positive, in other cases insignificantly negative 
and in yet other cases barely insignificantly negative. This suggests that for firms 
with high performance and/or growth goodwill-amortisation charges proxy for 
some unrecognised economic assets or more generally an unrecognised economic 
value. A likely candidate is the economic value of internally-generated goodwill. 
For some firms with low performance and/or growth, goodwill-amortisation 
charges seem to reflect economic charges. And finally, cumulative goodwill-
amortisation charges are found to be positively associated with stock prices, 
suggesting that the amortisation method leads to over-amortisation of goodwill 
(Kang and Zhao 2010). Along with the impairment-only method and the 
amortisation method, an accounting method combining amortisation and 
impairment testing is investigated. This method provides similar results as those 
found for the impairment-only method and the amortisation method. A 
significantly negative coefficient is found on goodwill-impairment losses, whereas 
a significantly positive coefficient is found on goodwill-amortisation charges. 
Neither goodwill-impairment losses nor goodwill-amortisation charges are pre-
emptied of significance when explaining stock prices and stock returns.  
 
The relative decision usefulness is tested by comparing value relevance of 
goodwill numbers reported under the impairment-only method with value 
relevance of goodwill numbers reported under alternative methods. The 
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comparison is conducted by employing as-accounted numbers under the 
impairment-only method and as-if accounted numbers under four alternative 
methods: impairment-only method (current IFRS), amortisation-only method, 
amortisation-and-impairment method and permanent retention. The amortisation 
period is the one applied by the firms prior to IFRS adoption. The accounting 
method with no amortisation and impairment testing is the one providing least 
value-relevant information. Adjusted R-squares when employing this method are 
significantly lower than adjusted R-squares from any other accounting method for 
goodwill. This suggests that any other method than permanent retention of book 
goodwill is better at explaining variations in stock prices and stock returns. The 
other comparisons do not provide as clear order of preference. Still, some 
indications might be found. The impairment-only method is not superior to the 
amortisation or the combined amortisation-and-impairment method. Rather, some 
of the results indicate that an accounting method with amortisation and 
impairment testing provides accounting numbers that better explain variations in 
stock prices and stock returns. Still, this does not imply that the amortisation 
method (or a combined method) is better in terms of faithful representation of 
economic fundamentals than the impairment-only method. As argued previously 
in this chapter, amortisation charges do not seem to reflect economic charges. 
They rather seem to proxy for some unrecognised economic assets or some 
unrecognised economic value, which means that reporting these as charges is 
inconsistent with faithful reporting. However, for some firms with low economic 
performance and/or growth, there are indications that goodwill-amortisation 
charges might reflect economic charges. But in these cases, the reduction in 
economic goodwill could, and perhaps should, be reflected as impairment losses 
rather than amortisation charges. Taken together, this suggests that the 
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impairment-only method provides more faithful reporting of goodwill than a 
method with amortisation.  
 
The value-relevance methodology is believed to be insufficient to provide 
evidence on the reliability of accounting numbers. Impairment testing of goodwill 
makes use of unverifiable fair-value estimates, which involves high measurement 
uncertainty and the risk of opportunistic earnings management. Thus, goodwill-
impairment losses might reflect earnings-management incentives rather than 
economic impairment. However, the fact that goodwill-impairment losses are 
significantly negatively associated with stock prices and stock returns suggests 
that they to some extent reflect economic impairment in goodwill. Still, for certain 
firms and in certain situations, goodwill-impairment losses might be biased 
depictions of economic impairment.  
 
Earnings-management incentives may influence the accounting for impairment 
losses. Two regression models are employed to investigate this influence: One 
model where earnings-management incentives explain the impairment decisions 
and another model where earnings-management incentives explain the size of 
impairment losses. To control for the extent to which these losses are faithfully 
reported, variables supposed to reflect economic impairment are included as 
additional variables. The results from these regressions suggest that impairment 
losses under current IFRS are associated with variables for economic impairment 
rather than earnings-management incentives. The decision to report impairment 
losses and the size of reported impairment losses are associated with economic 
variables at three different aggregation levels: macro-economic level, industry-
sector level and firm level. Some rather weak evidence, however, indicates that 
these losses might be influenced by CFO cash-bonus payments, CFO conditional 
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stocks, income smoothing and CEO changes. These results are sensitive to the use 
of winsorised or non-winsorised variables, to the exclusion of financial-recession 
observations and the use of alternative specifications of cash-bonus variables and 
conditional stock or stock-option variables. To the extent these findings are not 
driven by econometrical problems such as measurement errors, the lack of 
significance of variables for earnings-management incentives supports the claim 
that impairment decisions and size of impairment losses reflect economic 
impairment rather than earnings-management incentives. An alternative 
explanation of insignificant results is that the variables for earnings-management 
incentives suffer from non-trivial measurement errors which result in insignificant 
associations between these variables and impairment losses. The development of 
more sensitive variables for earnings-management incentives might be an exercise 
for future research in order to try to distinguish these two explanations of 
insignificant results. 
 
The above research design does not investigate the degree of misrepresentation in 
goodwill-impairment losses. In order to derive a measure of misrepresentation, 
some inspiration is found in the idea of separating total accruals in normal and 
abnormal accruals and the recent contributions made by Zang (2008)  and 
Lapointe-Antundes et al. (2008) to the asset-impairment literature. Abnormal-
impairment losses are calculated as differences between reported impairment 
losses and estimates of normal or expected impairment losses. These normal-
impairment losses are estimated as fitted values from a regression of reported 
impairment losses on economic variables supposed to reflect economic 
impairment. Any deviation from this estimate of normal-impairment losses is 
interpreted as evidence of either understated or overstated impairment losses.  
 
  
458 
The degree of misrepresentation in reported goodwill-impairment losses is 
supposed to increase in earnings-management incentives to misrepresent and 
decrease in the presence of corporate-governance mechanisms. Efficient corporate 
governance is expected to constrain opportunistic earnings management and 
thereby the degree of misrepresentation in goodwill-impairment losses. Corporate-
governance variables for board and audit-committee characteristics are employed 
along with variables for managerial stockholdings, the presence of blockholders 
and cross-listing. The investigation reveals that most variables for earnings-
management incentives lack any associations with understated or overstated 
impairment losses. These results are found to be rather robust to the exclusion of 
financial-recession observations, to alternative estimates of abnormal-impairment 
losses and to alternative specifications of cash-bonus variables. There is a 
tendency, however, that firms paying large CFO-cash bonuses generally report 
more understated impairment losses in goodwill. Similar evidence is found for 
firms with CEOs with large stock-options holdings. There is also some evidence 
suggesting that CEO changes are associated with less understated and more 
overstated impairment losses. These results suggest that misrepresentation of 
impairment losses might reflect reporting incentives triggered by CEO and CFO 
remuneration or CEO changes. Misrepresentation in reported impairment losses is 
to a limited extent constrained by corporate-governance mechanisms. There are 
some exceptions. Higher CEO and CFO stockholdings are found to be associated 
with less overstated impairment losses. Other corporate-governance mechanisms, 
however, are found to be associated with more rather than less misrepresentation. 
This is the case for board size, audit-committee activity and cross-listing. A 
positive association is found between these board characteristics, cross-listing and 
overstated impairment losses. Yet other corporate-governance mechanisms are not 
found to have any associations with understated or overstated impairment losses.  
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There is more than one possible explanation of these results. Historically, 
conservatism has been considered a qualitative characteristic of accounting 
(Kothari et al. 2010). A certain degree of conservatism has been considered 
necessary to prevent the management from overstating net earnings and net-asset 
values. Overstated impairment losses could, therefore, reflect conservatism. To the 
extent that board members, audit-committee members, blockholders and other 
corporate structures consider conservatism a remedy to prevent earnings 
management, a positive rather than a negative association might be revealed 
between these corporate-governance structures and overstated impairment losses. 
A similar argument, however, cannot be found for a negative association between 
these corporate-governance structures and understated impairment losses. There 
are also some potential explanations of insignificant coefficients on corporate-
governance variables. The impairment-testing procedure for goodwill is highly 
technical and requires advanced expertise in financial accounting and valuation. 
Most board members (except the financial-accounting expert) do not hold such 
expertise. Moreover, impairment losses in goodwill are basically unverifiable. The 
impairment-testing procedure is discretionary in most of its facets. It is, therefore, 
difficult even for trained auditors to question the assumptions and the input 
information applied when conducting the impairment test (Ramanna 2008, Zang 
2008, Ramanna and Watts 2009). This may explain why some of the board 
characteristics are found to have no associations with overstated or understated 
impairment losses. A last explanation is econometrical problems caused by 
measurement errors, confounding variables and endogeneity problems.  
 
8.1. Conclusion  
This dissertation is aimed at answering questions concerning the decision 
usefulness of goodwill numbers under current IFRS. This involves questions 
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regarding the value relevance of goodwill numbers and the risk of goodwill-
impairment losses being opportunistically managed. An investigation of value 
relevance is supposed to provide evidence on relevance and to some extent 
reliability of accounting numbers for equity valuation. An investigation of the risk 
of opportunistic earnings management is supposed to provide evidence on the 
reliability of reported goodwill-impairment losses. The first research question 
concerns the value relevance of goodwill numbers reported under current IFRS. 
Book goodwill is found to be positively associated with stock prices. This is 
consistent with the notion that book goodwill represents an economic asset which 
is reflected in stock prices. Goodwill-impairment losses are found to be negatively 
associated with stock prices and stock returns, respectively. This is consistent with 
the notion that these impairment losses represent economic impairment reflected 
in stock prices and stock returns. Goodwill numbers reported under current IFRS 
are, therefore, value relevant.  
 
The second research question concerns the value relevance of goodwill numbers 
reported under current IFRS compared to the value relevance of goodwill numbers 
reported under alternative accounting methods. Four different accounting methods 
are investigated: impairment-only method (current IFRS), amortisation-only 
method, amortisation-and-impairment method and permanent retention. All 
methods allowing reporting of amotisation charges and/or impairment losses are 
better in terms of value relevance than the permanent retention method. The order 
of preference is not as clear when it comes to the other methods. There are some 
results, however, indicating that an accounting method with amortisation and 
impairment testing provides accounting numbers that better explain variation in 
stock prices and stock returns. This does not suggest, however, that a combined 
amortisation-and-impairment method should be preferred compared to the current 
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impairment-only method. Amortisation charges are found to be positively 
associated with stock prices and stock returns, respectively. These charges are not 
reflecting economic charges. Reporting these charges in the profit and loss 
account is, therefore, inconsistent with faithful reporting.  
 
A set of alternative tests are conducted to investigate whether this positive 
association might be driven by scale effects. Alternative scaling and control for 
scale by using the residuals from regressions of stock prices or stock returns on 
size have no significant effect on the positive association. Moreover, the positive 
association is in fact more significant when return-earnings rather than price-book 
earnings regressions are employed bringing further support that the positive 
association is not driven by scale effects. Rather, the positive association seems to 
be driven by firms with high performance and/or growth. Moreover, accumulated 
goodwill-amortisation charges are found to be positively associated with stock 
prices. This may suggest that these charges are reflecting economic value for 
instance the economic value of internally-generated goodwill. More investigation 
of this positive association might be an issue for future research.   
 
Research questions three and four concern the risk of goodwill-impairment losses 
being opportunistically reported. Goodwill-impairment losses might reflect 
earnings-management incentives rather than economic impairment. The value-
relevance findings suggest that impairment losses are not totally unreliable, but 
value relevance does not address reliability in particular. Research question three 
concerns the extent to which goodwill-impairment losses are associated with 
variables supposed to reflect economic impairment and earnings-management 
incentives. Both the impairment decision and size of reported impairment losses 
are found to be associated with variables for economic impairment. This is 
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consistent with the value-relevance findings suggesting that these impairment 
losses are associated with economic impairment reflected in stock prices and stock 
returns. Still, for certain firms or in certain situations impairment losses might be 
managed. Some rather weak evidence is found that the reporting of these losses 
might be influenced by CFOs remuneration, incentives to smooth earnings and 
CEO changes. COB and CEO remuneration, COB and CFO changes, big-bath 
incentives and debt-contracting incentives are not found to have any predicted 
associations with impairment losses in goodwill. There are at least two 
contradicting explanations of these findings. These earnings-management 
incentives play no role when reporting impairment losses in goodwill or the 
earnings-management incentives suffer from non-trivial measurement errors 
which bias the results. Earnings-management incentives are not directly 
observable. Proxies supposed to be highly positively correlated with the 
unobservable incentives are, therefore, employed. The risk of substantial 
measurement errors is especially profound when measuring remuneration 
incentives, debt-covenant incentives and political-cost incentives. These incentives 
are reflected by rather crude proxies. The unpredicted associations should, 
therefore, be interpreted with caution. Still, the value-relevance findings for 
impairment losses and the results demonstrating predicted associations between 
these losses and variables supposed to reflect economic impairment, suggest that 
these impairment losses are not on average heavily influenced by earnings-
management incentives.  
 
Research question four concerns misrepresentation of impairment losses. 
Misrepresentation, not caused by accounting regulation, will probably be the result 
of earnings management. Earnings-management incentives are supposed to 
increase misrepresentation, whereas corporate-governance mechanisms are 
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supposed to decrease misrepresentation of impairment losses. Impairment losses 
might be understated or overstated. Most of the results are inconsistent with the 
hypotheses. Variables for earnings-management incentives are generally not 
significantly associated with understated or overstated impairment losses. There 
are some exceptions. There is a tendency that firms paying large CFO cash-bonus 
payments generally understate impairment losses. A similar association is found 
between CEOs stock options and understated impairment losses. There is also 
some evidence suggesting that CEO changes are associated with less understated 
and more overstated impairment losses. These results indicate that 
misrepresentation of impairment losses might reflect reporting incentives triggered 
by CEO and CFO remuneration and CEO changes. Like variables for earnings-
management incentives, variables for corporate-governance mechanisms are 
generally insignificantly associated with misrepresentation of impairment losses. 
Rather, some corporate-governance variables are found to be associated with more 
overstated impairment losses. This is the case for board size, audit-committee 
activity and cross-listing. This could be the result of conservatism. Stronger 
monitoring performed by the board and the audit committee along with cross-
listing at stock exchanges with strict disclosure regulations and enforcement, may 
lead to more conservative accounting and thereby potentially overstated 
impairment losses. As for research question three, the above results must be 
interpreted with caution. The estimates of misrepresentation are based on fitted 
values from a regression of reported impairment losses on variables for economic 
impairment. Thus, the estimates of misrepresentation will, therefore, be 
determined by the set of variables supposed to be highly positively correlated with 
economic impairment. As the true impairment is unobservable, these estimates 
might be measured with some unobservable error. Moreover, both earnings-
management incentives and corporate-governance mechanisms will likely be 
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measured with error. It is, therefore, not absolutely clear whether unpredicted 
associations are the result of true unpredicted associations or measurement errors. 
Still, taking the results together, they support the arguments of IASB and FASB 
that the impairment-only method provides more decision-useful information of 
goodwill than the previous amortisation method. Goodwill numbers under the 
impairment-only method are value relevant. Moreover, goodwill-impairment 
losses have strong predicted associations with variables of economic impairment. 
Goodwill-amortisation charges have positive associations with stock prices and 
stock returns, which suggests that these charges are not reflecting economic 
charges in goodwill.  
 
8.2. Future research 
The present dissertation might be expanded in several ways. Two of these are in 
particular focus here: Alternative research designs and alternative specifications of 
some main variables. One important research finding of this dissertation is the 
positive association between goodwill-amortisation charges and stock prices and 
stock returns. The positive association is driven by firms with high performance, 
high growth or firms not reporting impairment losses in goodwill. One suggestion 
is that these amortisation charges are associated with some unrecognised assets or 
benefits that are reflected in stock prices and stock returns. A more careful 
investigation of this positive association might be an interesting avenue for future 
research.  
 
A potential expansion might be to investigate whether purchased goodwill loses 
value relevance when goodwill becomes older. By including goodwill purchased 
the current year and the previous years as explanatory variables of stock prices, 
the size and significance of the coefficients might be used to investigate economic 
  
465 
lifetime of purchased goodwill. If coefficients on older goodwill are discounted 
relative to more recent goodwill, this might be interpreted as evidence of goodwill 
having limited economic lifetime.     
 
The investigation of decision usefulness of goodwill-accounting numbers is 
conducted in several steps in this dissertation. First, the value relevance of these 
impairment losses is investigated and then the associations between impairment 
losses, variables for economic impairment, earnings-management incentives and 
corporate-governance mechanisms. One step forward might be to develop a test 
design where value relevance of goodwill-impairment losses is investigated 
conditional on variables for earnings-management incentives and corporate-
governance mechanisms. Such a test design would make it possible to investigate 
whether value relevance of goodwill-impairment losses varies by earnings-
management incentives and corporate-governance mechanisms. If the capital 
market is sufficiently efficient, value relevance of impairment losses should be 
impaired in those cases where there are strong incentives to misrepresent 
economic impairment in goodwill. Similarly, value relevance is expected to be 
enhanced in those cases where there is strong corporate governance. One way to 
conduct such an analysis is to generate indicator variables of earnings-
management incentives and corporate-governance mechanisms and include these 
variables as categorical moderator variables in the value-relevance regressions 
(e.g. Marquardt and Wiedman 2004, Aboody et al. 1999, Kallapur and Kwan 
2004). To be consistent with the notion that the presence of earnings-management 
incentives impairs value relevance, the coefficients on interaction variables with 
earnings-management indicators should be significantly negative. Similarly, the 
coefficients on interaction variables with corporate-governance indicators should 
be significantly positive.  
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A more powerful test design should take into account the likelihood that goodwill-
impairment losses are explained by variables for earnings-management incentives. 
One way to do this is to form indicator variables of earnings-management on the 
likelihood that these impairment losses are explained by variables for earnings-
management incentives. The estimated probabilities from a logit regression of 
impairment losses on earnings-management incentives might be used to make a 
probability ranking. Based on this ranking, two indicator variables might be 
generated: One indicator which equals 1 if estimated probabilities are above the 
upper quartile of the probability ranking and otherwise 0 and another indicator 
which equals 1 if estimated probabilities are between the upper quartile and the 
lower quartile and otherwise 0. Impairment losses with probabilities below the 
lower quartile might be used as reference group. These indicator variables could 
next be employed as categorical moderator variables in the value-relevance 
regressions.  
 
A common problem of studies investigating earnings management and corporate 
governance is endogeneity (e.g. Field et al. 2001, Armstrong et al. 2010). A 
classical example is whether variables such as CEO changes reflect earnings-
management incentives or economic fundamentals. The association between CEO 
changes and impairment losses might be driven by the fact that firms that suffer 
from financial distress change CEOs and report impairment losses. Thus, the 
positive association between CEO changes and impairment losses might be 
explained by economic fundamentals rather than earnings-management incentives 
(Murphy and Zimmerman 1993, Fields et al. 2001). Still, the inclusion of variables 
for economic impairment is supposed to provide some control for this endogeneity 
(Francis et al. 1996, Riedl 2004). Similar examples of endogeneity problems can 
be found for corporate-governance mechanisms. Firms with strong corporate 
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governance are found to have less earnings management (e.g. Warfield et al. 1995, 
Dechow et al. 1996, Beasley 1996, Chtourou et al. 2001, Klein 2002, Koh 2003, 
Xie et al. 2003, Peasnell, et al. 2005, Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2005, 
Mulgrew and Forker 2006, Ebrahim 2007, Koh, LaPlante and Tong 2007). This 
might be the result of endogeneity. Firms engaging in less earnings management 
might choose stronger corporate-governance structures because they have less to 
conceal (Brickley and Zimmerman 2010). If this is the case, corporate-governance 
structures are not the reason why these firms have less earnings management. One 
way to mitigate endogeneity problems is to investigate earnings management and 
corporate governance in more controlled settings, where, for instance, incentives 
for earnings management are supposed to be particularly strong.  
 
A related problem is measurement errors in variables reflecting earnings-
management incentives and corporate-governance mechanisms. Most of the 
employed variables are rather crude, which suggests that they may suffer from 
significant measurement errors (Field et al. 2001). For instance, conditional stocks 
and stock options might be inadequate measures of the incentives triggered by 
stock and option-based compensation. An ideal measure of conditional stock and 
stock-option incentives should reflect how sensitive managers’ wealth in 
conditional stocks and stock options is to changes in underlying stock prices. Such 
direct measures are hard to obtain. An alternative would be to employ the firm’s 
earnings-response coefficients as estimates of how sensitive the firms’ stock prices 
are to changes in net earnings. Alternative measures might also be employed for 
management changes (e.g. Kvaal 2010), debt-covenant incentives (e.g. Armstrong 
et al. 2010) and some of the corporate-governance mechanisms (e.g Brickley and 
Zimmerman 2010). 
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The disseration could also be expanded in other ways. For instance, do firms with 
stronger corporate-governance structures report more and larger impairment 
losses? Positive associations between stronger corporate-governance structures 
and more and larger impairment losses might be consistent with the notion that 
these structures lead to more conservative accounting. Another possible extension 
is to investigate the value relevance and information content of abnormal-
impairment losses. Do these losses reflect any value-relevant information or are 
they only pure noise? Are there any significant differences in value relevance 
between reported impairment losses, normal-impairment losses and abnormal-
impairment losses? And finally, what is the information content of abnormal-
impairment losses? Do abnormal-impairment losses make larger or less market 
responses than normal-impairment losses? Only future research can answer these 
questions. 
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Appendix A – Research question 1 and 2 
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ho
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A
M
C
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 is
 a
s-
if 
ac
co
un
te
d 
go
od
w
ill
-a
m
or
tis
at
io
n 
ch
ar
ge
s o
f f
irm
 i,
 p
er
io
d 
t 
(a
m
or
tis
at
io
n-
an
d-
im
pa
irm
en
t m
et
ho
d)
; G
IM
C i
,t i
s a
s-
if 
ac
co
un
te
d 
go
od
w
ill
-im
pa
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en
t l
os
se
s o
f f
irm
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 p
er
io
d 
t (
am
or
tis
at
io
n-
an
d-
im
pa
irm
en
t m
et
ho
d)
; (
EQ
CA
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G
W
C
A
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 is
 a
s-
if 
ac
co
un
te
d 
bo
ok
 e
qu
ity
 re
du
ce
d 
by
 a
s-
if 
ac
co
un
te
d 
bo
ok
 g
oo
dw
ill
 o
f f
irm
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 ti
m
e 
t-1
(a
m
or
tis
at
io
n-
an
d-
im
pa
irm
en
t m
et
ho
d)
; G
W
C
A
I i,t
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 a
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ac
co
un
te
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bo
ok
 g
oo
dw
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 o
f f
irm
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 ti
m
e 
t-1
(a
m
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an
d-
im
pa
irm
en
t m
et
ho
d)
; R
i,t
 is
 st
oc
k 
re
tu
rn
 o
f f
irm
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 p
er
io
d 
t; 
(
E+
G
IM
) i,
t,t
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 is
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 p
re
-im
pa
irm
en
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et
 e
ar
ni
ng
s o
f f
irm
 i 
fr
om
 p
er
io
d 
t-1
 to
 t;
 
G
IM
i,t
,t-
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 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 re
po
rte
d 
go
od
w
ill
-im
pa
irm
en
t l
os
se
s o
f f
irm
 i 
fr
om
 p
er
io
d 
t-1
 to
 t;
 
G
A
M
i,t
,t-
1 
is
 a
s-
if 
ac
co
un
te
d 
go
od
w
ill
-a
m
or
tis
at
io
n 
ch
ar
ge
s o
f f
irm
 i 
fr
om
 p
er
io
d 
t-1
 to
 t 
(a
m
or
tis
at
io
n-
on
ly
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et
ho
d)
; 
G
IM
C
i,t
,t-
1 i
s c
ha
ng
es
 in
 a
s-
if 
ac
co
un
te
d 
go
od
w
ill
-im
pa
irm
en
t l
os
se
s o
f f
irm
 i,
 p
er
io
d 
t-1
 to
 t 
(a
m
or
tis
at
io
n-
an
d-
im
pa
irm
en
t m
et
ho
d)
; 
G
A
M
C
i,t
,t-
1 i
s c
ha
ng
es
 in
 a
s-
if 
ac
co
un
te
d 
go
od
w
ill
-a
m
or
tis
at
io
n 
ch
ar
ge
s o
f f
irm
 i 
fr
om
 p
er
io
d 
t-1
 to
 t 
(a
m
or
tis
at
io
n-
an
d-
im
pa
irm
en
t m
et
ho
d)
. G
oo
dw
ill
-im
pa
irm
en
t l
os
se
s a
nd
 g
oo
dw
ill
-a
m
or
tis
at
io
n 
ch
ar
ge
s t
ak
e 
po
si
tiv
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va
lu
es
. A
ll 
in
de
pe
nd
en
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ar
ia
bl
es
 in
 p
ric
e-
bo
ok
-e
ar
ni
ng
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ss
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 a
re
 d
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te
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r o
f o
ut
st
an
di
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 c
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t t
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e 
t. 
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ll 
va
ria
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 in
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ef
la
te
d 
by
 m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 a
t t
im
e 
t-1
. *
in
di
ca
te
s s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 a
t 1
0%
 le
ve
l (
tw
o-
ta
ile
d)
, 
**
in
di
ca
te
s s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 a
t 5
 %
 le
ve
l (
tw
o-
ta
ile
d)
, *
**
 in
di
ca
te
s s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 a
t 1
%
 le
ve
l (
tw
o-
ta
ile
d)
. T
he
 c
or
re
la
tio
n 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s a
re
 e
st
im
at
ed
 o
n 
no
n-
m
is
si
ng
 sa
m
pl
e 
of
 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 (w
ith
 o
ut
lie
rs
). 
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Table A3 – Including year dummies – hypotheses 1a and 1b 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model, year-dummies and control 
variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.924*** 
(8.35) 
2.396*** 
(10.49) 
2.865*** 
(6.92) 
2.249*** 
(9.27) 
-13.688** 
(-2.26) 
-8.862** 
(-2.38) 
-14.864** 
(-2.19) 
-9.593** 
(-2.45) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.497*** 
(4.56) 
3.681*** 
(9.29) 
3.119*** 
(3.59) 
4.325*** 
(7.86) 
1.962*** 
(3.83) 
3.352*** 
(7.79) 
2.478*** 
(2.80) 
4.130*** 
(7.30) 
GIMi,t - -3.869*** 
(-2.90) 
-3.602** 
(-2.59) 
-3.841** 
(-2.24) 
-3.261** 
(-2.39) 
-3.246** 
(-2.45) 
-1.991** 
(-2.09) 
-3.190* 
(-1.96) 
-1.828** 
(-1.98) 
(EQ-GW)i,t-1 + 0.775*** 
(5.55) 
0.740*** 
(13.08) 
0.725*** 
(2.75) 
0.629*** 
(5.76) 
0.706*** 
(4.83) 
0.655*** 
(10.69) 
0.649*** 
(2.60) 
0.562*** 
(4.94) 
GWi,t-1 + 1.687*** 
(5.32) 
1.202*** 
(6.91) 
1.592*** 
(4.32) 
1.096*** 
(6.12) 
1.435*** 
(4.73) 
1.075*** 
(6.46) 
1.350*** 
(3.84) 
0.892*** 
(5.24) 
YEAR_2006  0.325* 
(1.71) 
0.292 
(1.62) 
0.207 
(1.05) 
0.367** 
(2.01) 
0.246 
(1.32) 
0.146 
(0.82) 
0.061 
(0.29) 
0.291 
(1.63) 
YEAR_2007  -0.111 
(-0.36) 
-0.173 
(-0.80) 
-0.332  
(-1.08) 
-0.231  
(-1.02) 
-0.073 
(-0.26) 
-0.019 
(-0.09) 
-0.282  
(-0.98) 
-0.152  
(-0.66) 
YEAR_2008  -2.012*** 
(-4.35) 
-1.444*** 
(-5.94) 
-2.268*** 
(-4.27) 
-1.385*** 
(-5.61) 
-1.673*** 
(-3.94) 
-1.208*** 
(-5.18) 
-1.832***  
(-3.77) 
-1.135*** 
(-4.78) 
YEAR_2009  -0.598 
(-1.49) 
-0.345 
(-1.42) 
-0.697  
(-1.46) 
-0.288  
(-1.20) 
-0.473 
(-1.26) 
-0.195 
(-0.79) 
-0.556  
(-1.24) 
-0.102  
(-0.38) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.644** (2.57) 
1.025** 
(2.43) 
0.561** 
(2.38) 
1.080** 
(2.50) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.912*** (3.16) 
0.611*** 
(3.40) 
0.977*** 
(3.05) 
0.652*** 
(3.44) 
RESOURCESi,t      -1.724 (-0.75) 
-1.481 
(-1.35) 
-2.264  
(-0.80) 
-2.119* 
(-1.67) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  
 
 -2.082* (-1.76) 
-1.312* 
(-1.71) 
-2.425*  
(-1.91) 
-1.720** 
(-2.12) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -3.596*** (-2.64) 
-2.908*** 
(-3.36) 
-3.719***  
(-2.68) 
-2.700*** 
(-2.60) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -0.657 (-0.42) 
-0.394 
(-0.43) 
-0.812  
(-0.47) 
-0.563  
(-0.56) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.137** (-2.53) 
-2.063*** 
(-2.67) 
-3.288** 
(-2.45) 
-2.245*** 
(-2.75) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  
 
 -5.414*** (-3.45) 
-3.345*** 
(-3.44) 
-6.962***  
(-4.34) 
-4.560*** 
(-4.33) 
UTILITIESi,t      -3.641** (-2.47)
-2.298** 
(-2.17)
-3.915**  
(-2.44) 
-2.615** 
(-2.27)
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  
 
 -3.466*** (-2.69) 
-2.415*** 
(-2.71) 
-3.873***  
(-2.87) 
-2.898*** 
(-3.22) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.787** (-2.19) 
-1.598* 
(-1.89) 
-2.599*  
(-1.94) 
-1.745* 
(-1.93) 
N  909 851 762 718 909 855 762 722 
F-value  19.27*** 71.74*** 15.60*** 40.30*** 14.46*** 44.23*** 14.13*** 27.17*** 
Adjusted R2  0.503 0.591 0.496 0.587 0.557 0.639 0.546 0.650 
Max VIF  1.57 1.55 1.57 1.55 5.35 5.35 5.31 5.52 
Mean VIF  1.37 1.35 1.42 1.42 2.13 2.10 2.13 2.15 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment 
losses of firm i, period t; (EQ-GW)i,t-1is book equity reduced by book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GWi,t-1is book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time 
t. YEAR_2006, YEAR_2007, YEAR_2008, YEAR_2009 are dummy variables equal 1 if the year is 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively and 
otherwise 0. YEAR_2005 is the benchmark year. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t, 
NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION 
_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. 
BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are 
unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), 
*** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are 
considered as outliers. 
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Table A4 – Excluding 2008 observations – hypotheses 1a and 1b 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.327*** 
(5.33) 
1.960*** 
(7.87) 
2.026*** 
(4.01) 
1.751*** 
(7.10) 
-9.154 
(-1.51) 
-6.754* 
(-1.84) 
-11.548* 
(-1.66) 
-8.146** 
(-2.05) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.999*** 
(3.82) 
4.539*** 
(9.15) 
3.266*** 
(2.94) 
5.257*** 
(8.57) 
2.443**
* 
(3.29) 
3.899*** 
(8.12) 
2.701** 
(2.43) 
4.671*** 
(7.40) 
GIMi,t - -2.664* 
(-1.70) 
-2.122 
(-1.24) 
-2.663 
(-1.38) 
-1.482 
(-0.86) 
-2.364 
(-1.56) 
-2.791* 
(-1.80) 
-2.283 
(-1.23) 
-2.035 
(-1.34) 
(EQ-GW)i,t-1 + 0.801*** 
(4.18) 
0.716*** 
(8.96) 
0.954*** 
(2.68) 
0.735*** 
(6.42) 
0.767**
* 
(4.01) 
0.655*** 
(10.50) 
0.871** 
(2.57) 
0.575*** 
(4.63) 
GWi,t-1 + 1.927*** 
(4.67) 
1.366*** 
(6.00) 
1.909*** 
(4.20) 
1.198*** 
(6.15) 
1.694**
* 
(4.22) 
1.121*** 
(6.44) 
1.673***  
(3.79) 
0.933*** 
(5.66) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.562** (2.56) 
0.448 
(1.57) 
0.512** 
(2.34) 
0.534  
(1.62) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.669** (2.34)
0.502*** 
(2.82)
0.778**  
(2.42) 
0.579*** 
(2.98) 
RESOURCESi,t      -0.892 (-0.41) 
-1.205 
(-1.06) 
-1.761 
(-0.66) 
-1.893 
(-1.48) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  
 
 
-
2.249** 
(-2.01) 
-1.355* 
(-1.74) 
-2.552** 
(-2.16) 
-1.842** 
(-2.25) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 
-
3.186** 
(-2.48)
-2.690*** 
(-3.16) 
-3.177** 
(-2.53) 
-2.568** 
(-2.53) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -0.230 (-0.15) 
-0.049 
(-0.05) 
-0.391  
(-0.24) 
-0.597  
(-0.58) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t  
  
 
 
-
3.038** 
(-2.54)
-2.059** 
(-2.61) 
-3.162** 
(-2.52) 
-2.316*** 
(-2.74) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  
 
 
-
4.606**
* 
(-3.26)
-2.596** 
(-2.45) 
-6.032*** 
(-4.34) 
-3.952*** 
(-3.75) 
UTILITIESi,t  
  
 
 
-
3.406** 
(-2.53) 
-2.478** 
(-2.55) 
-3.786*** 
(-2.66) 
-2.880*** 
(-2.62) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  
 
 
-
3.314**
* 
(-2.68)
-2.486*** 
(-2.86) 
-3.653***  
(-2.89) 
-2.941*** 
(-3.28) 
FINANCEi,t  
  
 
 
-
3.292** 
(-2.60) 
-2.018** 
(-2.41) 
-2.762** 
(-2.22) 
-2.151** 
(-2.38) 
N  734 685 615 574 734 688 615 581 
F-value  19.82*** 63.78*** 18.43*** 66.54*** 9.62*** 39.00*** 10.42*** 28.94*** 
Adjusted R2  0.548 0.615 0.555 0.617 0.594 0.679 0.595 0.680 
Max VIF  1.43 1.27 1.43 1.49 4.89 4.92 4.94 5.19 
Mean VIF  1.25 1.16 1.25 1.28 2.13 2.10 2.12 2.18 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment 
losses of firm i, period t; (EQ-GW)i,t-1is book equity reduced by book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GWi,t-1is book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time 
t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION _TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% 
level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s 
distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A5 – Excluding large book goodwill – hypotheses 1a and 1b 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  
2.719*** 
(7.85) 
2.304*** 
(8.74) 
2.422*** 
(6.38) 
1.999*** 
(7.06) 
-
19.281**
* 
(-2.72) 
-10.363** 
(-2.59) 
-
21.273**
* 
(-2.78) 
-11.175*** 
(-2.60) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.850*** 
(5.30) 
4.281*** 
(8.82) 
4.112*** 
(6.50) 
4.918*** 
(9.00) 
2.267*** 
(4.68) 
3.270*** 
(6.80) 
3.322*** 
(5.01) 
4.387*** 
(6.37) 
GIMi,t - -5.044*** 
(-2.89) 
-2.668** 
(-2.27) 
-4.884* 
(-1.92)
-2.304**  
(-2.14)
-4.560*** 
(-2.69)
-2.407* 
(-1.80)
-4.306* 
(-1.81) 
-2.115* 
(-1.69)
(EQ-GW)i,t-1 + 0 .650*** 
(4.69) 
0.628*** 
(8.77) 
0.449* 
(1.83) 
0.584*** 
(5.49) 
0.588*** 
(3.97) 
0.588*** 
(7.38) 
0.402* 
(1.67) 
0.504*** 
(4.04) 
GWi,t-1 + 2.068*** 
(5.98) 
1.079*** 
(2.91) 
1.910*** 
(5.08)
1.087*** 
(2.91)
1.930*** 
(6.08)
1.179*** 
(3.29)
1.773*** 
(5.01) 
0.966*** 
(2.84) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.666** (2.53) 
1.181** 
(2.27) 
0.497** 
(2.55) 
1.126** 
(2.26) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      1.157*** (3.40) 
0.680*** 
(3.51) 
1.254*** 
(3.41) 
0.711*** 
(3.37) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.257 (-1.01) 
-1.658 
(-1.44) 
-2.918  
(-1.07) 
-2.130 
(-1.61) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  
 
 -1.898 (-1.62) 
-1.407* 
(-1.86) 
-2.262*  
(-1.79) 
-1.713** 
(-2.06) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -3.094** (-2.44) 
-2.793*** 
(-3.19) 
-3.186**  
(-2.53) 
-2.275** 
(-2.17) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -1.589 (-1.02) 
-0.755 
(-0.77) 
-1.996 
(-1.20) 
-1.073 
(-1.04) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -2.542** (-2.06) 
-1.647* 
(-1.98) 
-2.725**  
(-2.08) 
-1.663* 
(-1.88) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  
 
 -4.752*** (-3.12) 
-2.899*** 
(-2.66) 
-6.220***  
(-3.89) 
-3.884*** 
(-3.54) 
UTILITIESi,t      -3.610** (-2.47) 
-2.154** 
(-2.02) 
-3.794**  
(-2.34) 
-2.176* 
(-1.85) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  
 
 -2.909** (-2.22) 
-2.619*** 
(-2.94) 
-3.758***  
(-3.26) 
-2.954*** 
(-3.59) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.381** (-1.98) 
-1.659** 
(-1.98) 
-2.331*  
(-1.80) 
-1.513* 
(-1.66) 
N  682 637 559 522 682 642 559 527 
F-value  29.43*** 71.59*** 25.81*** 50.61*** 11.37*** 24.50*** 17.72*** 24.54*** 
Adjusted R2  0 .524 0 .570 0.545 0.613 0.571 0.632 0.588 0.659 
Max VIF  1.29 1.24 1.48 1.37 4.12 4.17 4.16 4.26 
Mean VIF  1.24 1.18 1.38 1.24 2.03 1.98 2.03 1.97 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment 
losses of firm i, period t; (EQ-GW)i,t-1is book equity reduced by book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GWi,t-1is book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time 
t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION _TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% 
level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s 
distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A6 – Excluding large goodwill-impairment losses – hypotheses 1a and 
1b 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  
2.518*** 
(6.49) 
2.038*** 
(9.03) 
2.244*** 
(4.91) 
1.825*** 
(7.69) 
-
15.340**
* 
(-2.54) 
-12.023*** 
(-3.38) 
-15.636** 
(-2.33) 
-11.562*** 
(-3.01) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.840*** 
(3.99) 
4.424*** 
(9.04)
3.923*** 
(2.91)
5.222*** 
(9.51)
2.261*** 
(3.49)
3.565*** 
(7.75) 
3.163** 
(2.40) 
4.747*** 
(8.53)
GIMi,t - -6.544 
(-0.58) 
-4.457 
(-0.73) 
-9.104  
(-0.87) 
-8.638  
(-1.12) 
-2.926 
(-0.26) 
-1.639 
(-0.31) 
-4.987 
(-0.47) 
0.781  
(0.12) 
(EQ-GW)i,t-1 + 0.728*** 
(4.47) 
0.645*** 
(8.46)
0.592* 
(1.87)
0.580*** 
(5.30)
0.656*** 
(3.86)
0.633*** 
(8.88) 
0.523* 
(1.80) 
0.545*** 
(4.78)
GWi,t-1 + 1.629*** 
(4.20) 
1.128*** 
(6.21) 
1.505*** 
(3.13) 
1.036*** 
(5.62) 
1.363*** 
(3.69) 
1.067*** 
(6.13) 
1.270*** 
(2.84) 
0.889***  
(5.11) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.727** (2.66) 
0.992** 
(2.43) 
0.712** 
(2.51) 
1.117***  
(2.68) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.982*** (3.45) 
0.754*** 
(4.42) 
0.994*** 
(3.19) 
0.722*** 
(3.88) 
RESOURCESi,t      -1.983  (-0.89) 
-1.851* 
(-1.69) 
-2.224 
(-0.80) 
-2.234* 
(-1.77) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  
 
 -2.377**  (-2.05) 
-1.305* 
(-1.84) 
-2.756** 
(-2.23) 
-1.466* 
(-1.94) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -3.363*** (-2.71) 
-2.690*** 
(-3.35) 
-3.395*** 
(-2.70) 
-2.668*** 
(-3.25) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -0.877 (-0.57) 
-0.575 
(-0.65) 
-0.939 
(-0.57) 
-0.553 
(-0.58) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.309*** (-2.82) 
-2.224*** 
(-3.00) 
-3.406*** 
(-2.74) 
-2.170*** 
(-2.76) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  
 
 -4.678*** (-3.25) 
-3.428*** 
(-3.48) 
-5.901*** 
(-4.46) 
-3.853*** 
(-3.86) 
UTILITIESi,t      -3.761*** (-2.71) 
-2.351** 
(-2.36) 
-3.867*** 
(-2.62) 
-2.492** 
(-2.27) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  
 
 -3.658*** (-2.76) 
-2.654*** 
(-3.10) 
-4.067*** 
(-3.02) 
-2.708*** 
(-3.09) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.939** (-2.42) 
-1.723** 
(-2.16) 
-2.755** 
(-2.19) 
-1.674* 
(-1.96) 
N  864 800 719 673 864 812 719 681 
F-value  25.81*** 67.59*** 20.35*** 52.93*** 12.32*** 36.91*** 10.06*** 29.70*** 
Adjusted R2  0.497 0.560 0.502 0.600 0.553 0.648 0.551 0.671 
Max VIF  1.29 1.35 1.54 1.50 5.02 5.05 4.99 5.05 
Mean VIF  1.20 1.20 1.33 1.29 2.18 2.14 2.17 2.15 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment 
losses of firm i, period t; (EQ-GW)i,t-1is book equity reduced by book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GWi,t-1is book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time 
t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION _TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% 
level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s 
distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A7 – Stock prices measured with time lag t+2 months – hypotheses 1a 
and 1b 
  
  Stock price t+2 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  
2.667*** 
(7.38) 
2.164*** 
(9.20) 
2.535*** 
(6.46) 
1.890*** 
(8.16) 
-
14.537**
* 
(-2.40) 
-9.679*** 
(-2.61) 
-
16.332**
* 
(-2.42) 
-10.704*** 
(-2.76) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.696*** 
(4.79) 
3.951*** 
(8.65) 
3.339*** 
(4.10)
4.900*** 
(9.56)
2.072*** 
(4.12)
3.540*** 
(7.85)
2.591*** 
(3.25) 
4.063*** 
(7.55) 
GIMi,t - -3.628***  
(-2.87) 
-3.093** 
(-2.08) 
-3.453** 
(-2.07) 
-2.325 
(-1.62) 
-2.894** 
(-2.27) 
-1.797* 
(-1.73) 
-2.655* 
(-1.68) 
-1.344 
(-1.37) 
(EQ-GW)i,t-1 + 0.757*** 
(4.86) 
0.764*** 
(11.61) 
0.647** 
(2.48)
0.727*** 
(11.61)
0.676*** 
(4.15)
0.652*** 
(8.60)
0.563** 
(2.25) 
0.528*** 
(4.44) 
GWi,t-1 + 1.524*** 
(5.28) 
1.130*** 
(6.63) 
1.389*** 
(4.14) 
0.969*** 
(5.71) 
1.283*** 
(4.76) 
1.009*** 
(6.21) 
1.164***  
(3.69) 
0.841***  
(5.23) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.706*** (3.10) 
1.063** 
(2.56) 
0.723*** 
(3.12) 
1.248***  
(2.78) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.970*** (3.35) 
0.661*** 
(3.70) 
1.060***  
(3.31) 
0.661*** 
(3.70) 
RESOURCESi,t      -1.793  (-0.76) 
-1.507 
(-1.30) 
-2.460 
(-0.89) 
-1.408 
(-1.12) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  
 
 -2.790**  (-2.20) 
-1.740** 
(-2.41) 
-3.171** 
(-2.26) 
-2.061** 
(-2.51) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -3.415** (-2.23) 
-3.310*** 
(-3.90) 
-3.523** 
(-2.23) 
-2.784*** 
(-2.69) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -1.253 (-0.80) 
-0.824 
(-0.95) 
-1.429 
(-0.81) 
-1.076 
(-1.12) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.683*** (-2.83) 
-2.518*** 
(-3.42) 
-3.754** 
(-2.60) 
-2.485*** 
(-3.01) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  
 
 -5.791*** (-3.39) 
-4.391*** 
(-4.97) 
-7.441*** 
(-4.37) 
-4.457*** 
(-4.31) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.213*** (-2.70) 
-2.714** 
(-2.60) 
-4.480** 
(-2.53) 
-2.776** 
(-2.29) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  
 
 -4.084*** (-2.89) 
-2.823*** 
(-3.12) 
-4.415*** 
(-2.84) 
-2.823*** 
(-3.12) 
FINANCEi,t      -3.349** (-2.52) 
-2.080** 
(-2.59) 
-3.097** 
(-2.15) 
-1.932** 
(-2.14) 
N  909 845 762 711 909 853 762 718 
F-value  20.10*** 64.33*** 18.79*** 61.58*** 9.62*** 36.85*** 10.11*** 26.66*** 
Adjusted R2  0 .479 0 .532 0.467 0.552 0.541 0.624 0.526 0.614 
Max VIF  1.22 1.18 1.40 1.31 5.27 5.32 5.26 5.34 
Mean VIF  1.16 1.12 1.26 1.20 2.23 2.19 2.22 2.18 
Stock price of firm i, time t+2 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-
impairment losses of firm i, period t; (EQ-GW)i,t-1is book equity reduced by book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GWi,t-1is book goodwill of firm i, time t-
1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, 
time t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION _TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% 
level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s 
distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A8 – Stock prices measured with time lag t+3 months – hypotheses 1a 
and 1b 
  
  Stock price t+3 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  
2.761*** 
(8.00) 
2.167*** 
(9.26) 
2.527*** 
(6.66) 
1.883*** 
(8.43) 
-
14.908**
* 
(-2.50) 
-9.889*** 
(-2.80) 
-16.679** 
(-2.51) 
-10.790*** 
(-2.85) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.703*** 
(4.80) 
4.268*** 
(9.71)
3.478*** 
(4.27)
5.033*** 
(10.20)
2.097*** 
(4.14)
3.511*** 
(8.69) 
2.728*** 
(3.46) 
4.219*** 
(8.11)
GIMi,t - -3.366***  
(-3.45) 
-2.987 
(-1.43) 
-3.293** 
(-2.31) 
-2.053  
(-1.02) 
-2.617*** 
(-2.68) 
-1.746* 
(-1.69) 
-2.511* 
(-1.88) 
-1.422 
(-1.46) 
(EQ-GW)i,t-1 + 0.680*** 
(5.01) 
0.729*** 
(10.69)
0.583** 
(2.38)
0.667*** 
(6.90)
0.601*** 
(4.14)
0.606*** 
(8.56) 
0.499** 
(2.12) 
0.465*** 
(3.83)
GWi,t-1 + 1.534*** 
(5.42) 
1.120*** 
(6.48) 
1.422*** 
(4.31) 
1.028*** 
(6.02) 
1.293*** 
(4.89) 
0.961*** 
(5.64) 
1.202*** 
(3.89) 
0.848*** 
(4.97) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.759*** (3.07) 
0.974** 
(2.53) 
0.673*** 
(3.06) 
1.076** 
(2.36) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.997*** (3.51) 
0.671*** 
(3.91) 
1.075*** 
(3.42) 
0.715*** 
(3.86) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.186  (-0.95) 
-1.228  
(-1.22) 
-2.410 
(-0.86) 
-1.392 
(-1.22) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  
 
 -2.890**  (-2.25) 
-1.614** 
(-2.29) 
-3.096** 
(-2.20) 
-1.926** 
(-2.53) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -3.544** (-2.29) 
-2.708*** 
(-3.02) 
-3.443** 
(-2.19) 
-2.760*** 
(-2.98) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -1.561  (-1.00) 
-0.819  
(-0.98) 
-1.614 
(-0.94) 
-1.107 
(-1.24) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.792*** (-2.89) 
-2.356*** 
(-3.36) 
-3.748*** 
(-2.63) 
-2.451*** 
(-3.24) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  
 
 -5.965*** (-3.49) 
-4.271*** 
(-4.94) 
-7.385*** 
(-4.38) 
-4.296*** 
(-4.35) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.529*** (-2.88) 
-2.776*** 
(-2.73) 
-4.626*** 
(-2.64) 
-3.063*** 
(-2.77) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  
 
 -4.075*** (-2.78) 
-2.828*** 
(-3.29) 
-4.285*** 
(-2.73) 
-2.985*** 
(-3.18) 
FINANCEi,t      -3.314** (-2.47) 
-1.862** 
(-2.43) 
-2.949** 
(-2.06) 
-1.761** 
(-2.09) 
N  909 846 762 707 909 848 762 718 
F-value  24.08*** 69.12*** 20.49*** 78.37*** 10.36*** 38.67*** 9.87*** 27.91*** 
Adjusted R2  0.465 0.542 0.473 0.557 0.527 0.595 0.530 0.618 
Max VIF  1.22 1.16 1.40 1.35 5.27 5.41 5.26 5.36 
Mean VIF  1.16 1.11 1.26 1.22 2.23 2.19 2.22 2.19 
Stock price of firm i, time t+3 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-
impairment losses of firm i, period t; (EQ-GW)i,t-1is book equity reduced by book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GWi,t-1is book goodwill of firm i, time t-
1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, 
time t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION _TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% 
level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s 
distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
  
482 
 
Table A9 – Stock prices measured with time lag t+4 months – hypotheses 1a 
and 1b 
  
  Stock price t+4 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  
2.837*** 
(8.53) 
2.196*** 
(9.62) 
2.576*** 
(7.20) 
2.017*** 
(8.68) 
-
14.466**
* 
(-2.37) 
-
10.178**
* 
(-2.79) 
-16.224** 
(-2.38) 
-10.915*** 
(-2.79) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.759*** 
(4.66) 
4.385*** 
(9.77) 
3.529*** 
(4.16)
4.959*** 
(9.97)
2.115*** 
(4.02)
3.730*** 
(8.43)
2.750*** 
(3.41) 
4.108*** 
(7.98) 
GIMi,t - -3.097***  
(-3.50) 
-2.703**  
(-2.26) 
-3.045**  
(-2.33) 
-2.095* 
(-1.92) 
-2.371*** 
(-2.75) 
-1.637 
(-1.55) 
-2.281* 
(-1.90) 
-1.771** 
(-2.05) 
(EQ-GW)i,t-1 + 0.706*** 
(5.41) 
0 .741*** 
(11.41) 
0.616** 
(2.58)
0.631*** 
(6.05)
0.624*** 
(4.45)
0.607*** 
(7.99)
0.524** 
(2.31) 
0.557*** 
(4.44) 
GWi,t-1 + 1.504*** 
(5.59) 
1.135*** 
(6.28) 
1.401*** 
(4.41) 
1.044*** 
(5.89) 
1.264*** 
(5.15) 
0 .978*** 
(5.84) 
1.181***  
(4.08) 
0.917*** 
(5.43) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0 .813*** (2.81) 
1.079*** 
(2.70) 
0.703*** 
(2.91) 
1.101** 
(2.41) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0 .981*** (3.38) 
0 .682*** 
(3.87) 
1.054*** 
(3.28) 
0.715*** 
(3.74) 
RESOURCESi,t      -1.761  (-0.76) 
-1.034  
(-0.98) 
-1.960 
(-0.70) 
-1.297 
(-1.15) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  
 
 -2.881**  (-2.11) 
-1.443** 
(-1.96) 
-3.047**  
(-2.05) 
-1.754** 
(-2.21) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -3.647** (-2.24) 
-2.665*** 
(-2.86) 
-3.467** 
(-2.09) 
-2.639** 
(-2.77) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -1.455  (-0.89) 
-0.761 
(-0.88) 
-1.426 
(-0.80) 
-0.951  
(-1.01) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.833*** (-2.81) 
-2.353*** 
(-3.20) 
-3.730** 
(-2.52) 
-2.371*** 
(-3.01) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  
 
 -6.003*** (-3.40) 
-4.184*** 
(-4.61) 
-7.326*** 
(-4.15) 
-4.645*** 
(-4.61) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.586*** (-2.83) 
-2.797*** 
(-2.71) 
-4.600** 
(-2.56) 
-2.849** 
(-2.49) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  
 
 -4.067*** (-2.63) 
-2.924*** 
(-3.61) 
-4.233** 
(-2.56) 
-3.060*** 
(-3.58) 
FINANCEi,t      -3.493** (-2.51) 
-1.909** 
(-2.38) 
-2.997** 
(-2.01) 
-1.753** 
(-2.02) 
N  909 849 762 713 909 850 762 717 
F-value  30.30*** 79.13*** 26.17*** 64.42*** 12.58*** 40.24*** 11.19*** 32.53*** 
Adjusted R2  0.465 0.556 0.477 0.578 0.529 0.619 0.534 0.633 
Max VIF  1.22 1.17 1.40 1.39 5.27 5.42 5.26 5.35 
Mean VIF  1.16 1.12 1.26 1.25 2.23 2.20 2.22 2.18 
Stock price of firm i, time t+4 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-
impairment losses of firm i, period t; (EQ-GW)i,t-1is book equity reduced by book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GWi,t-1is book goodwill of firm i, time t-
1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, 
time t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION _TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% 
level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s 
distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A10 – Scaled by total assets t-1 – hypotheses 1a and 1b 
  
  Market value scaled by total assets t-1 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.600*** 
(2.62) 
0.274*** 
(3.83) 
0.476*** 
(3.07) 
0.240*** 
(3.33) 
0.479 
(0.56) 
0.314 
(0.46) 
-0.286  
(-0.31) 
-0.628  
(-0.92) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 10.076*** 
(3.56) 
8.485*** 
(13.32) 
6.812*** 
(3.79) 
7.703*** 
(11.94) 
10.052**
* 
(3.51) 
8.750*** 
(11.01) 
6.741*** 
(3.77) 
7.829*** 
(12.26) 
GIMi,t - -3.995 
(-1.61) 
-4.268*** 
(-3.90) 
-4.478** 
(-2.11) 
-4.669*** 
(-4.34) 
-3.924 
(-1.53) 
-3.876*** 
(-3.13) 
-4.006* 
(-1.88) 
-3.206*** 
(-3.36) 
(EQ-GW)i,t-1 + -0.440 
(-0.47) 
0.570*** 
(2.96) 
-0.497 
(1.07) 
0.652*** 
(3.09) 
-0.587 
(-0.63) 
0.525*** 
 (2.73) 
0.292  
(0.67) 
0.407*** 
(2.05) 
GWi,t-1 + -0.177 
(-0.19) 
0.993*** 
(4.74) 
0.805*  
(1.70) 
1.324*** 
(5.07) 
-0.456 
(-0.49) 
0.679** 
(2.39) 
0.534  
(1.26) 
0.722*** 
(2.81) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.189* (1.82)
0.435*** 
(3.77) 
0.175* 
(1.87)
0.292*** 
(2.77)
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.012 (0.28) 
-5.73*10-4 
 (-0.02) 
0.049 
(1.08) 
0.049  
(1.52) 
RESOURCESi,t      -0.647** (-2.03)
-0.380* 
(-1.69) 
-0.640*  
(-1.92)
-0.601***  
(-2.61)
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  
 
 -0.064  (-0.34) 
0.095 
(0.68) 
-0.176  
(-1.00) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 -0.438** (-2.12) 
-0.228 
(-1.40) 
-0.435**  
(-2.25) 
-0.226  
(-1.62) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  
 
 0.117  (0.61) 
0.206 
(1.38) 
-0.027  
(-0.13) 
0.078 
(0.52) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.097 (-0.56)
-0.070 
(-0.57) 
-0.278 
(-1.46)
-0.104  
(-0.87)
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  
 
 0.104 (0.39) 
0.307 
(1.31) 
-0.364 
(-1.48) 
-0.164  
(-0.93) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.472**  (-2.29) 
-0.254 
(-1.63) 
-0.611*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.390***  
(-2.67) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  
 
 0.692* (1.65) 
0.333* 
(1.72) 
0.328 
(0.88) 
0.334* 
(1.72) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.092  (-0.44) 
-0.187  
(-1.38) 
-0.175  
(-0.66) 
-0.235*  
(-1.92) 
N  909 867 762 726 909 868 762 723 
F-value  13.36*** 65.11*** 19.79*** 53.62*** 10.65*** 19.89*** 12.85*** 22.93*** 
Adjusted R2  0.381 0.461 0.355 0.428 0.393 0.507 0.377 0.488 
Max VIF  2.81 2.50 3.41 1.61 5.36 5.35 5.37 5.67 
Mean VIF  1.91 1.76 2.20 1.33 2.43 2.26 2.48 2.28 
Market value of firm i, time t, scaled by total assets at time t-1, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GIMi,t is 
reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t; (EQ-GW)i,t-1is book equity reduced by book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GWi,t-1is book goodwill of 
firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of 
firm i, time t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION _TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment 
losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. All variables (both dependent and independent variables) except from control 
variables and industry-sector dummies are scaled by total asset of firm i, time t-1.  t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level 
(two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger 
than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
 
  
484 
 
Table A11 – Scaled by total sales t – hypotheses 1a and 1b 
  
  Market value scaled by total sales t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.799*** 
(7.26) 
0.661*** 
(9.82) 
0.512*** 
(4.43) 
0.451*** 
(8.08) 
-0.828 
 (-0.59) 
-1.147*** 
(-1.20) 
-1.420*** 
(-1.05) 
-2.002** 
(-2.21) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.757*** 
(7.48) 
2.351*** 
(9.36) 
3.234*** 
(7.10) 
4.121*** 
(8.58) 
1.689*** 
(8.08) 
2.299*** 
(9.05) 
3.033*** 
(7.03) 
3.603*** 
(9.52) 
GIMi,t - -2.812*** 
(-2.75) 
-2.741*** 
(-3.23) 
-3.091*** 
(-3.02) 
-2.191*** 
(-3.26) 
-2.687** 
(-2.45) 
-2.671*** 
(-3.97) 
-2.572*** 
(-2.79) 
-2.505*** 
(-6.03) 
(EQ-GW)i,t-1 + 0.836*** 
(22.22) 
0.912*** 
(16.34) 
0.908*** 
(6.73)
0.931*** 
(11.28)
0.777*** 
(16.64)
0.817*** 
(30.85)
0.814*** 
(5.41) 
0.948*** 
(14.83)
GWi,t-1 + 1.662*** 
(3.98) 
1.339*** 
(8.34) 
1.692*** 
(4.55) 
1.215*** 
(7.87) 
1.421*** 
(3.60) 
1.203*** 
(9.14) 
1.428*** 
(3.94) 
1.239*** 
(9.00) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.221* (1.84) 
0.365** 
(2.14) 
0.162* 
(1.88) 
0.479*** 
(3.31) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.073 (1.15) 
0.078* 
(1.76) 
0.100 
(1.63) 
0.112*** 
(2.63) 
RESOURCESi,t      0.058 (0.14) 
0.013 
(0.05) 
-0.263  
(-0.59) 
-0.329  
(-1.42) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    0.025  (0.08) 
0.140 
(0.78) 
-0.225  
(-0.71) 
0.071 
(0.53) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.515 (-1.61) 
-0.330* 
(-1.71) 
-0.514 
(-1.60) 
-0.246  
(-1.52) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    0.308  (0.86) 
0.457*  
(1.91) 
0.103  
(0.28) 
0.239 
(1.26) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.156 (-0.48) 
-3.04*10-4 
(-0.00) 
-0.342  
(-1.07) 
-0.042  
(-0.30) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    1.005 (0.83) Omitted
37 -0.676*  (-1.93) 
-0.336* 
(-1.83) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.058 (-0.14) 
0.029 
(0.13) 
-0.425  
(-1.13) 
-0.046 
 (-0.23) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    1.026 (1.41) 
0.498* 
(1.77) 
0.948 
(1.20) 
0.523* 
(1.77) 
FINANCEi,t      0.867*  (1.87) 
0.525*** 
(2.46) 
0.572 
(1.11) 
0.356* 
(1.88) 
N  909 852 762 710 909 856 762 713 
F-value  137.43*** 81.55*** 16.80*** 77.80*** 47.18*** 98.29*** 16.98*** 35.68*** 
Adjusted R2  0.659 0.572 0.587 0.531 0.678 0.724 0.620 0.622 
Max VIF  1.09 1.08 1.10 1.11 5.24 5.35 5.22 5.50 
Mean VIF  1.07 1.02 1.08 1.09 2.20 2.26 2.17 2.18 
Table continues on next page. 
 
  
                                           
37 No observations. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Market value of firm i, time t, scaled by total sales in period t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GIMi,t is 
reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t; (EQ-GW)i,t-1is book equity reduced by book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GWi,t-1is book goodwill of 
firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of 
firm i, time t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION _TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. All variables (both dependent and independent variables) except from 
control variables and industry-sector dummies are scaled by total sales of firm i, period t. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significant at 10% 
level (two-tailed), **indicates significant at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significant at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations having a value of 
Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
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Table A12 – Control for size – hypotheses 1a and 1b 
  
  Unstandardised residuals t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  -2.710*** 
(-6.75) 
-3.021*** 
(-11.04) 
-2.850*** 
(-6.22) 
-3.210 *** 
(-10.79) 
20.526**
* 
(3.48) 
24.515*** 
(6.83) 
19.015*** 
(2.87) 
24.945*** 
(6.24) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.736*** 
(3.60) 
2.939*** 
(7.01) 
2.128*** 
(2.61) 
3.429*** 
(7.75) 
2.039*** 
(3.96) 
3.470*** 
(7.86) 
2.493*** 
(2.79) 
4.259*** 
(7.35) 
GIMi,t - -3.335** 
(-2.53) 
-2.179** 
(-2.46) 
-3.367** 
(-2.13) 
-1.920** 
(-2.14) 
-3.630*** 
(-2.73) 
-2.542*** 
(-2.67) 
-3.550** 
(-2.20) 
-2.275** 
(-2.51) 
(EQ-GW)i,t-1 + 0 .642*** 
(4.12) 
0.565*** 
(7.77) 
0.602** 
(2.20) 
0.598*** 
(5.81) 
0.683*** 
(4.56) 
0.648*** 
(10.56) 
0.621** 
(2.45) 
0.553*** 
(5.06) 
GWi,t-1 + 1.305*** 
(4.25) 
0.867*** 
(4.63) 
1.268*** 
(3.58) 
0.789*** 
(4.10) 
1.373*** 
(4.58) 
1.034*** 
(6.29) 
1.292*** 
(3.73) 
0.882*** 
(5.29) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.677*** (2.76)
0.988** 
(2.54)
0.613** 
(2.56) 
1.154*** 
(2.71)
lnSIZE_MVi,t      -0.979*** (-3.47) 
-1.234*** 
(-7.15) 
-0.903*** 
(-2.88) 
-1.256***  
(-6.50) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.156 (-0.92)
-1.948* 
(-1.81)
-2.552 
(-0.87) 
-2.351* 
(-1.82)
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -2.447** (-2.04) 
-1.659** 
(-2.34) 
-2.807** 
(-2.13) 
-1.916** 
(-2.51) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.397** (-2.54) 
-2.864*** 
(-3.60) 
-3.511** 
(-2.56) 
-2.939***  
(-3.47) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.951 (-0.60) 
-0.649 
 (-0.74) 
-1.091 
(-0.62) 
-0.585  
(-0.59) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.309*** (-2.63)
-2.268*** 
(-3.08)
-3.461** 
(-2.51) 
-2.273***  
(-2.85)
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -5.412***  (-3.38) 
-4.282*** 
(-4.83) 
-6.976***  
(-4.38) 
-4.191***  
(-4.17) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.041*** (-2.69) 
-2.699*** 
(-2.68) 
-4.337** 
(-2.60) 
-2.861**  
(-2.51) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -3.732*** (-2.85) 
-2.820*** 
(-3.45) 
-4.167*** 
(-2.85) 
-3.005***  
(-3.44) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.941** (-2.28) 
-1.794** 
(-2.25) 
-2.762** 
(-2.00) 
-1.799**  
(-2.06) 
N  909 852 762 715 909 851 762 721 
F-value  11.82*** 56.17*** 9.49*** 56.94*** 9.44*** 56.63*** 16.38*** 33.14*** 
Adjusted R2  0.357 0 .392 0.347 0.391 0.430 0.558 0.415 0.568 
Max VIF  1.22 1.45 1.40 1.43 5.27 5.43 5.26 5.51 
Mean VIF  1.16 1.27 1.26 1.27 2.23 2.21 2.22 2.24 
Dependent variable is unstandardised residuals from a regression of stock prices on size where size is measured as natural logarithm of the equity-market 
value at the end of the fiscal year. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, 
period t; (EQ-GW)i,t-1is book equity reduced by book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GWi,t-1is book goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth 
in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t. RESOURCESi,t, 
GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t, 
NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION _TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm 
belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment losses take positive values. 
Regression coefficients are unstandardised. All variables (both dependent and independent variables) except from control variables and industry-sector 
dummies are scaled by total sales of firm i, period t. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significant at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates 
significant at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significant at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations having a value of Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where 
n is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
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Table A13 – Including year dummies – hypothesis 1c 
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model, year-dummies and control 
variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.222*** 
(6.13) 
0.196*** 
(8.18) 
0.197*** 
(5.26) 
0.187*** 
(7.83) 
-0.120 
(-0.55) 
-0.328* 
(-1.98) 
-0.508**  
(-2.09) 
-0.513*** 
(-3.32) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.501*** 
(3.35) 
1.263*** 
(7.49) 
1.629*** 
(3.93) 
1.335*** 
(9.44) 
1.376*** 
(3.08) 
1.056*** 
(6.51) 
1.342*** 
(3.39) 
1.090*** 
(5.90) 
 (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 + -0.721* 
(-1.77) 
-0.314** 
(-2.38) 
-0.393 
(-1.62) 
-0.276*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.699* 
(-1.65) 
-0.273** 
(-2.46) 
-0.303 
(-1.26) 
-0.206* 
(-1.84) 
GIMi,t - -0.549** 
(-2.57) 
-1.248*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.495** 
(-2.49) 
-1.033*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.393* 
(-1.83) 
-0.891** 
 (-2.06) 
-0.350* 
(-1.78) 
-0.910** 
 (-2.25) 
GIMi,t,t-1 - -0.303*** 
(-4.86) 
-0.783*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.314*** 
(-4.59) 
-0.819*** 
(-3.21) 
-0.332*** 
(-5.55) 
-0.998*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.343*** 
(-5.00) 
-0.845*** 
(-3.03) 
YEAR_2006  -0.122*** 
(-3.90) 
-0.090*** 
(-3.42) 
-0.103*** 
(-3.17) 
-0.069** 
(-2.57) 
-0.132***  
(-4.18) 
-0.092*** 
(-3.54) 
-0.121***  
(-3.66) 
-0.067*** 
(-2.53) 
YEAR_2007  -0.383*** 
(-11.91) 
-0.335*** 
(-12.11) 
-0.370*** 
(-11.09) 
-0.351*** 
(-12.38) 
-0.404*** 
(-11.79) 
-0.365*** 
(-12.66) 
-0.392*** 
(-11.69) 
-0.353*** 
(-12.35) 
YEAR_2008  -0.616*** 
(-13.95) 
-0.581*** 
(-19.85) 
-0.595*** 
(-13.00) 
-0.578*** 
(-19.08) 
-0.638*** 
(-13.61) 
-0.597*** 
(-18.95) 
-0.605*** 
(-13.52) 
-0.567*** 
(-18.85) 
YEAR_2009  0.146*** 
(2.91) 
0.061* 
(1.77) 
0.129*** 
(2.44) 
0.057 
(1.56) 
0.131** 
(2.53) 
0.075** 
(2.17) 
0.113** 
(2.04) 
0.085** 
(2.31) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.068 (1.47) 
0.144*** 
(3.55) 
0.034  
(1.26) 
0.104** 
(2.34) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.019* (1.76) 
0.029*** 
(3.62) 
0.037*** 
(3.16) 
0.037*** 
(5.00) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1  
    
4.84*10-
5** 
(2.09) 
1.21*10-4 
 (0.24) 
4.05*10-
5** 
(1.88) 
7.70*10-5*** 
 (4.46) 
RESOURCESi,t      0.096  (1.21) 
-0.054 
(-0.92) 
0.128 
(1.46) 
0.055 
(0.91) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.001 (-0.02) 
-0.017 
(-0.47) 
-0.029  
(-0.80) 
-0.031  
(-0.98) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.171*** (-3.97) 
-0.165*** 
(-3.44) 
-0.166*** 
(-4.23) 
-0.165*** 
(-3.43) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.104** (-2.52) 
-0.122*** 
(-3.27) 
-0.137*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.133*** 
(-3.68) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.109*** (-3.07) 
-0.134*** 
(-3.99) 
-0.094*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.112*** 
(-3.39) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.232*** (-3.26) 
-0.191** 
(-2.44) 
-0.332***  
(-5.00) 
-0.230*** 
(-2.80) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.079* (-1.86) 
-0.107** 
(-2.56) 
-0.139***  
(-3.29) 
-0.133*** 
(-3.26) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    0.043 (0.51) 
-0.090* 
(-1.89) 
0.048 
(0.53) 
-0.059  
(-1.33) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.030 (-0.72) 
-0.074* 
(-1.96) 
-0.022  
(-0.52) 
-0.065* 
(-1.65) 
N  895 856 762 726 895 855 762 720 
F-value  52.13*** 91.21*** 45.05*** 94.40*** 31.46*** 43.07*** 33.04*** 51.37*** 
Adjusted R2  0.392 0.477 0.398 0.507 0.406 0.502 0.414 0.521 
Max VIF  1.74 1.95 1.61 1.78 5.34 5.16 5.25 5.06 
Mean VIF  1.50 1.61 1.45 1.55 2.10 2.12 2.03 2.01 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock return of firm i, period t is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t; GIMi,t,t-1 is changes in reported 
goodwill-impairment losses of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, period from t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural 
logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. YEAR_2006, YEAR_2007, YEAR_2008, 
YEAR_2009 are dummy variables equal 1 if the year is 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively and otherwise 0. YEAR_2005 is used as benchmark year. 
RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment 
losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), 
**indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n 
where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A14 – Excluding 2008 observations – hypothesis 1c  
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred
. 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0 .052 
(1.21) 
0.048** 
(2.32) 
0.071* 
(1.80) 
0.063*** 
(2.92) 
0.435 
(1.53) 
0.228 
(1.06) 
-0.047  
(-0.16) 
-0.047  
(-0.21) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.375*** 
(3.80) 
1.837*** 
(7.56) 
2.051*** 
(3.84) 
1.726*** 
(6.99) 
2.226*** 
(3.32) 
1.670*** 
(6.82) 
1.724*** 
(3.21) 
1.570*** 
(6.08) 
 (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 + -0.894* 
(-1.83) 
-0.396** 
(-2.58) 
-0.487* 
(-1.64) 
-0.301 
(-1.58) 
-0.853* 
(-1.66) 
-0.270**  
(-1.99) 
-0.371 
(-1.24) 
-0.197* 
(-1.64) 
GIMi,t - -0.842 
(-1.27) 
-0.317 
(-0.41) 
-0.741  
(-1.17) 
-0.385  
(-1.08) 
-0.724 
(-0.98) 
-0.223  
(-0.32) 
-0.648 
(-0.97) 
-0.223  
(-0.38) 
GIMi,t,t-1 - -0.380*** 
(-7.26) 
-1.396** 
(-2.46) 
-0.390*** 
(-7.72) 
-0.444*** 
(-14.34) 
-0.397*** 
(-7.68) 
-1.429*** 
(-3.49) 
-0.410*** 
(-7.95) 
-1.374*** 
(-3.32) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.024 (0.87) 
0.066  
(1.25) 
-0.004 
(-0.17) 
0.008 
(0.13) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      -0.014 (-0.97) 
-0.004 
(-0.34) 
0.011  
(0.72) 
0.010  
(0.98) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1  
    
9.98*10-
5*** 
(4.49) 
-2.37*10-4  
(-0.38) 
9.54*10-5*** 
(4.22) 
-2.56*10-4  
(-0.38) 
RESOURCESi,t      0.142 (1.45) 
-0.018 
(-0.26) 
0.191* 
(1.64) 
0.079  
(1.12) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.056 (-1.04) 
-0.066 
(-1.50) 
-0.098**  
(-2.31) 
-0.084** 
(-2.09) 
CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.217*** (-3.02) 
-0.151*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.212***  
(-3.62) 
-0.157*** 
(-3.15) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.095* (-1.75) 
-0.115*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.149***  
(-3.20) 
-0.139***  
(-3.24) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.128*** (-2.95) 
-0.140*** 
(-3.66) 
-0.121***  
(-3.02) 
-0.127*** 
(-3.29) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.066 (-0.68) 
-0.128** 
(-2.46) 
-0.163* 
(-1.85) 
-0.110 
(-1.32) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.083* (-1.77) 
-0.110** 
(-2.32) 
-0.147*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.136*** 
(-2.82) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    0.044  (0.46) 
-0.113 
(-1.63) 
0.028 
(0.28) 
-0.077  
(-1.10) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.107* (-1.93) 
-0.135*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.076  
(-1.42) 
-0.108** 
(-2.10) 
N  720 681 615 584 720 685 615 580 
F-value  25.16*** 21.81*** 22.38*** 104.00*** 14.08*** 6.97*** 12.33*** 5.59*** 
Adjusted R2  0.158 0.106 0.144 0.148 0.167 0.106 0.159 0.104 
Max VIF  1.44 1.58 1.44 1.42 4.85 4.84 4.86 4.82 
Mean VIF  1.23 1.31 1.23 1.23 2.02 2.02 2.00 1.99 
Stock return of firm i, period t is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t; GIMi,t,t-1 is changes in reported 
goodwill-impairment losses of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, period from t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural 
logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, 
UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 
0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. 
t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates 
significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A15 – Excluding large book goodwill – hypothesis 1c  
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.014 
(0.34) 0.014 (0.77) 
-0.005  
(-0.12) 
-0.008  
(-0.34) 
-0.584* 
(-1.93) 
-0.632**  
(-2.39) 
-1.030*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.774*** 
(-2.86) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.631*** 
(2.86) 
1.145*** 
(5.58) 
1.690*** 
(3.14) 
1.320*** 
(5.50) 
1.486** 
(2.55) 
1.033*** 
(4.40) 
1.342**  
(2.56) 
0.849*** 
(3.48) 
 (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 + -0.438 
(-0.84) 
0.517*** 
(2.64) 
-0.022  
(-0.07) 
0.648*** 
(3.22) 
-0.386  
(-0.71) 
0.376* 
(1.76) 
0.114  
(0.35) 
0.802*** 
(3.59) 
GIMi,t - -0.916** 
 (-2.59) 
-1.815* 
 (-1.93) 
-0.901**  
(-2.37)
-1.482 
(-1.43)
-0.808** 
(-2.60)
0.518  
(0.46)
-0.800** 
(-2.54) 
-1.115  
(-1.18)
GIMi,t,t-1 - -0.476 
(-1.38) 
-1.513** 
(-2.46) 
-0.369  
(-1.15) 
-1.564** 
(-2.48) 
-0.509 
(-1.43) 
-2.860*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.388  
(-1.19) 
-1.392** 
(-2.18) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.049 (1.41) 
0.014 
(0.20) 
0.019 
(0.72) 
-0.020  
(-0.26) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.035** (2.37) 
0.039*** 
(3.09) 
0.056*** 
(3.27) 
0.046*** 
(3.57) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1  
    
1.16*10-
4*** 
(4.13)
-8.64*10-4  
(-1.23) 
1.05*10-4*** 
(3.18) 
-1.08*10-3  
(-1.57) 
RESOURCESi,t      -0.050  (-0.58) 
-0.158** 
(-2.31) 
-0.002  
(-0.02) 
-0.079 
(-1.15) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.141*** (-2.98) 
-0.156***  
(-3.61) 
-0.176*** 
(-4.62) 
-0.179***  
(-4.82) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.163*** (-2.88) 
-0.160*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.148***  
(-3.33) 
-0.127*** 
(-2.86) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.241*** (-5.44) 
-0.258*** 
(-6.20) 
-0.271*** 
(-6.21) 
-0.268*** 
(-6.82) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.154*** (-3.83) 
-0.193***  
(-4.81) 
-0.135***  
(-3.47) 
-0.161***  
(-4.21) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.175*** (-2.75) 
-0.199*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.245***  
(-3.27) 
-0.231*** 
(-3.97) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.191*** (-4.19) 
-0.215*** 
(-4.98) 
-0.231*** 
(-4.76) 
-0.217*** 
(-4.97) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.103** (-2.02) 
-0.299*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.092  
(-1.59) 
-0.252*** 
(-3.10) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.113***  (-2.69) 
-0.168*** 
(-4.41) 
-0.086**  
(-2.18) 
-0.098** 
(-2.57) 
N  670 644 559 531 670 639 559 531 
F-value  6.56*** 34.20*** 6.06*** 29.87*** 6.97*** 11.19*** 6.71*** 8.83*** 
Adjusted R2  0.114 0.164 0.114 0.151 0.119 0.164 0.134 0.167 
Max VIF  1.75 2.16 1.56 1.74 4.11 3.99 4.11 3.97 
Mean VIF  1.48 1.99 1.39 1.71 1.99 2.05 1.91 1.94 
Stock return of firm i, period t is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t; GIMi,t,t-1 is changes in reported 
goodwill-impairment losses of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, period from t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural 
logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, 
UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and 
otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are 
unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** 
indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as 
outliers. 
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Table A16 – Excluding large goodwill-impairment losses – hypothesis 1c 
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0 .008 
(0.19) 
-0.014  
(-0.74) 
-0.018  
(-0.43) 
-0.039*  
(-1.96) 
-0.586** 
(-2.29) 
-0.603*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.975** 
(-3.10) 
-0.684*** 
(-2.96) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.730*** 
(3.06) 
1.502*** 
(7.29) 
1.956*** 
(3.46) 
1.867*** 
(8.03) 
1.599*** 
(2.77) 
1.260*** 
(5.85) 
1.642*** 
(3.00) 
1.476*** 
(6.08) 
 (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 + -0.406  
(-0.80) 
0.329* 
(1.94)
0.047  
(0.15)
0.320** 
(2.19)
-0.344  
(-0.65)
0.325** 
(1.98) 
0.189  
(0.60) 
0.502*** 
(2.96)
GIMi,t - 1.781 
 (0.44) 
-0.105 
 (-0.05) 
1.365 
(0.27) 
-1.539  
(-0.56) 
2.221 
(0.59) 
-2.492  
(-1.05) 
1.585 
(0.35) 
-5.284* 
(-1.99) 
GIMi,t,t-1 - -0.436*** 
(-7.97) 
-1.616*** 
(-2.96)
-0.435*** 
(-6.68)
-1.482*** 
(-2.79)
-0.463*** 
(-8.37)
-1.735*** 
(-3.16) 
-0.463*** 
(-7.01) 
-1.815*** 
(-3.16)
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.041 (1.25) 
0.018 
(0.32) 
0.021 
(0.89) 
0.013  
(0.22) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.034*** (2.71) 
0.036*** 
(3.66) 
0.052*** 
(3.46) 
0.039*** 
(3.56) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1      6.80*10
-4 
(-1.05) 
-8.24*10-4* 
(-1.78) 
-8.46*10-4 
(-1.18) 
-8.08*10-4* 
(-1.65) 
RESOURCESi,t      -0.027 (-0.31) 
-0.149** 
(-2.16) 
0.029 
(0.30) 
-0.076** 
(-0.83) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.116*** (-2.71) 
-0.158***  
(-4.27) 
-0.135*** 
(-3.82) 
-0.160***  
(-5.35) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.162*** (-2.92) 
-0.123*** 
(-2.51) 
-0.149*** 
(-3.13) 
-0.100** 
(-2.04) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.195*** (-4.59) 
-0.217*** 
(-5.86) 
-0.216*** 
(-5.47) 
-0.210*** 
(-5.99) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.164*** (-4.51)
-0.187***  
(-5.35) 
-0.140*** 
(-4.11) 
-0.155***  
(-4.83)
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.160** (-2.55) 
-0.181*** 
(-3.41) 
-0.218*** 
(-2.90) 
-0.197*** 
(-3.06) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.181*** (-3.99) 
-0.208*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.230*** 
(-4.84) 
-0.216*** 
(-5.11) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    0.002 (0.02) 
-0.158** 
(-2.52) 
-0.002 
(-0.02) 
-0.125** 
(-2.07) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.109** (-2.54) 
-0.176*** 
(-4.73) 
-0.087** 
(-2.14) 
-0.146*** 
(-3.65) 
N  850 815 719 682 850 812 719 684 
F-value  24.87*** 29.26*** 17.49*** 34.08*** 10.56*** 10.25*** 8.47*** 11.19*** 
Adjusted R2  0.118 0.135 0.127 0.132 0.126 0.137 0.144 0.159 
Max VIF  1.64 1.74 1.38 1.44 4.99 4.85 4.91 4.75 
Mean VIF  1.32 1.37 1.19 1.22 2.09 2.08 2.01 1.97 
Stock return of firm i, period t is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t; GIMi,t,t-1 is changes in reported 
goodwill-impairment losses of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, period from t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is 
natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, 
GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  
NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the 
firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment losses take positive 
values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates 
significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is 
total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A17 – Stock return measured with time lag t+2 months – hypothesis 1c 
  
  Stock return t+2months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusiv
e 
outliers 
Intercept  0.071** 
(2.07) 
0.020  
(1.19) 
0.071** 
(2.07) 
-0.003 
(-0.16) 
-0.525** 
(-2.20) 
-0.602** 
(-2.60) 
-0.736*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.723*** 
(-3.08) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 0.730 
(1.62) 
0.965*** 
(5.13) 
0.730 
(1.62) 
1.236*** 
(5.09) 
0.553 
(1.21) 
0.659*** 
(3.28) 
0.811**  
(2.33) 
0.658*** 
(2.83) 
 (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 + 0.097 
(0.27) 
0.284* 
(1.78) 
0.097 
(0.27) 
0.374** 
(2.18) 
0.167 
 (0.46) 
0.366** 
(2.21) 
0.202 
(0.59) 
0.460*** 
(2.68) 
GIMi,t - -0.471***  
(-2.98) 
-0.738** 
(-2.02) 
-0.471***  
(-2.98) 
-2.29*10-4 
(-0.00) 
-0.368** 
(-2.24) 
-0.426***  
(-2.75) 
-0.380** 
(-2.49) 
-0.376***  
(-2.81) 
GIMi,t,t-1 - -0.362*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.438*** 
(-9.71) 
-0.362*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.885*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.380*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.444*** 
(-9.70) 
-0.348*** 
(-3.30) 
-0.428*** 
(-11.28) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.013 (0.34) 
-0.088  
(-1.46) 
0.008 
(0.23) 
-0.102 
(-1.57) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.034*** (2.97) 
0.038*** 
(3.45) 
0.041*** 
(3.50) 
0.042*** 
(3.79) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1  
    
2.08*10-
4*** 
(4.36) 
-0.001** 
(-2.08) 
2.00*10-4*** 
(4.41) 
-0.001* 
(-1.84) 
RESOURCESi,t      0.033 (0.39) 
-0.051 
(-0.59) 
0.053 
(0.62) 
0.076  
(0.77) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.101** (-2.03) 
0.134***  
(-2.64) 
-0.098**  
(-2.33) 
-0.110**  
(-2.44) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.079 (-1.22) 
-0.150 
(-1.52) 
-0.050  
(-0.87) 
-0.048  
(-0.67) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.199*** (-3.94) 
-0.207*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.188*** 
(-4.32) 
-0.195*** 
(-3.87) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.142*** (-3.17) 
-0.165*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.102*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.123*** 
(-2.68) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.221*** (-3.79) 
-0.239*** 
(-3.91) 
-0.213*** 
(-3.47) 
-0.234*** 
(-3.43) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.173*** (-3.19) 
-0.212*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.191*** 
(-3.83) 
-0.210*** 
(-3.78) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.013  (-0.15) 
-0.183*** 
(-2.81) 
0.024  
(0.26) 
-0.125** 
(-2.14) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.122** (-2.50)
-0.136** 
(-2.53)
-0.086* 
(-1.94) 
-0.110** 
(-2.12)
N  896 863 762 731 896 863 762 727 
F-value  29.02*** 51.63*** 35.46*** 28.53*** 11.86*** 12.86*** 12.43*** 14.38*** 
Adjusted R2  0.047 0.076 0.063 0.080 0.058 0.110 0.075 0.107 
Max VIF  1.62 1.82 1.53 3.16 5.25 5.39 5.19 5.32 
Mean VIF  1.43 1.44 1.38 2.34 2.17 2.22 2.11 2.11 
Stock return of firm i, period t+2 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in 
pre-impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t; GIMi,t,t-1 is changes in reported 
goodwill-impairment losses of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, period from t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural 
logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, 
UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and 
otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are 
unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** 
indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as 
outliers. 
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Table A18 – Stock return measured with time lag t+3 months – hypothesis 1c 
  
  Stock return t+3 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.051** 
(2.17) 0.011 (0.58) 
0.056** 
(2.02) 0.007 (0.37) 
-0.489** 
(-2.20) 
-0.644*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.744*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.790*** 
(-3.33) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.044*** 
(3.28) 
1.098*** 
(5.47) 
0.890*** 
(2.71) 
1.145*** 
(5.16) 
0.896*** 
(2.74) 
0.766*** 
(3.67) 
0.666** 
(2.01) 
0.962*** 
(3.74) 
 (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 + -0.016  
(-0.04) 
0 .218 
(1.58) 
0.145  
(0.42) 
0.239* 
(1.64) 
0.034 
(0.09) 
0.316** 
(2.08) 
0.220 
(0.63) 
0.307* 
(1.90) 
GIMi,t - -0.209  
(-1.52) 
-0.077 
(-0.15)
-0.231  
(-1.34)
-0.083  
(-0.17)
-0.141 
(-0.97)
0.278 
(0.45) 
-0.158  
(-0.89) 
0.475 
(0.79)
GIMi,t,t-1 - -0.326* 
(-1.86) 
-1.172** 
(-2.36) 
-0.281  
(-1.41) 
-1.130** 
(-2.35) 
-0.336* 
(-1.89) 
-1.423** 
(-2.44) 
-0.288  
(-1.42) 
-1.313** 
(-2.48) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      -0.002  (-0.06) 
-0.015  
(-0.25) 
-0.003  
(-0.08) 
-0.034  
(-0.52) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.032*** (3.05) 
0.039*** 
(3.82) 
0.044*** 
(3.75) 
0.044*** 
(3.89) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1  
    
2.40*10-
4*** 
(4.79)
-0.002** 
(-2.43) 
2.45*10-4*** 
(5.46) 
-0.001** 
(-2.10) 
RESOURCESi,t      -0.064 (-0.86) 
-0.131* 
(-1.75) 
-0.002  
(-0.02) 
-0.004 
(-0.04) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.119** (-2.33) 
-0.121** 
(-2.50) 
-0.120***  
(-2.66) 
-0.103** 
(-2.36) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.047 (-0.87) 
-0.043  
(-0.56) 
-0.017  
(-0.34) 
-0.013  
(-0.18) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.226*** (-4.35) 
-0.214*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.232*** 
(-4.68) 
-0.202*** 
(-4.12) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.165*** (-3.51) 
-0.174*** 
(-3.77) 
-0.128*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.129*** 
(-3.02) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.258*** (-3.74) 
-0.220*** 
(-3.29) 
-0.283***  
(-3.37) 
-0.288*** 
(-4.44) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.223*** (-4.19) 
-0.222*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.235***  
(-4.40) 
-0.216*** 
(-3.94) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.033 (-0.37) 
-0.160** 
(-2.37) 
0.016  
(0.18) 
-0.112 
(-1.56) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.155*** (-3.17) 
-0.141*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.118** 
(-2.51) 
-0.101** 
(-2.06) 
N  896 866 762 737 896 864 762 727 
F-value  11.03*** 26.02*** 8.07*** 22.11*** 7.87*** 7.72*** 7.51*** 12.71*** 
Adjusted R2  0.064 0.077 0.065 0.075 0.069 0.088 0.079 0.107 
Max VIF  1.74 1.76 1.74 1.69 5.25 5.34 5.19 5.27 
Mean VIF  1.51 1.71 1.51 1.62 2.19 2.27 2.14 2.21 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock return of firm i, period t+3 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in 
pre-impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t; GIMi,t,t-1 is changes in reported 
goodwill-impairment losses of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, period from t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural 
logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, 
UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and 
otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are 
unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** 
indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as 
outliers. 
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Table A19 – Stock return measured with time lag t+4 months – hypothesis 1c 
  
  Stock return t+4 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0 .073*** 
(3.45) 
0.032* 
(1.65) 
0.065*** 
(2.70) 
0.022 
(1.12) 
-0.377* 
(-1.85) 
-0.579*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.582*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.773*** 
(-3.51) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 0.669** (2.60) 
0.994*** 
(4.64) 
0.773*** 
(2.65) 
1.045*** 
(4.68) 
0.542** 
(2.06) 
0.416*** 
(2.89) 
0.580** 
(2.02) 
0.670*** 
(3.01) 
 (E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
0.041  
(0.18) 
0.265* 
(1.64)
-0.030  
(-0.13)
0.353** 
(2.04)
0.082 
(0.36)
0.392*** 
(3.10) 
0.031 
(0.13) 
0.330*** 
(2.73)
GIMi,t - -0.299*  (-1.86) 
-0.394  
(-0.74) 
-0.305* 
(-1.96) 
0.016  
(0.04) 
-0.217 
 (-1.41) 
0.288 
(0.54) 
-0.225  
(-1.57) 
0.240 
(0.48) 
GIMi,t,t-1 - -0.158  (-0.82) 
-0.763 
(-1.62)
-0.159  
(-0.83)
-0.697  
(-1.57)
-0.182 
(-0.97)
-0.849* 
(-1.75) 
-0.177  
(-0.96) 
-0.798* 
(-1.76)
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.032  (1.36)
0.012  
(0.52) 
0.019 
(0.84) 
-0.040  
(-0.63)
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.028*** (2.92) 
0.038*** 
(3.76) 
0.036*** 
(3.45) 
0.043*** 
(4.08) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1  
    
1.66*10-
4*** 
(4.31) 
-0.001* 
(-1.81) 
1.63*10-4*** 
(4.70) 
-0.002** 
(-2.37) 
RESOURCESi,t      -0.043  (-0.61)
-0.028 
(-0.35) 
0.010  
(0.13) 
0.038  
(0.46)
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.138** (-2.50) 
-0.144*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.123** 
(-2.31) 
-0.095* 
(-1.93) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    0.027 (0.41) 
0.038 
(0.53) 
0.063 
(1.03) 
0.090 
(1.33) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.233*** (-4.06) 
-0.237*** 
(-4.16) 
-0.223*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.198*** 
(-3.55) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.169*** (-3.29)
-0.178*** 
(-3.53) 
-0.126** 
(-2.57) 
-0.109** 
(-2.26)
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.247*** (-2.93) 
-0.262*** 
(-4.33) 
-0.253** 
(-2.52) 
-0.266*** 
(-4.69) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.204*** (-3.56) 
-0.217*** 
(-3.74) 
-0.206*** 
(-3.59) 
-0.185*** 
(-3.18) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.031  (-0.34) 
-0.137** 
(-2.09) 
0.041  
(0.47) 
-0.018 
(-0.26) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.162*** (-2.98) 
-0.172*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.113** 
(-2.09) 
-0.098* 
(-1.82) 
N  896 864 762 733 896 859 762 722 
F-value  13.45*** 14.76*** 12.36*** 14.89*** 7.92*** 10.64*** 7.92*** 10.36*** 
Adjusted R2  0.038 0.056 0.031 0.060 0.052 0.090 0.051 0.087 
Max VIF  1.74 1.71 1.66 3.31 5.25 5.44 5.19 5.55 
Mean VIF  1.67 1.55 1.60 2.43 2.23 2.50 2.16 2.48 
Stock return of firm i, period t+4 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in 
pre-impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t; GIMi,t,t-1 is changes in reported 
goodwill-impairment losses of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, period from t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural 
logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, 
UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and 
otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are 
unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** 
indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as 
outliers. 
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Table A20 – Control for size – hypothesis 1c 
  
  Unstandardised residuals t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  -0.123*** 
(-3.44) 
-0.135***  
(-7.66) 
-0.131*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.152***  
(-8.06) 
0.066 
(0.27) 
0.049 
(0.22) 
-0.283 
(-1.00) 
-0.123  
(-0.52) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.523*** 
(2.96) 
1.154*** 
(6.01) 
1.549*** 
(3.38) 
1.416*** 
(6.40) 
1.502*** 
(2.84) 
1.184*** 
(5.45) 
1.395***  
(3.09) 
0.986*** 
(4.25) 
 (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 + -0.368  
(-0.79) 
0.467*** 
(2.74) 
0.014  
(0.05)
0.490*** 
(2.95)
-0.365 
(-0.76)
0.208 
(0.264)
0.070 
(0.25) 
0.536*** 
(3.30)
GIMi,t - -0.696***  
(-3.96) 
-1.302** 
(-2.35) 
-0.644***  
(-3.79) 
-1.259** 
(-2.20) 
-0.635*** 
(-3.56) 
-0.147  
(-0.20) 
-0.579***  
(-3.47) 
-1.321**  
(-2.52) 
GIMi,t,t-1 - -0.458***  
(-8.02) 
-1.605*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.459***  
(-7.64)
-1.365*** 
(-2.86)
-0.471***  
(-8.19)
-1.835*** 
(-3.47)
-0.472*** 
(-7.83) 
-0.556*** 
(-13.27)
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.037 (1.14)
-0.010  
(-0.18)
0.010 
(0.33) 
-0.037  
(-0.60)
lnSIZE_MVi,t      -0.003 (-0.24) 
 4.79*10-4  
(-0.05) 
0.014  
(1.00) 
 4.79*10-4  
(-0.05) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1  
     
1.17*10-
4*** 
(4.03) 
7.19*10-4 
(-1.05) 
1.08*10-4*** 
(3.49) 
-8.43*10-4 
(-1.15) 
RESOURCESi,t      -0.052  (-0.60)
-0.160** 
(-2.26)
0.004  
(0.05) 
-0.055 
(-0.62)
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.132*** (-3.16) 
-0.162*** 
(-4.39) 
-0.145*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.157*** 
(-4.90) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.154*** (-2.84) 
-0.140*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.140*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.111*** 
(-2.65) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.198*** (-4.66) 
-0.221*** 
(-5.56) 
-0.216*** 
(-5.40) 
-0.218*** 
(-5.74) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.166*** (-4.62)
-0.120*** 
(-5.54)
-0.139*** 
(-4.11) 
-0.160*** 
(-4.75)
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.162** (-2.43) 
-0.152** 
(-2.15) 
-0.236*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.195*** 
(-2.84) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.195*** (-4.18) 
-0.229*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.240***  
(-4.99) 
-0.226*** 
(-5.06) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.030  (-0.36) 
-0.168*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.014  
(-0.15) 
-0.137** 
(-2.29) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.110*** (-2.61) 
-0.160*** 
(-4.23) 
-0.087** 
(-2.18) 
-0.104*** 
(-2.63) 
N  895 861 762 727 895 858 762 729 
F-value  24.37*** 38.86*** 21.72*** 33.29*** 12.78*** 10.34*** 11.45*** 19.14*** 
Adjusted R2  0.117 0.144 0.124 0.139 0.118 0.121 0.128 0.154 
Max VIF  1.69 1.94 1.52 1.52 5.25 5.10 5.19 5.03 
Mean VIF  1.39 1.63 1.30 1.44 2.16 2.19 2.09 2.05 
The dependent variable is the unstandardised residuals from a regression of stock return on size where size is measured as natural logarithm of equity-market 
value at the end of the fiscal year. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-impairment net earnings of 
firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses of firm i, period t; GIMi,t,t-1 is changes in reported goodwill-impairment losses of 
firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, period from t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market 
value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, 
UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 
0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment losses take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. 
t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates 
significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A23 – Including year dummies – hypothesis 2a 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model with year-dummies Main model, year-dummies and control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.734*** 
(7.68) 
2.010*** 
(8.02) 
2.755*** 
(7.50) 
2.011*** 
(7.96) 
-14.261** 
(-2.01) 
-11.736*** 
(-3.06) 
-14.521** 
(-2.05) 
-11.875*** 
(-3.08) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.016*** 
(3.45) 
3.965*** 
(8.58) 
3.049*** 
(3.44) 
3.958*** 
(8.57) 
2.400*** 
(2.63) 
3.415*** 
(7.61) 
2.422*** 
(2.64) 
3.490*** 
(7.19) 
GAMi,t  15.584*** 
(2.78) 
8.201** 
(1.97) 
15.519**
* 
(2.78) 
8.134* 
(1.94) 
15.408**
* 
(2.78) 
9.716** 
(2.17) 
15.361*** 
(2.78) 
9.677** 
(2.15) 
(EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 + 0.673*** 
(2.90) 
0.758*** 
(8.08)
0.681*** 
(2.95)
0.755*** 
(8.04)
0.610*** 
(2.82)
0.681*** 
(7.59) 
0.618*** 
(2.85)
0.673*** 
(7.33)
GWCAi,t-1 + 0.632* 
(1.68) 
0.800** 
(2.56) 
0.633* 
(1.68) 
0.803** 
(2.55) 
0.388 
(1.17) 
0.418 
(1.35) 
0.385 
(1.16) 
0.401 
(1.27) 
YEAR_2006  0.388** 
(2.14) 
0.484*** 
(2.69) 
0.343* 
(1.84) 
0.490*** 
(2.71) 
0.237 
(1.23) 
0.387** 
(2.20) 
0.168 
(0.84) 
0.450*** 
(2.73) 
YEAR_2007  -0.226 
(-0.67) 
-0.186 
(-0.86) 
-0.272  
(-0.79) 
-0.179  
(-0.82) 
-0.202 
(-0.65) 
-0.109 
(-0.48) 
-0.275  
(-0.88) 
-0.115 
(-0.50) 
YEAR_2008  -2.551*** 
(-4.34) 
-1.408*** 
(-5.58) 
-2.594*** 
(-4.39) 
-1.402*** 
(-5.57) 
-2.107*** 
(-3.95) 
-1.170*** 
(-4.70) 
-2.171*** 
(-4.04) 
-1.158*** 
(-4.59) 
YEAR_2009  -0.575 
(-1.23) 
-0.164 
(-0.68) 
-0.603  
(-1.27) 
-0.150  
(-0.62) 
-0.468  
(-1.09) 
-0.070 
(-0.28) 
-0.522  
(-1.19) 
-0.049  
(-0.19) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.379* (1.83) 
0.517*** 
(3.22) 
0.373* 
(1.80) 
0.519*** 
(3.21) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.945*** (2.83) 
0.752*** 
(4.05) 
0.959*** 
(2.86) 
0.756*** 
(4.04) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.524  (-0.92) 
-1.582 
(-1.26) 
-2.420 
(-0.88) 
-1.625 
(-1.25) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -2.417* (-1.87) 
-1.603* 
(-1.85) 
-2.378* 
(-1.82) 
-1.565* 
(-1.76) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.890*** (-2.79) 
-2.656** 
(-2.59) 
-3.875*** 
(-2.75) 
-2.638** 
(-2.54) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.646  (-0.38) 
-0.628  
(-0.60) 
-0.649  
(-0.38) 
-0.604  
(-0.56) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.319** (-2.48) 
-2.316*** 
(-2.67) 
-3.300** 
(-2.41) 
-2.237*** 
(-2.49) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -7.222*** (-4.10) 
-4.350*** 
(-4.23) 
-7.288*** 
(-4.03) 
-4.307*** 
(-4.05) 
UTILITIESi,t      -3.796** (-2.30) 
-2.117* 
(-1.80) 
-3.806** 
(-2.27) 
-2.105* 
(-1.76) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.390*** (-3.34) 
-2.887*** 
(-3.17) 
-4.354*** 
(-3.26) 
-2.849*** 
(-3.05) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.822** (-2.11)
-1.863** 
(-2.01) 
-2.785** 
(-2.04)
-1.815* 
(-1.91)
N  767 721 762 717 767 724 762 721 
F-value  22.54*** 45.17*** 22.54*** 45.20*** 15.10*** 34.05*** 15.01*** 34.08*** 
Adjusted R2  0.500 0.596 0.500 0.595 0.552 0.639 0.550 0.635 
Max VIF  4.00 3.86 4.00 3.87 5.22 5.35 5.31 5.47 
Mean VIF  2.12 2.03 2.12 2.04 2.43 2.37 2.44 2.40 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-
amortisation charges of firm i, period t; (EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by book goodwill under the amortisation method of 
firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation method of firm i, time t-1. YEAR_2006, YEAR_2007, YEAR_2008, 
YEAR_2009 are dummy variables equal 1 if the year is 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively and otherwise 0. YEAR_2005 is the benchmark year. 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. 
RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% 
level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance 
larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A24 – Excluding 2008 observations – hypothesis 2a 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred
. 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  1.823*** 
(3.72) 
1.643*** 
(6.54) 
1.790*** 
(3.71) 
1.594*** 
(6.31) 
-10.397 
(-1.47) 
-8.918** 
(-2.21) 
-10.863 
(-1.55) 
-8.898** 
(-2.20) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.191*** 
(3.08) 
4.737*** 
(8.18) 
3.247*** 
(3.07) 
4.934*** 
(8.22) 
2.653** 
(2.55) 
4.217*** 
(7.38) 
2.693** 
(2.54) 
4.214*** 
(7.37) 
GAMi,t  18.864*** 
(2.71) 
11.816*** 
(2.90) 
18.718*** 
(2.70) 
11.882*** 
(2.92) 
19.188*** 
(2.76) 
12.671*** 
(2.93) 
19.059*** 
(2.76) 
12.662*** 
(2.91) 
(EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 + 0.906*** 
(2.75) 
0.828*** 
(7.09) 
0.929*** 
(2.86) 
0.826*** 
(6.99) 
0.831*** 
(2.69) 
0.675*** 
(5.76) 
0.853*** 
(2.77) 
0.674*** 
(5.74) 
GWCAi,t-1 + 0.932** 
(2.23) 
0.679** 
(2.24) 
0.941** 
(2.24) 
0.665** 
(2.17) 
0.649* 
(1.74) 
0.452 
(1.51) 
0.654* 
(1.75) 
0.451 
(1.50) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.398** (2.18) 
0.353*** 
(4.22) 
0.395** 
(2.16) 
0.354*** 
(4.23) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.709** (2.16) 
0.609*** 
(3.11) 
0.728** 
(2.23) 
0.608 
(3.08) 
RESOURCESi,t      -1.795 (-0.70) 
-1.626 
(-1.34) 
-1.613 
(-0.63) 
-1.606 
(-1.30) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -2.348** (-2.00) 
-1.740** 
(-2.15) 
-2.298* 
(-1.94) 
-1.723** 
(-2.06) 
CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.118** (-2.48) 
-2.577*** 
(-2.62) 
-3.065** 
(-2.44) 
-2.564** 
(-2.54) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.182  (-0.11) 
-0.762  
(-0.76) 
-0.175 
 (-0.11) 
-0.745 
 (-0.72) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.031** (-2.48) 
-2.462*** 
(-2.95) 
-2.991** 
(-2.41) 
-2.445*** 
(-2.83) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -5.944*** (-3.96) 
-3.950*** 
(-3.88) 
-5.954*** 
(-3.88) 
-3.933*** 
(-3.73) 
UTILITIESi,t      -3.409** (-2.38) 
-2.590** 
(-2.55) 
-3.428** 
(-2.35) 
-2.572** 
(-2.45) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.100*** (-3.40) 
-3.049*** 
(-3.60) 
-4.025*** 
(-3.33) 
-3.036*** 
(-3.48) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.780** (-2.31)
-2.193** 
(-2.45) 
-2.734** 
(-2.23)
-2.164** 
(-2.34)
N  620 574 615 569 620 582 615 578 
F-value  18.42*** 65.78*** 19.19*** 61.35*** 11.92*** 38.55*** 12.15*** 38.34*** 
Adjusted R2  0.574 0.612 0.575 0.617 0.612 0.690 0.614 0.688 
Max VIF  3.91 3.64 3.92 3.66 4.84 5.14 4.95 5.27 
Mean VIF  2.66 2.48 2.65 2.47 2.51 2.56 2.52 2.59 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-
amortisation charges of firm i, period t; (EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by book goodwill under the amortisation method of firm 
i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation method of firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm 
i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, 
UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 
0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are 
unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** 
indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as 
outliers. 
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Table A25 – Excluding large book goodwill - hypothesis 2a 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.498*** 
(6.24) 
1.945*** 
(6.55) 
2.480*** 
(6.17) 
2.006*** 
(6.84) 
-21.002** 
(-2.60) 
-12.151*** 
(-2.79) 
-21.318*** 
(-2.64) 
-12.435*** 
(-2.84) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.932*** (5.70) 
4.683*** 
(8.99) 
3.977*** 
(5.69) 
4.651*** 
(8.97) 
3.165*** 
(4.05) 
3.986*** 
(6.42) 
3.203*** 
(4.08) 
4.078*** 
(6.47) 
GAMi,t  23.627** (2.29) 
19.760*** 
(3.05) 
23.252** 
(2.27) 
19.289*** 
(2.94) 
22.337** 
(2.22) 
19.580*** 
(3.24) 
21.999** 
(2.20) 
16.590*** 
(2.67) 
(EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 + 0.406* (1.91) 
0.640*** 
(5.62) 
0.415* 
(1.95)
0.612*** 
(5.76)
0.369* 
(1.80)
0.509*** 
(3.60)
0.379* 
(1.83) 
0.555*** 
(4.50)
GWCAi,t-1 
+ 0.129 
(0.22) 
-0.223 
(-0.49) 
0.137 
(0.24) 
-0.242  
(-0.53) 
0.121 
(0.21) 
0.087 
(0.19) 
0.121 
(0.21) 
0.233  
(0.50) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.356 (1.59) 
0.908* 
(1.88) 
0.354 
(1.58) 
0.956* 
(1.92) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      1.252*** (3.20) 
0.753*** 
(3.53) 
1.267*** 
(3.22) 
0.761*** 
(3.54) 
RESOURCESi,t      -3.447 (-1.27) 
-2.030 
(-1.57) 
-3.385 
(-1.24) 
-1.876 
(-1.44) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -2.464* (-1.85) 
-1.615* 
(-1.89) 
-2.446* 
(-1.80) 
-1.547* 
(-1.79) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.589*** (-2.74) 
-2.348** 
(-2.24) 
-3.577*** 
(-2.69) 
-2.271** 
(-2.20) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -1.905 (-1.14) 
-1.175 
(-1.16) 
-1.931 
(-1.13) 
-1.147 
(-1.12) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -2.859** (-2.13) 
-1.698* 
(-1.90) 
-2.859** 
(-2.07) 
-1.659* 
(-1.83) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -6.359*** (-3.74) 
-3.847*** 
(-3.47) 
-6.393*** 
(-3.66) 
-3.841*** 
(-3.42) 
UTILITIESi,t      -3.717** (-2.22) 
-2.027* 
(-1.68) 
-3.747** 
(-2.20) 
-2.054* 
(-1.71) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.025*** (-3.34) 
-2.870*** 
(-3.35) 
-3.999*** 
(-3.26) 
-2.769*** 
(-3.21) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.837** (-2.06) 
-1.676* 
(-1.90) 
-2.830** 
(-2.02) 
-1.687* 
(-1.90) 
N  563 518 559 517 563 528 559 526 
F-value  22.83*** 45.51*** 22.78*** 52.81*** 20.40*** 22.16*** 20.41*** 25.31*** 
Adjusted R2  0.536 0.571 0.535 0.591 0.583 0.641 0.582 0.658 
Max VIF  4.42 4.44 4.44 4.79 4.56 4.56 4.58 4.27 
Mean VIF  2.94 2.85 2.93 3.07 2.44 2.38 2.45 2.37 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-
amortisation charges of firm i, period t; (EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by book goodwill under the amortisation method of 
firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation method of firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales 
of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, 
UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and 
otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are 
unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** 
indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as 
outliers. 
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Table A26 – Stock prices measured with time lag t+2 months - hypothesis 2a 
  
  Stock price t+2 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.459*** 
(6.75) 
1.876*** 
(7.49) 
2.445*** 
(6.75) 
1.862*** 
(7.43) 
-16.164** 
(-2.28) 
-12.672*** 
(-3.46) 
-16.492** 
(-2.33) 
-12.673*** 
(-3.45) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.264*** 
(4.03) 
4.573*** 
(9.15) 
3.297*** 
(4.01) 
4.527*** 
(9.94) 
2.524*** 
(3.08) 
3.419*** 
(7.23) 
2.549*** 
(3.08) 
3.417*** 
(7.23) 
GAMi,t  12.084** 
(2.25) 
6.904* 
(1.67) 
12.021** 
(2.24) 
7.507* 
(1.85) 
11.974** 
(2.31) 
9.773*** 
(2.85) 
11.911** 
(2.30) 
9.803*** 
(2.84) 
(EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 + 0.592** 
(2.56) 
0.693*** 
(6.18) 
0.601*** 
(2.61) 
0.722*** 
(6.49) 
0.522** 
(2.34) 
0.573*** 
(6.32) 
0.532** 
(2.38) 
0.571*** 
(6.30) 
GWCAi,t-1 + 0.656* 
(1.64) 
0.694** 
(2.30) 
0.657* 
(1.64) 
0.669** 
(2.25) 
0.430 
(1.21) 
0.296 
(1.28) 
0.428 
(1.20) 
0.293 
(1.26) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.579*** (2.94) 
1.083** 
(2.61) 
0.573*** 
(2.92) 
1.077** 
(2.58) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      1.052*** (3.14)
0.812*** 
(4.52) 
1.067*** 
(3.18)
0.811*** 
(4.50)
RESOURCESi,t      -2.734 (-1.03) 
-1.459  
(-1.13) 
-2.645  
(-1.00) 
-1.434 
(-1.10) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -3.193** (-2.29) 
-1.997** 
(-2.36) 
-3.187** 
(-2.25) 
-1.982** 
(-2.28) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.623** (-2.35) 
-2.905*** 
(-2.87) 
-3.616** 
(-2.32) 
-2.890*** 
(-2.81) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -1.336 (-0.78) 
-1.177 
(-1.20) 
-1.358  
(-0.78) 
-1.159 
(-1.15) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.794*** (-2.68) 
-2.624*** 
(-3.10) 
-3.792***  
(-2.62) 
-2.608*** 
(-2.99) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -7.728*** (-4.32) 
-5.151*** 
(-4.94) 
-7.768***  
(-4.24) 
-5.134*** 
(-4.78) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.420** (-2.47) 
-2.607** 
(-2.25) 
-4.455**  
(-2.45) 
-2.589** 
(-2.19) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.829*** (-3.34) 
-3.446*** 
(-3.76) 
-4.811*** 
(-3.28) 
-3.433*** 
(-3.66) 
FINANCEi,t      -3.281** (-2.34)
-2.107** 
(-2.33) 
-3.262**  
(-2.28)
-2.072** 
(-2.24)
N  767 710 762 709 767 715 762 711 
F-value  23.22*** 49.07*** 23.73*** 53.05*** 11.51*** 31.17*** 11.71*** 30.86*** 
Adjusted R2  0.469 0.554 0.468 0.568 0.531 0.614 0.530 0.612 
Max VIF  3.91 3.85 3.92 3.79 5.14 5.20 5.24 5.31 
Mean VIF  2.64 2.53 2.63 2.50 2.59 2.52 2.61 2.55 
Stock price of firm i, time t+2 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted 
goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t; (EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by book goodwill under the amortisation 
method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation method of firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth 
in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. RESOURCESi,t, 
GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  
NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the 
firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-amortisation charges take positive 
values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates 
significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is 
total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A27 – Stock price measured with time lag t+3 months - hypothesis 2a 
  
  Stock price t+3 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.455*** 
(7.11) 
1.905*** 
(7.58) 
2.444*** 
(7.10) 
1.799*** 
(7.71) 
-16.575** 
(-2.39) 
-11.391*** 
(-3.13) 
-16.847** 
(-2.43) 
-11.378*** 
(-3.12) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.414*** 
(4.26) 
4.684*** 
(10.68) 
3.440*** 
(4.24) 
4.791*** 
(11.25) 
2.672*** 
(3.33) 
3.881*** 
(8.16) 
2.692*** 
(3.32) 
3.878*** 
(8.15) 
GAMi,t  10.828** 
(2.11) 
5.738  
(1.48) 
10.779** 
(2.10) 
5.890 
(1.53) 
10.494** 
(2.12) 
5.865* 
(1.67) 
10.450** 
(2.12) 
5.882* 
(1.67) 
(EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 + 0.531** 
(2.44) 
0.654*** 
(5.82) 
0.538** 
(2.48)
0.725*** 
(7.23)
0.460** 
(2.21)
0.524*** 
(5.39)
0.468** 
(2.24) 
0.523*** 
(5.37)
GWCAi,t-1 + 0.788** 
(2.13) 
0.804*** 
(2.81) 
0.789** 
(2.13) 
0.810*** 
(2.83) 
0.582* 
(1.81) 
0.593** 
(2.20) 
0.579* 
(1.80) 
0.592** 
(2.19) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.545*** (2.89) 
0.590*** 
(3.95) 
0.543*** 
(2.87) 
0.590*** 
(3.95) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      1.070*** (3.28) 
0.746*** 
(4.16) 
1.082*** 
(3.30) 
0.744*** 
(4.13) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.690 (-1.00) 
-1.242 
(-1.13) 
-2.602  
(-0.97) 
-1.207 
(-1.08) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -3.126** (-2.23) 
-1.898** 
(-2.49) 
-3.109** 
(-2.18) 
-1.871** 
(-2.40) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.547** (-2.30) 
-2.784*** 
(-3.24) 
-3.531** 
(-2.27) 
-2.759*** 
(-3.14) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -1.550 (-0.93) 
-1.237 
(-1.41) 
-1.557 
(-0.91) 
-1.207 
(-1.34) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.792*** (-2.70) 
-2.522*** 
(-3.33) 
-3.780*** 
(-2.64) 
-2.494*** 
(-3.20) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -7.661*** (-4.31) 
-4.861*** 
(-5.00) 
-7.682*** 
(-4.23) 
-4.829*** 
(-4.84) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.583*** (-2.60) 
-2.708** 
(-2.50) 
-4.600** 
(-2.56) 
-2.677** 
(-2.43) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.633*** (-3.19) 
-3.084*** 
(-3.61) 
-4.609*** 
(-3.12) 
-3.060*** 
(-3.52) 
FINANCEi,t      -3.124** (-2.23) 
-1.912** 
(-2.35) 
-3.096** 
(-2.16) 
-1.871** 
(-2.24) 
N  767 711 762 706 767 716 762 712 
F-value  26.09*** 58.19*** 26.09*** 75.20*** 10.90*** 41.94*** 11.07*** 41.54*** 
Adjusted R2  0.477 0.569 0.475 0.566 0.536 0.614 0.534 0.612 
Max VIF  3.91 3.76 3.92 3.77 5.14 5.17 5.24 5.28 
Mean VIF  2.64 2.50 2.63 2.47 2.59 2.51 2.61 2.53 
Stock price of firm i, time t+3 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted 
goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t; (EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by book goodwill under the amortisation 
method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation method of firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in 
total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. RESOURCESi,t, 
GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  
NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm 
belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. 
Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 
% level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of 
observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A28 – Stock price measured with time lag t+4 months - hypothesis 2a 
  
  Stock price t+4 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusiv
e 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.483*** 
(7.70) 
2.040*** 
(8.58) 
2.468*** 
(7.69) 
2.041*** 
(8.57) 
-15.985** 
(-2.27) 
-11.930*** 
(-3.08) 
-16.228** 
(-2.31) 
-11.412*** 
(-2.96) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.456*** 
(4.22) 
4.712*** 
(10.25) 
3.479*** 
(4.19) 
4.697*** 
(10.26) 
2.683*** 
(3.32) 
3.706*** 
(7.99) 
2.704*** 
(3.32) 
3.725*** 
(8.02) 
GAMi,t  12.653** 
(2.33) 
3.517 
(1.12) 
12.641** 
(2.33) 
3.504 
(1.11) 
12.509** 
(2.36) 
4.956* 
(1.80) 
12.514** 
(2.36) 
4.746* 
(1.71) 
(EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 + 0.571*** 
(2.67) 
0.695*** 
(6.49) 
0.577*** 
(2.72) 
0.690*** 
(6.46) 
0.491** 
(2.42) 
0.627*** 
(6.15) 
0.498** 
(2.46) 
0.626*** 
(6.11) 
GWCAi,t-1 + 0.653* 
(1.67) 
0.842*** 
(3.16) 
0.653* 
(1.66) 
0.847*** 
(3.17) 
0.432 
(1.23) 
0.773** 
(3.09) 
0.429 
(1.22) 
0.787** 
(3.12) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.551*** (2.94) 
0.882** 
(2.09) 
0.550*** 
(2.93) 
0.919** 
(2.15) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      1.045*** (3.16) 
0.767*** 
(4.01) 
1.051*** 
(3.17) 
0.737*** 
(3.87) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.272 (-0.85) 
-1.262 
(-1.18) 
-2.097 
(-0.78) 
-1.133 
(-1.04) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -3.133** (-2.10) 
-1.766** 
(-2.23) 
-3.040** 
(-2.00) 
-1.657** 
(-2.04) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.626** (-2.22) 
-2.743*** 
(-3.04) 
-3.531** 
(-2.14) 
-2.640*** 
(-2.84) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -1.409 (-0.81) 
-1.182 
(-1.28) 
-1.332 
(-0.75) 
-1.033 
(-1.09) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.833*** (-2.62)
-2.480*** 
(-3.14) 
-3.743** 
(-2.51) 
-2.357*** 
(-2.91)
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -7.646*** (-4.11) 
-4.831*** 
(-4.77) 
-7.572*** 
(-3.98) 
-4.628*** 
(-4.48) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.610** (-2.53) 
-2.462** 
(-2.21) 
-4.539** 
(-2.45) 
-2.439** 
(-2.16) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.727*** (-3.13) 
-3.187*** 
(-3.89) 
-4.626*** 
(-3.13) 
-3.071*** 
(-3.68) 
FINANCEi,t      -3.245** (-2.21) 
-1.976** 
(-2.37) 
-3.139** 
(-2.10) 
-1.859** 
(-2.18) 
N  767 712 762 708 767 716 762 713 
F-value  31.96*** 62.62*** 32.53*** 63.02*** 12.55*** 39.71*** 12.78*** 38.77*** 
Adjusted R2  0.484 0.578 0.482 0.577 0.543 0.627 0.541 0.623 
Max VIF  3.91 3.81 3.92 3.83 5.14 5.22 5.24 5.33 
Mean VIF  2.64 2.51 2.63 2.52 2.59 2.57 2.61 2.60 
Stock price of firm i, time t+4 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted 
goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t; (EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by book goodwill under the amortisation 
method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation method of firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth 
in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. RESOURCESi,t, 
GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  
NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the 
firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-amortisation charges take positive 
values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates 
significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is 
total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A29 – Scaled by total assets t-1 – hypothesis 2a  
  
  Market value scaled by total assets t-1 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred
. 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.442*** 
(3.13) 
0.273*** 
(3.88) 
0.440*** 
(3.10) 
0.270*** 
(3.81) 
-0.147  
(-0.16) 
-0.640  
(-0.96) 
-0.190  
(-0.20) 
-0.682 
(-1.03) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 6.449*** 
(3.79) 
7.428*** 
(11.89) 
6.454*** 
(3.79) 
7.442*** 
(11.90) 
6.370***  
(3.74) 
7.354*** 
(11.73) 
6.363***  
(3.74) 
7.351*** 
(11.72) 
GAMi,t  15.740***  
(3.65) 
14.939*** 
(5.84) 
15.717***  
(3.62) 
14.809*** 
(5.67) 
16.195*** 
(3.55) 
13.658*** 
(6.18) 
16.186*** 
(3.52) 
13.589*** 
(6.08) 
(EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 + 0.431  
(1.42) 
0.562*** 
(2.66) 
0.439 
(1.44) 
0.575*** 
(2.73) 
0.379 
(1.33) 
0.497**  
(2.52) 
0.382 
(1.33) 
0.504**  
(2.55) 
GWCAi,t-1 + -0.253  
(-0.52) 
0.081 
(0.28) 
-0.244 
(-0.50) 
0.099 
(0.33) 
-0.357  
(-0.79) 
-0.154 
(-0.57) 
-0.354 
(-0.78) 
-0.141  
(-0.52) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.138** (2.02) 
0.250*** 
(2.70) 
0.135** 
(2.02) 
0.247** 
(2.60) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.039  (0.87) 
0.049 
(1.56) 
0.042 
(0.93) 
0.052 
(1.63) 
RESOURCESi,t      -0.603* (-1.89) 
-0.589** 
(-2.66) 
-0.596* 
(-1.84) 
-0.576** 
(-2.59) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.015  (-0.85) 
0.023  
(0.20) 
-0.159  
(-0.88) 
0.018 
(0.15) 
CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.451**  (-2.25) 
-0.162  
(-1.56) 
-0.457**  
(-2.25) 
-0.164  
(-1.56) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.008 (-0.04) 
0.062 
(0.47) 
-0.018  
(-0.09) 
0.055 
(0.41) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.283  (-1.50) 
-0.121  
(-1.10) 
-0.230  
(-1.50) 
-0.124 
(-1.11) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.565**  (-2.15) 
-0.309**  
(-2.24) 
-0.579**  
(-2.17) 
-0.317**  
(-2.26) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.608***  (-2.73) 
-0.364*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.618***  
(-2.73) 
-0.370**  
(-2.59) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.371  (-1.46) 
-0.033 
(-0.22) 
-0.377  
(-1.47) 
-0.034  
(-0.22) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.203  (-0.81)
-0.248**  
(-2.20)
-0.209  
(-0.82) 
-0.256**  
(-2.21)
N  767 725 762 720 767 726 762 721 
F-value  27.56*** 50.53*** 27.81*** 50.59*** 13.50*** 22.20*** 13.50*** 27.42*** 
Adjusted R2  0.343 0.431 0.427 0.433 0.440 0.516 0.440 0.517 
Max VIF  4.31 2.40 4.33 2.42 5.25 5.52 5.35 5.63 
Mean VIF  2.69 1.77 2.69 1.78 2.61 2.31 2.64 2.34 
Table continues on next page. 
 
  
  
509 
Table continues from previous page.  
Market value of firm i, time t, scaled by total assets at time t-1, is dependent variable.  (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMi,t 
is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t; (EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by book goodwill under the 
amortisation method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation method of firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is 
growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. RESOURCESi,t, 
GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  
NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm 
belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. 
Regression coefficients are unstandardised. All variables (both dependent and independent variables) except from control variables and industry-sector 
dummies are scaled by total asset of firm i, time t-1. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates 
significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total 
number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A30 – Scaled by total sales t – hypothesis 2a  
  
  Market value scaled by total sales t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred
. 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.540*** 
(4.30) 
0.437*** 
(8.33) 
0.540*** 
(4.28) 
0.437*** 
(8.28) 
-0.776 
(-0.52) 
-1.991**  
(-2.25) 
-0.821  
(-0.55) 
-2.036**  
(-2.31) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.229*** (6.90) 
4.088*** 
(10.73) 
3.230*** 
(6.90) 
4.095*** 
(10.74) 
3.025*** 
(6.90) 
3.402*** 
(9.92) 
3.022*** 
(6.90) 
3.403*** 
(9.93) 
GAMi,t  12.296*** (4.29) 
11.817*** 
(9.50) 
12.245*** 
(4.25) 
11.537*** 
(8.15) 
11.447*** 
(4.06) 
11.571*** 
(13.37) 
11.435*** 
(4.04) 
11.428*** 
(12.66) 
(EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 + 0.860*** (5.99) 
0.892*** 
(13.74) 
0.860*** 
(6.00) 
0.892*** 
(13.71) 
0.746*** 
(4.96) 
0.878*** 
(15.35) 
0.746*** 
(4.94) 
0.881*** 
(15.23) 
GWCAi,t-1 + 0.576 (1.47) 
0.507*** 
(2.77) 
0.581 
(1.47) 
0.529*** 
(2.79) 
0.466 
(1.26) 
0.412*** 
(2.76) 
0.466 
(1.25) 
0.428*** 
(2.79) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.144* (1.84) 
0.410*** 
(2.96) 
0.143 
(1.83) 
0.410*** 
(2.94) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.071 (1.03) 
0.113*** 
(2.73) 
0.073 
(1.07) 
0.115*** 
(2.80) 
RESOURCESi,t      -0.241  (-0.55) 
-0.326  
(-1.43) 
-0.227  
(-0.51) 
-0.309  
(-1.35) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.190 (-0.61) 
0.090  
(0.66) 
-0.194  
(-0.61) 
0.091  
(0.65) 
CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.556* (-1.76) 
-0.280* 
(-1.83) 
-0.560*  
(-1.73) 
-0.277* 
(-1.78) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    0.173 (0.48) 
0.216  
(1.19) 
0.165 
(0.45) 
0.214 
(1.16) 
CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.318  (-1.01) 
-0.050  
(-0.35) 
-0.322  
(-1.00) 
-0.048  
(-0.34) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -1.155** (-2.32) 
Omitted39 
 
-1.166** 
(-2.32) 
Omitted 
 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.464 (-1.15)
0.005 
(0.02)
-0.472  
(-1.15) 
0.002 
(0.01)
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    0.239 (0.53) 
0.225 
(0.92) 
0.237 
(0.52) 
0.230 
(0.93) 
FINANCEi,t      0.688 (1.36) 
0.398** 
(2.20) 
0.684 
(1.32) 
0.384** 
(2.20) 
N  767 714 762 709 767 714 762 709 
F-value  19.07 *** 118.42*** 18.96*** 109.01*** 17.74*** 96.93*** 18.07*** 90.18*** 
Adjusted R2  0.634 0.560 0.634 0.560 0.659 0.625 0.658 0.624 
Max VIF  1.54 2.18 1.54 2.21 5.12 5.40 5.22 5.52 
Mean VIF  1.30 1.60 1.30 1.62 2.24 2.38 2.27 2.41 
Table continues on next page. 
 
  
                                           
39 No observations. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Market value of firm i, time t, scaled by total sales period t, is dependent variable.  (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMi,t is 
as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t; (EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by book goodwill under the 
amortisation method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation method of firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is 
growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. RESOURCESi,t, 
GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  
NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm 
belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. 
Regression coefficients are unstandardised. All variables (both dependent and independent variables) except from control variables and industry-sector 
dummies are scaled by total sales of firm i, period t. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates 
significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total 
number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A31 – Control for size – hypotheses 2a 
  
  Unstandardised residuals t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusiv
e 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  -2.907*** 
(-6.58) 
-3.344*** 
(-11.27) 
-2.927*** 
(-6.65) 
-3.343*** 
(-11.20) 
18.884*** 
(2.69) 
23.141*** 
(5.91) 
18.599*** 
(2.66) 
22.870*** 
(5.82) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.051** 
(2.49) 
3.149*** 
(8.07) 
2.092** 
(2.50) 
3.146*** 
(8.06) 
2.430** 
(2.60) 
3.666*** 
(7.34) 
2.452** 
(2.60) 
3.671*** 
(7.33) 
GAMi,t  11.182** 
(2.11) 
7.200** 
(2.43) 
11.161** 
(2.11) 
7.235** 
(2.43) 
12.843** 
(2.46) 
10.514*** 
(2.96) 
12.791** 
(2.45) 
10.472*** 
(2.94) 
(EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 + 0.545** 
(2.26) 
0.696*** 
(7.07) 
0.557** 
(2.33) 
0.695*** 
(7.04) 
0.569** 
(2.61) 
0.648*** 
(6.96) 
0.577*** 
(2.64) 
0.653*** 
(6.99) 
GWCAi,t-1 + 0.578* 
(1.69) 
0.535** 
(2.29) 
0.575* 
(1.67) 
0.533** 
(2.27) 
0.466 
(1.42) 
0.360 
(1.51) 
0.463 
(1.41) 
0.339 
 (1.43) 
GROWTH(SALES)i,t      0.446** (2.04) 
0.549*** 
(3.31) 
0.445** 
(2.03) 
0.547*** 
(3.29) 
lnSIZE(MV)i,t      -0.894*** (-2.69) 
-1.172*** 
(-6.18) 
-0.881*** 
(-2.64) 
-1.150*** 
(-6.04) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.921 (-1.03) 
-1.848 
(-1.43) 
-2.830 
(-1.00) 
-2.071 
(-1.60) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -2.878**
 
(-2.15) 
-1.740** 
(-2.11) 
-2.859** 
(-2.09) 
-1.894** 
(-2.32) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.679*** (-2.69) 
-2.867*** 
 (-3.46) 
-3.663*** 
(-2.65) 
-3.036*** 
(-3.73) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -1.034  (-0.60) 
-0.913 
 (-0.92) 
-1.043 
(-0.60) 
-0.934 
(-0.93) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.553** (-2.58)
-2.322*** 
(-2.73)
-3.541** 
(-2.51) 
-2.487*** 
(-2.93)
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -7.448*** (-4.19) 
-4.711*** 
(-4.48) 
-7.472*** 
(-4.11) 
-4.952*** 
(-4.69) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.345** (-2.53) 
-2.321** 
(-2.01) 
-4.366** 
(-2.49) 
-2.531** 
(-2.20) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.653*** (-3.38) 
-3.173*** 
(-3.71) 
-4.629*** 
(-3.31) 
-3.338*** 
(-3.91) 
FINANCEi,t      -3.013** (-2.19) 
-1.929** 
 (-2.17) 
-2.985** 
(-2.12) 
-2.084** 
 (-2.35) 
N  767 718 762 714 767 722 762 718 
F-value  11.21*** 50.89*** 11.52*** 50.38*** 11.11*** 104.59*** 11.21*** 105.79*** 
Adjusted R2  0.344 0.384 0.346 0.382 0.413 0.544 0.414 0.542 
Max VIF  3.91 3.69 3.92 3.69 5.14 5.34 5.24 5.60 
Mean VIF  2.64 2.41 2.63 2.41 2.59 2.57 2.61 2.63 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
The dependent variable is the unstandardised residuals from a regression of stock prices on size where size is measured as natural logarithm of equity-
market value at the end of the fiscal year.  (E+GIM)i,t is the pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMi,t is the as-if reported goodwill 
amortisation charge of firm i, period t; (EQCA-GWCA)i,t-1 is the as-if calculated book value of equity reduced by book value of goodwill under the 
amortisation method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is the as-if calculated book value of goodwill under the amortisation method of firm i, time t-1; 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is the relative growth in total sales of firm i,from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is the natural logarithm of the market value of firm i, 
time t. RESOURCESi,t,GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t,CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t,NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES,UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry dummy 
variables equals the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark industry. Goodwill 
amortisation charges have positive numbers in these regressions. All variables except stock price, control variables and industry dummies are scaled by 
number of outstanding shares. Regression coefficients are unstandardized. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significant at 10% level (two-
tailed),**indicates significant at 5 % level (two-tailed),*** indicates significant at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations having a value of Cook’s distance 
larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
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Table A32 – Including year dummies – hypothesis 2b 
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model, year-dummies and control variables 
  Available sample / Non-missing sample Available sample / Non-missing sample 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive outliers Exclusive outliers Inclusive outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.169 *** 
(4.63) 
0.169 *** 
(6.32) 
-0.537** 
 (-2.04) 
-0.506*** 
(-2.94) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.642*** (4.00) 
1.447*** 
(8.26) 
1.316*** 
(3.39) 
1.219*** 
(6.14) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
-0.351 
 (-1.55) 
-0.251** 
(-2.15) 
-0.249 
(-1.12) 
-0.192 
(-1.61) 
GAMi,t  1.919*** (5.03) 
0.633 
(1.34)
2.153*** 
(6.10)
1.147** 
(2.17) 
GAMi,t,t-1  2.277 (1.54) 
2.767*** 
(3.02) 
2.134* 
(1.64) 
2.063** 
(2.25) 
YEAR_2006  -0.107*** 
(-3.21) 
-0.074*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.126***  
(-3.78) 
-0.080*** 
(-2.96) 
YEAR_2007  -0.375*** 
(-11.16) 
-0.356*** 
(-12.36) 
-0.400*** 
(-11.71) 
-0.371*** 
(-13.02) 
YEAR_2008  -0.630*** 
(-13.75) 
-0.605*** 
(-18.55) 
-0.642*** 
(-14.41) 
-0.604*** 
(-19.10) 
YEAR_2009  0 .102* 
(1.95) 
0.035 
(0.92) 
0.080  
(1.48) 
0.052 
(1.36) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t    0.026 (1.16) 
0.058 
(1.17) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t    0.038*** (2.97)
0.037*** 
(4.50) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1    5.11*10
-5** 
(2.32) 
-1.73*10-5 
 (-0.34) 
RESOURCESi,t    0.147* (1.66)
0.025 
(0.41) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  -0.033 (-0.84) 
-0.051*  
(-1.65) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.188*** (-3.91) 
-0.186*** 
 (-4.11) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.141*** (-3.34) 
-0.153*** 
 (-4.36) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t    -0.114*** (-2.93)
-0.138*** 
(-4.24) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  -0.380*** (-4.45) 
-0.369*** 
 (-9.17) 
UTILITIESi,t    -0.139*** (-2.70) 
-0.140***  
(-3.42) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  -0.011 (-0.15) 
-0.113*** 
 (-2.83) 
FINANCEi,t    -0.019 (-0.41) 
-0.079** 
 (-2.02) 
N  762 727 762 716 
F-value  48.15*** 84.41*** 35.99*** 38.66*** 
Adjusted R2  0.402 0.492 0.421 0.517 
Max VIF  1.62 1.70 5.26 5.17 
Mean VIF  1.44 1.48 2.04 2.03 
Table continues on next page.    
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock return of firm i, period t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM) i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i, period t; GAMi,t,t-1 is changes 
in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to 
t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. YEAR_2006, 
YEAR_2007, YEAR_2008, YEAR_2009 are dummy variables equal 1 if the year is 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively and otherwise 0. 
YEAR_2005 is the benchmark year. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, 
INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. 
BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are 
unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), 
*** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are 
considered as outliers. 
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Table A33 – Excluding 2008 observations – hypothesis 2b 
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample / Non-missing sample Available sample / Non-missing sample 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive outliers Exclusive outliers Inclusive outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.016 
(0.40) 
0.016 
(0.63) 
-0.033 
 (-0.10) 
0.026  
(0.11) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.043*** (3.87) 
1.860*** 
(7.74) 
1.659*** 
(3.18) 
1.511*** 
(5.64) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
-0.408 
 (-1.45) 
-0.482*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.276 
(-0.99) 
-0.259 
(-1.60) 
GAMi,t  2.941*** (4.99) 
2.227*** 
(3.32)
3.151*** 
(5.26)
2.985*** 
(3.86) 
GAMi,t,t-1  1.415 (1.08) 
0.880  
(0.84) 
1.321 
(1.12) 
0.634  
(0.56) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t    -0.005 (-0.17) 
-0.023  
(-0.40) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t    0.008 (0.54) 
0.007 
(0.61) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1    1.02*10
-4*** 
(4.07) 
-4.52*10-4 
(-0.70) 
RESOURCESi,t    0.216* (1.87) 
0.068 
(1.02) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  -0.118*** (-2.74) 
-0.131*** 
(-3.44) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.230*** (-3.01) 
-0.164*** 
(-2.74) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.157*** (-3.26) 
-0.159*** 
(-3.75) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t    -0.147*** (-3.61) 
-0.170*** 
 (-4.26) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  -0.242** (-2.48) 
-0.209***  
(-4.01) 
UTILITIESi,t    -0.150*** (-2.76) 
-0.144***  
(-2.73) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  -0.064  (-0.79) 
-0.148** 
(-2.20) 
FINANCEi,t    -0.084 (-1.57) 
-0.128** 
(-2.51) 
N  615 588 615 582 
F-value  10.18*** 17.85*** 8.26*** 6.06*** 
Adjusted R2  0.178 0.096 0.197 0.107 
Max VIF  1.46 1.44 4.87 4.75 
Mean VIF  1.23 1.22 2.00 1.96 
Stock return of firm i, period t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM) i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i, period t; GAMi,t,t-1 is changes 
in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to 
t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. 
RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 
10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s 
distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A34 – Excluding large goodwill – hypothesis 2b 
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample / Non-missing sample Available sample / Non-missing sample 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive outliers Exclusive outliers Inclusive outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  -0.064 
 (-1.23) 
-0.052**  
(-2.15) 
-1.330*** 
 (-3.45) 
-1.042***  
(-3.53) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.664*** (3.11) 
1.503*** 
(6.78) 
1.242** 
(2.51) 
0.959*** 
(3.64) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
0.024 
(0.08) 
0.511*** 
(2.74)
0.182 
(0.65)
0.740*** 
(3.23) 
GAMi,t  5.314** (2.09) 
3.096** 
(2.29) 
6.708** 
(2.47) 
4.617*** 
(2.72) 
GAMi,t,t-1  0.197  (0.35) 
-0.637  
(-0.44)
0.135 
(0.19)
-0.974  
(-0.74) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t    0.023 (0.85) 
-0.018  
(-0.24) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t    0.067*** (3.75) 
0.056*** 
(4.00) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1    1.05*10
-4** 
(2.59) 
-0.001* 
(-1.88) 
RESOURCESi,t    0.008 (0.08) 
-0.078 
(-1.06) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  -0.198*** (-4.30) 
-0.195*** 
(-4.93) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.185*** (-2.85) 
-0.123** 
(-2.55) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.282*** (-5.48) 
-0.280*** 
(-6.16) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t    -0.149*** (-3.38)
-0.176*** 
 (-4.17) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  -0.221*** (-2.75) 
-0.221***  
(-3.29) 
UTILITIESi,t    -0.217*** (-3.72) 
-0.213***  
(-4.17) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  -0.124**  (-2.14) 
-0.283*** 
(-3.32) 
FINANCEi,t    -0.115** (-2.38) 
-0.109*** 
(-2.63) 
N  559 525 559 532 
F-value  4.41*** 29.80*** 5.70*** 8.81*** 
Adjusted R2  0.122 0.124 0.154 0.158 
Max VIF  1.57 1.61 4.10 4.00 
Mean VIF  1.28 1.32 1.89 1.85 
Stock return of firm i, period t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM) i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i, period t; GAMi,t,t-1 is changes 
in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to 
t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. 
RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 
10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s 
distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A35 – Stock return measured with time lag t+2 months – hypothesis 2b 
  
  Stock return t+2 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  -0.014  
(-0.47) 
-0.017 
(-0.79) 
-0.014  
(-0.49) 
-0.018  
(-0.83) 
-0.751*** 
 (-2.65) 
-0.762***  
(-3.16) 
-0.748*** 
 (-2.64) 
-0.785***  
(-3.23) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.067*** (2.90) 
1.193*** 
(5.10) 
1.076*** 
(2.92) 
1.209*** 
(5.16) 
0.771** 
(2.14) 
0.645** 
(2.60) 
0.780** 
(2.16) 
0.673** 
(2.71) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
0.094 
(0.31) 
0.280* 
(1.68) 
0.089 
(0.29)
0.266 
(1.60)
0.192 
(0.63)
0.342** 
(2.15)
0.187 
(0.61) 
0.340** 
(2.14)
GAMi,t  3.231*** (3.29) 
2.533*** 
(3.81) 
3.210*** 
(3.27) 
2.484*** 
(3.73) 
3.613*** 
(3.56) 
3.080*** 
(4.47) 
3.588*** 
(3.54) 
3.016*** 
(4.37) 
GAMi,t,t-1  -6.994*** (-4.07) 
-11.689***  
(-5.08) 
-7.003*** 
(-4.09) 
-11.707***  
(-5.07) 
-7.259***  
(-4.27) 
-9.928*** 
(-5.13) 
-7.274***  
(-4.30) 
-10.052*** 
(-5.11) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.040 (1.52) 
-0.027  
(-0.44) 
0.040 
(1.54) 
-0.024  
(-0.38) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.041*** (3.09) 
0.043*** 
(3.80) 
0.041*** 
(3.09) 
0.043*** 
(3.81) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1  
    2.16*10
-4*** 
(4.60) 
-0.001  
(-1.54) 
2.16*10-
4*** 
(4.64) 
-0.001 
(-1.51) 
RESOURCESi,t      0.065 (0.75) 
0.073 
(0.75) 
0.064 
(0.74) 
0.089 
(0.88) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.127*** (-2.97) 
-0.126***  
(-2.81) 
-0.127*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.107** 
(-1.99) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    - 0.006 (-0.16) 
-0.052 
(-0.67) 
-0.006  
(-0.16) 
-0.033  
(-0.38) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.208*** (-4.64) 
-0.201*** 
(-4.10) 
-0.208*** 
(-4.64) 
-0.182*** 
(-3.22) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.151*** (-3.58) 
-0.169*** 
 (-3.64) 
-0.151*** 
(-3.58) 
-0.150*** 
 (-2.75) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.434** (-2.17) 
-0.287***  
(-5.16) 
-0.433** 
(-2.17) 
-0.270***  
(-4.35) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.211*** (-3.60) 
-0.207***  
(-3.72) 
-0.211*** 
(-3.61) 
-0.189***  
(-3.04) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.099 (-1.04) 
-0.199*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.099  
(-1.03) 
-0.178** 
(-2.49) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.120** (-2.37) 
-0.141** 
(-2.54) 
-0.125** 
(-2.40) 
-0.128** 
(-2.02) 
N  763 715 762 714 763 719 762 719 
F-value  9.40*** 28.76*** 9.42*** 28.60*** 7.97*** 8.05*** 8.06*** 8.04*** 
Adjusted R2  0.103 0.127 0.103 0.128 0.122 0.149 0.122 0.151 
Max VIF  1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 5.23 5.35 5.23 5.22 
Mean VIF  1.28 1.28 1.28 1.29 2.10 2.11 2.10 2.08 
Stock return of firm i, period t+2 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM) i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in 
pre-impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i, period t; GAMi,t,t-1 is changes in 
as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; 
lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, 
GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  
NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm 
belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. 
Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 
% level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of 
observations are considered as outliers. 
  
  
519 
Table A36 – Stock return measured with time lag t+3 months – hypothesis 2b 
  
  Stock return t+3 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.023 
(0.62) 
0.005  
(0.22) 
0.021 
(0.58) 
0.003 
(0.15) 
-0.874*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.879***  
(-3.63) 
-0.870*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.875***  
(-3.63) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 0.813** (2.38) 
1.058*** 
(4.74) 
0.825** 
(2.41) 
1.081*** 
(4.85) 
0.546 
(1.60) 
0.711*** 
(2.79) 
0.557 
(1.64) 
0.730*** 
(2.87) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
0.244 
(0.81) 
0.224 
(1.50)
0.239 
(0.80)
0.206 
(1.40)
0.327 
(1.07)
0.421** 
(2.44) 
0.322 
(1.06)
0.405** 
(2.35)
GAMi,t  2.031 (1.47) 
0.885 
(1.38) 
2.005 
(1.46) 
0.816 
(1.28) 
2.269* 
(1.65) 
1.567 
(1.94) 
2.237 
(1.63) 
1.489*  
(1.88) 
GAMi,t,t-1  -1.197 (-0.74) 
-7.131*** 
(-2.79) 
-1.233  
(-0.76) 
-7.314*** 
(-2.83) 
-1.429 
(-0.85) 
-7.828*** 
(-3.58) 
-1.479 
(-0.89) 
-8.002*** 
(-3.60) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      2.74*10
-4 
(0.01) 
-0.012 
 (-0.18) 
7.78*10-4 
(0.02) 
-0.008  
(-0.12) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.049*** (3.72) 
0.049*** 
(4.24) 
0.049*** 
(3.71) 
0.049*** 
(4.23) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1  
    
2.55*10-
4*** 
(5.14) 
-0.001* 
(-1.93) 
2.55*10-
4*** 
(5.22) 
-0.001* 
(-1.86) 
RESOURCESi,t      0.008 (0.10) 
0.012 
(0.13) 
0.008  
(0.09) 
0.010 
(0.11) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.137*** (-3.02) 
-0.127***  
(-2.75) 
-0.137*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.126***  
(-2.74) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.017 (-0.33) 
-0.011  
(-0.13) 
-0.017  
(-0.32) 
-0.010  
(-0.13) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.253*** (-4.96) 
-0.226*** 
(-4.48) 
-0.253*** 
(-4.96) 
-0.225*** 
(-4.47) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.160*** (-3.60) 
-0.159*** 
 (-3.43) 
-0.160*** 
(-3.59) 
-0.158*** 
 (-3.41) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.384*** (-2.72) 
-0.330***  
(-5.91) 
-0.384*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.331***  
(-5.92) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.252*** (-4.29) 
-0.229*** 
(-3.98) 
-0.251*** 
(-4.30) 
-0.229*** 
(-3.99) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.048  (-0.51) 
-0.129  
(-1.59) 
-0.047  
(-0.50) 
-0.126  
(-1.56) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.125**  (-2.52) 
-0.108** 
(-2.05) 
-0.134***  
(-2.70) 
-0.118*** 
(-2.26) 
N  763 730 762 729 763 726 762 725 
F-value  3.34** 13.93*** 3.39** 13.92*** 6.60*** 6.93*** 6.70*** 6.80*** 
Adjusted R2  0.062 0.063 0.063 0.065 0.081 0.117 0.081 0.118 
Max VIF  1.56 1.52 1.57 1.52 5.22 5.35 5.22 5.34 
Mean VIF  1.29 1.28 1.29 1.28 2.10 2.13 2.09 2.13 
Stock return of firm i, period t+3 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM) i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in 
pre-impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i, period t; GAMi,t,t-1 is changes 
in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; 
lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, 
GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  
NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm 
belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. 
Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance 
at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of 
observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A37 – Stock return measured with time lag t+4 months – hypothesis 2b 
  
  Stock return t+4 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.052* 
(1.70) 
0.038* 
(1.79) 
0.051* 
(1.67) 
0.036* 
(1.72) 
-0.666*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.872***  
(-3.94) 
-0.663*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.870***  
(-3.95) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 0.717** (2.42) 
0.842*** 
(3.81) 
0.727** 
(2.45) 
0.862*** 
(3.88) 
0.504* 
(1.76) 
0.565** 
(2.51) 
0.514* 
(1.79) 
0.583** 
(2.60) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
0.033 
(0.15) 
0.410** 
(2.46) 
0.027 
(0.12)
0.394** 
(2.37)
0.097 
(0.44)
0.343*** 
(2.81)
0.090 
(0.41) 
0.328*** 
(2.70) 
GAMi,t  0.774 (0.66) 
-0.088  
(-0.13) 
0.753 
(0.64) 
-0.136  
(-0.20) 
0.934  
(0.82) 0.728 (1.04) 
0.908 
(0.80) 
0.671  
(0.98) 
GAMi,t,t-1  -0.748  (-0.74) 
-5.536** 
(-2.50) 
-0.771  
(-0.76) 
-5.661** 
(-2.54) 
-0.950  
(-0.92) 
-6.942*** 
(-3.64) 
-0.982  
(-0.95) 
-7.064*** 
(-3.66) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.021  (0.95) 
-0.005  
(-0.07) 
0.022 
(0.97) 
-0.002  
(-0.03) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.040*** (3.57) 
0.049*** 
(4.56) 
0.040*** 
(3.57) 
0.049*** 
(4.56) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1  
    
1.66*10-
4** 
(4.47) 
-0.001** 
(-2.18) 
1.67*10-
4** 
(4.55) 
-0.001** 
(-2.12) 
RESOURCESi,t      0.012 (0.15) 
0.034 
(0.39) 
0.011 
(0.14) 
0.032 
(0.37) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.132** (-2.43) 
-0.107** 
(-2.08) 
-0.131** 
(-2.43) 
-0.107** 
(-2.07) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    0.063  (1.03) 
0.091  
(1.24) 
0.063 
(1.04) 
0.091 
(1.25) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.236***  (-4.14) 
-0.215*** 
(-3.83) 
-0.235 
*** 
 (-4.14) 
-0.214*** 
(-3.82) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.144*** (-2.87) 
-0.134*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.143*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.134*** 
(-2.64) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.317** (-2.37) 
-0.309***  
(-5.00) 
-0.317** 
(-2.37) 
-0.309***  
(-5.00) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.217*** (-3.62) 
-0.199*** 
(-3.29) 
-0.217*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.199*** 
(-3.30) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    0.011  (0.13) 
-0.031  
(-0.39) 
0.012 
(0.14) 
-0.029 
(-0.37) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.116**  (-2.06)
-0.102* 
(-1.79)
-0.123**  
(-2.20) 
-0.111* 
(-1.96)
N  763 728 762 727 763 720 762 719 
F-value  3.09** 12.67*** 3.11** 12.72*** 7.15*** 8.22*** 7.25*** 8.13*** 
Adjusted R2  0.022 0.058 0.023 0.059 0.045 0.100 0.045 0.101 
Max VIF  1.54 1.55 1.54 1.55 5.23 5.59 5.22 5.59 
Mean VIF  1.28 1.29 1.28 1.29 2.09 2.19 2.09 2.19 
Stock return of firm i, period t+4 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM) i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is 
changes in pre-impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i, period t; 
GAMi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of 
firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm 
i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 
10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s 
distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A38 – Control for size – hypothesis 2b 
  
  Unstandardised residuals t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample / Non-missing sample Available sample / Non-missing sample 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive outliers Exclusive outliers Inclusive outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  -0.186*** 
(-5.44) 
-0.205*** 
(-9.53) 
-0.376 
 (-1.17) 
-0.181 
(-0.70) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.568*** (3.45) 
1.557*** 
(6.45) 
1.358*** 
(3.08) 
1.202*** 
(5.00) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
0.055  
(0.22) 
0.448** 
(2.57) 
0.130  
(0.52) 
0.447*** 
(2.66) 
GAMi,t  2.681*** (5.16) 
2.369*** 
(6.84)
2.817*** 
(5.61)
2.559*** 
(7.81) 
GAMi,t,t-1  0.393  (0.31) 
-2.699 
(-1.59) 
0.282 
(0.23) 
-0.465 
(-0.58) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t    0.010 (0.32) 
-0.029 
 (-0.49) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t    0.017 (1.08) 
0.009 
(0.70) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1    1.15*10
-4*** 
(3.29) 
-9.26*10-4 
(-1.25) 
RESOURCESi,t    0.014  (0.15) 
-0.054 
(-0.59) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  -0.167*** (-4.37) 
-0.186*** 
(-5.49) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.151*** (-2.69) 
-0.109** 
(-2.44) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.233*** (-5.37) 
-0.230*** 
(-5.74) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t    -0.175*** (-4.69) 
-0.189*** 
 (-5.13) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  -0.342*** (-2.81) 
-0.271***  
(-5.42) 
UTILITIESi,t    -0.255*** (-4.15) 
-0.228***  
(-4.44) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  -0.097  (-1.27) 
-0.178*** 
(-3.05) 
FINANCEi,t    -0.101** (-2.31) 
-0.137*** 
(-3.25) 
N  762 727 762 727 
F-value  11.89*** 37.76*** 12.07*** 12.52*** 
Adjusted R2  0.121 0.152 0.128 0.146 
Max VIF  1.53 1.47 5.20 5.07 
Mean VIF  1.27 1.24 2.09 2.04 
The dependent variable is the unstandardised residuals from a regression of stock return on size where size is measured as natural logarithm of equity-
market value at the end of the fiscal year. (E+GIM) i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-impairment 
net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i, period t; GAMi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if 
accounted goodwill-amortisation charge of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; 
lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. 
RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 
10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s 
distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A39 – Including year dummies – hypothesis 2c 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model, year-dummies and control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred
. 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.627*** 
(7.04) 
2.026*** 
(8.32) 
2.649*** 
(6.86) 
2.027*** 
(8.26) 
-13.724** 
 (-2.00) 
-9.025** 
(-2.31) 
-13.989** 
 (-2.04) 
-9.307** 
(-2.38) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.981*** (3.57) 
4.256*** 
(7.83) 
3.017*** 
(3.57) 
4.249*** 
(7.83) 
2.373*** 
(2.78) 
3.958*** 
(6.71) 
2.401*** 
(2.79) 
3.982*** 
(6.74) 
GAMCi,t  
 
15.165*** 
(2.79) 
8.310** 
(2.03) 
15.090**
* 
(2.79) 
8.240** 
(2.00) 
15.325*** 
 (2.85) 
13.978*** 
(3.63) 
15.273*** 
 (2.85) 
13.928*** 
(3.61) 
GIMCi,t - -3.860* (-1.76) 
-2.795** (-
2.59) 
-3.894* 
(-1.76)
-2.799**  
(-2.59)
-3.176 
(-1.54)
-1.593* 
(-1.67)
-3.217 
(-1.54) 
-1.578* 
(-1.66)
(EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 + 0.726*** (2.83) 
0.700*** 
(6.87) 
0.736*** 
(2.88) 
0.697*** 
(6.83) 
0.648*** 
(2.71) 
0.614*** 
(5.50) 
0.658*** 
(2.74) 
0.610*** 
(5.48) 
GWCAIi,t-1 + 0.827** (2.07) 
0.760** 
(2.41) 
0.830** 
(2.07) 
0.763** 
(2.41) 
0.536 
(1.52) 
0.158 
(0.61) 
0.535 
(1.52) 
0.139 
(0.53) 
YEAR_2006  0.383** 
(2.17) 
0.493*** 
(2.65) 
0.334** 
(1.83) 
0.498*** 
(2.67) 
0.242 
(1.26) 
0.399** 
(2.32) 
0.171  
(0.86) 
0.335* 
(1.82) 
YEAR_2007  -0.256 
(-0.84) 
-0.237 
(-1.04) 
-0.308  
(-1.00) 
-0.230  
(-1.01) 
-0.226 
(-0.78) 
-0.196 
(-0.87) 
-0.303  
(-1.04) 
-0.263  
(-1.12) 
YEAR_2008  -2.315*** 
(-4.29) 
-1.318*** 
(-5.36) 
-2.360*** 
(-4.33) 
-1.312 *** 
(-5.35) 
-1.925*** 
(-3.86) 
-1.155*** 
(-4.99) 
-1.990*** 
(-3.94) 
-1.209*** 
(-5.07) 
YEAR_2009  -0.457 
(-1.08) 
-0.195 
(-0.82) 
-0.489  
(-1.14) 
-0.182  
-0.75) 
-0.366 
(-0.92) 
-0.058 
(-0.24) 
-0.422  
(-1.04) 
-0.102  
(-0.41) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.386** (2.08) 
0.510*** 
(3.14) 
0.381** 
(2.04) 
0.509*** 
(3.07) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.909*** (2.83) 
0.615*** 
(3.25) 
0.922*** 
(2.86) 
0.629*** 
(3.32) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.165 (-0.78) 
-1.730 
(-1.35) 
-2.046 
(-0.73) 
-1.744 
(-1.33) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -2.305* (-1.83) 
-1.538* 
(-1.80) 
-2.259* 
(-1.77) 
-1.493* 
(-1.70) 
CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.658*** (-2.63) 
-2.581** 
(-2.48) 
-3.635** 
(-2.59) 
-2.565** 
(-2.44) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.582  (-0.35) 
-0.650  
(-0.63) 
-0.580  
(-0.34) 
-0.466  
(-0.44) 
CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -3.187** (-2.42) 
-2.162** 
(-2.49) 
-3.160** 
(-2.35) 
-2.133** 
(-2.38) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -6.756*** (-4.15) 
-3.844*** 
(-3.76) 
-6.813*** 
(-4.06) 
-3.901*** 
(-3.68) 
UTILITIESi,t      -3.595** (-2.25) 
-2.137* 
(-1.82) 
-3.598** 
(-2.21) 
-2.135* 
(-1.78) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.255*** (-3.30) 
-2.973*** 
(-3.41) 
-4.210*** 
(-3.22) 
-2.942*** 
(-3.29) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.592* (-1.95) 
-1.770* 
(-1.89) 
-2.546* 
(-1.88) 
-1.721* 
(-1.79) 
N  767 721 762 717 767 722 762 719 
F-value  17.82*** 42.20*** 17.41*** 42.17*** 14.09*** 29.46*** 14.15*** 29.50*** 
Adjusted R2  0.511 0.608 0.510 0.607 0.558 0.644 0.557 0.641 
Max VIF  4.02 3.86 4.02 3.87 5.23 5.37 5.32 5.49 
Mean VIF  2.02 1.97 2.02 1.97 2.37 2.34 2.39 2.36 
Table continues on next page.        
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-
amortisation charges of firm i, period t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment loss under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of 
firm i, period t; (EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment 
method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of firm i, time t-1; 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. 
YEAR_2006, YEAR_2007, YEAR_2008, YEAR_2009 are dummy variables equal 1 if the year is 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively and otherwise 0. 
YEAR_2005 is the benchmark year. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are 
all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. 
Goodwill-impairment losses and goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-
tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A40 – Excluding 2008 observations – hypothesis 2c  
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  1.829*** 
(3.66) 
1.683*** 
(6.83) 
1.795*** 
(3.65) 
1.678*** 
(6.76) 
-10.392 
 (-1.47) 
-8.280** 
(-2.02) 
-10.859  
(-1.55) 
-8.372** 
(-2.10) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.133*** (3.04) 
4.941*** 
(8.29) 
3.190*** 
(3.02) 
4.913*** 
(8.30) 
2.601** 
(2.51) 
4.300*** 
(6.59) 
2.640** 
(2.51) 
4.528*** 
(7.42) 
GAMCi,t  
 
17.876*** 
(2.78) 
9.728** 
(2.11) 
17.706**
* 
(2.77) 
9.570** 
(2.04) 
18.595** 
 (2.88) 
12.011*** 
(2.70) 
18.446** 
 (2.88) 
10.468*** 
(2.23) 
GIMCi,t - -2.582 (-1.14) 
-1.641  
(-0.80) 
-2.618 
(-1.14) 
-0.641  
(-0.33) 
-2.157 
(-1.00) 
-0.736 
(-0.38) 
-2.207  
(-1.01) 
-0.753  
(-0.38) 
(EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 + 0.939*** (2.69) 
0.762*** 
(6.65) 
0.963*** 
(2.79) 
0.768*** 
(6.76) 
0.853** 
(2.60) 
0.596*** 
(4.83) 
0.876*** 
(2.68) 
0.599*** 
(4.89) 
GWCAIi,t-1 + 1.098**  (2.38) 
0.798** 
(2.38) 
1.110** 
 (2.40) 
0.826** 
(2.44) 
0.771* 
(1.86) 
0.371 
(1.21) 
0.779* 
(1.88) 
0.445 
(1.43) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.351* (1.91) 
0.365*** 
(4.31) 
0.348* 
(1.90) 
0.347*** 
(4.34) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.706** (2.16)
0.578*** 
(2.91)
0.724** 
(2.22) 
0.577*** 
(2.96)
RESOURCESi,t      -1.566 (-0.60) 
-1.750 
(-1.32) 
-1.376  
(-0.54) 
-1.538 
(-1.19) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -2.265** (-1.97) 
-1.671* 
(-1.93) 
-2.212** 
(-1.91) 
-1.615* 
(-1.84) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -2.984**  (-2.36) 
-2.456** 
(-2.31) 
-2.926** 
 (-2.32) 
-2.390** 
(-2.26) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.145 (-0.09) 
-0.468 
(-0.43) 
-0.136  
(-0.08) 
-0.454  
(-0.42) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -2.960** (-2.44) 
-2.255** 
(-2.55) 
-2.916** 
(-2.37) 
-2.198** 
(-2.43) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -5.751***  (-4.01) 
-3.748***  
(-3.47) 
-5.752***  
(-3.92) 
-3.684*** 
(-3.33) 
UTILITIESi,t      -3.273** (-2.35) 
-2.309** 
(-2.03) 
-3.288** 
(-2.31) 
-2.331** 
(-2.04) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -3.998*** (-3.36) 
-2.938*** 
(-3.27) 
-3.918*** 
(-3.29) 
-2.771*** 
(-3.03) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.617** (-2.19) 
-1.956** 
(-2.04) 
-2.567** 
(-2.11) 
-1.989** 
(-2.07) 
N  620 577 615 572 620 585 615 579 
F-value  15.54*** 59.76*** 16.49*** 61.16*** 11.39*** 32.13*** 11.80*** 33.84*** 
Adjusted R2  0.576 0.616 0.577 0.617 0.612 0.676 0.614 0.680 
Max VIF  3.96 3.50 3.97 3.51 4.85 5.02 4.95 5.13 
Mean VIF  2.36 2.17 2.35 2.17 2.43 2.39 2.45 2.42 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-
amortisation charges of firm i, period t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment loss under the amortisation-and-impairment method of 
goodwill of firm i, period t; (EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-
impairment method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of firm i, 
time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, 
time t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
impairment losses and goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level 
(two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A41 – Excluding large book goodwill – hypothesis 2c 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.378*** 
(6.82) 
1.833*** 
(6.69) 
2.360*** 
(6.80) 
1.836*** 
(6.67) 
-20.694*** 
(-2.68) 
-11.967*** 
(-2.77) 
-21.013*** 
 (-2.72) 
-11.929*** 
(-2.76) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.822*** (5.93) 
4.901*** 
(8.67) 
3.868*** 
(5.95) 
4.895*** 
(8.66) 
3.057*** 
(4.35) 
4.030*** 
(6.39) 
3.096*** 
(4.40) 
4.029*** 
(6.39) 
GAMCi,t  
 
23.739** 
(2.38) 
21.081*** 
(3.24) 
23.328** 
(2.35) 
20.752*** 
(3.13) 
22.670** 
 (2.24) 
19.702*** 
(3.31) 
22.315** 
 (2.22) 
19.635*** 
(3.27) 
GIMCi,t - -4.982 (-1.55) 
-3.987** 
(-2.51) 
-4.997  
(-1.54)
-3.999** 
(-2.52)
-4.375 
(-1.46)
-2.741** 
(-2.13)
-4.398 
(-1.46) 
-2.748** 
(-2.13)
(EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 + 0.455* (1.95) 
0.619*** 
(5.85) 
0.465** 
(1.99) 
0.615*** 
(5.82) 
0.406* 
(1.77) 
0.553*** 
(4.50) 
0.416* 
(1.80) 
0.552*** 
(4.49) 
GWCAIi,t-1 + 0.610  (1.01) 
0.064 
(0.12) 
0.621 
(1.02)
0.091 
(0.16)
0.523 
(0.90)
0.056 
(0.13)
0.526  
(0.91) 
0.062 
(0.14)
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.369* (1.90) 
0.899* 
(1.88) 
0.367* 
(1.90) 
0.913* 
(1.89) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      1.221*** (3.31) 
0.741*** 
(3.50) 
1.235*** 
(3.34) 
0.737*** 
(3.46) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.797 (-1.03) 
-1.772 
(-1.40) 
-2.720 
(-0.99) 
-1.733 
(-1.35) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -2.162* (-1.69) 
-1.631* 
(-1.99) 
-2.134* 
(-1.64) 
-1.593* 
(-1.88) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.254** (-2.49) 
-2.263** 
(-2.19) 
-3.23** 
(-2.44) 
-2.229** 
(-2.12) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -1.836 (-1.14) 
-1.167 
(-1.15) 
-1.853 
(-1.13) 
-1.127 
(-1.08) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -2.622** (-2.03) 
-1.628* 
(-1.84) 
-2.610** 
(-1.97) 
-1.589* 
(-1.75) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -5.992*** (-3.79) 
-3.814***  
(-3.51) 
-6.014*** 
(-3.70) 
-3.770***  
(-3.37) 
UTILITIESi,t      -3.467** (-2.15) 
-2.018* 
(-1.70) 
-3.488** 
(-2.12) 
-1.978 
(-1.63) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -3.648*** (-3.03) 
-2.775*** 
(-3.35) 
-3.611*** 
(-2.95) 
-2.744*** 
(-3.23) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.466* (-1.84) 
-1.528* 
(-1.71) 
-2.450* 
(-1.79) 
-1.494 
(-1.63) 
N  563 523 559 520 563 528 559 525 
F-value  31.85*** 52.56*** 32.44*** 52.41*** 19.33*** 23.87*** 19.62*** 23.62*** 
Adjusted R2  0.555 0.613 0.554 0.612 0.596 0.662 0.595 0.660 
Max VIF  4.34 4.52 4.36 4.61 4.48 4.16 4.50 4.25 
Mean VIF  2.59 2.57 2.59 2.60 2.37 2.24 2.38 2.27 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-
amortisation charges of firm i, period t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment loss under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of 
firm i, period t; (EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment 
method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of firm i, time t-1; 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. 
RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment 
losses and goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates 
significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations 
with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A42 – Excluding large goodwill-impairment losses – hypothesis 2c 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusiv
e 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.085*** 
(5.16) 
1.742*** 
(7.59) 
2.065*** 
(5.14) 
1.749*** 
(7.58) 
-15.126** 
 (-2.28) 
-12.098*** 
(-3.21) 
-15.436** 
 (-2.34) 
-12.419*** 
(-3.29) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.845*** (2.97) 
5.028*** 
(9.66) 
3.893*** 
(2.95) 
5.018*** 
(9.65) 
3.088** 
(2.44) 
4.367*** 
(7.94) 
3.128** 
(2.44) 
4.381*** 
(7.98) 
GAMCi,t   
15.973*** 
(2.86) 
8.956** 
(2.14) 
15.923*** 
(2.86) 
8.891** 
(2.11) 
16.199*** 
 (2.95) 
12.107*** 
(3.34) 
16.160*** 
 (2.95) 
12.005*** 
(3.30) 
GIMCi,t - 1.272 (0.07) 
9.023** 
(2.18) 
0.895  
(0.05) 
8.814** 
(2.14) 
9.592 
(0.58) 
9.033 
(1.62) 
9.278 
(0.56) 
9.104  
(1.63) 
(EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 + 0.565* (1.91) 
0.598*** 
(5.56) 
0.576* 
(1.94) 
0.596*** 
(5.53) 
0.493* 
(1.86) 
0.585*** 
(5.10) 
0.502* 
(1.88) 
0.584*** 
(5.09) 
GWCAIi,t-1 + 0.642 (1.31) 
0.628** 
(2.03) 
0.643 
(1.31) 
0.632** 
(2.03) 
0.357 
(0.86) 
0.281 
(1.10) 
0.355 
(0.85) 
0.264 
(1.03) 
          
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.547*** (2.74) 
0.904** 
(2.18) 
0.549*** 
(2.75) 
0.925** 
(2.20) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.963*** (3.14) 
0.750*** 
(4.11) 
0.975*** 
(3.19) 
0.765*** 
(4.16) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.180 (-0.82) 
-2.015 
(-1.63) 
-2.053 
(-0.77) 
-2.040 
(-1.61) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -2.683** (-2.10) 
-1.540** 
(-1.98) 
-2.655** 
(-2.06) 
-1.516** 
(-1.89) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.474*** (-2.78) 
-2.817*** 
(-3.50) 
-3.443*** 
(-2.73) 
-2.809*** 
(-3.40) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.773 (-0.48) 
-0.871 
(-0.92) 
-0.776  
(-0.47) 
-0.698  
(-0.70) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.373*** (-2.68)
-2.290*** 
(-2.81)
-3.352*** 
(-2.62) 
-2.273*** 
(-2.70)
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -5.606*** (-4.24) 
-3.962*** 
(-3.96) 
-5.614*** 
(-4.14) 
-3.993*** 
(-3.87) 
UTILITIESi,t      -3.612** (-2.43) 
-2.236** 
(-2.01) 
-3.623** 
(-2.39) 
-2.250** 
(-1.98) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.592*** (-3.53) 
-3.015*** 
(-3.63) 
-4.552*** 
(-3.46) 
-3.001*** 
(-3.52) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.813** (-2.20) 
-1.867** 
(-2.14) 
-2.773** 
(-2.14) 
-1.839** 
(-2.05) 
N  724 674 719 670 724 683 719 680 
F-value  22.09*** 64.73*** 22.45*** 64.49*** 14.77*** 31.26*** 14.72*** 31.36*** 
Adjusted R2  0.519 0.613 0.518 0.611 0.569 0.675 0.569 0.672 
Max VIF  3.84 3.90 3.85 3.91 4.89 5.07 4.99 5.19 
Mean VIF  2.35 2.35 2.34 2.36 2.46 2.46 2.47 2.48 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-
amortisation charges of firm i, period t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment loss under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of 
firm i, period t; (EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment 
method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of firm i, time t-1; 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. 
RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment 
losses and goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates 
significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations 
with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A43 – Stock price measured with time lag t+2 months – hypothesis 2c 
  
  Stock price t+2 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusiv
e 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.402*** 
(6.38) 
1.796*** 
(7.32) 
2.386*** 
(6.40) 
1.780*** 
(7.31) 
-15.486** 
 (-2.28) 
-11.041*** 
(-2.97) 
-15.812** 
 (-2.34) 
-11.033*** 
(-2.96) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.217*** (4.13) 
4.767*** 
(9.30) 
3.252*** 
(4.12) 
4.760*** 
(9.28) 
2.499*** 
(3.24) 
3.651*** 
(6.59) 
2.525*** 
(3.24) 
3.649*** 
(6.58) 
GAMCi,t  
 
11.859** 
(2.21) 
7.471* 
(1.86) 
11.784** 
(2.19) 
7.418* 
(1.84) 
12.052** 
 (2.33) 
9.189** 
(2.63) 
11.981** 
 (2.32) 
9.210*** 
(2.62) 
GIMCi,t - -3.527*  (-1.65) 
-1.205  
(-1.11) 
-3.564*  
(-1.65) 
-1.211  
(-1.11) 
-2.682  
(-1.34) 
-1.172 
(-1.16) 
-2.726  
(-1.35) 
-1.182 
(-1.17) 
(EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 + 0.645** (2.54) 
0.707*** 
(6.41) 
0.656** 
(2.59) 
0.705*** 
(6.38) 
0.558** 
(2.30) 
0.562*** 
(4.94) 
0.569** 
(2.35) 
0.560*** 
(4.92) 
GWCAIi,t-1 + 0.838** (2.01) 
0.737** 
(2.43) 
0.842** 
(2.01) 
0.742** 
(2.44) 
0.558 
(1.51) 
0.390 
(1.61) 
0.559 
(1.51) 
0.388 
(1.60) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.573*** (3.23) 
1.068**  
(2.54) 
0.568*** 
(3.21) 
1.062**  
(2.50) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      1.011*** (3.16) 
0.728*** 
(4.00) 
1.025*** 
(3.20) 
0.727*** 
(3.97) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.394 (-0.88) 
-1.462 
(-1.13) 
-2.291 
(-0.84) 
-1.434 
(-1.09) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -3.066** (-2.24) 
-1.973** 
(-2.39) 
-3.054** 
(-2.20) 
-1.957** 
(-2.31) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.440** (-2.21) 
-2.814*** 
(-2.76) 
-3.426** 
(-2.18) 
-2.796*** 
(-2.70) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -1.259 (-0.74) 
-1.097 
 (-1.13) 
-1.277  
(-0.74) 
-1.097 
 (-1.08) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.666** (-2.62) 
-2.515*** 
(-3.03) 
-3.658** 
(-2.56) 
-2.495*** 
(-2.92) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -7.326*** (-4.30) 
-4.483*** 
(-4.42) 
-7.355*** 
(-4.21) 
-4.461*** 
(-4.28) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.206** (-2.41)
-2.415** 
(-2.07)
-4.235** 
(-2.38) 
-2.393** 
(-2.01)
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.692*** (-3.30) 
-3.330*** 
(-3.71) 
-4.666*** 
(-3.23) 
-3.314*** 
(-3.61) 
FINANCEi,t      -3.070** (-2.19) 
-1.994** 
(-2.22) 
-3.043** 
(-2.13) 
-1.957** 
(-2.13) 
N  767 713 762 709 767 717 762 713 
F-value  18.32*** 44.86*** 18.85*** 44.72*** 10.74*** 24.04*** 10.97*** 23.76*** 
Adjusted R2  0.479 0.585 0.478 0.584 0.536 0.612 0.536 0.610 
Max VIF  3.97 3.77 3.97 3.78 5.16 5.23 5.26 5.34 
Mean VIF  2.36 2.25 2.35 2.26 2.52 2.45 2.53 2.47 
Stock price of firm i, time t+2 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted 
goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment loss under the amortisation-and-impairment method 
of goodwill of firm i, period t; (EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-
and-impairment method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of 
firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of 
firm i, time t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
impairment losses and goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level 
(two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A44 – Stock price measured with time lag t+3 months – hypothesis 2c 
  
  Stock price t +3 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.412*** 
(6.64) 
1.730*** 
(7.68) 
2.399*** 
(6.63) 
1.734*** 
(7.65) 
-15.975** 
(-2.39) 
-10.860*** 
(-3.06) 
-16.248** 
(-2.44) 
-10.842*** 
(-3.05) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.373*** (4.34) 
5.115*** 
(10.00) 
3.401*** 
(4.32) 
5.107*** 
(9.99) 
2.650*** 
(3.47) 
4.039*** 
(7.92) 
2.672*** 
(3.47) 
4.037*** 
(7.92) 
GAMCi,t  
 
10.632** 
(2.11) 
6.143 
(1.63) 
10.572** 
(2.09) 6.089 (1.60) 
10.596** 
 (2.18) 
5.404 
(1.52) 
10.545** 
 (2.17) 
5.415  
(1.51) 
GIMCi,t - -3.282*  (-1.79) 
-1.453 
(-1.41)
-3.312*  
(-1.79)
-1.459 
(-1.41)
-2.457  
(-1.46)
-1.325 
(-1.31) 
-2.494  
(-1.46)
-1.336 
(-1.32)
(EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 + 0.580** (2.43) 
0.722*** 
(7.46) 
0.589** 
(2.47) 
0.719*** 
(7.41) 
0.493** 
(2.18) 
0.497*** 
(4.21) 
0.502** 
(2.21) 
0.496*** 
(4.19) 
GWCAIi,t-1 + 0.948** (2.34) 
0.831*** 
(2.85)
0.951** 
(2.34)
0.836*** 
(2.85)
0.688* 
(1.92)
0.639** 
 (2.32) 
0.689* 
(1.92)
0.638** 
(2.31)
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.534*** (3.07) 
0.564*** 
(4.11) 
0.532*** 
(3.06) 
0.564*** 
(4.11) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      1.034*** (3.30) 
0.719*** 
(4.12) 
1.046*** 
(3.32) 
0.717*** 
(4.09) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.369 (-0.86) 
-1.232 
(-1.11) 
-2.269  
(-0.82) 
-1.195 
(-1.06) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -3.007** (-2.19) 
-1.906** 
(-2.53) 
-2.984** 
(-2.13) 
-1.879** 
(-2.43) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.382** (-2.17) 
-2.732*** 
(-3.15) 
-3.359** 
(-2.14) 
-2.706*** 
(-3.05) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -1.476  (-0.89) 
-1.208 
 (-1.39) 
-1.480  
(-0.88) 
-1.176 
(-1.32) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.674***  (-2.65) 
-2.479*** 
(-3.33) 
-3.656** 
 (-2.58) 
-2.450*** 
(-3.20) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -7.304*** (-4.30) 
-4.765*** 
(-5.00) 
-7.316*** 
(-4.20) 
-4.732*** 
(-4.84) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.389** (-2.54) 
-2.649** 
(-2.47) 
-4.402** 
(-2.50) 
-2.617** 
(-2.40) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.513*** (-3.14) 
-3.033*** 
(-3.58) 
-4.481*** 
(-3.07) 
-3.007*** 
(-3.48) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.926** (-2.09) 
-1.795** 
(-2.18) 
-2.892** 
(-2.02) 
-1.751** 
(-2.07) 
N  767 713 762 709 767 715 762 711 
F-value  19.29*** 68.12*** 19.62*** 67.65*** 10.10*** 38.67*** 10.24*** 38.29*** 
Adjusted R2  0.484 0.587 0.482 0.586 0.539 0.617 0.537 0.615 
Max VIF  3.97 3.82 3.97 3.83 5.16 5.18 5.26 5.29 
Mean VIF  2.36 2.26 2.35 2.27 2.52 2.44 2.53 2.47 
Stock price of firm i, time t+3 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted 
goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment loss under the amortisation-and-impairment method of 
goodwill of firm i, period t; (EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-
impairment method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of firm i, 
time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, 
time t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
impairment losses and goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level 
(two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A45 – Stock price measured with time lag t+4 months - hypothesis 2c 
  
  Stock price t +4 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  2.442*** 
(7.00) 
1.903*** 
(7.68) 
2.425*** 
(6.99) 
1.905*** 
(7.68) 
-15.460** 
(-2.27) 
-10.640*** 
(-2.85) 
-15.702** 
(-2.31) 
-10.576*** 
(-2.83) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.417*** (4.24) 
4.950*** 
(9.66) 
3.443*** 
(4.23) 
4.934*** 
(9.67) 
2.662*** 
(3.43) 
4.014*** 
(7.56) 
2.684*** 
(3.43) 
4.008*** 
(7.56) 
GAMCi,t  
 
12.439** 
(2.28) 
4.001  
(1.23) 
12.418** 
(2.27) 
3.970 
(1.22) 
12.586** 
(2.37) 
4.405  
(1.60) 
12.584** 
(2.37) 
4.461  
(1.61) 
GIMCi,t - -2.987*  (-1.78) 
-1.384 
(-1.24) 
-3.013*  
(-1.78) 
-1.390  
(-1.24) 
-2.173 
(-1.43) 
-1.319 
(-1.24) 
-2.215  
(-1.43) 
-1.343 
(-1.27) 
(EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 + 0.617*** (2.65) 
0.673*** 
(6.31) 
0.624*** 
(2.69) 
0.669*** 
(6.27) 
0.520*** 
(2.37) 
0.573*** 
(4.59) 
0.529*** 
(2.41) 
0.571*** 
(4.56) 
GWCAIi,t-1 + 0.807* (1.96) 
0.981*** 
(3.47) 
0.809* 
(1.96) 
0.986*** 
(3.47) 
0.533 
(1.46) 
0.757*** 
(2.95) 
0.532 
(1.46) 
0.757*** 
(2.94) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.539*** (3.10) 
0.823* 
(1.92) 
0.539*** 
(3.09) 
0.832* 
(1.92) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      1.013*** (3.17)
0.705*** 
(3.85)
1.019*** 
(3.17) 
0.697*** 
(3.80)
RESOURCESi,t      -1.979  (-0.72) 
-1.285 
(-1.16) 
-1.792 
(-0.65) 
-1.153 
(-1.03) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -3.026** (-2.06) 
-1.810** 
(-2.30) 
-3.372**  
(-2.03) 
-1.702** 
(-2.11) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.473** (-2.11) 
-2.723*** 
(-2.96) 
-3.473** 
(-2.11) 
-2.616*** 
(-2.78) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -1.345  (-0.78) 
-1.101  
(-1.19) 
-1.264  
(-0.72) 
-0.981  
(-1.04) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.727**  (-2.57) 
-2.424*** 
(-3.10) 
-3.632** 
 (-2.45) 
-2.312*** 
(-2.88) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -7.328*** (-4.07) 
-4.674*** 
(-4.70) 
-7.244*** 
(-3.94) 
-4.539*** 
(-4.47) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.429** (-2.48) 
-2.501** 
(-2.24) 
-4.352** 
(-2.39) 
-2.375** 
(-2.10) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.616*** (-3.09) 
-3.148*** 
(-3.87) 
-4.508*** 
(-2.97) 
-3.044*** 
(-3.67) 
FINANCEi,t      -3.063** (-2.09) 
-1.866** 
(-2.19) 
-2.950** 
(-1.97) 
-1.743** 
(-2.00) 
N  767 713 762 709 767 715 762 711 
F-value  24.27*** 46.65*** 24.70*** 46.94*** 11.60*** 36.37*** 11.77*** 35.92*** 
Adjusted R2  0.490 0.577 0.488 0.576 0.545 0.629 0.543 0.627 
Max VIF  3.97 4.13 3.97 4.15 5.16 5.22 5.26 5.34 
Mean VIF  2.36 2.40 2.35 2.41 2.52 2.50 2.53 2.53 
Stock price of firm i, time t+4 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted 
goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment loss under the amortisation-and-impairment method of 
goodwill of firm i, period t; (EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-
impairment method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of firm i, 
time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, 
time t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-
impairment losses and goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level 
(two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A46 – Scaled by total assets t-1 – hypothesis 2c 
  
  Market value scaled by total assets t-1 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  4.198*** 
(6.62) 
0.250*** 
(3.74) 
0.429*** 
(3.10) 
0.246*** 
(3.66) 
-0.119 
(-0.13) 
-0.578 
(-0.87) 
-0.162  
(-0.17) 
-0.719  
(-1.08) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 14.344*** (3.44) 
7.407*** 
(11.73) 
6.455*** 
(3.87) 
7.420*** 
(11.74) 
6.392*** 
(3.84) 
7.281*** 
(11.66) 
6.385*** 
(3.83) 
7.329*** 
(11.70) 
GAMCi,t  
 
15.815*** 
(3.62) 
15.520*** 
(12.05) 
15.792*** 
(3.60) 
15.439*** 
(11.79) 
16.237*** 
(3.51) 
14.032*** 
(6.96) 
16.227*** 
(3.47) 
13.937*** 
(6.79) 
GIMCi,t - -3.998* (-1.87) 
-4.596*** 
(-3.18)
-4.009* 
(-1.87)
-4.610*** 
(-3.18)
-3.577* 
(-1.74)
-3.366** 
(-2.57) 
-3.583* 
(-1.74)
-3.338** 
(-2.55)
(EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 + 0.508* (1.64) 
0.651*** 
(3.16) 
0.517* 
(1.66) 
0.666*** 
(3.23) 
0 .446 
(1.52) 
0.535*** 
(2.72) 
0.449 
(1.52) 
0.538*** 
(2.75) 
GWCAIi,t-1 + -0.154 (-0.30) 
0.257 
(1.01)
-0.145 
(-0.28)
0.275 
(1.01)
-0.274 
(-0.57)
-0.113 
(-0.41) 
-0.270 
(-0.55)
-0.119  
(-0.43)
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.128*  (1.96) 
0.226** 
(2.42) 
0.126* 
(1.96) 
0.217** 
(2.30) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.037  (0.82) 
0.046 
(1.46) 
0.039 
(0.87) 
0.053*  
(1.66) 
RESOURCESi,t      -0.587* (-1.85) 
-0.567** 
(-2.57) 
-0.578* 
(-1.81) 
-0.566** 
(-2.53) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.136  (-0.78) 
0.031 
(0.26) 
-0.145  
(-0.82) 
0.027 
(0.22) 
CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.430**  (-2.16) 
-0.148 
(-1.40) 
-0.436**  
(-2.16) 
-0.151 
(-1.42) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    0.009 (0.04) 
0.075 
(0.56) 
-0.002  
(-0.01) 
0.086 
(0.62) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.256 (-1.37) 
-0.106  
(-0.97) 
-0.262  
(-1.38) 
-0.109  
(-0.97) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.448** (-1.97) 
-0.264*  
(-1.68) 
-0.462**  
(-2.00) 
-0.287* 
(-1.78) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.573*** (-2.69) 
-0.344** 
 (-2.51) 
-0.583*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.357** 
(-2.55) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.343 (-1.35) 
-0.004 
 (-0.02) 
-0.348 
(-1.35) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.185 (-0.75) 
-0.242**  
(-2.15) 
-0.191  
(-0.76) 
-0.246** 
(-2.12) 
N  767 725 762 720 767 726 762 722 
F-value  5.21*** 76.45*** 30.81*** 76.04*** 16.80*** 26.65*** 16.79*** 26.19*** 
Adjusted R2  0.075 0.471 0.434 0.473 0.445 0.519 0.445 0.522 
Max VIF  4.37 2.08 4.39 2.09 5.28 5.52 5.38 5.63 
Mean VIF  2.38 1.45 2.39 1.45 2.54 2.25 2.56 2.28 
Market value of firm i, time t, scaled by total assets at time t-1, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t is 
as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment loss under the amortisation-and-
impairment method of goodwill of firm i, period t; (EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by as-if accounted book goodwill under the 
amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment method of 
goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market 
value of firm i, time t. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are 
all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. 
Goodwill-impairment losses and goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-
tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A47 – Scaled by total sales t – hypothesis 2c 
  
  Market value scaled by total sales t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred
. 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.509*** 
(4.36) 
0.441*** 
(8.18) 
0.509*** 
(4.34) 
0.440*** 
(8.12) 
-0.881  
(-0.62) 
-1.784** 
(-2.00) 
-0.928  
(-0.66) 
-1.827** 
(-2.06) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 3.196*** (7.23) 
4.014*** 
(10.48) 
3.197*** 
(7.22) 
4.018*** 
(10.48) 
3.009*** 
(7.18) 
3.412***  
(9.87) 
3.007*** 
(7.17) 
3.413***  
(9.88) 
GAMCi,t  
 
12.292*** 
(4.44) 
12.056*** 
(9.87) 
12.239*** 
(4.40) 
11.769*** 
(8.41) 
11.488*** 
(4.20) 
11.015*** 
(11.36) 
11.469*** 
(4.18) 
10.850*** 
(10.68) 
GIMCi,t - -2.755*** (-2.63) 
-2.169*** 
(-3.38) 
-2.758*** 
(-2.63) 
-2.185*** 
(-3.40) 
-2.371** 
(-2.55) 
-2.403*** 
(-2.63) 
-2.373** 
(-2.55) 
-2.414*** 
(-2.64) 
(EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 + 0.886*** (6.34) 
0.940*** 
(15.92) 
0.886*** 
(6.34) 
0.940*** 
(15.92) 
0.778*** 
(5.28) 
0.898*** 
(15.81) 
0.779*** 
(5.27) 
0.902*** 
(15.73) 
GWCAIi,t-1 + 0.847** (2.14) 
0.525*** 
(2.69) 
0.853** 
(2.14) 
0.550*** 
(2.70) 
0.717* 
(1.87) 
0.542*** 
(3.08) 
0.719* 
(1.86) 
0.562*** 
(3.12) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.124* (1.82) 
0.349** 
(2.52) 
0.122* 
(1.82) 
0.349** 
(2.50) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.075 (1.16) 
0.103** 
(2.48) 
0.077 
(1.19) 
0.105** 
(2.53) 
RESOURCESi,t      -0.231 (-0.53) 
-0.297 
(-1.31) 
-0.217 
(-0.49) 
-0.280  
(-1.23) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.202 (-0.65) 
0.084 
(0.62) 
-0.206  
(-0.65) 
0.085 
(0.61) 
CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_ GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.532* (-1.70) 
-0.269* 
(-1.78) 
-0.535* 
(-1.67) 
-0.266* 
(-1.74) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    0.151 (0.43) 
0.223  
(1.23) 
0.144 
(0.40) 
0.221  
(1.20) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.326 (-1.05) 
-0.041  
(-0.30) 
-0.330  
(-1.03) 
-0.040  
(-0.29) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.950** (-2.34) 
-0.419***  
(-2.75) 
-0.961** 
(-2.33) 
-0.422***  
(-2.70) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.420  (-1.09) 
-0.008 
(0.04) 
-0.428  
(-1.09) 
0.005  
(0.02) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    0.206  (0.49) 
0.278  
(1.10) 
0.204  
(0.48) 
0.284 
(1.11) 
FINANCEi,t      0.609 (1.22) 
0.356**  
(2.11) 
0.602  
(1.18) 
0.341* 
(1.94) 
N  767 718 762 713 767 714 762 709 
F-value  16.74*** 103.62*** 16.66*** 94.55*** 17.27*** 92.29*** 17.59*** 84.98*** 
Adjusted R2  0.653 0.564 0.653 0.564 0.673 0.626 0.672 0.626 
Max VIF  1.60 2.33 1.60 2.37 5.12 5.38 5.22 5.50 
Mean VIF  1.26 1.54 1.27 1.56 2.18 2.20 2.20 2.23 
Market value of firm i, time t, scaled by total sales period t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t is as-
if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges of firm i, period t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment loss under the amortisation-and-impairment 
method of goodwill of firm i, period t; (EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-
and-impairment method of firm i, time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of firm i, 
time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. 
RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector 
dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment 
losses and goodwill-amortisation charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates 
significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations 
with Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A48 – Control for size – hypothesis 2c 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  -2.961*** 
(-6.57) 
-3.340*** 
(-11.18) 
-2.984*** 
(-6.67) 
-3.316*** 
(-11.15) 
19.803**
* 
(2.97) 
24.778*** 
(6.52) 
19.514*** 
(2.93) 
24.791*** 
(6.51) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.005** (2.56) 
3.584*** 
(7.28) 
2.049** 
(2.58) 
3.565*** 
(7.29) 
2.398*** 
(2.77) 
4.064***  
(7.12) 
2.421*** 
(2.78) 
4.062***  
(7.11) 
GAMCi,t  
 
11.399** 
(2.28) 
6.483** 
(2.04) 
11.369** 
(2.29) 
6.468** 
(2.02) 
12.989**
* 
(2.55)
9.439*** 
(2.67) 
12.929*** 
(2.55) 
9.436*** 
(2.65) 
GIMCi,t - -3.403* (-1.76) 
-1.587 
(-1.30) 
-3.447* 
(-1.76) 
-1.574  
(-1.30) 
-3.624* 
(-1.78) 
-2.380** 
(-2.52) 
-3.664* 
(-1.77) 
-2.389** 
(-2.53) 
(EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 + 0.595** (2.22) 
0.619*** 
(5.46)
0.609** 
(2.29)
0.601*** 
(5.59)
0.616** 
(2.54)
0.583*** 
(5.41) 
0.626** 
(2.57)
0.581*** 
(5.38)
GWCAIi,t-1 + 0.715** (1.99) 
0.497* 
(1.76) 
0.715** 
(1.99) 
0.492* 
(1.73) 
0.628* 
(1.80) 
0.429* 
(1.79) 
0.628* 
(1.80) 
0.429* 
(1.78) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.446** (2.28) 
0.531*** 
(3.44) 
0.445** 
(2.28) 
0.532*** 
(3.43) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      -0.949*** (-3.02) 
-1.253***  
(-6.83) 
-0.937*** 
(-2.97) 
-1.255***  
(-6.80) 
RESOURCESi,t      -2.489 (-0.87) 
-1.955 
(-1.51) 
-2.382 
(-0.83) 
-1.924 
(-1.47) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -2.712** (-2.09) 
-1.767** 
(-2.20) 
-2.686** 
(-2.04) 
-1.742** 
(-2.11) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.447** (-2.52) 
-2.796*** 
(-3.36) 
-3.428** 
(-2.48) 
-2.775*** 
(-3.24) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.930 (-0.55) 
-0.732  
(-0.74) 
-0.933 
(-0.54) 
-0.706  
(-0.70) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.385** (-2.51) 
-2.238*** 
(-2.70) 
-3.366** 
(-2.44) 
-2.213** 
(-2.59) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -6.908*** (-4.26) 
-4.070*** 
(-4.02) 
-6.920*** 
(-4.16) 
-4.043*** 
(-3.88) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.076** (-2.46) 
-2.307** 
(-2.02) 
-4.089** 
(-2.42) 
-2.280* 
(-1.96) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -4.477***  (-3.35) 
-3.068*** 
(-3.66) 
-4.443*** 
(-3.27) 
-3.047*** 
(-3.55) 
FINANCEi,t      -2.747**  (-2.02) 
-1.751* 
 (-1.95) 
-2.711* 
(-1.95) 
-1.712* 
 (-1.86) 
N  767 718 762 715 767 720 762 716 
F-value  8.88*** 41.61*** 9.23*** 47.78*** 12.80*** 35.41*** 13.01*** 35.31*** 
Adjusted R2  0.355 0.400 0.357 0.419 0.425 0.561 0.427 0.560 
Max VIF  3.97 3.38 3.97 3.39 5.16 5.34 5.26 5.46 
Mean VIF  2.36 2.07 2.35 2.10 2.52 2.49 2.53 2.52 
The dependent variable is unstandardised residuals from a regression of stock prices on size where size is measured as natural logarithm of equity-market 
value at the end of the fiscal year. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges of 
firm i, period t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment loss under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of firm i, period t; 
(EQCAI-GWCAI)i,t-1 is as-if accounted book equity reduced by as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i, 
time t-1; GWCAi,t-1is as-if accounted book goodwill under the amortisation-and-impairment method of goodwill of firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is 
growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i, time t. RESOURCESi,t, 
GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  
NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm 
belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Goodwill-impairment losses and goodwill-amortisation 
charges take positive values. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-
tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations with Cook’s distance larger than 
4/n where n is total number of observations are considered as outliers. 
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Table A49 – Including year dummies – hypothesis 2d 
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model, year-dummies and control variables 
  Available sample / Non-missing sample Available sample / Non-missing sample 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive outliers Exclusive outliers Inclusive outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.167*** 
(4.35) 
0.175*** 
(6.40) 
-0.499** 
(-1.97) 
-0.463*** 
(-2.71) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.636*** 
 (3.97) 
1.424*** 
(7.77) 
1.311*** 
(3.39) 
1.106***  
(5.83) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
-0.363 
(-1.60) 
-0.271** 
(-2.31) 
-0.258  
(-1.17) 
-0.233* 
(-1.96) 
GAMCi,t  2.285*** 
(2.68) 
0.737 
(1.45)
2.527*** 
(3.11)
1.338** 
(2.53) 
GAMCi,t,t-1  2.382 
(1.55) 
3.017*** 
(3.17) 
2.255* 
(1.66) 
2.361**  
(2.26) 
GIMCi,t - -0.917**  
(-2.42) 
-0.946*  
(-1.78)
-0.825** 
(-2.23)
-1.488*** 
(-2.89) 
GIMCi,t,t-1 - -0.195 
(-1.29) 
-0.988*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.193  
(-1.35) 
-0.259** 
(-2.06) 
YEAR_2006  -0.106*** 
(-3.25) 
-0.079*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.124*** 
(-3.78) 
-0.085*** 
(-3.16) 
YEAR_2007  -0.377*** 
(-11.32) 
-0.350*** 
(-11.71) 
-0.399*** 
(-11.85) 
-0.377*** 
(-13.28) 
YEAR_2008  -0.614*** 
(-13.56) 
-0.599*** 
(-18.89) 
-0.626*** 
(-14.24) 
-0.606*** 
(-18.94) 
YEAR_2009  0.101* 
(1.94) 
0.023 
(0.61) 
0.081 
(1.51) 
0.039  
(1.00) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t    0.023 (1.09) 
0.032 
(0.60) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t    0.036*** (2.93)
0.035*** 
(4.38) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1    5.86*10
-5*** 
(2.63) 
2.28*10-4 
(-0.45) 
RESOURCESi,t    0.155* (1.77)
0.018 
(0.28) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  -0.035  (-0.91) 
-0.049  
(-1.57) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.181*** (-3.77) 
-0.186*** 
(-3.78) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.137*** (-3.24) 
-0.149*** 
(-4.23) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t    -0.108*** (-2.84)
-0.139*** 
(-4.29) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  -0.339***  (-4.58) 
-0.303*** 
(-5.20) 
UTILITIESi,t    -0.131** (-2.61) 
-0.129*** 
(-3.23) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  -0.018  (-0.24) 
-0.107*** 
(-2.66) 
FINANCEi,t    -0.017  (-0.38) 
-0.073* 
(-1.85) 
N  762 728 762 720 
F-value  51.40*** 68.10*** 39.00*** 36.11*** 
Adjusted R2  0.411 0.488 0.429 0.512 
Max VIF  2.37 1.72 5.26 5.19 
Mean VIF  1.65 1.47 2.09 1.99 
Table continues on next page.     
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock return of firm i, period t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-
impairment method of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-impairment 
method of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i, 
period t; GIMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i from period t-1 
to t; YEAR_2006, YEAR_2007, YEAR_2008, YEAR_2009 are dummy variables equal 1 if the year is 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 respectively and 
otherwise 0. YEAR_2005 is the benchmark year. GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural 
logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, 
GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  
NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the 
firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector.Goodwill-amortisation charges and goodwill-
impairment losses take positive values in these regressions. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses.*indicates 
significant at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significant at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significant at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations 
having a value of Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
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Table A50 – Excluding 2008 observations – hypothesis 2d 
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample / Non-missing sample Available sample / Non-missing sample 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive outliers Exclusive outliers Inclusive outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.006 
(0.15) 
0.010 
(0.40) 
-0.025 
(-0.08) 
-0.003  
(-0.01) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.069***  (3.91) 
1.816*** 
(7.32) 
1.677*** 
(3.23) 
1.498***  
(5.64) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
-0.434  
(-1.59) 
-0.294  
(-1.47) 
-0.298  
(-1.12) 
-0.110  
(-0.56) 
GAMCi,t  3.849*** (3.82) 
2.513*** 
(3.91)
4.226*** 
(4.26)
2.664*** 
(3.95) 
GAMCi,t,t-1  1.228  (0.98) 
0.781 
(0.64) 
1.161 
(1.05) 
0.951 
(0.78) 
GIMCi,t - -1.801* (-1.86) 
-1.442* 
(-1.91)
-1.837* 
(-1.81)
-1.938** 
(-2.28) 
GIMCi,t,t-1 - -0.009 (-0.06) 
-0.645* 
(-1.76) 
0.020 
(0.13) 
-1.001** 
(-2.23) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t    -0.010  (-0.31) 
-0.024  
(-0.39) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t    0.008 (0.49) 
0.008 
(0.77) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1    1.20*10
-4*** 
(4.38) 
-4.87*10-4 
(-0.76) 
RESOURCESi,t    0.227* (1.95) 
0.062 
(0.92) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  -0.120*** (-2.79) 
-0.136*** 
(-3.57) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.226***  (-2.79) 
-0.166** 
(-2.60) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.154*** (-3.09) 
-0.160*** 
(-3.61) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t    -0.148***  (-3.60) 
-0.167*** 
(-4.28) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  -0.164*  (-1.87) 
-0.180***  
(-2.83) 
UTILITIESi,t    -0.137**  (-2.55) 
-0.143*** 
(-2.90) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  -0.081  (-0.99) 
-0.130**  
(-2.08) 
FINANCEi,t    -0.086  (-1.60) 
-0.131** 
(-2.58) 
N  615 578 615 580 
F-value  12.30*** 15.99*** 9.32*** 6.25*** 
Adjusted R2  0.182 0.106 0.203 0.124 
Max VIF  2.26 1.51 4.88 4.72 
Mean VIF  1.58 1.26 2.05 1.90 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock return of firm i, period t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-
impairment method of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-impairment 
method of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i, 
period t; GIMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i from period t-1 
to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, 
time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER 
_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, 
INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. 
BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector.Goodwill-amortisation charges and goodwill-impairment losses take positive values in 
these regressions. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses.*indicates significant at 10% level (two-tailed), 
**indicates significant at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significant at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations having a value of Cook’s distance 
larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
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Table A51 – Excluding large book goodwill – hypothesis 2d 
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample / Non-missing sample Available sample / Non-missing sample 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive outliers Exclusive outliers Inclusive outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  -0.060  
(-1.17) 
-0.034 
(-1.28) 
-1.300*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.951***  
(-3.25) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.655***  (3.12) 
1.269*** 
(5.87) 
1.228** 
(2.53) 
0.741*** 
(2.84) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
-0.006  
(-0.02) 
0.546***  
(3.28) 
0.158 
(0.56) 
0.845*** 
(3.59) 
GAMCi,t  5.973**  (2.21) 
3.380** 
(2.14) 
7.422** 
(2.60) 
5.151*** 
(2.92) 
GAMCi,t,t-1  0.171  (0.27) 
-1.065 
 (-0.64) 
0.223 
(0.29) 
-1.072  
(-0.66) 
GIMCi,t - -1.425*** (-3.14) 
-2.038* 
(-1.75) 
-1.420*** 
(-3.84) 
-1.506  
(-1.26) 
GIMCi,t,t-1 - -0.242  (-0.06) 
-1.500** 
(-2.16) 
-0.252  
(-1.01) 
-1.403* 
(-1.78) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t    0.019 (0.66) 
-0.025  
(-0.31) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t    0.066*** (3.73) 
0.052*** 
(3.81) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1    1.16*10
-4*** 
(2.73) 
-0.001** 
(-2.00) 
RESOURCESi,t    0.022 (0.23) 
-0.077  
(-1.04) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  -0.190*** (-4.20) 
-0.191*** 
(-4.59) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.184*** (-2.64) 
-0.130** 
(-2.28) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.280*** (-5.50) 
-0.278*** 
(-6.18) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t    -0.136*** (-3.09) 
-0.164*** 
(-3.93) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  -0.213***  (-2.68) 
-0.213***  
(-3.40) 
UTILITIESi,t    -0.212***  (-3.63) 
-0.204*** 
(-4.04) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  -0.091  (-1.18) 
-0.271*** 
(-3.50) 
FINANCEi,t    -0.110** (-2.23) 
-0.106** 
(-2.47) 
N  559 530 559 530 
F-value  4.81*** 15.49*** 5.40*** 6.80*** 
Adjusted R2  0.132 0.147 0.164 0.176 
Max VIF  1.59 1.86 4.11 3.97 
Mean VIF  1.31 1.48 1.83 1.88 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock return of firm i, period t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-
impairment method of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-impairment 
method of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i, 
period t; GIMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i from period t-1 
to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, 
time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER 
_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, 
INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. 
BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector.Goodwill-amortisation charges and goodwill-impairment losses take positive values in 
these regressions. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses.*indicates significant at 10% level (two-tailed), 
**indicates significant at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significant at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations having a value of Cook’s distance 
larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
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Table A52 – Excluding large goodwill impairment losses – hypothesis 2d 
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample / Non-missing sample Available sample / Non-missing sample 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive outliers Exclusive outliers Inclusive outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  -0.084* 
(-1.85) 
-0.060** 
(-2.61) 
-1.012*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.657*** 
(-2.94) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.040***  
(3.63) 
1.780*** 
(7.15) 
1.655*** 
(3.11) 
1.372*** 
(5.72) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
0.063  
(0.23) 
0.454***  
(2.62) 
0.234 
(0.87) 
0.563***  
(3.21) 
GAMCi,t  3.669**  
(3.71) 
1.817*** 
(3.14) 
4.027*** 
(3.99) 
1.855*** 
(3.04) 
GAMCi,t,t-1  0.895 
(0.67) 
-3.861* 
(-1.71) 
0.823  
(0.67) 
-3.543 
(-1.38) 
GIMCi,t - 5.531 
(0.99) 
-9.184 
(-1.02) 
5.146  
(1.03) 
-8.957 
(-1.45) 
GIMCi,t,t-1 - -0.063  
(-0.41) 
-0.895* 
(-1.79) 
-0.050  
(-0.31) 
-0.942* 
(-1.83) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t    0.019 (0.75) 
0.024 
(0.38) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t    0.051*** (3.42) 
0.037*** 
(3.52) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1    -0.001 (-1.59) 
9.47*10-4* 
(-1.84) 
RESOURCESi,t    0.052  (0.53) 
-0.055  
(-0.62) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  -0.160***  (-4.23) 
-0.179*** 
(-5.57) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.164***  (-2.65) 
-0.098*  
(-1.71) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.225***  (-5.48) 
-0.210***  
(-6.08) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t    -0.167***  (-4.60) 
-0.172***  
(-5.09) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  -0.180**  (-2.31) 
-0.188***  
(-2.81) 
UTILITIESi,t    -0.220***  (-4.03) 
-0.209*** 
(-4.75) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  -0.127  (-1.53) 
-0.137**  
(-2.27) 
FINANCEi,t    -0.103**  (-2.25) 
-0.147***  
(-3.55) 
N  719 683 719 681 
F-value  16.17*** 24.10*** 9.18*** 8.87*** 
Adjusted R2  0.155 0.143 0.175 0.159 
Max VIF  2.25 1.45 4.93 4.80 
Mean VIF  1.54 1.19 2.06 1.90 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock return of firm i, period t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-
impairment method of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-impairment 
method of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i, 
period t; GIMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i from period t-1 
to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, 
time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER 
_GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, 
INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. 
BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector.Goodwill-amortisation charges and goodwill-impairment losses take positive values in 
these regressions. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses.*indicates significant at 10% level (two-tailed), 
**indicates significant at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significant at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations having a value of Cook’s distance 
larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
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Table A53 – Stock return measured with time lag t+2 months – hypothesis 2d 
  
  Stock return t+2 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusiv
e 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  -0.020  
(-0.72) 
-0.004  
(-0.19) 
-0.020  
(-0.74) 
-0.005  
(-0.23) 
-0.762*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.776***  
(-3.23) 
-0.761*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.774***  
(-3.22) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.083*** 
(3.16) 
1.070*** 
(4.52) 
1.091*** 
(3.18) 
1.086*** 
(4.58) 
0.790** 
(2.37) 
0.624*** 
(2.64) 
0.798** 
(2.38) 
0.639*** 
(2.70) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
0.104 
(0.33) 
0.190 
(1.26) 
0.099 
(0.32) 
0.177 
(1.18) 
0.209 
(0.66) 
0.399** 
(2.52) 
0.204 
(0.64) 
0.387** 
(2.45) 
GAMCi,t  3.504*** 
(3.16) 
1.560** 
(2.21) 
3.475*** 
(3.13) 
1.506** 
(2.12) 
3.834*** 
(3.34) 
2.240*** 
(3.25) 
3.801*** 
(3.30) 
2.181*** 
(3.14) 
GAMCi,t,t-1  -1.605  
(-0.87) 
-6.633** 
(-2.60) 
-1.628  
(-0.88) 
-6.752*** 
(-2.63) 
-1.776 
(-0.99) 
-4.322** 
(-2.03) 
-1.807  
(-1.00) 
-4.404** 
(-2.05) 
GIMCi,t - -1.311***  
(-3.19) 
-1.596** 
(-2.19) 
-1.305***  
(-3.20) 
-1.585** 
(-2.17) 
-1.269*** 
(-3.13) 
-1.363* 
(-1.88) 
-1.263*** 
(-3.13) 
-1.336* 
(-1.85) 
GIMCi,t,t-1 - -0.086  
(-0.44) 
-0.235  
(-0.50) 
-0.087  
(-0.44) 
-0.243  
(-0.51) 
-0.078  
(-0.39) 
-0.347  
(-0.81) 
-0.079  
(-0.39) 
-0.362  
(-0.85) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.013 (0.36)
-0.082  
(-1.22)
0.014 
(0.37) 
-0.079  
(-1.18)
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.041*** (3.22) 
0.044*** 
(3.89) 
0.041*** 
(3.21) 
0.044*** 
(3.87) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1      2.22*10
-4*** 
(4.27)
-0.002* 
(-1.88)
2.22*10-4*** 
(4.31) 
-0.002*  
(-1.84)
RESOURCESi,t      0.074 (0.86) 
0.081 
(0.83) 
0.074 
(0.85) 
0.080 
(0.81) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.127*** (-2.95) 
-0.126*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.127*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.125*** 
(-2.71) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.061  (-0.84) 
-0.130  
(-1.37) 
-0.061  
(-0.84) 
-0.129  
(-1.36) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.205*** (-4.38) 
-0.211*** 
(-4.16) 
-0.205*** 
(-4.38) 
-0.210*** 
(-4.15) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.140***  (-3.34) 
-0.151***  
(-3.16) 
-0.140***  
(-3.34) 
-0.151***  
(-3.15) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.275***  (-2.69) 
-0.275***  
(-5.07) 
-0.275***  
(-2.69) 
-0.275***  
(-5.07) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.198***  (-3.35) 
-0.212*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.198*** 
 (-3.36) 
-0.212*** 
(-3.70) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.077  (-0.85) 
-0.191*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.076  
(-0.84) 
-0.190*** 
(-2.79) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.103**  (-2.07) 
-0.119**  
(-2.31) 
-0.108**  
(-2.12) 
-0.125**  
(-2.38) 
N  763 729 762 728 763 719 762 718 
F-value  19.56*** 11.44*** 19.58*** 11.37*** 10.74*** 6.98*** 10.79*** 6.97*** 
Adjusted R2  0.089 0.072 0.089 0.072 0.105 0.103 0.105 0.103 
Max VIF  1.55 1.56 1.55 1.56 5.23 5.33 5.23 5.33 
Mean VIF  1.40 1.40 1.41 1.40 2.05 2.09 2.05 2.09 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock return of firm i, period t+2 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in 
pre-impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-impairment 
method of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i 
from period t-1 to t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i, period t; GIMCi,t,t-1 is 
changes in as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is 
growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-
equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, 
NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, 
INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. 
BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector.Goodwill-amortisation charges and goodwill-impairment losses take positive values in these 
regressions. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses.*indicates significant at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates 
significant at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significant at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations having a value of Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n 
is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
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Table A54 – Stock return measured with time lag t+3 months – hypothesis 2d 
  
  Stock return t+3 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusiv
e 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.001  
(0.02) 
-0.002 
(-0.09) 
-2.44*10-4 
(-0.01) 
0.006  
(0.27) 
-0.766*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.891***  
(-3.65) 
-0.763*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.885***  
(-3.63) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 0.899*** 
(2.76) 
1.086*** 
(4.89) 
0.909*** 
(2.79) 
1.065*** 
(4.84) 
0.631* 
(1.93) 
0.785*** 
(3.12) 
0.642* 
(1.96) 
0.809*** 
(3.22) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
0.173 
(0.52) 
0.217 
(1.46) 
0.167 
(0.50) 
0.190 
(1.28) 
0.262 
(0.76) 
0.307* 
(1.83) 
0.256 
(0.74) 
0.288* 
(1.73) 
GAMCi,t  3.412*** 
(2.70) 
1.111 
(1.51) 
3.362*** 
(2.66) 
0.866 
(1.16) 
3.657*** 
(2.77) 
2.118*** 
(2.78) 
3.599*** 
(2.72) 
2.029*** 
(2.70) 
GAMCi,t,t-1  -0.626  
(-0.42) 
-6.309** 
(-2.60) 
-0.660  
(-0.45) 
-7.005*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.803  
(-0.53) 
-7.513*** 
 (-2.94) 
-0.851  
(-0.57) 
-7.715*** 
 (-2.99) 
GIMCi,t - -1.056** 
(-2.48) 
-0.191  
(-0.28) 
-1.045** 
(-2.46) 
-0.943  
(-1.22) 
-1.021** 
(-2.31) 
7.51*10-4 
(0.00) 
-1.010** 
(-2.29) 0.036 (0.05) 
GIMCi,t,t-1 - -0.145  
(-0.49) 
-0.385 
(-0.56) 
-0.146  
(-0.49) 
-0.576  
(-0.85) 
-0.135  
(-0.44) 
-0.678  
(-1.00) 
-0.136  
(-0.44) 
-0.694  
(-1.02) 
GROWTH(SALES)i,t      -0.001 (-0.04)
0.010  
(0.15)
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
0.015 
(0.23)
lnSIZE(MV)i,t      0.043*** (3.39) 
0.049*** 
(4.21) 
0.043*** 
(3.38) 
0.048*** 
(4.19) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1      2.66*10
-4*** 
(5.12)
-0.001*  
(-1.95)
2.67*10-4*** 
(5.19) 
-0.001*  
(-1.89)
RESOURCESi,t      0.023 (0.30) 
0.004 
(0.05) 
0.022 
(0.28) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.143***  (-3.20) 
-0.127*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.143***  
(-3.20) 
-0.126*** 
(-2.76) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.026  (-0.43) 
-0.013 
(-0.17) 
-0.026  
(-0.43) 
-0.013  
(-0.17) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.244*** (-4.78) 
-0.227***  
(-4.48) 
-0.244  
(-4.78) 
-0.226***  
(-4.47) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.160*** (-3.67) 
-0.163***  
(-3.54) 
-0.159*** 
(-3.66) 
-0.162***  
(-3.53) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.322***  (-2.72) 
-0.322*** 
(-5.81) 
-0.321***  
(-2.72) 
-0.322*** 
(-5.81) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.239***  (-4.04) 
-0.224*** 
(-3.92) 
-0.239***  
(-4.05) 
-0.224*** 
(-3.93) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.078  (-0.86) 
-0.144*  
(-1.80) 
-0.076  
(-0.84) 
-0.142*  
(-1.77) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.125**  (-2.48) 
-0.110** 
(-2.09) 
-0.133*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.120** 
(-2.30) 
N  763 732 762 730 763 726 762 725 
F-value  30.50*** 16.28*** 30.23*** 12.33*** 14.60*** 7.46*** 14.58*** 7.31*** 
Adjusted R2  0.089 0.077 0.088 0.078 0.105 0.122 0.105 0.123 
Max VIF  1.90 10.31 1.90 1.65 5.22 14.33 5.22 14.34 
Mean VIF  1.62 4.34 1.62 1.46 2.13 3.50 2.13 3.50 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock return of firm i, period t+3 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in 
pre-impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-
impairment method of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-impairment 
method of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i, 
period t; GIMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i from period t-1 to t; 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t; 
LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, 
NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, 
INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. 
BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector.Goodwill-amortisation charges and goodwill-impairment losses take positive values in these 
regressions. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses.*indicates significant at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates 
significant at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significant at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations having a value of Cook’s distance larger than 4/n 
where n is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
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Table A55 – Stock return measured with time lag t+4 months – hypothesis 2d 
  
  Stock return t+4 months 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.033 
(1.27) 
0.019  
(0.91) 
0.032 
(1.24) 
0.018 
(0.84) 
-0.590** 
(-2.57) 
-0.802***  
(-3.59) 
-0.588** 
(-2.57) 
-0.798***  
(-3.59) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 0.785*** 
(2.72) 
1.054*** 
(4.58) 
0.795*** 
(2.74) 
1.074*** 
(4.64) 
0.571** 
(2.02) 
0.601*** 
(2.63) 
0.580** 
(2.05) 
0.622*** 
(2.73) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
-0.018  
(-0.08) 
0.290* 
(1.66) 
-0.024  
(-0.11)
0.276 
(1.58)
0.050 
(0.22)
0.300** 
(2.44)
0.044 
(0.19) 
0.285** 
(2.33)
GAMCi,t  2.033* 
(1.87) 
0.367  
(0.62) 
1.995* 
(1.84) 
0.308 
(0.51) 
2.128* 
(1.92) 
1.236* 
(1.85) 
2.083* 
(1.88) 
1.170* 
(1.78) 
GAMCi,t,t-1  -0.522  
(-0.54) 
-1.597 
(-1.36) 
-0.543  
(-0.56) 
-1.641 
(-1.42) 
-0.676  
(-0.70) 
-6.825*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.707  
(-0.73) 
-6.962*** 
(-3.01) 
GIMCi,t - -0.858** 
(-2.23) 
-0.249  
(-0.53) 
-0.849** 
(-2.22) 
-0.224  
(-0.47) 
-0.789**  
(-2.09) 
-0.297  
(-0.52) 
-0.779**  
(-2.08) 
-0.266  
(-0.47) 
GIMCi,t,t-1 - -0.031  
(-0.11) 
-0.292  
(-0.62) 
0.033  
(-0.12) 
-0.306  
(-0.64) 
-0.040  
(-0.14) 
-0.177  
(-0.32) 
-0.042  
(-0.15) 
-0.195  
(-0.36) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.020  (0.82) 
0.014  
(0.22) 
0.020 
(0.85) 
0.018 
(0.28) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.036*** (3.26) 
0.046*** 
(4.26) 
0.036*** 
(3.26) 
0.046*** 
(4.25) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1  
    
1.74*10-
4*** 
(4.44) 
-0.001 
(-1.36) 
1.75*10-
4*** 
(4.51) 
-0.001 
(-1.32) 
RESOURCESi,t      0.024 (0.31) 
0.038 
(0.47) 
0.023 
(0.30) 
0.037 
(0.44) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.136** (-2.53) 
-0.126**  
(-2.42) 
-0.136** 
(-2.53) 
-0.125**  
(-2.41) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    0.055  (0.81) 
0.069  
(0.94) 
0.055  
(0.82) 
0.068 
(0.94) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.230***  (-4.01) 
-0.232***  
(-4.17) 
-0.229***  
(-4.01) 
-0.231***  
(-4.16) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.145***  (-2.90)
-0.153*** 
(-3.07)
-0.145***  
(-2.90) 
-0.153*** 
(-3.06)
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.275**  (-2.28) 
-0.316*** 
(-5.19) 
-0.275**  
(-2.28) 
-0.316*** 
(-5.18) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.210***  (-3.45) 
-0.219*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.210***  
(-3.46) 
-0.219*** 
(-3.64) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.013 (-0.14) 
-0.109  
(-1.52) 
-0.011 
(-0.13) 
-0.108  
(-1.49) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.116**  (-2.06) 
-0.128** 
(-2.25) 
-0.123**  
(-2.18) 
-0.137** 
(-2.42) 
N  763 733 762 732 763 723 762 722 
F-value  23.60*** 19.71*** 23.42*** 19.45*** 12.96*** 8.59*** 12.95*** 8.48*** 
Adjusted R2  0.039 0.066 0.039 0.067 0.059 0.103 0.059 0.104 
Max VIF  2.20 10.44 2.20 10.45 5.23 15.92 5.23 15.93 
Mean VIF  1.64 4.30 1.64 4.30 2.13 3.68 2.13 3.68 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table continues from previous page. 
Stock return of firm i, period t+4 months, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in 
pre-impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-
impairment method of firm i, period t; GAMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-impairment 
method of firm i from period t-1 to t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i, 
period t; GIMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i from period t-1 to t; 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time t; 
LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, 
NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, 
INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. 
BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector.Goodwill-amortisation charges and goodwill-impairment losses take positive values in these 
regressions. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses.*indicates significant at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates 
significant at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significant at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations having a value of Cook’s distance larger than 4/n 
where n is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
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Table A56 – Control for size – hypothesis 2d 
  
  Unstandardised residuals t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample / Non-missing sample Available sample / Non-missing sample 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive outliers Exclusive outliers Inclusive outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  -0.185***  
(-5.03) 
-0.172***  
(-7.55) 
-0.278 
(-0.93) 
-0.103  
(-0.44) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.562*** 
(3.45) 
1.362*** 
(5.82) 
1.357*** 
(3.11) 
1.166*** 
(5.06) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1  
+ 
0.026  
(0.10) 
0.517*** 
(2.97)
0.102 
(0.40)
0.462*** 
(2.74) 
GAMCi,t  3.254*** 
(3.36) 
1.642***  
(2.94) 
3.440*** 
(3.61) 
1.987*** 
(3.37) 
GAMCi,t,t-1  0.513  
(0.41) 
-3.228* 
(-1.73) 
0.454  
(0.38) 
-0.380  
(-0.49) 
GIMCi,t - -1.515*** 
(-3.70) 
-3.206*** 
(-4.12) 
-1.501*** 
(-3.59) 
-2.206** 
(-2.50) 
GIMCi,t,t-1 - -0.122  
(-0.90) 
-0.094  
(-0.63) 
-0.111  
(-0.79) 
-0.322* 
(-1.73) 
GROWTH_SALESi,t    0.005 (0.16) 
-0.034  
(-0.57) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t    0 .012 (0.83) 
0.005 
(0.48) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1    1.27*10
-4*** 
(3.50) 
-9.05*10-4 
(-1.23) 
RESOURCESi,t    0.033 (0.36) 
-0.049 
(-0.55) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
  -0.165*** (-4.37) 
-0.183***  
(-5.64) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.151***  (-2.47) 
-0.107** 
(-2.28) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
  -0.223***  (-5.22) 
-0.217*** 
(-5.72) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t    -0.164***  (-4.56) 
-0.176*** 
(-4.98) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
  -0.262***  (-3.07) 
-0.205*** 
(-3.27) 
UTILITIESi,t    -0.239*** (-4.07) 
-0.215*** 
(-4.67) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
  -0.105  (-1.40) 
-0.154*** 
(-2.73) 
FINANCEi,t    -0.097** (-2.18)
-0.134***  
(-3.23) 
N  762 725 762 724 
F-value  24.18*** 19.08*** 13.35*** 7.68*** 
Adjusted R2  0.142 0.138 0.148 0.126 
Max VIF  2.36 1.55 5.21 5.06 
Mean VIF  1.66 1.31 2.14 1.95 
Table continues on next page.     
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Table continues from previous page. 
The dependent variable is unstandardised residuals from a regression of stock returns on size where size is measured as natural logarithm of equity-
market value at the end of the fiscal year. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-impairment net 
earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GAMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-impairment method of 
firm i, period t; GAMCi,t,t-1 is changes in as-if accounted goodwill-amortisation charges under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i from 
period t-1 to t; GIMCi,t is as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i, period t; GIMCi,t,t-1 is 
changes in as-if accounted goodwill-impairment losses under the amortisation-and-impairment method of firm i from period t-1 to t; 
GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of the equity-market value of firm i, time 
t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, 
NON_CYCLICAL_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, 
INFORMATION_TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. 
BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector.Goodwill-amortisation charges and goodwill-impairment losses take positive values in 
these regressions. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses.*indicates significant at 10% level (two-tailed), 
**indicates significant at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significant at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations having a value of Cook’s distance 
larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
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Table A57 – No impairment and amortisation – price-book-earnings 
regressions 
  
  Stock price t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  3.100***  
(7.98) 
2.121***  
(9.04) 
2.907***  
(5.93)
1.983***  
(8.30)
-18.590*** 
(-3.04)
-14.399*** 
(-3.53)
-20.027*** 
(-2.83) 
-14.227*** 
(-3.21)
(E+GIM)i,t + 2.628*** 
(4.32) 
4.143*** 
(9.07) 
3.108*** 
(3.08) 
4.819*** 
(8.86) 
2.022*** 
(3.50) 
3.400*** 
(7.78) 
2.405** 
(2.33) 
3.774*** 
(7.12) 
(EQ-GW)i,t-1 + 0.789*** 
(5.21) 
0.712*** 
(11.55) 
0.774*** 
(2.90) 
0.619*** 
(6.24) 
0.726*** 
(4.83) 
0.679*** 
(12.37) 
0.693*** 
(2.87) 
0.669*** 
(7.45) 
GW_NOi,t-1 + 0.800*** 
(5.27) 
0.992*** 
(5.09) 
0.783*** 
(2.94)
0.859*** 
(4.76)
0.738*** 
(4.93)
0.686*** 
(12.42)
0.703*** 
(2.92) 
0.675*** 
(7.49)
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.696** (2.40) 
1.114*** 
(2.67) 
0.623** 
(2.09) 
1.331*** 
(2.98) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      1.166*** (3.98) 
0.878*** 
(4.48) 
1.238*** 
(3.68) 
0.876*** 
(4.09) 
RESOURCESi,t      -3.189  (-1.27) 
-2.188** 
(-2.03) 
-3.619 
(-1.16) 
-2.471* 
(-1.84) 
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -2.357* (-1.80) 
-1.270* 
(-1.89) 
-2.733* 
(-1.92) 
-1.737** 
(-2.07) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -3.828*** (-2.72) 
-2.853*** 
(-4.00) 
-3.946*** 
(-2.70) 
-3.082*** 
(-3.55) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.891  (-0.52) 
-0.491 
(-0.59) 
-1.021 
(-0.54) 
-0.757  
(-0.74) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -3.332** (-2.44) 
-2.029*** 
(-2.92) 
-3.504** 
(-2.35) 
-2.284*** 
(-2.66) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -6.258*** (-3.33) 
-4.633*** 
(-5.34) 
-8.142*** 
(-4.39) 
-4.808*** 
(-4.54) 
UTILITIESi,t      -4.648*** (-2.81) 
-2.747*** 
(-2.76) 
-5.008*** 
(-2.75) 
-3.137** 
(-2.60) 
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -3.928*** (-2.74) 
-2.706***  
(-3.46) 
-4.346*** 
(-2.84) 
-3.088***  
(-3.32) 
FINANCEi,t      -3.434**  (-2.34)
-1.817**  
(-2.47)
-3.147**  
(-2.06) 
-1.977**  
(-2.17)
N  909 859 762 722 909 857 762 725 
F-value  21.86*** 101.34*** 17.93*** 82.98*** 9.43*** 44.01*** 9.64*** 27.38*** 
Adjusted R2  0.449 0.541 0.438 0.553 0.525 0.616 0.512 0.619 
Max VIF  21.19 1.17 35.67 1.33 24.40 22.06 38.80 38.58 
Mean VIF  14.51 1.14 24.21 1.25 5.57 5.30 7.62 7.62 
Stock price of firm i, time t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t; GW_NOi,t-1 is book goodwill without any 
deduction for amortisation charges or impairment losses (during the period investigated) of firm i, period t-1; (EQ-GW))i,t-1 is book equity reduced by book 
goodwill without any deduction for amortisation charges or impairment losses (during the period investigated) of firm i, time t-1; GROWTH_SALESi,t is 
growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity 
ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL 
_CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_ TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t 
are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry 
sector. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates 
significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). Observations having a value of Cook’s distance larger than 4/n 
where n is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
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Table A58 – No impairment and amortisation – return-earnings regressions 
  
  Stock return t 
 Main model Main model with control variables 
  Available sample Non-missing Available sample Non-missing 
Test variables Pred. Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Inclusive 
outliers 
Exclusive 
outliers 
Intercept  0.004 
(0.10) 
-0.024  
(-1.51) 
-0.009  
(-0.24) 
-0.031*  
(-1.78) 
-0.706*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.838***  
(-3.61) 
-1.059*** 
(-3.67) 
-0.944***  
(-3.73) 
(E+GIM)i,t + 1.689*** 
(3.24) 
1.501*** 
(8.44) 
1.765*** 
(3.73) 
1.566*** 
(8.15) 
1.554*** 
(2.91) 
1.285 *** 
(5.86) 
1.483*** 
(3.17) 
1.154*** 
(4.87) 
(E+GIM)i,t,t-1 + -0.432 
(-0.94) 
0.063 
(0.38)
-0.066  
(-0.25)
0.495*** 
(3.07)
-0.388 
(-0.81)
0.087 
(0.49) 
0.036  
(0.13)
0.595*** 
(3.27)
GROWTH_SALESi,t      0.035 (1.09) 
0.020  
(1.00) 
0.007 
(0.24) 
-0.032  
(-0.53) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t      0.040*** (3.35) 
0.047*** 
(4.27) 
0.056*** 
(4.07) 
0.052*** 
(4.33) 
LEVERAGEi,t-1  
    
1.11*10-
4*** 
(3.98) 
-7.36*10-4 
(-1.07) 
1.01*10-4*** 
(3.41) 
-8.30*10-4 
(-1.11) 
RESOURCESi,t      -0.059  (-0.69)
-0.168** 
 (-2.36) 
-0.008  
(-0.08)
-0.071 
(-0.76)
GENERAL_ 
INDUSTRIALSi,t 
 
    -0.133*** (-3.22) 
-0.165*** 
(-4.47) 
-0.147*** 
(-4.15) 
-0.167*** 
(-5.37) 
CYCLICAL_ CONSUMER_ 
GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.152***  (-2.82) 
-0.116***  
(-2.94) 
-0.138*** 
 (-3.19) 
-0.111***  
(-2.93) 
NON-CYCLICAL_ 
CONSUMER_GOODSi,t 
 
    -0.200*** (-4.74) 
-0.220*** 
(-5.58) 
-0.217*** 
(-5.43) 
-0.225*** 
(-5.95) 
CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t      -0.166***  (-4.63) 
-0.200*** 
(-5.54) 
-0.138***  
(-4.10) 
-0.171*** 
(-4.98) 
NON_CYCLICAL_ 
SERVICESi,t 
 
    -0.223*** (-2.95) 
-0.262***  
(-3.41) 
-0.308*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.298***  
(-6.17) 
UTILITIESi,t      -0.197*** (-4.20)
-0.227***  
(-4.88) 
-0.244*** 
(-4.99)
-0.239***  
(-5.08)
INFORMATION_ 
TECHNOLOGYi,t 
 
    -0.030  (-0.36) 
-0.165*** 
(-2.67) 
-0.014  
(-0.15) 
-0.141** 
(-2.29) 
FINANCEi,t      -0.110**  (-2.61) 
-0.153*** 
(-4.03) 
-0.087**  
(-2.20) 
-0.123*** 
(-3.22) 
N  895 852 762 721 895 862 762 726 
F-value  10.09*** 68.02*** 9.73*** 63.11*** 7.91*** 12.31*** 8.20*** 11.16*** 
Adjusted R2  0.094 0.109 0.091 0.116 0.102 0.123 0.108 0.135 
Max VIF  1.68 1.90 1.51 1.60 5.23 5.10 5.17 5.03 
Mean VIF  1.68 1.90 1.51 1.60 2.31 2.28 2.23 2.16 
Stock return of firm i, period t, is dependent variable. (E+GIM)i,t is pre-impairment net earnings of firm i, period t;  (E+GIM)i,t,t-1 is changes in pre-
impairment net earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t; GROWTH_SALESi,t is growth in total sales of firm i, from period t-1 to t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural 
logarithm of market value of firm i, time t; LEVERAGEi,t-1 is debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, time t-1. RESOURCESi,t, GENERAL_INDUSTRIALSi,t, 
CYCLICAL_CONSUMER _GOODSi,t, NON_CYCLICAL _CONSUMER_GOODSi,t, CYCLICAL_SERVICESi,t,  NON_CYCLICAL_SERVICES, 
UTILITIESi,t, INFORMATION_ TECHNOLOGYi,t, FINANCEi,t are all industry-sector dummies which equal 1 if the firm belongs to the sector and 
otherwise 0. BASIC_INDUSTRIES is used as benchmark-industry sector. Regression coefficients are unstandardised. t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
*indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). 
Observations having a value of Cook’s distance larger than 4/n where n is total number of observations are classified as outliers. 
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Table B1 – Excluding 2008 observations – hypotheses 3c to 3al40 
  
 Impairment decision Size of impairment losses 
  Economic Economic and EM Economic Economic and EM 
Test variables Pred Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Intercept  -2.051*** (-15.02) 
-2.036*** 
(-12.42) 
-6.623*** 
(-4.39) 
-6.066*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.065*** 
(-4.77) 
-0.016*** 
(-9.57) 
-0.087** 
(-2.08) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.09) 
UNEMPLOY%i,t,t-
1
+ 0.197 
(1.60) 
0.201 
(1.48) 
0.265* 
(1.80) 
0.269* 
(1.80) 
0.005* 
(1.93) 
0.002** 
(2.51) 
0.006** 
(2.14) 
0.003*** 
(2.98) 
INDROAi,t,t-1 - -1.462 
(-0.19) 
5.324 
(0.51) 
-4.352 
(-0.47) 
-3.530 
(-0.29) 
0.076 
(0.64) 
0.061 
(1.05) 
-0.030 
(-0.28) 
-2.29*10-4 
(-0.00) 
RETi,t - -0.500* 
(-2.22) 
-0.582* 
(-1.85) 
-0.721*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.644* 
(-1.92) 
-0.012* 
(-1.95) 
-0.005** 
(-2.33) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.04) 
SALES%i,t,t-1 - -0.00579 
(-1.56) 
-0.011** 
(-2.09) 
-0.015*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.013** 
(-2.06) 
-1.24*10-4 
(-1.13) 
-6.95*10-5**
(-1.98) 
-3.63*10-4*** 
(-2.78) 
-9.11*10-5**
(-2.25) 
ROAi,t,t-1 - 0.610 
(0.64) 
0.891 
(0.41) 
-0.393 
(-0.25) 
-0.064 
(-0.02) 
0.023 
(0.80) 
0.012 
(0.82) 
-0.002 
(-0.06) 
0.004 
(0.16) 
OCF%i,t,t-1 - -5.37*10
-5 
(-0.88) 
-0.001 
(-0.94) 
-3.77*10-5 
(-0.70) 
-0.002 
(-1.30) 
-1.71*10-6 
(-0.87) 
-1.14*10-5 
(-1.34) 
-8.83*10-7 
(-0.78) 
-1.62*10-5* 
(-1.71) 
BMi,t + 0.150 
(1.29) 
-0.101 
(-0.32) 
0.239** 
(2.16) 
0.094 
(0.26) 
0.003 
(1.38) 
-2.10*10-4 
(-0.10) 
0.003** 
(1.99) 
1.10*10-4 
(0.05) 
HISTi,t + 2.006*** 
(9.67) 
2.019*** 
(9.53) 
2.156*** 
(8.72) 
2.113*** 
(8.21) 
0.035*** 
(4.81) 
0.012*** 
(7.33) 
0.032*** 
(4.99) 
0.012*** 
(7.34) 
COB_BONi,t -   0.881 
(1.04) 
0.709 
(0.50) 
  0.021 (1.56) 
0.008 
(1.00) 
CEO_BONi,t -   0.237 (0.93) 
1.897 
(1.52)   
0.002 
(1.15) 
0.014** 
(2.00) 
CFO_BONi,t -   -0.730 (-1.04)
-2.603* 
(-1.90)   
-0.026* 
(-1.82) 
-0.020** 
(-2.55)
COB_ 
COSTOCKi,t 
- 
  
-0.181 
(-0.55) 
0.950 
(0.47)   
-0.005 
(-0.71) 
-0.008 
(-0.70) 
CEO_ 
COSTOCKi,t 
- 
  
0.002*** 
(3.29) 
-0.020 
(-0.56)   
1.34*10-5*** 
(4.03) 
-9.54*10-5 
(-0.52) 
CFO_ 
COSTOCKi,t 
- 
  
-0.004 
(-0.92) 
-0.010 
(-0.70)   
-4.73*10-5 
(-1.30) 
1.30*10-5 
(0.16) 
COB_ 
OPTIONi,t 
- 
  
-0.196* 
(-1.72) 
-0.493 
(-0.63)   
-0.004 
(-1.52) 
1.33*10-4 
(0.03) 
CEO_ 
OPTIONi,t 
- 
  
0.003 
(1.29) 
0.005 
(0.24)   
2.92*10-5 
(1.36) 
2.73*10-5 
(0.18) 
CFO_ 
OPTIONi,t 
- 
  
0.002 
(1.45) 
0.003 
(0.28)   
6.21*10-5* 
(1.89) 
7.75*10-5 
(1.28) 
BATHi,t -   4.284 (1.55) 
-1.831 
(-0.30)   
0.077 
(1.54) 
-0.017 
(-0.44) 
SMOOTHi,t +   0.366 (1.34)
0.369 
(1.17)   
0.010* 
(1.94) 
0.003 
(1.40)
COBi,t +   -0.587 (-1.50) 
-0.460 
(-1.21)   
-0.006 
(-1.04) 
-0.002 
(-1.06) 
CEOi,t +   -0.130 (-0.34) 
-0.117 
(-0.30)   
0.002 
(0.43) 
0.001 
(0.41) 
CFOi,t +   0.129 (0.35) 
0.023 
(0.06)   
0.002 
(0.32) 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
DEBTi,t -   0.011 (1.36) 
0.119** 
(2.52)   
0.0001* 
(1.65) 
4.34*10-4* 
(1.74) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t +   0.156* (1.80) 
0.188** 
(2.00)   
0.003 
(1.42) 
0.001 
(1.42) 
Table continues on next page. 
  
                                           
40 No test results are provided for hypotheses 3a and 3b, 3g and 3h, 3aa and 3ab.  
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Table continues from previous page. 
N  832 832 678 678 832 832 678 678 
Log-likelihood  -475.347 -357.912 -273.414 -279.840 128.433 303.722 155.130 271.216 
Wald Chi2-test  120.55*** 124.89*** 135.82*** 145.85*** 3.58*** 9.19*** 2.65***  4.02*** 
Pseudo R2  0.148 0.148 0.211 0.193 -0.637 -0.217 -0.884 -0.305 
Max VIF  1.22 1.36 1.83 4.07 1.22 1.36 1.83 4.07 
Mean VIF  1.08 1.18 1.21 1.73 1.08 1.18 1.21 1.73 
IMP_DECISIONi,t equals 1 if firm i reports goodwill-impairment losses for period t; otherwise 0; IMP_AMOUNTi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses (a 
positive amount) of firm i, period t, scaled by total assets at time t-1; UNEMPLOY%i,t,t-1 is average-monthly percentage changes in unemployment rates 
from period t-1 to t; INDROAi,t,t-1 is median changes in industry-sector pre-impairment return-on-assets from period t-1 to t where industry-sector is defined 
according to FTSE codes to which firm i belongs; RETi,t is stock returns of firm i, period t; SALES%i,t,t-1 is percentage changes in total sales of firm i, from 
period t-1 to t; ROAi,t,t-1 is changes in pre-impairment return-on-assets of firm i, from period t-1 to t; OCF%i,t,t-1 is percentage changes in operating cash 
flows of firm i, from period t-1 to t; BMi,t is pre-impairment book-to-market ratios of firm i, time t; HISTi,t  equals 1 if goodwill-impairment losses are 
reported for firm i, period t-1; otherwise 0; COB_BONi,t is cash-bonus payment to COB of firm i period t, scaled by total cash compensation to COB period t; 
CEO_BONi,t is cash-bonus payment to CEO of firm i period t, scaled by total cash compensation to CEO period t; CFO_BONi,t is cash-bonus payment to 
CFO of firm i period t, scaled by total cash compensation to CFO period t; COB_COSTOCKi,t is number of conditional stocks held by COB of firm i time t, 
scaled by number of common stocks held by COB at time t; CEO_COSTOCKi,t is number of conditional stocks held by CEO of firm i time t, scaled by 
number of common stocks held by CEO at time t; CFO_COSTOCKi,t is number of conditional stocks held by CFO of firm i time t, scaled by number of 
common stocks held by CFO at time t; COB_OPTi,t is number of executive stock options held by COB of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks 
held by COB at time t; CEO_OPTi,t is number of executive stock options held by CEO of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks held by CEO at 
time t; CFO_OPTi,t is number of executive stock options held by CFO of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks held by CFO at time t; BATHi,t is 
changes in pre-impairment earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t, scaled by total assets at time t-1, when below the median of nonzero negative values of this 
variable; otherwise 0; SMOOTHi,t is changes in pre-impairment earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t, scaled by total assets at time t-1, when above the 
median of nonzero positive values of this variable; otherwise 0; COBi,t equals 1 if firm i changes COB in period t; otherwise 0; CEOi,t equals 1 if firm i 
changes CEO in period t; otherwise 0; CFOi,t equals 1 if firm i changes CFO in period t; otherwise 0; DEBTi,t is pre-impairment debt-to-equity ratio of firm 
i, period t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i time t. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level 
(two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). To investigate the effect of outliers, all the 
continuous variables are winsorised at 5th and 95th percentile. 
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Table B2 – Excluding large goodwill-impairment losses – hypotheses 3c to 
3al41 
  
 Impairment decision Size of impairment losses 
  Economic Economic and EM Economic Economic and EM 
Test variables Pred Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Intercept  -2.177*** (-14.61) 
-2.137*** 
(-11.52) 
-6.847*** 
(-3.87) 
-7.722*** 
(-3.87) 
-0.065*** 
(-4.77) 
-0.010*** 
(-8.47) 
-3.878*** 
(-3.13) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.09) 
UNEMPLOY%i,t,t-1 + -0.046 
(-0.38) 
-0.045 
(-0.36) 
0.058 
(0.42) 
0.015 
(0.10) 
-4.57*10-5 
(-0.09) 
-1.19*10-5 
(-0.02) 
0.001 
(1.02) 
3.74*10-4 
(0.71) 
INDROAi,t,t-1 - -12.689** 
(-2.27) 
-7.025 
(-0.81) 
-12.550** 
(-2.03) 
-5.652 
(-0.57) 
-0.048** 
(-2.23) 
-0.042 
(-1.19) 
-0.035* 
(-1.69) 
-0.017 
(-0.48) 
RETi,t - -0.409** 
(-2.30) 
-0.500* 
(-1.93) 
-0.452** 
(-1.99) 
-0.395 
(-1.30) 
-0.002** 
(-2.12) 
-0.003** 
(-2.15) 
-0.003*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.003** 
(-2.58) 
SALES%i,t,t-1 - -0.003 
(-0.87) 
-0.006 
(-1.17) 
-0.003 
(-0.67) 
-0.005 
(-0.80) 
-1.79*10-5 
(-1.06) 
-3.36*10-5* 
(-1.65) 
-1.01*10-5 
(-0.62) 
-2.15*10-5 
(-1.06) 
ROAi,t,t-1 - 0.273 
(0.29) 
-0.467 
(-0.24) 
0.118 
(0.09) 
0.612 
(0.15) 
0.002 
(0.67) 
0.004 
(0.55) 
1.73*10-4 
(0.03) 
4.15*10-5 
(0.00) 
OCF%i,t,t-1 - -1.83*10
-4 
(-0.74) 
-0.002 
(-1.52) 
-1.34*10-4* 
(-1.68) 
-0.003* 
(-1.70) 
-2.72*10-7*** 
(-6.65) 
-7.67*10-6 
(-1.32) 
-3.03*10-7*** 
(-5.38) 
-1.10*10-5* 
(-1.65) 
BMi,t + 0.238** 
(2.55) 
0.376 
(1.43) 
0.319*** 
(2.91) 
0.656** 
(1.96) 
0.001** 
(2.25) 
0.002 
(1.45) 
0.001** 
(2.50) 
0.002 
(1.47) 
HISTi,t + 2.146*** 
(10.57) 
2.102*** 
(10.20) 
2.148*** 
(9.23) 
2.070*** 
(8.86) 
0.008*** 
(7.86) 
0.008*** 
(7.78) 
0.008*** 
(7.44) 
0.008*** 
(7.13) 
COB_BONi,t -   1.547** 
(2.18) 
2.109 
(1.63) 
  0.008** (2.47) 
0.011** 
(1.98) 
CEO_BONi,t -   0.217 (0.92) 
1.763 
(1.46)   
4.71*10-4 
(0.97) 
0.006 
(1.35) 
CFO_BONi,t -   -0.888 (-1.30) 
-2.448* 
(-1.83)   
-0.005** 
(-2.03) 
-0.011** 
(-2.11) 
COB_ 
COSTOCKi,t 
- 
  
-0.355 
(-1.20) 
0.473 
(0.30)   
-0.002* 
(-1.71) 
-0.003 
(-0.46) 
CEO_ 
COSTOCKi,t 
- 
  
3.97*10-5 
(0.80) 
0.002 
(0.05)   
4.44*10-7** 
(2.01) 
2.66*10-5 
(0.25) 
CFO_ 
COSTOCKi,t 
- 
  
-0.014* 
(-1.70) 
-0.027* 
(-1.68)   
-4.41*10-5 
(-1.49) 
-8.10*10-5 
(-1.36) 
COB_ 
OPTIONi,t 
- 
  
-0.124** 
(-1.97) 
-0.390 
(-0.59)   
-5.32*10-4** 
(-2.13) 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
CEO_ 
OPTIONi,t 
- 
  
0.002 
(0.93) 
-0.024 
(-1.02)   
6.45*10-6* 
(1.66) 
-1.01*10-4 
(-1.20) 
CFO_ 
OPTIONi,t 
- 
  
-0.003 
(-0.59) 
2.68*10-4 
(0.02)   
-1.09*10-5 
(-0.64) 
5.93*10-6 
(0.14) 
BATHi,t -   -0.554 (-0.26) 
-6.753 
(-1.20)   
1.28*10-4 
(0.02) 
-0.012 
(-0.58) 
SMOOTHi,t +   0.233 (0.87)
0.245 
(0.75)   
0.001 
(1.26) 
0.001 
(1.04)
COBi,t +   -0.581 (-1.54) 
-0.444 
(-1.22)   
-0.002 
(-1.62) 
-0.001 
(-1.12) 
CEOi,t +   0.235 (0.72)
0.300 
(0.88)   
0.002 
(1.52) 
0.002 
(1.52)
CFOi,t +   0.145 (0.44) 
0.021 
(0.06)   
3.01*10-4 
(0.27) 
-2.06*10-4 
(-0.18) 
DEBTi,t -   0.004 (0.41)
0.132*** 
(2.69)   
-3.64*10-7 
(-0.02) 
2.87*10-4* 
(1.91)
lnSIZE_MVi,t +   0.226*** (2.79) 
0.249*** 
(2.82)   
0.001** 
(2.49) 
7.65*10-4** 
(2.41) 
Table continues on next page. 
  
                                           
41 No test results are provided for hypotheses 3a and 3b, 3g and 3h, 3aa and 3ab.  
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Table continues from previous page. 
N  1013 1013 824 824 1013 1013 824 824 
Log-likelihood  -404.290 -357.912 -273.414 -313.975 398.830 393.975 347.534 340.299 
Wald Chi2-test  136.22*** 134.07*** 182.19*** 168.86*** 37.37*** 9.43*** 20.97***  3.81*** 
Pseudo R2  0.155 0.145 0.197 0.191 -0.193 -0.178 -0.262 -0.236 
Max VIF  1.28 1.47 1.85 4.50 1.28 1.47 4.07 4.50 
Mean VIF  1.11 1.23 1.24 1.79 1.11 1.23 1.73 1.79 
IMP_DECISIONi,t equals 1 if firm i reports goodwill-impairment losses for period t; otherwise 0; IMP_AMOUNTi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses (a 
positive amount) of firm i, period t, scaled by total assets at time t-1; UNEMPLOY%i,t,t-1 is average-monthly percentage changes in unemployment rates 
from period t-1 to t; INDROAi,t,t-1 is median changes in industry-sector pre-impairment return-on-assets from period t-1 to t where industry-sector is defined 
according to FTSE codes to which firm i belongs; RETi,t is stock returns of firm i, period t; SALES%i,t,t-1 is percentage changes in total sales of firm i, from 
period t-1 to t; ROAi,t,t-1 is changes in pre-impairment return-on-assets of firm i, from period t-1 to t; OCF%i,t,t-1 is percentage changes in operating cash 
flows of firm i, from period t-1 to t; BMi,t is pre-impairment book-to-market ratios of firm i, time t; HISTi,t  equals 1 if goodwill-impairment losses are 
reported for firm i, period t-1; otherwise 0; COB_BONi,t is cash-bonus payment to COB of firm i period t, scaled by total cash compensation to COB period t; 
CEO_BONi,t is cash-bonus payment to CEO of firm i period t, scaled by total cash compensation to CEO period t; CFO_BONi,t is cash-bonus payment to 
CFO of firm i period t, scaled by total cash compensation to CFO period t; COB_COSTOCKi,t is number of conditional stocks held by COB of firm i time t, 
scaled by number of common stocks held by COB at time t; CEO_COSTOCKi,t is number of conditional stocks held by CEO of firm i time t, scaled by 
number of common stocks held by CEO at time t; CFO_COSTOCKi,t is number of conditional stocks held by CFO of firm i time t, scaled by number of 
common stocks held by CFO at time t; COB_OPTi,t is number of executive stock options held by COB of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks 
held by COB at time t; CEO_OPTi,t is number of executive stock options held by CEO of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks held by CEO at 
time t; CFO_OPTi,t is number of executive stock options held by CFO of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks held by CFO at time t; BATHi,t is 
changes in pre-impairment earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t, scaled by total assets at time t-1, when below the median of nonzero negative values of this 
variable; otherwise 0; SMOOTHi,t is changes in pre-impairment earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t, scaled by total assets at time t-1, when above the 
median of nonzero positive values of this variable; otherwise 0; COBi,t equals 1 if firm i changes COB in period t; otherwise 0; CEOi,t equals 1 if firm i 
changes CEO in period t; otherwise 0; CFOi,t equals 1 if firm i changes CFO in period t; otherwise 0; DEBTi,t is pre-impairment debt-to-equity ratio of firm 
i, period t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-market value of firm i time t. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level 
(two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). To investigate the effect of outliers, all the 
continuous variables are winsorised at 5th and 95th percentile. 
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Table B3 – Changes in cash-bonus payments – hypotheses 3c to 3al42  
  
 Impairment decision Size of impairment losses 
  Economic Economic and EM Economic Economic and EM 
Test variables Pred Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Non-
winsorised Winsorised 
Intercept  -2.051*** (-15.02) 
-2.036*** 
(-12.42) 
-5.154*** 
(-3.48) 
-6.204*** 
(-3.73) 
-0.065*** 
(-4.77) 
-0.016*** 
(-9.57) 
-0.132*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.0337** 
(-2.94) 
UNEMPLOY%i,t,t-1 + 0.177 
(1.54) 
0.155 
(1.29) 
0.285** 
(2.04) 
0.230 
(1.62) 
0.006** 
(2.03) 
0.002** 
(2.18) 
0.007** 
(2.58) 
0.003** 
(2.45) 
INDROAi,t,t-1 - -9.646* 
(-1.91) 
-4.949 
(-0.65) 
-9.995* 
(-1.73)
-7.073 
(-0.81)
-0.154 
(-1.21)
-0.029 
(-0.58)
-0.112 
(-1.27) 
-0.045 
(-0.88)
RETi,t - -0.698*** 
(-3.42) 
-0.875*** 
(-3.44) 
-0.722*** 
(-3.03) 
-0.652** 
(-2.29) 
-0.024*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.008*** 
(-4.05) 
-0.018*** 
(-3.34) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.40) 
SALES%i,t,t-1 - -1.99*10
-4 
(-0.68) 
-0.006 
(-1.24) 
-0.006 
(-1.33)
-0.007 
(-1.25)
-3.31*10-5 
(-0.38)
-5.02*10-5 
(-1.45)
-1.79*10-4** 
(-1.97) 
-6.46*10-5* 
(-1.80)
ROAi,t,t-1 - 0.171 
(0.18) 
-0.455 
(-0.26) 
0.189 
(0.16) 
2.113 
(0.57) 
0.015 
(0.50) 
0.004 
(0.31) 
0.005 
(0.20) 
0.012 
(0.52) 
OCF%i,t,t-1 - -1.53*10
-4 
(-0.91) 
-0.002 
(-1.41) 
-1.08*10-4** 
(-1.98)
-0.002 
(-1.51)
-7.67*10-7**
(-2.63)
-1.00*10-5 
(-1.17)
-4.88*10-7** 
(-2.34) 
-1.31*10-5 
(-1.41)
BMi,t + 0.323*** 
(2.93) 
0.554* 
(2.45) 
0.426*** 
(3.53) 
0.853*** 
(3.16) 
0.010*** 
(3.19) 
0.005*** 
(2.82) 
0.008*** 
(3.02) 
0.006*** 
(3.10) 
HISTi,t + 2.064*** 
(10.46) 
2.014*** 
(10.04) 
2.147*** 
(9.35)
2.052*** 
(8.82)
0.049*** 
(4.19)
0.012*** 
(8.22)
0.034*** 
(5.98) 
0.012*** 
(7.74)
COB_BONi,t,t-1 -   0.132 
(0.71) 
0.197 
(0.05) 
  0.003 (1.08) 
0.013 
(0.59) 
CEO_BONi,t,t-1 -   0.230 (1.06) 
0.689 
(1.43)   
7.80*10-4* 
(1.80) 
0.004 
(1.57) 
CFO_BONi,t,t-1 -   -0.238 (-0.87) 
-1.340** 
(-2.39)   
-0.005 
(-1.29) 
-0.011*** 
(-3.05) 
COB_ 
COSTOCKi,t 
- 
  
-0.365 
(-1.21) 
-0.361 
(-0.21)   
-0.005 
(-0.62) 
-0.012 
(-1.00) 
CEO_ 
COSTOCKi,t 
- 
  
1.30*10-5 
(0.35) 
0.004 
(0.13)   
1.71*10-7 
(0.17) 
4.43*10-5
(0.24) 
CFO_ 
COSTOCKi,t 
- 
  
-0.003 
(-0.94) 
-0.018 
(-1.48)   
-8.73*10-5** 
(-2.39) 
-7.01*10-5 
(-0.84) 
COB_ 
OPTIONi,t 
- 
  
-0.135 
(-1.43) 
0.043 
(0.06)   
-0.006 
(-1.15) 
0.002 
(0.35) 
CEO_ 
OPTIONi,t 
- 
  
0.003 
(1.29) 
-0.017 
(-0.80)   
2.96*10-5* 
(1.77) 
-1.05*10-4 
(-0.70) 
CFO_ 
OPTIONi,t 
- 
  
0.002** 
(2.10) 
0.010 
(1.16)   
8.54*10-5*** 
(3.18) 
1.09*10-4* 
(1.73) 
BATHi,t -   -0.185 (-0.10) 
-6.403 
(-1.24)   
0.009 
(0.29) 
-0.027 
(-0.80) 
SMOOTHi,t +   0.277 (1.17) 
0.188 
(0.64)   
0.008* 
(1.72) 
0.002 
(1.06) 
COBi,t +   -0.570* (-1.65) 
-0.509 
(-1.57)   
-0.009 
(-1.62) 
-0.003* 
(-1.75) 
CEOi,t +   0.417 (1.41) 
0.444 
(1.43)   
0.008* 
(1.88) 
0.004** 
(2.13) 
CFOi,t +   -0.012 (-0.04) 
-0.297 
(-0.87)   
-3.64*10-4 
(-0.06) 
-0.003 
(-1.15) 
DEBTi,t -   0.005 (0.62) 
0.120*** 
(2.77)   
6.90*10-5 
(0.87) 
5.59*10-4** 
(2.14) 
lnSIZE_MVi,t +   0.138** (2.07) 
0.170** 
(2.32)   
0.002 
(1.34) 
7.04*10-4 
(1.46) 
Table continues on next page. 
  
                                           
42 No test results are provided for hypotheses 3a and 3b, 3g and 3h, 3aa and 3ab.  
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Table continues from previous page. 
N  1068 1068 868 868 1068 1068 868 868 
Log-likelihood  -475.347 -481.598 -365.90 -372.739 122.079 408.981 187.668 357.544 
Wald Chi2-test  149.35*** 154.43*** 185.53*** 167.91*** 3.28*** 13.97*** 3.82***  4.91*** 
Pseudo R2  0.161 0.149 0.202 0.187 -1.929 -0.226 -1.261 -0.300 
Max VIF  1.29 1.51 1.86 3.72 1.29 1.51 1.86 3.72 
Mean VIF  1.11 1.24 1.24 1.61 1.11 1.24 1.24 1.61 
IMP_DECISIONi,t equals 1 if firm i reports goodwill-impairment losses for period t; otherwise 0; IMP_AMOUNTi,t is reported goodwill-impairment losses (a 
positive amount) of firm i, period t, scaled by total assets at time t-1; UNEMPLOY%i,t,t-1 is average-monthly percentage changes in unemployment rates 
from period t-1 to t; INDROAi,t,t-1 is median changes in industry-sector pre-impairment return-on-assets from period t-1 to t where industry-sector is defined 
according to FTSE codes to which firm i belongs; RETi,t is stock returns of firm i, period t; SALES%i,t,t-1 is percentage changes in total sales of firm i, from 
period t-1 to t; ROAi,t,t-1 is changes in pre-impairment return-on-assets of firm i, from period t-1 to t; OCF%i,t,t-1 is percentage changes in operating cash 
flows of firm i, from period t-1 to t; BMi,t is pre-impairment book-to-market ratios of firm i, time t; HISTi,t  equals 1 if goodwill-impairment losses are 
reported for firm i, period t-1; otherwise 0; ); COB_BONi,t.t-1 is changes in cash bonus payments to COB of firm i from period t-1 to t, scaled by total cash 
compensation to COB period t; CEO_BONi,t,t-1 is changes in cash bonus payment to CEO of firm i from period t-1 to t, scaled by total cash compensation to 
CEO  period t; CFO_BONi,t,t-1 is changes in cash bonus payment to CFO of firm i from period t-1 to t, scaled by total cash compensation to CFO period t; 
COB_COSTOCKi,t is number of conditional stocks held by COB of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks held by COB at time t; 
CEO_COSTOCKi,t is number of conditional stocks held by CEO of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks held by CEO at time t; 
CFO_COSTOCKi,t is number of conditional stocks held by CFO of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks held by CFO at time t; COB_OPTi,t is 
number of executive stock options held by COB of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks held by COB at time t; CEO_OPTi,t is number of 
executive stock options held by CEO of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks held by CEO at time t; CFO_OPTi,t is number of executive stock 
options held by CFO of firm i time t, scaled by number of common stocks held by CFO at time t; BATHi,t is changes in pre-impairment earnings of firm i 
from period t-1 to t, scaled by total assets at time t-1, when below the median of nonzero negative values of this variable; otherwise 0; SMOOTHi,t is changes 
in pre-impairment earnings of firm i from period t-1 to t, scaled by total assets at time t-1, when above the median of nonzero positive values of this variable; 
otherwise 0; COBi,t equals 1 if firm i changes COB in period t; otherwise 0; CEOi,t equals 1 if firm i changes CEO in period t; otherwise 0; CFOi,t equals 1 
if firm i changes CFO in period t; otherwise 0; DEBTi,t is pre-impairment debt-to-equity ratio of firm i, period t; lnSIZE_MVi,t is natural logarithm of equity-
market value of firm i time t. t-statistics are given in parentheses. *indicates significance at 10% level (two-tailed), **indicates significance at 5 % level (two-
tailed), *** indicates significance at 1% level (two-tailed). To investigate the effect of outliers, all the continuous variables are winsorised at 5th and 95th 
percentile. 
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Appendix C – Value-relevance regressions 
The price-level regression is typically motivated by the Feltham-Ohlson and the 
Ohlson model. These models are based on the dividend-discount model which can 
be expressed as follows:  
    
tP  = 

 



1 )( 

k
t
R
dE   
    
where    
    
Pt  = Market price of equity at time t.  
dt = Net dividends paid at time t.  
Rk = Discount factor, one plus the discount rate.  
    
 
The market price is the equilibrium, no-arbitrage market price. The clean-surplus 
assumption is employed to establish the relationship between accounting numbers 
and dividends. This assumption states that changes in book equity values equal net 
earnings less net dividends: 
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1ty  = ttt xdy   [x1] 
    
where    
    
yt-1 = Book equity value at time t-1.  
yt = Book equity value at time t.  
dt = Net dividends paid at time t.  
xt  = Net earnings of period t.  
 
Net dividends might be written as: 
  
dt = )( 1 ttt yyx  [x2] 
 
Abnormal earnings, atx , at time t, are defined as net earnings less the required rate 
of return on book equity value at time t-1:  
 
a
tx  = 1)1(  tkt yRx  [x3] 
 
By combining [x2] and [x3], net dividends at time t, dt, can be determined entirely 
by accounting numbers and the discount factor: 
 
dt = ttkat yyRx  1  [x4] 
 
By assuming that the time horizon is t  and that the remaining book equity 
value at time t  will be paid out to the shareholders, the dividend-discount 
model may be converted to: 
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[x7] 
 
By distributing the expectation notation and splitting up the fractions by their 
numerators, the value of the firm can simply be written as the book equity value at 
time t plus the present value of the firm’s expected abnormal earnings. 
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[x8] 
The final term 
 t
k
tt
R
yE
)(
 is assumed to be zero which yields: 
tP  = 
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[x9] 
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Given 
  ttt yyE   and an infinite time horizon, [x8] can be written as: 
  
tP  = 

  
  




 
1 1
1
)(
)1(
)(  

k
tkt
t
k
a
t
t R
yRxEy
R
xEy   
 
This model expresses the market price of the firm as the sum of the firm’s book 
equity value and the present value of expected abnormal earnings. The model is 
known as the Feltham-Ohlson model.  Ohlson (1995) assumes that abnormal 
earnings follow a simple autoregressive process:  
    
a
tx 1  = 1 ttatx   [x10] 
    
where    
    
a
tx 1  = Abnormal earnings of period t+1.  
a
tx  = Abnormal earnings of period t.  
t = Non-accounting information at time t.  
 = Persistence parameter of abnormal earnings; 0<1.  
1t  = Error term at time t+1, zero-mean value.  
 
The persistence parameter is set between 0 <1 which means that abnormal 
earnings will eventually converge to zero from its current level. If non-accounting 
information is set equal to zero, one unit of abnormal earnings in period t will lead 
to the following series of future abnormal earnings: 
 
.....32
1




i
i  [x11] 
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The discounted value of this series equals the effect of one unit abnormal earnings 
at time t on the market price at time t: 
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[x11] 
 
The sum of the geometric series, 
)( 

kR
 , is termed the abnormal-earnings 
multiplier
1 .  
Non-accounting information is assumed to follow an autoregressive process 
similar to abnormal earnings: 
 
1t  = 1 tt   [x12] 
    
where    
    
t+1 = Non-accounting information at time t+1.  
t = Non-accounting information at time t.  
 = Persistence parameter of ; 0  <1.  
1t  = Error term at time t+1, zero-mean value.  
 
The effect on market price at time t of one unit t equals the following multiplier: 
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588 
This is termed the “other information” multiplier
2 . By using the Feltham-Ohlson 
model and the multipliers
1 and 2  in [x11] and [x13], the following equation is 
derived: 
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[x14] 
  t is assumed to be a zero-mean error term: 0)(  tE .  
Since 
  


)(
1
k
t
a
t
R
xE



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k
x
R )( 


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
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)(
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t
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E



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kk
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 ))(( 
, this 
yields: 
 
tP  = tatt xy  21   [x15] 
    
where    
    
1  = 
)( 

kR
  
2  = 
))((   kk
k
RR
R   
 
By using the definition of abnormal earnings [x3] and the clean-surplus 
assumption [x1], the market price at time t can be expressed as: 
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tP  = tatt xy  21   = 
ttktt yRxy  2111 )1(   = 
ttttktt xdyRxy  211 ])[1(  = 
tttttktktktt xdyxRdRyRxy  211 )(  = 
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[x16] 
 
By substituting 
)1( k
k
R
R  with  and 
)(
)1()1( 1 




k
k
k R
RR  with k, the following 
equation known as the Ohlson model is derived: 
 
ttttt ykdxkP  2)1()(  [x17] 
 
This model is based solely on net earnings, book equity value and other non-
accounting information as explanatory variables of firm value. By substituting yt 
with the right hand side of [x1] solved for yt and substituting atx 1 with the right 
hand side of [x3], the following expression is derived: 
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tP  = tatt xy  21   [x18] 
tP  = ttktttt yRxdxy  2111 ])1([    
tP + dt = ttkt yRx  2111 )]1(1[)1(    
    
where    
    
1  = 
)( 

kR
  
2  = 
))((   kk
k
RR
R   
 
The above valuation model suggests the following regression specification: 
 
tt dP   = tttt yx 				   31210  
 
If the linear dynamics of abnormal earnings and non-accounting information are 
met, the regression-coefficient estimates, 1 and 2, can be interpreted as estimates 
of )1( 1 and )]1(1[ 1  kR , respectively. Thus, the estimate of 1 is believed to be 
a function of the persistence parameter of abnormal earnings,  , and the discount 
factor kR . 2 on the other hand is believed to be a function of the persistence 
parameter of abnormal earnings,  , the discount factor, kR , and the persistence 
parameter of non-accounting information .  
 
The return specification can also be justified with reference to the Ohlson model. 
This model will rest on the assumption of clean-surplus accounting and the linear 
dynamics of the Ohlson model. An appropriate starting point is equation [x17] 
above: 
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tP  = tttt dxkyk  2)()1(   
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 Substituting  with
)1( k
k
R
R  and k  with 1)1( kR , yields the following equation: 
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Returns might be calculated as follows: 
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Substituting tP in [xx2] with the right hand side of [xx1], yields: 
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[xx5] 
 
Equation [xx5] implies that return is explained by changes in book equity values, 
changes in net earnings, changes in dividends and changes in non-accounting 
information. Substituting ttt dyy  1 (equation [x1]) with xt, and 1)1( kR  with k, 
the following return equation is derived: 
 
tR  = 
1
1,2111,1 )()()1(

 
t
tttttt
P
dkxkxk 
 [xx6] 
 
Equation [xx6] shows that return is explained by levels of net earnings period t, 
changes in net earnings form period t-1 to period t, net dividends at time t-1 and 
changes in non-accounting information from time t-1 to time t. The weights of net 
earnings, changes in net earnings and lagged dividends may be expressed as 
follows: 
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If the abnormal-persistence parameter equals 1 and non-accounting information is 
ignored, return will be explained by changes in net earnings and lagged dividends. 
In contrast, if the abnormal-persistence parameter equals 0 and non-accounting 
information is ignored, return will be explained by current earnings alone. 
Equation [xx6] suggests the following regression specification:  
 
tR  = ttttttt dxx 					   1,4131,210  
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